First reported crash en route to Oshkosh

Not long after i started flying i got rolled in a B200 crossing behind a 757 about 5 miles in trail
 
Like actually upside down?
Yep and then it seemed best to go with it and just keep rolling to get the dirty side back down. Evidently i'm no bob hoover because the boxes in the back made a heck of a mess and I spilled my coffee everywhere.
 
Yep and then it seemed best to go with it and just keep rolling to get the dirty side back down. Evidently i'm no bob hoover because the boxes in the back made a heck of a mess and I spilled my coffee everywhere.

Wow. Major respect man, well done.
 
Makes sense. So when I see something of that size along my route..regardless of altitude..how far should I stay away?
Best to remain above or displaced upwind. If you're downwind and/or below I'd give it at least 5 miles.
 
The 150 across from me got upset by an airliner above. I knew the pilot was wearing a ball cap because there was a ball cap button-shaped indentation in the roof of the aircraft. With seatbelts fastened the guy had been forced so hard upwards that his cap went through the headliner and made an impression on the roof of the aircraft. It had wrinkles in the skin of the wings and was totaled by the insurance company. Had one of the nicest paint jobs I've seen on a 150.
 
Heck I got rolled 90 degrees by a 172RG in my plane. Granted I was MUCH closer.

Briefly sickening to be rolling with full counter aileron.
 
So, I got some new info on this crash.

Apparently, he DID call up Milwaukee Approach, and he wanted to go up the lakeshore at 1500 MSL (~900 AGL). They were landing on the 25's at the time, and the airport is fairly close to the lake (the Class C surface area extends out into/over the lake).

There was an MD80 inbound that was going to cause a conflict. There were some exchanges between the Cherokee and the controller to attempt to resolve it, but in the end the controller had to issue a turn to 090 to the Cherokee.

When the Cherokee reported the MD80 in sight, the controller told him to maintain visual separation and resume own navigation, but he cut in really close behind the MD80.

As soon as the Cherokee crossed the path the MD80 had flown, the radar showed a nearly vertical plunge to the water.

So, the suspected cause is that the Cherokee went right into the MD80's wake, and when it hit the left wingtip vortex it pitched down sharply - pointed straight down or even past it - and that attitude was simply unrecoverable at that low altitude.

Sad, but entirely preventable.

How high were they again? It seems hard to believe that a guy with his experience could not recover from an unusual attitude in a thousand feet.

What was their cruising altitude above the water?

(BTW: Mary and I are from Racine. The pilot in this accident was my F-I-L's flight instructor, and well known as an excellent pilot.)
 
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How high were they again? It seems hard to believe that a guy with his experience could not recover from an unusual attitude in a thousand feet.

What was their cruising altitude above the water?

I think they said 1500 MSL, which is 916 above the lake.

They may have *almost* recovered and then whacked their heads on the panel when they hit the water if they were in an old Cherokee without the shoulder belts.

They may have pitched past 90 degrees down, which makes the recovery more interesting - Do you pull through more than 90 degrees of the loop, or roll it and pull less than 90 degrees? Does the decision between the two take precious milliseconds away from the recovery time?

I'm glad I heard about this, though, and I'll certainly be more wary flying under the ORD arrivals going down past Chicago.
 
How high were they again? It seems hard to believe that a guy with his experience could not recover from an unusual attitude in a thousand feet.

What was their cruising altitude above the water?

(BTW: Mary and I are from Racine. The pilot in this accident was my F-I-L's flight instructor, and well known as an excellent pilot.)

Small world.
 
So, I got some new info on this crash.

Apparently, he DID call up Milwaukee Approach, and he wanted to go up the lakeshore at 1500 MSL (~900 AGL). They were landing on the 25's at the time, and the airport is fairly close to the lake (the Class C surface area extends out into/over the lake).

There was an MD80 inbound that was going to cause a conflict. There were some exchanges between the Cherokee and the controller to attempt to resolve it, but in the end the controller had to issue a turn to 090 to the Cherokee.

When the Cherokee reported the MD80 in sight, the controller told him to maintain visual separation and resume own navigation, but he cut in really close behind the MD80.

As soon as the Cherokee crossed the path the MD80 had flown, the radar showed a nearly vertical plunge to the water.

So, the suspected cause is that the Cherokee went right into the MD80's wake, and when it hit the left wingtip vortex it pitched down sharply - pointed straight down or even past it - and that attitude was simply unrecoverable at that low altitude.

Sad, but entirely preventable.

