Korean 777 Down in SFO

[N801BH]

...Having him IP with a very senior jumbo captain transitioning to a new plane actually makes sense, rather than IP'ing a former FO just moving to Captain.

And neither one of these "top of the line" pilots of that airline noticed they were 40 MPH too slow on final.......

You have got to be #ucking kidding me...

 

[PilotAlan]

And neither one of these "top of the line" pilots of that airline noticed they were 40 kts too slow on final.......
You have got to be #ucking kidding me...

You need to back the %&$* up, Jack. I am not defending this crew's behavior.

What I *AM* doing is calling out the logical fallacies in your statement.
You said it was crazy that "not only was the left seater fairly new to the plane......the guy sitting in the right seat was apparently on his first flight as an IP"

So, who is an INSTRUCTOR pilot supposed to instruct? Someone who already knows how to fly the plane?
How do you develop new instructors if none are allowed to have a first student?

If you can't understand how it could be a rational decision to have a new IP's first student be an experienced jumbo captain, as opposed to an inexperienced FO, then we have nothing further to discuss.

 

[N801BH]

You need to back the %&$* up, Jack. I am not defending this crew's behavior.

What I *AM* doing is calling out the logical fallacies in your statement.
You said it was crazy that "not only was the left seater fairly new to the plane......the guy sitting in the right seat was apparently on his first flight as an IP"

So, who is an INSTRUCTOR pilot supposed to instruct? Someone who already knows how to fly the plane?
How do you develop new instructors if none are allowed to have a first student?

If you can't understand how it could be a rational decision to have a new IP's first student be an experienced jumbo captain, as opposed to an inexperienced FO, then we have nothing further to discuss.

Your opinion............ And I respect it...

 

[wabower]

A fair amount of thought and protocol goes into the decisions regarding how crews are paired up for training and other stuff. I don't know how the Asianna training stacks up with US, but assume the captain was doing IOE (initial operating experience) phase that is more like "differences training" than any other descriptive term that I know. I think that my friends who are 747 captains have a pretty good grasp of heavy-jet ops, and wouldn't require a "back to day one" course to move to another plane of similar ilk from the same mfr.

You need to back the %&$* up, Jack. I am not defending this crew's behavior.

What I *AM* doing is calling out the logical fallacies in your statement.
You said it was crazy that "not only was the left seater fairly new to the plane......the guy sitting in the right seat was apparently on his first flight as an IP"

So, who is an INSTRUCTOR pilot supposed to instruct? Someone who already knows how to fly the plane?
How do you develop new instructors if none are allowed to have a first student?

If you can't understand how it could be a rational decision to have a new IP's first student be an experienced jumbo captain, as opposed to an inexperienced FO, then we have nothing further to discuss.

 

[NoHeat]

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/07/119_138903.html

Asiana Airlines CEO defends his pilots


By Kim Jae-won

Asiana Airlines CEO Yoon Young-doo on Tuesday strongly defended the two men who piloted the ill-fated Flight 214, which crashed at San Francisco International Airport on Saturday (local time).

Yoon said that both were experienced. “Captain Lee Jeong-min had flown to San Francisco 33 times before. Co-pilot Lee Kang-guk also had been to San Francisco 29 times with a B747,” said Yoon at a press conference.

Yoon’s remarks came amid the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was investigating the actions taken on the aircraft, including those of the pilots. Media both at home and abroad pointed fingers at the pilots, assuming that something went been wrong in the cockpit.

However, Jung Yoon-shik, a professor at Jungwon University based in Goesan, North Chungcheong Province, said that mechanical problems in the engines might have caused the crash.

“It is possible that the engines were not working properly when the plane was landing on the runway. With the malfunctioning, pilots might have failed to control the engines,” said Jung who previously worked as a pilot for Asiana.

Deborah Hersman, the chairwoman of the NTSB, told a press conference that the plane was traveling at about 106 knots at impact, “significantly slower than the target approach speed of 137 knots,” hinting that engine problems could be the reason of the crash.

Yoon said he will head for the Californian city on Tuesday afternoon, along with six family members of passengers who were onboard of Flight 214. Asiana said that Yoon will visit casualties who are being treated at seven hospitals in the city, including San Francisco General Hospital.

