Kettle Moraine Forest, Saved by the chute.

Kind of makes me wonder how the insurance companies are going to start looking at these chute deployments.
 
Kind of makes me wonder how the insurance companies are going to start looking at these chute deployments.
Considering that Cirrus calls the plane "totaled" when the chute is deployed, you could have a million-dollar pull.
 
Considering that Cirrus calls the plane "totaled" when the chute is deployed, you could have a million-dollar pull.
If none emergency deployment become a habit, I wonder if there’s going to start to be a premium premium for BRS equipped aircraft?
 
https://archive.liveatc.net/kmke/KMKE3-App-Dep-May-16-2021-0200Z.mp3

Sounds like he had instrument/HSI problems IMC at night. Glad they may it. The flight in question is in the 1st 10 minutes of above link. Standard thinking may be the plane could still fly fine without HSI heading info, but I don’t know all the details.

I'm thinking his comments like 'this things acting up', 'it's not following the line', 'there's to much going on to follow the line in' may point to an Autopilot/GPS Navigator issue. I never heard the Controller give him a heading to fly and see how that worked. Just jumped right into no gyro vectors. These ATC Live tapes sometimes leave things out though.
It's an SR22 built in 2001, serial number 0131. Anyone know what avionics it likely had?
 
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I'm thinking his comments like 'this things acting up', 'it's not following the line', 'there's to much going on to follow the line in' may point to an Autopilot/GPS Navigator issue. I never heard the Controller give him a heading to fly and see how that worked. Just jumped right into no gyro vectors. These ATC Live tapes sometimes leave things out though.
It's an SR22 built in 2001, serial number 0131. Anyone know what avionics it likely had?

It could have had anything, if it's original it most likely has a Sandel HSI, Dual Garmin 430, S-TEC 55X autopilot, ARNAV ICDS-2000 MFD.

I have no idea what happened here, but the pilot sounded confused to me.
 
It could have had anything, if it's original it most likely has a Sandel HSI, Dual Garmin 430, S-TEC 55X autopilot, ARNAV ICDS-2000 MFD.

I have no idea what happened here, but the pilot sounded confused to me.

Yeah. I think he said 'I don't know what's going on up here' at one point. And I'm sure a Whiskey Compass could be added to that list
 
Yeah. I think he said 'I don't know what's going on up here' at one point. And I'm sure a Whiskey Compass could be added to that list

Plus a back up attitude and airspeed indicator, and a backup altimeter.
 
If none emergency deployment become a habit, I wonder if there’s going to start to be a premium premium for BRS equipped aircraft?

Failure of a critical instrument in IMC at night, a subsequent loss of control and deployment of the BRS isn't a non-emergency. Besides that, when has there been an incident where pulling the handle wasn't an emergency? Calling that a "habit" is ridiculous.

One thing there is never a shortage of is SGOTI second guessing and criticizing the decisions of Cirrus pilots in emergency situations.
 
AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED ELETRICAL ISSUES, THE CHUTE WAS DEPLOYED AND LANDED IN TREES IN KETTLE MORAINE STATE FOREST, WHITEWATER, WI.

METAR at ETB shows about 700 OVC
 
Failure of a critical instrument in IMC at night, a subsequent loss of control and deployment of the BRS isn't a non-emergency. Besides that, when has there been an incident where pulling the handle wasn't an emergency? Calling that a "habit" is ridiculous.

One thing there is never a shortage of is SGOTI second guessing and criticizing the decisions of Cirrus pilots in emergency situations.
OK, well, I guess you told me.
But, one would think that given the known expertise of the average Cirrus pilot that a back-up would be provided for such a critical instrument, especially flying at night in IMC. Maybe the back up failed too.
 
should I high five myself again?

"
A small plane crashed in the Kettle Moraine Forest in the town of Whitewater on Saturday night, and authorities were able to rescue all three occupants without any injuries
"

..at night
..IMC
..low OVC
..instrument failure (or at least instrument trouble).. or maybe just plane old disorientation

with the most common cause of plane crashes in GA being "loss of control" and this guy having no real options under him (a forest!) I bet he was sure happy to have the red handle to pull and be completed uninjured!
 