Well, NTSB probable cause is out, and it turns out that it was pitched hard enough that the aircraft broke up in flight. :(

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20130728X01815&key=1
 
Wow

My only experience with wake turbulence was from a Blackhawk in the pattern ( at dusk)
It gave me a respect for it ( I was in a 152)
 
Wow! Not placing judgement, but it's really eye opening that a pilot of his experience became the victim of a wake turbulence encounter.


"The pilot in the left seat, age 79, held an airline transport pilot certificate for airplane multiengine land and airplane single-engine land. He also held a flight instructor certificate for airplane single and multiengine land, instrument airplane, and advanced ground instructor...

The application for this medical certificate indicated that the pilot had logged 32,920 hours of flight experience; 350 hours of which were logged in the previous six months. This pilot's logbooks were not recovered; therefore, the entire scope of his experience could not be determined."


Very sad indeed :(. RIP
 
Wow! Not placing judgement, but it's really eye opening that a pilot of his experience became the victim of a wake turbulence encounter.

Yes, but did you ever consider what happens when flying behind another plane but across its path before? I sure hadn't until this happened. Every single thing the FAA says about wake turbulence is about two aircraft flying on the same path and the rolling moment it would induce, not anything about crossing paths and the pitching moment that would overstress your plane as in this case.

IMO, the FAA needs to update their documentation on this subject...
 
Yes, but did you ever consider what happens when flying behind another plane but across its path before? I sure hadn't until this happened. Every single thing the FAA says about wake turbulence is about two aircraft flying on the same path and the rolling moment it would induce, not anything about crossing paths and the pitching moment that would overstress your plane as in this case.

IMO, the FAA needs to update their documentation on this subject...

Yes I have and crossing 1.4 miles behind an MD-80 (or anything larger than the Piper/Cessna, etc) I'm flying, is WAYYY out of my comfort zone!:yikes:
 
The MD-80 was descending. That would have triggered an alarm in my head. Again, not placing judgement. Just trying to learn.

"According to recorded radar data, the flight path of N1549X crossed the flight path of DAL931at 1437:51 at 1,800 feet, which was 39 seconds after DAL931 passed the same point at the same altitude."



"At 1436:25, the controller instructed the pilot of N1549X to turn right heading 090 and the pilot acknowledged. The controller continued, "…there is traffic just to you ah twelve o'clock and about two miles descending out of two thousand three hundred, an MD-80." The pilot replied, "all right, I can go down lower if you like" The controller responded, "…negative I need you just to turn out of there then I'll get you northbound as soon as I can." The pilot then stated, "OK, I've got them in sight." The controller replied, "…thank you, just pass behind that traffic and then you can proceed northbound as requested." The pilot responded, "All right."
 
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Yes, but did you ever consider what happens when flying behind another plane but across its path before? I sure hadn't until this happened. Every single thing the FAA says about wake turbulence is about two aircraft flying on the same path and the rolling moment it would induce, not anything about crossing paths and the pitching moment that would overstress your plane as in this case.

IMO, the FAA needs to update their documentation on this subject...


Not exactly true, unless the following statement is new to this AC, 90-23G (dated 2/10/14):dunno:

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_90-23G.pdf

"(3) [FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman][FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman]When crossing behind a lead aircraft, try to cross above its flightpath or, terrain permitting, at least 1,000 feet below." [/FONT]
[/FONT]
 
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.

Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."

Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.

IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.

In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.

So, what can we do about this?

In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?

In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.

Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.

I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.
 
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.

Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."

Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.

IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.

In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.

So, what can we do about this?

In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?

In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.

Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.

I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.

Contributing to the accident was the approach controller’s failure to issue a wake turbulence advisory to the pilot.
 
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.

Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."

Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.

IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.

In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.

So, what can we do about this?

In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?

In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.

Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.

I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.

All very good points. However, in this case, it was a failure of the pilot as well - He was on an assigned heading BEFORE he turned to go behind the airliner. He was not on a vector when he crossed so close behind the other plane, it was his own doing.

Better warnings from ATC and better documentation (and education) from the FAA would help immensely.
 
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call,.........


One word will fix all the problems...... UNABLE......:rolleyes:

PIC in calling the shots...
 
When the PIC mentioned to ATC that he could go lower, I was thinking I would have gone higher and went over the MD-80's wake.
 
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.

Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."

Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.

IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.

In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.

So, what can we do about this?

In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?

In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.

Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.

I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.


+1 :yes:
 
My detector is a small electronic sensor with alarms, exposure tracking, and the ability to output what is going on in PPM. I use it when I think it's appropriate but I most certainly do not carry, position, and activate it in every airplane I'm doing a flight review in during the middle of June.