According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, currently 39 people are hospitalized, including eight Koreans. The ministry said that most of them are now in sound condition, expecting no more fatalities will be reported further.

Earlier on Monday night, Yoon offered his apologies to the parents of two Chinese teenagers killed in the crash-landing. He repeated his apology to the parents of Wang Linjia and Ye Mengyuan during their brief stopover in Korea’s Incheon International Airport on their way to San Francisco.

President Park Geun-hye also offered condolences over the deaths of two Chinese schoolgirls and instructed the Cabinet to clearly determine what caused the crash and take preventive steps.

“I offer words of condolences to the Chinese students killed in the airliner crash and to their families. The safety of people should come prior to all of other issues, and it is truly regrettable that this accident has happened,” Park said during a Cabinet meeting.

 

[Jim Logajan]

And neither one of these "top of the line" pilots of that airline noticed they were 40 kts too slow on final.

They probably weren't that slow till about ~1/4 mile (~7 seconds?) from the runway.

From the article linked by Timmer in post 364 are these two graphs plotted from radar data taken from flightaware. The black lines are plotted from UAL852, another 777 from Heathrow London that landed 10 minutes prior to AAR214, which is shown in brown lines. As close a comparable as one is likely to get.

Flight 214 was actually faster on final than the other flight till it was under 2 nm from touchdown. They were also higher than the other flight till about the same distance.

I don't know anything about flying jets. But at 1000 ft AGL they were a tad closer(!) and a tad faster(!) than the other jet. At less than 2 nm they had probably less than a minute at those speeds to correct. The airspeed got away from them in the last mile and a half, but their glide slope seems to look good to within a 3/4 mile. In a piston plane I know if I had that happen it would be because I pulled back on the yoke without adding power.

 

[Clark1961]

Every instructor has a first student.
Having him IP with a very senior jumbo captain transitioning to a new plane actually makes sense, rather than IP'ing a former FO just moving to Captain.

If a "very senior jumbo captain" has just 10,000 hours then that describes the problem right there.

 

[Fearless Tower]

In a piston plane I know if I had that happen it would be because I pulled back on the yoke without adding power.

Based on the video and knowledgeable witness statements regarding the increasing pitch angle, that is exactly what they did.

They used pitch to correct the glide path and based on the pilots statements, he assumed that the auto throttles were tracking with him.

Sounds like no one was actually watching airspeed until it was too late. Colgan 3407 all over again....just low enough that it didn't kill everyone.

 

[Cap'n Jack]

The press seems to be indicating that one of the pilots only had 47 hours in type. How many hours are needed to make a trained pilot in type?

 

[MassPilot]

There is no excuse for poor airmanship and I would like to hear from the 777 guys here, but I can see how one can become complacent when using auto throttles all the time. Is it possible that they got disengaged without either of them noticing until it was too late? Sure, the slow airspeed should have been noticed, but if you are accustomed the system holding your airspeed right where you want it, it's possible to develop a bad habit of omitting it from your scan.

From the latest reports, sounds like you called it.

 

[wabower]

More insights from training IP:

Subject: the lowdown on Korean pilots

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the 400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO (Rejected Take-Off) and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG. Many of the new captains were coming off the 777 or B747 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out; I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training at KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 knot crosswind and the weather CAVU. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this SFO Asiana crew, it didn’t‚ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min.

After 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. This captain requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Each time he failed to “extend the FAF” so he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and three missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken [to teach third world pilots basic flying]. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tried to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

Koreans are very, very, bright and smart, so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning. so they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM, never-challenge-authority still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there are virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are OK. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t have the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send them to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. It was a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

There is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. In accordance with their SOP, he must call for the autopilot to be engaged at 250 feet, just after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Not even one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800 feet‚ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed using the autothrottle. Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean Captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVU weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

 

[steingar]

There must be something breathtakingly wrong when an experienced and professional flight crew bungles a simple landing in CAVU weather.