PS - having one redundant instrument does not eliminate all the risks. We all learned this in our IR training but how many people would know how to handle a situation like this? Now add in being IMC, night, maybe bumps.. maybe stress..? Already experiencing the leans from some manuevering

Which do you follow? how do you know?

upload_2021-5-18_19-28-26.png
 
I do not know how the guy got into this situation. But, I would wonder what kind of preflight planning went on. Night, IMC, remote or inhospitable country, single engine, single pilot. Seems to me that too many high risk factors add up to perhaps not doing the flight?
 
I do not know how the guy got into this situation. But, I would wonder what kind of preflight planning went on. Night, IMC, remote or inhospitable country, single engine, single pilot. Seems to me that too many high risk factors add up to perhaps not doing the flight?
Yeah.., it in a Cirrus with a chute...
 
PS - having one redundant instrument does not eliminate all the risks. We all learned this in our IR training but how many people would know how to handle a situation like this? Now add in being IMC, night, maybe bumps.. maybe stress..? Already experiencing the leans from some manuevering

Which do you follow? how do you know?

View attachment 96468

Yup. Flying partial panel is one thing. Recognizing instrument failure and identifying which instrument is failing is another.
 
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PS - having one redundant instrument does not eliminate all the risks. We all learned this in our IR training but how many people would know how to handle a situation like this? Now add in being IMC, night, maybe bumps.. maybe stress..? Already experiencing the leans from some manuevering

Which do you follow? how do you know?

View attachment 96468
In that scenario I’d probably just start the engine so the vacuum pump starts working and then taxi to the runway, but I guess the answer you’re looking for is “pull the chute”. :D
 
https://archive.liveatc.net/kmke/KMKE3-App-Dep-May-16-2021-0200Z.mp3

Sounds like he had instrument/HSI problems IMC at night. Glad they may it. The flight in question is in the 1st 10 minutes of above link. Standard thinking may be the plane could still fly fine without HSI heading info, but I don’t know all the details.

The first 10 minutes of that is just the end of the show. He first checks in towards the beginning of this. After he gets direct JIGTA you can go forward to about 18:40. Then the story starts. https://archive.liveatc.net/kmke/KMKE3-App-Dep-May-16-2021-0130Z.mp3
 
If none emergency deployment become a habit, I wonder if there’s going to start to be a premium premium for BRS equipped aircraft?
Looking at various LSA's chute and non chute equipped I was told to expect a 30-50% higher premium for the chute, based on same hull value.
 
Highlights the need for flight instructors to really focus on those partial panel flying skills during initial and recurrent instrument training.
 
Based on his disconnected sounding responses my early guess (and it's just a guess) is that his autopilot wasn't doing what he expected it to do, which can happen when the AP's rate or attitude source (depending on the AP) goes belly up. He sounded as though he was unable to identify his problem, much less work it. And possibly he never transitioned to hand flying using backup flight instruments (or if he did, he didn't have the airmanship to hold heading and altitude.)
 
OK, well, I guess you told me.

But, one would think that given the known expertise of the average Cirrus pilot that a back-up would be provided for such a critical instrument, especially flying at night in IMC. Maybe the back up failed too.

Your statement infers the "known expertise" of "average" Cirrus pilots is inferior to pilots with similar experience flying similarity capable aircraft without ballistic parachutes, and that therefore they rely on the presence of the parachute to mask weaknesses in their skills and decision making.

Just what is this "known expertise" you speak of? Since you seem to be familiar with the experience level of the "average" Cirrus pilot, why don't you provide that information so we may evaluate it? Since any statistical metric is invalid without a reference point, it will also be necessary for you to explain how the data point of "average" was determined.

Your observations about Cirrus pilots also infer apparent remiss by the manufacturer in not providing a backup or backups to ameliorate the possible failure of instruments required for flight in night, IMC, or both conditions. Again, to establish the effects of the variables on the data, more information is required.

It appears the only reasonable manner in which to provide such data supporting your position is to examine the behavior of other pilots with similar.piloting experience flying IFR capable aircraft in similar situations but without ballistic parachutes installed. This data can establish commonality in the chain of events, then evaluate the outcome of both data sets vis-a-vis the availability and use of the parachute in Cirrus aircraft versus its not being installed in the other group.

Only then can your dismissal of the "known expertise" of "average" Cirrus pilots be validated. I look forward to seeing the supporting data behind your position in the matter.