Jesse, can you give us some info on your electronic CO sensor? What make and model? Rough price? Where'd you get it? Thanks! Joe
 
One word will fix all the problems...... UNABLE......:rolleyes:

PIC in calling the shots...

This is true, however many are loath to contradict the instructions of ATC out of fear and also familiarity. Those that regularly fly IFR just get used to following orders.

In this case though, did the pilot really understand the danger present? I bet he thought that he might get a bump or two, not complete airframe failure. It's easy to say "unable" when there is hill in front of you, or a towering thunderstorm, but something invisible in calm, clear air?

I refuse to blame the pilot, or the controller in this case. I think there is just a serious lack of education on the subject, and perhaps lack of respect for crossing a wake. It really needs to be treated with the same seriousness as a thunderstorm.
 
No accident chain has simply one link. ATC should've alerted the pilot to the potential for wake turbulence. The pilot should have known about wake turbulence theory and pull the PIC card. And perhaps it was not the wake itself that destroyed the Arrow but the pilot's attempt to recover in the wake.

The new AC on wake turbulence shared by redtail does cover enroute wake turbulence avoidance, although its primary concern is in the terminal phase of flight. Granted this AC was just issued two months ago (perhaps in light of this accident?) but it does show the FAA is trying to do something about avoiding wake turbulence.
 
Not exactly true, unless the following statement is new to this AC, 90-23G (dated 2/10/14):dunno:

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_90-23G.pdf

"(3) [FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman][FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman]When crossing behind a lead aircraft, try to cross above its flightpath or, terrain permitting, at least 1,000 feet below." [/FONT]
[/FONT]

Wow - That's new. 2/10/14. I found a copy of the previous AC (90-23F), and it does not have anything in it about crossing. In fact, the one you posted is 7 pages longer and appears to have a lot more research behind it.

Good reading for all of us... It's significantly different than the previous one, and all of the other FAA material to this point on the subject. Good find!
 
Wow - That's new. 2/10/14. I found a copy of the previous AC (90-23F), and it does not have anything in it about crossing. In fact, the one you posted is 7 pages longer and appears to have a lot more research behind it.

Good reading for all of us... It's significantly different than the previous one, and all of the other FAA material to this point on the subject. Good find!

Yeah right after I posted that, I found the previous one and couldn't find anything about crossing either.
 
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.

Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."

Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.

IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.

In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.

So, what can we do about this?

In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?

In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.

Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.

I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.

This is true, however many are loath to contradict the instructions of ATC out of fear and also familiarity. Those that regularly fly IFR just get used to following orders.

In this case though, did the pilot really understand the danger present? I bet he thought that he might get a bump or two, not complete airframe failure. It's easy to say "unable" when there is hill in front of you, or a towering thunderstorm, but something invisible in calm, clear air?

I refuse to blame the pilot, or the controller in this case. I think there is just a serious lack of education on the subject, and perhaps lack of respect for crossing a wake. It really needs to be treated with the same seriousness as a thunderstorm.

:yeahthat: Great post.
 
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I have a confession to make:redface:.

I have flown along the beaches under the JFK bravo at 500', enroute to the Hudson River from Long Island and return.

On a few occasions JFK tower gave me the "caution wake turbulence" advisory for the big boys that were landing on 31L/R.

I must admit, my thinking was... I'll be ok, maybe a few bumps. He's at least 1000' above me and crossing my flightpath. I've never felt much of anything but I think I'm going to change that mindset when they're landing on the 4's or 31's (or departing the opposite direction).:eek:
 
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I have a confession to make:redface:....

You are not alone. I'm sure there are a lot of confessions out there if people are honest with themselves. Learning to fly at KOAK in the San Francisco Bay Area, I have crossed paths with airliners many a time. I have heard the "Caution, wake turbulence" call more times than I can remember. I have blindly flown on ATC headings right into the potential hazard, both under IFR and VFR flight following. I have thankfully never experienced any terrible turbulence as a result.

However, I am one of those that believed that a crossing perpendicular to the turbulence, while not desirable, was nothing more than a real bumpy ride. I had no idea it could break airplanes. I will adjust my thinking.
 
AC 90-23G
"NOTE: A new class, the Super, above the Heavy class, has been approved on an interim basis for aircraft such as the Airbus A380 and Antonov AN225."

Saw an AN225 back in the 90's when I worked at Newark. The landing and takeoff were amazing AND LOUD. That thing is huge!

I see Emirates A380's flying over my house occasionally, landing on 22L at JFK. Incredible sight to see something that big in the air.

Now I'm going to have to start listening to my handheld to see if I hear "SUPER" :wink2:
 
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