 

[NoHeat]

The pilots are blaming the auto-throttle

http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-sfo-crash-probe-20130710,0,1241740.story

The pilots flying the Asiana Airlines jetliner that crashed in San Francisco told federal investigators that an automatic throttle — a system akin to a car's cruise control — had failed to keep the jetliner at the proper speed for landing. The Asiana pilots said in interviews with the National Transportation Safety Board that they had set the auto-throttles to maintain an air speed of 137 knots. That's a significantly faster speed than the plane actually achieved as it came in for its landing at San Francisco International Airport on Saturday.
As the inquiry entered its fourth day, Deborah A.P. Hersman, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, said investigators were still trying to verify whether the throttles were properly activated.
The pilots' statements do not resolve the central question of why the Boeing 777's speed and altitude fell so far out of the normal range for landing at SFO before it hit a sea wall and crash-landed. But outside air safety experts said the statements suggest a risky reliance on technology when the flight crew should have been constantly monitoring the airplane's speed.

 

[SCCutler]

There must be something breathtakingly wrong when an experienced and professional flight crew bungles a simple landing in CAVU weather.

You say a little, but said a lot.

The pilots are blaming the auto-throttle

http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-sfo-crash-probe-20130710,0,1241740.story

The pilots flying the Asiana Airlines jetliner that crashed in San Francisco told federal investigators that an automatic throttle — a system akin to a car's cruise control — had failed to keep the jetliner at the proper speed for landing. The Asiana pilots said in interviews with the National Transportation Safety Board that they had set the auto-throttles to maintain an air speed of 137 knots. That's a significantly faster speed than the plane actually achieved as it came in for its landing at San Francisco International Airport on Saturday.
As the inquiry entered its fourth day, Deborah A.P. Hersman, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, said investigators were still trying to verify whether the throttles were properly activated.
The pilots' statements do not resolve the central question of why the Boeing 777's speed and altitude fell so far out of the normal range for landing at SFO before it hit a sea wall and crash-landed. But outside air safety experts said the statements suggest a risky reliance on technology when the flight crew should have been constantly monitoring the airplane's speed.

I had no idea that the Auto-Throttle function also served to conceal, from both pilots, the display of airspeed and altitude, as well as the view out the window on the front. Who knew?

 

[steingar]

I had no idea that the Auto-Throttle function also served to conceal, from both pilots, the display of airspeed and altitude, as well as the view out the window on the front. Who knew?

This is just basic airmanship, nothing more. The pilots duty doesn't stop just because something broke.

 

[wabower]

Spike, did you watch the AA "children of the magenta" tape? it was obviously prepared more than 10 years ago, but Van hit the nail on the head when he said something like "if the flight path is lower than target pulling the nose into the V-bars with A/T engaged will increase power to maintain speed, and without A/T airspeed will deteriorate to a stall (or whatever)."
He was advocating that the PF maintain tactile feel of the controls in order to know "what's it doing now" and to be sure the crew was aware of automation status, in this case whether A/T was engaged.

He may hereinafter be referred to as a prophet.

You say a little, but said a lot.



I had no idea that the Auto-Throttle function also served to conceal, from both pilots, the display of airspeed and altitude, as well as the view out the window on the front. Who knew?

 

[Matthew]

This is just basic airmanship, nothing more. The pilots duty doesn't stop just because something broke.

It's sounding like the only thing that broke was the flight crew.

 

[Fearless Tower]

Spike, did you watch the AA "children of the magenta" tape? it was obviously prepared more than 10 years ago, but Van hit the nail on the head when he said something like "if the flight path is lower than target pulling the nose into the V-bars with A/T engaged will increase power to maintain speed, and without A/T airspeed will deteriorate to a stall (or whatever)."
He was advocating that the PF maintain tactile feel of the controls in order to know "what's it doing now" and to be sure the crew was aware of automation status, in this case whether A/T was engaged.

He may hereinafter be referred to as a prophet.

One of the interesting things I have been noticing recently is that there are two distinct camps with regards to 'Children of the Magenta'. Some seem to be of the belief that the presentation is way outdated by even more advances technology and that only more technology can save us from ourselves. Others see this as a critical period in professional aviation where we have forgotten the lessons and need to get back to the basics of basic airmanship.

 

[mikea]

...I had no idea that the Auto-Throttle function also served to conceal, from both pilots, the display of airspeed and altitude, as well as the view out the window on the front. Who knew?