Given that your inference is prevalent in the GA community, I'm confident your establishment of the facts will be most welcome.
 
Gotta agree with @Tantalum. Night IFR over a low overcast over inhospitable terrain in a piston single sounds like poor decision making, parachute or not.
 
Highlights the need for flight instructors to really focus on those partial panel flying skills during initial and recurrent instrument training.

It was in a thread here I got concerned about that. Recognition of instrument failure was one of the ‘speculations.’ Don’t remember if it turned out to be the cause and don’t care. It dawned on me that while I had plenty of partial panel time during training, I hadn’t had much, if any, training in recognizing impending failure. It was just, poof, instruments would get covered up. I scheduled time with a CFII and worked on it.
 
It was in a thread here I got concerned about that. Recognition of instrument failure was one of the ‘speculations.’ Don’t remember if it turned out to be the cause and don’t care. It dawned on me that while I had plenty of partial panel time during training, I hadn’t had much, if any, training in recognizing impending failure. It was just, poof, instruments would get covered up. I scheduled time with a CFII and worked on it.
curious how you worked on that. It's tough to fail an instrument in a flying aircraft other than disabling it.
 
Based on his disconnected sounding responses my early guess (and it's just a guess) is that his autopilot wasn't doing what he expected it to do, which can happen when the AP's rate or attitude source (depending on the AP) goes belly up. He sounded as though he was unable to identify his problem, much less work it. And possibly he never transitioned to hand flying using backup flight instruments (or if he did, he didn't have the airmanship to hold heading and altitude.)
Fortunately he was in an aircraft where none of that was needed.
 
..it is not cut and dry either. Depending on what causes the failure the most insidious would be bad airspeed indicator readings.. and in most cases you might not know the indicator is wrong until too late. Usually the airspeed won't just drop to zero or magically stay the same

https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to...your-pitot-tube-ices-over-airspeed-indicator/

I had a stuck altimeter once upon a time. Relatively speaking, it happened at a good time, right at the end of a long out and back VFR cross-country. I'd ducked beneath the Atlanta Class B to make my way home (that meant <3,500' in that area, IIRC), flew 30 miles under the shelf, then began the final descent to home base. The altimeter never varied as I dropped ~2,000' towards pattern altitude. Imagine that at night in IFR over the mountains - losing 2,000' without being able to tell.
 
Yup. Flying partial panel is one thing. Recognizing instrument failure and identifying which instrument is failing is another.
When I learned instrument flying we called it a scan and cross check. You didn't twitch a muscle until your cross check isolated the bad indication. Maybe they don't teach that anymore.
 
curious how you worked on that. It's tough to fail an instrument in a flying aircraft other than disabling it.

Simulator. Don't remember which one but it was pretty sophisticated. You sat in it, not just in a chair in front of it. The instructor can do all kinds of mean nasty evil stuff. It doesn't just 'poof' turn off an instrument and/or flag it. It lets it slowly wind down not making sense if your comparing to other instruments.
 
Your statement infers the "known expertise" of "average" Cirrus pilots is inferior to pilots with similar experience flying similarity capable aircraft without ballistic parachutes, and that therefore they rely on the presence of the parachute to mask weaknesses in their skills and decision making.

Just what is this "known expertise" you speak of? Since you seem to be familiar with the experience level of the "average" Cirrus pilot, why don't you provide that information so we may evaluate it? Since any statistical metric is invalid without a reference point, it will also be necessary for you to explain how the data point of "average" was determined.

Your observations about Cirrus pilots also infer apparent remiss by the manufacturer in not providing a backup or backups to ameliorate the possible failure of instruments required for flight in night, IMC, or both conditions. Again, to establish the effects of the variables on the data, more information is required.

It appears the only reasonable manner in which to provide such data supporting your position is to examine the behavior of other pilots with similar.piloting experience flying IFR capable aircraft in similar situations but without ballistic parachutes installed. This data can establish commonality in the chain of events, then evaluate the outcome of both data sets vis-a-vis the availability and use of the parachute in Cirrus aircraft versus its not being installed in the other group.

Only then can your dismissal of the "known expertise" of "average" Cirrus pilots be validated. I look forward to seeing the supporting data behind your position in the matter.

Given that your inference is prevalent in the GA community, I'm confident your establishment of the facts will be most welcome.

