Helicopter Down FL

My understanding is the clip from the sully movie is fictional and that no such conversation happened at the NTSB hearing. In fact, the NTSB and the FAA knew long before Sullenberger about the startle response or effect and it’s impact on pilots during emergencies.
 
Much like in the fixed wing world, time will tell.

FWIW, I had under 500 hours total time in helicopters when I had my first two engine failures.
 
SkyDog58 said:
My understanding is the clip from the sully movie is fictional and that no such conversation happened at the NTSB hearing. In fact, the NTSB and the FAA knew long before Sullenberger about the startle response or effect and it’s impact on pilots during emergencies.
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Interesting. According to this article, Sullenberger was a consultant on the film. I wonder if he'd allow that exchange if it didn't really happen. https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/09...son-river-crashs-real-life-investigators-say/
 
SoCal 182 Driver said:
I had about 100.
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Wow. I thought I had bad luck. Assuming you set it down correctly and did not ball up the helicopter?

As I understand it, this particular helicopter was a tour helicopter, so the pilot had to have been at least a commercially rated pilot.
 
k9medic said:
Wow. I thought I had bad luck. Assuming you set it down correctly and did not ball up the helicopter?
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It was a weekend, and I put it down in a vacant schoolyard. No damage (other than an engine that grenaded, which caused the auto).
 
I also have had two engine failures one in a TH-55 at a hover…blew up a piston and one in an AH-1 which was fuel starvation during an air taxi to refuel, both non events due to the hundreds if not a 1000 plus autorotations to the ground during flight school and required air training maneuvers early in my career.

It is a rare event to do a real auto in training to the ground these days and most likely a demonstrated maneuver. Power recovery is now the normal.

Once twin engine aircraft were introduced in the military even they have reduced the training requirements as well. When I went through FT Rucker I would estimate 50% of my landings in any given day were some form of autorotation…those days have changed and the skill level as well…
 
Warlock said:
Once twin engine aircraft were introduced in the military even they have reduced the training requirements as well. When I went through FT Rucker I would estimate 50% of my landings in any given day were some form of autorotation…those days have changed and the skill level as well…
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I have only had one real engine failure, but I have had five transmission/clutch failures and a swashplate failure. All in two-engine helicopters.

A single engine failure in a multiengine helicopter can be a very dangerous and stressful event, especially when you are too heavy for continued single engine flight. Because multiengine helicopters are bigger, heavier and more complicated than the little birds, the need for an immediate response to a sudden power reduction is obvious. High altitude and slingload operations will complicate the decision making process because there are so many variables involved in doing what is needed to continue flight, if possible.

I have always thought that an engine failure in a single engine helicopter was a much simpler situation because you must land and that is your only choice. Life is so simple at that point!
 
SoCal 182 Driver said:
Interesting. According to this article, Sullenberger was a consultant on the film. I wonder if he'd allow that exchange if it didn't really happen. https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/09...son-river-crashs-real-life-investigators-say/
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The article cites Hanks stating Sullenberger asked that actual NTSB member names be removed from the script to avoid the implication they specifically targeted him and Skiles.

Without the prosecutorial angle there wouldn't have been much of a second half of the movie, though, and it sounds like everyone involved knew that. I also suspect Sully wouldn't protest too much to an exchange that portrayed him and Skiles as the only calm, rational and "professional" people in the room.
 
flightwriter said:
The article cites Hanks stating Sullenberger asked that actual NTSB member names be removed from the script to avoid the implication they specifically targeted him and Skiles.

Without the prosecutorial angle there wouldn't have been much of a second half of the movie, though, and it sounds like everyone involved knew that. I also suspect Sully wouldn't protest too much to an exchange that portrayed him and Skiles as the only calm, rational and "professional" people in the room.
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Even if the NTSB scene is fictional, it makes my point about human factors.
 
SoCal 182 Driver said:
...it makes my point about human factors.
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Unpack this for me as you have referenced human factors several times. You said you had less than 100 hours in helicopters when you made a successful autorotation. My first 2 where when I had less than 500 hours.

What human factors do you think came into play here that made his autorotation unsuccessful (referring to the failure to arrest the rate of descent not his decision to land in the water)?
 
k9medic said:
Unpack this for me as you have referenced human factors several times. You said you had less than 100 hours in helicopters when you made a successful autorotation. My first 2 where when I had less than 500 hours.

What human factors do you think came into play here that made his autorotation unsuccessful (referring to the failure to arrest the rate of descent not his decision to land in the water)?
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My auto was from 1,500', so I had plenty of time to recover from the initial startle response in reaction to having my engine suddenly quit, lower the collective, enter autorotation, and successfully put the ship down. My assumption on the Florida crash is that they were cruising the coast at a much lower altitude, and when they had a mechanical problem, the pilot didn't recover from the startle response quickly enough to properly do a low-level autorotation. The human factor is the startle response to the mechanical failure.
 
450' AGL, 90-ish kts. Claims he had less than 10 seconds between the time he first felt the vibration and the water impact.

According to an R44 height/velocity diagram I just reviewed, in theory he should have been able to autorotate. Instead, he tried troubleshooting (increasing power), and in those precious few seconds, he may have gotten himself into a situation where he couldn't successfully autoroate. (These are the human factors.) Or he just screwed up the autorotation altogether. The final report will be very interesting.
 
I’d be curious to see what caused the unexpected vibration and loss of power. The preliminary report didn’t identify anything other than the pilot’s testimony and the fact they found both fuel and oil in the aircraft.
 
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