This is just basic airmanship, nothing more. The pilots duty doesn't stop just because something broke.

The NTSB is reporting that the auto throttles were "armed," not engaged.

Time to sue Boeing for having defective autoland.

 

[SCCutler]

One of the interesting things I have been noticing recently is that there are two distinct camps with regards to 'Children of the Magenta'. Some seem to be of the belief that the presentation is way outdated by even more advances technology and that only more technology can save us from ourselves. Others see this as a critical period in professional aviation where we have forgotten the lessons and need to get back to the basics of basic airmanship.

Count me in the latter group; ultimately, it is always the pilots' job to keep the solid objects and the aircraft separate, meeting only where the rubber reaches the runway in the intended manner.

Spike, did you watch the AA "children of the magenta" tape? it was obviously prepared more than 10 years ago, but Van hit the nail on the head when he said something like "if the flight path is lower than target pulling the nose into the V-bars with A/T engaged will increase power to maintain speed, and without A/T airspeed will deteriorate to a stall (or whatever)."
He was advocating that the PF maintain tactile feel of the controls in order to know "what's it doing now" and to be sure the crew was aware of automation status, in this case whether A/T was engaged.

He may hereinafter be referred to as a prophet.

Indeed.

The NTSB is reporting that the auto throttles were "armed," not engaged.

Time to sue Boeing for having defective autoland.

Heh. They weren't even performing an autoland, but there are many who seem to think the airplane should have figured out what they wanted, rather than what they requested.

 

[weilke]

There must be something breathtakingly wrong when an experienced and professional flight crew bungles a simple landing in CAVU weather.

What is wrong is that the guy in the right seat didn't earn his stripes by flying around the patch in a 172 with a student bent on killing him. 'toc toc toc watch your speed' is a subconcious brain function in a good flight instructor.

Same problem (bad flight instructor supervising bozo in left seat) brought down the Colgan flight into Buffalo.

 

[Fearless Tower]

'nother interesting tidbit....just read on another board that the PF had previosly been on A320s before transitioning to the 777. Unlike Boeings, A320 A/Ts don't move when the A/T is doing its thing.

 

[wabower]

I think you just summarized the primary differences between Boeing and Airbus philosophy.

FWIW, Van's original presentation was much longer than the piece on the internet, and focused on the lessons learned from the Cali crash in which the crew sought to raise rather than lower the level of automation and lost SA prior to crashing into a mountain. Hence the magenta references and exaggerated heads-down-and-typing comedy relief he included, as well as "the airplane isn't going where you want it to go" that was part of the reason for the crash.

My direct experience is obviously GA rather than 121, although I was fortunate to have jump-seat privileges on AA and DL for a couple of years prior to 9-11 and got a first-hand look at their SOP's and standardization that are amazing when compared to any GA fleet.

I saw the pendulum start to swing as the SFI G-V sim was brought on-line in ~2000. For some time prior (I don't know how long because I wasn't involved in the program) the "king of the IP's" in the G-IV and other glass-cockpit programs was the guy who could make the FMS do the most tricks and amaze everybody with the 5 ways the box could do something when everybody else knew only one or 2, which, BTW, were usually more than enough.

As I was transitioning into the G-V IP ranks, one of the senior IP's became warily aware of the ever-increasing reliance on automation and decided to go old-school by turning off the automation (or never turning it on) and simply taxiing out and taking off to go fly the airplane with the rawest of raw data. His first sim session with a new crew involved letting both pilots fly the plane, learn the basic sight pictures, manual power settings, and other stuff that would be much like flying a 172.

The approach was so refreshingly simple and fundamentally sound that many others, me included, adopted it and then used the building-block approach to add each piece incrementally after the crew understood the drill. After watching both methods (which we were all obliged to do when we filled in as right-seaters or sat in as observers during sim sessions) it was clear which was more effective and better-received by the trainees.

I've been away from it for a few years and the old gang has all retired, so I don't know the current status but hope they're still starting at the front of the book.

One of the interesting things I have been noticing recently is that there are two distinct camps with regards to 'Children of the Magenta'. Some seem to be of the belief that the presentation is way outdated by even more advances technology and that only more technology can save us from ourselves. Others see this as a critical period in professional aviation where we have forgotten the lessons and need to get back to the basics of basic airmanship.