Apparently, i struck a nerve and you are calling me out.

Except for one fact, I offer only anecdotes. That fact, told to me by a Cirrus dealer is that 75% of Cirrus aircraft are financed as a business expense. My take away from that tidbit is that a lot of Cirrus pilots are buying them as their first plane for a personal/business convenience rather than the latest in a series of aircraft, building time and experience over years of flying lower performance aircraft as a hobby. It is also my opinion that the Cirrus is purchased because of the BRS as a crutch or a bone to throw a reluctant significant other. There are a lot of other, more capable used aircraft available for half the cost. Why buy a lesser performing aircraft for twice the money except for the BRS? Would Cirrus sales be what they are without the BRS? It is my opinion that Cirrus air frames attract lower time pilots with bigger checkbooks. They are the new Bonanza. Shiny status symbols for people concerned about such things.

The pilot in question, flying at night in IMC over terrain in a single engine aircraft begs a lot of questions. Would he have done that in an aircraft without a BRS? Either answer proves my point.

Paul B. offers some perspective in a You tube presentation
. In it he agrees that no one has died due to a BRS deployment. So it is a good thing for safety, but he mentioned a couple of instances where the handle was pulled but failed to deploy. In both examples the pilot landed safely anyway. So why did the pilots pulled the handle when they could have landed safely without it?

Additionally, In the comments section this was found:

Russell Witt
2 years ago
I worked at a Cirrus repair center, the biggest problem with the CAPS can be summed up in a direct quote from a Cirrus pilot that came into the shop “The weather was really crappy but I had the chute so I took off anyway “ I had to walk away.

Also, If you are taking my opinions as a personal slam, you should not. I don't know you. If you are a happy Cirrus owner, why worry about the 'inference prevalent in the GA community"? I own an Arrow II. A lot of pilots would not own one. For others, it is the plane they hope to get, one day. That is fine. I am happy with what I have. Be happy with what you have.
 
Apparently, i struck a nerve and you are calling me out.

Except for one fact, I offer only anecdotes. That fact, told to me by a Cirrus dealer is that 75% of Cirrus aircraft are financed as a business expense. My take away from that tidbit is that a lot of Cirrus pilots are buying them as their first plane for a personal/business convenience rather than the latest in a series of aircraft, building time and experience over years of flying lower performance aircraft as a hobby. It is also my opinion that the Cirrus is purchased because of the BRS as a crutch or a bone to throw a reluctant significant other. There are a lot of other, more capable used aircraft available for half the cost. Why buy a lesser performing aircraft for twice the money except for the BRS? Would Cirrus sales be what they are without the BRS? It is my opinion that Cirrus air frames attract lower time pilots with bigger checkbooks. They are the new Bonanza. Shiny status symbols for people concerned about such things.

The pilot in question, flying at night in IMC over terrain in a single engine aircraft begs a lot of questions. Would he have done that in an aircraft without a BRS? Either answer proves my point.

Paul B. offers some perspective in a You tube presentation
. In it he agrees that no one has died due to a BRS deployment. So it is a good thing for safety, but he mentioned a couple of instances where the handle was pulled but failed to deploy. In both examples the pilot landed safely anyway. So why did the pilots pulled the handle when they could have landed safely without it?

Additionally, In the comments section this was found:

Russell Witt
2 years ago
I worked at a Cirrus repair center, the biggest problem with the CAPS can be summed up in a direct quote from a Cirrus pilot that came into the shop “The weather was really crappy but I had the chute so I took off anyway “ I had to walk away.

Also, If you are taking my opinions as a personal slam, you should not. I don't know you. If you are a happy Cirrus owner, why worry about the 'inference prevalent in the GA community"? I own an Arrow II. A lot of pilots would not own one. For others, it is the plane they hope to get, one day. That is fine. I am happy with what I have. Be happy with what you have.


Your answer was as expected. No, I don't fly a Cirrus.
 
The chute's $25K price is expensive when you don't need it. When you need it, it's priceless. What an amazing device.

Back in 2006-2007, Cirrus Design adopted the marketing slogan "The Genius of Just in Case." While it didn't prove especially effective (they canned it within a few months, IIRC) I still think those six words are an absolutely spot-on summary of CAPS and other whole airframe ballistic parachute systems.
 
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