 

[EppyGA]

This is just basic airmanship, nothing more. The pilots duty doesn't stop just because something broke.

Apparently in their mind it does.

 

[Timmer]

I'm just starting my life as a student pilot, just to be clear I claim no experience ahead

I do study every accident I can in order to learn from mistakes as best I can. I always find the recent accidents interesting and many claim the problems of over-reliance on automation. This is, of course, a problem. It's also completely predictable that most accidents we will see for a while are over-reliance on automation since automation has removed many other types of accidents that have happened in the past and we need to be careful not to look at the old days through rose-colored glasses. Airlines are at an all-time safety record. Heck, back in the 70s or 80s there was nearly an airline crash every year if not multiples. Now we have a couple mainline accidents world-wide a decade. So there are obvious safety benefits from modern technology.

We also are just at beginning point with current FMS automation only being a couple decades old and changing with every new model of airplane, so we are still learning the best ways to use and implement automation into the cockpit. As a computer scientist, I've always have the belief that computers are at their best when they are aiding us in the ways we naturally act instead of taking control and us learning to use them. I don't know if current automation has gone too far in some ways for pilots learning to fly computers instead of computers aiding pilots in flying airplanes, but something I'm sure current designers are looking at.

Anyway, for the most part, this has been a great topic and a great lesson as someone who is just learning to fly and done a couple landings despite thousands of simulator and ground-trained landings and had his CFI remind me that he didn't want to die due to stalling on short final (I was focused on the runway and was letting my airspeed drop, I'm sure not too uncommon for newbies on their second attempt to land!). I hope aviation as a whole continues to learn and apply the mistakes instead of throwing them into the easier "they were poor pilots" bin to avoid self-reflection.

 

[MAKG1]

The pros do look at human factors extensively and will almost certainly look carefully at any possible issues with airspeed display and positive control with the autothrottle. There is a significant group over here doing such things for heavy airliners, one of several.

It's the armchair "pundits" on boards like this one that make racist comments and dismiss it as Asians not being able to pilot an airplane, and propose "solutions" about not flying Asian airlines.

Something clearly went wrong. It may be in training, it may be in equipment, it may be in CRM execution or OpsSpecs. More likely, it's a combination of all of them.

 

[Gary]

There must be something breathtakingly wrong when an experienced and professional flight crew bungles a simple landing in CAVU weather.

The NTSB is reporting that the auto throttles were "armed," not engaged.

Time to sue Boeing for having defective autoland.

Heh. They weren't even performing an autoland, but there are many who seem to think the airplane should have figured out what they wanted, rather than what they requested.

So.... the "pilots" were really flying the computer (FMS?), not the airplane??

Gary

 

[SCCutler]

It's the armchair "pundits" on boards like this one that make racist comments and dismiss it as Asians not being able to pilot an airplane, and propose "solutions" about not flying Asian airlines.

No one has yet made any racial comments.

No one has yet dismissed "...Asians [as] not being able to fly airplanes."

If this is the take-away message you are getting, you are not reading closely. Every environmental contributor to the accident chain must be considered, and to pretend that personal and/or societal norms cannot play a factor is simply silly.

Obviously, we do not know whether these factors materially contributed to this particular accident or not, or whether variances in training and qualification related to societal norms made it more likely to occur. Wait and read the report.

Most importantly, however, is this: for one to throw down the "racial comments" or "racist" card like this, when the commenter has no way of knowing the motives or beliefs of those about whom they complain, is the true measure of intolerance.

 

[Palmpilot]

As I pointed out to a group of non-pilots I was discussing this with last night, U.S. airline pilots used to have a cultural norm of excessive deference to the captain, which led to the development of cockpit resource management training. I don't think pointing that out is an expression of racial prejudice against my own race!

 

[denverpilot]

The IP is harping on the fact that the autothrottle switches were documented in the "armed" position after the crash in interviews today.

Just sharing for the fodder pile...

 

[Fearless Tower]

The IP is harping on the fact that the autothrottle switches were documented in the "armed" position after the crash in interviews today.

Just sharing for the fodder pile...

Which leads to two distinct possibilities....either the A/T malfunctioned (which is possible) or the flight crew did not fully understand the automation they were using (also possible).

Let's just give them the benefit of the doubt ad assume the A/T did malfunction. There were still 3 sets of eyeballs in that cockpit that failed to notice the airspeed decaying. Epic Fail.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk HD

 

[wabower]

More to the point, did anybody have a hand on the throttles to determine if they were moving as necessary?

Which leads to two distinct possibilities....either the A/T malfunctioned (which is possible) or the flight crew did not fully understand the automation they were using (also possible).

Let's just give them the benefit of the doubt ad assume the A/T did malfunction. There were still 3 sets of eyeballs in that cockpit that failed to notice the airspeed decaying. Epic Fail.


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[Fearless Tower]

More to the point, did anybody have a hand on the throttles to determine if they were moving as necessary?

Don't know, but that exact question is why it is noteworthy that the PF had transitioned from an Airbus where the throttles don't move when A/T is in control.


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[docmirror]

Don't forget that according to several sources, the A/T can be 'armed' but not active or in a hold mode if the pilots overrode the A/T functionality by keeping them manually held for X amount of time. This would seem to be consistent with the pilot moving the throttles to idle when he was high and fast earlier in the non-stabilized approach.

 

[X3 Skier]

One good thing besides the number of survivors is the cockpit appears fairly intact which I would think would aid in the investigation. Back when I was doing accident investigations for the USAF, that could be helpful or could be another source of confusion.

Cheers

 

[X3 Skier]

Don't know, but that exact question is why it is noteworthy that the PF had transitioned from an Airbus where the throttles don't move when A/T is in control.


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I am getting the impression nothing moves in an Airbus Cockpit except seat adjustment. IIRC, the fact that the sticks in the AF crash were force sticks with no motion meant the two pilots had no feedback when one was pulling and the other pushing with no net effect on pitch and that was listed as a contributing factor.

Cheers

 

[denverpilot]

Don't forget that according to several sources, the A/T can be 'armed' but not active or in a hold mode if the pilots overrode the A/T functionality by keeping them manually held for X amount of time. This would seem to be consistent with the pilot moving the throttles to idle when he was high and fast earlier in the non-stabilized approach.

Greg/R&W/whoever can correct me if this is wrong, but it's my understanding that if they are armed and you're down in stick shaker country... they move up whether they're inhibited or not.

Even the theorized flight level descent mode doesn't inhibit their response to low airspeed.

And they're not dependent on the AP or Flight Director being active, I don't believe. Separate.

Just stuff I've pieced together. Haven't been to 777 systems school. Nor, had to memorize any of it for tests, like they ostensibly would have...

 

[RotorAndWing]

I am getting the impression nothing moves in an Airbus Cockpit except seat adjustment. IIRC, the fact that the sticks in the AF crash were force sticks with no motion meant the two pilots had no feedback when one was pulling and the other pushing with no net effect on pitch and that was listed as a contributing factor.

Cheers

Huh? Force sticks with no motion?

In the A320/319 the sticks move with full motion, however they don't move in conjunction.

 

[Fearless Tower]

In the A320/319 the sticks move with full motion, however they don't move in conjunction.

I think that it what he meant to say.

 

[docmirror]

Greg/R&W/whoever can correct me if this is wrong, but it's my understanding that if they are armed and you're down in stick shaker country... they move up whether they're inhibited or not.

Even the theorized flight level descent mode doesn't inhibit their response to low airspeed.

And they're not dependent on the AP or Flight Director being active, I don't believe. Separate.

Just stuff I've pieced together. Haven't been to 777 systems school. Nor, had to memorize any of it for tests, like they ostensibly would have...

Post 233 and this: http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/342579-777-flch-climb-t-going-into-hold-no-low-speed-prot.html

seem to indicate that the A/T can be armed and yet not actively offering low speed protection. Also it seems there is no wakeup protection once the HOLD mode is activated in FLCH. I don't know if they were in that mode, but that would account for the lack of pilotage if the guy was waiting, and waiting, and waiting for the A/T to maintain safe speed.