Separate names with a comma.
Discussion in 'Flight Following' started by Jamie Kirk, Apr 18, 2019.
Looks like they yanked the FlightAware alteady
Could loss of an engine this low and full power cause it to pull left hard enough to loose control?
No idea what fuel load was for this mission, or any other load concerns, but we do know there were no passengers. Very sad. I’ve been considering moving up to a twin, so I’m always interested to hear the cause of incidents like this
There wasn't much flight to track. I read elsewhere that the fire was only ~1600' from where he pulled onto the runway.
Total speculation on my part, but this appears to be a classic Vmc roll. Rudder to the floor on the good engine side to stop the yaw, which is what causes the roll. Aileron deflection is useless but is a normal human reaction.
I wonder how often he had flown out of KFUL. He was apparently going home to Utah, so I suspect a good fuel load.
The runway he was using has an 8' fence about 30' past the end of the runway. I always thought it looked bigger and closer when I was launching that direction (in a 172). Then there's the KFI radio tower that's always on your mind launching that way. A lot going on there.
If all the correct inputs are initiated quickly, is it reasonable to say that this situation can be avoided some,most,or all of the time? I understand there are many variables in any given situation, just wondering “in general “ is this avoidable
And FUL's runway 24 is 3121' long with this much overrun:
At what takeoff weight? Without that information your post doesn't properly inform. The accident aircraft had a single occupant on board.
Don't let this accident steer you away from twins. You will learn VMC minimum control speed in training. Most of twin training is learning to fly with one engine not operating. So make sure your legs are in good shape....
To answer your question, yes or no. Usually the first reaction when one engine suddenly stops producing power is to close both throttles and hopefully stay on the remaining runway. I have never been to this airport but I understand that the runway is shorter than most folks may be used to, so that may have not been a very good option. But in light twins it is usually advisable to abort the takeoff if an engine stops producing power before rotation speed. Even if the engine fails after rotation but before the gear is up and below VYSE it is most advisable to abort the take off. But as in everything there is no one size fits all answer.
This may help understand a little more.
Nice post. Any uncommanded yaw during the takeoff roll is cause to close both throttles and apply maximum braking. Once at Vmc + 5 (typically), the twin is rotated and accelerated to blue-line
Agreed on the possibility of a Vmc roll. The "Rudder to the floor..." routine only works if you've got Vmc (or better), otherwise the good engine is going to kill you. Aileron deflection adds adverse yaw towards the failed engine, and is worse than useless. "Normal human reaction" has no place in correctly piloting an airplane, particularly a light twin after failing an engine in the first 50 feet following rotation. Just sayin'.
Yep, should have been dead foot, dead engine
The pilot should have been familiar with the runway, I am told he had a hangar there. I was there last night and saw him start to depart, I had just finished flying. I was leaving and stopped about where the red dot is on the picture because I heard a plane getting ready to depart and like most pilots stop and watch. I rolled down my window to watch, he was on the brakes and brought the engines up and then started his roll. He lifted off about 1,000' down and as he lifted off I rolled my window back up and started to drive away. As I turned the corner at the end of the hangars was when I saw the fireball out of the corner of my eye. The impact was on Taxiway A right by E, about 1,600' from where he started his roll.
There was a twin and a single in the runup area that probably saw the whole thing as well, you can see the twin facing the runway and the single facing the crash site in the picture below. It also occurred directly in front of the tower. A mechanic that I talked with this morning said that the pilot was in the run-up area for 30-40 minutes before departing cycling one of the props and engines. Not sure what he was working on but he must have felt that whatever it was he had cleared it up and could depart. All of it is very sad and my heart and prayers go out to his family. I called my wife right away to let her know I was safe as she knew I had been flying.
Thanks sk8s for your info, diagrams, and photos. Your runway photo/diagram leads me to believe that there was uncommanded yaw early in the takeoff sequence, and the (appropriate) response of closing both throttles immediately would have allowed for a complete stop on the remaining runway. Instead, (I shamelessly speculate, er...conjecture) it looks like the airplane was unstuck and horsed into the air, perhaps below Vmc, resulting in an uncontrollable in-flight emergency with a predictable outcome. Any competent multi-engine pilot does a careful takeoff briefing: speaking out-loud the decisions, decision points and speeds, and emergency procedures before pulling onto the runway before departure. The pilot must be a coiled spring; ready to make immediate corrections if anything varies from a precise sequence of normal events. Blessings to him and his family, along with all my fellow aviators on this Holy weekend.
I used to like to read Donald Clausing's blog. Retired L-1011 pilot who has written books on navigation and other topics. Here is an interesting read on engine out procedures in a twin.
I'm going to stick my neck out and say yes. in THE COMPLETE MULTIENGINE PILOT I tell the reader to use constructive paranoia....expect an engine to fail and be ready. Have a plan. If the failure occurs on the takeoff roll, stop, even if it means going off the end of the runway; if it occurs immediately after liftoff, full rudder on the good engine side, feather the prop on the failed engine, and land straight ahead on something soft and inexpensive. The airplane is controllable with the failed engine prop feathered and a bank into the good engine of a tad less than five degrees. The pilot's thinking should be "I'm going to lose an engine..." not "What do I do if I lose an engine?"
Constructive paranoia saved my bacon a couple of times.
Sorry. That long on a filed IFR plan to Utah just sounds "unlikely."
Of course, in the particular accident that was the inspiration of his column, it was ruled pilot error for flying in zed visibility during a fog-bound "at own risk" takeoff.
His previous flight from UT to CA on the 15th was supposed to leave at 10:00pm UTC and didn't depart until 10:43pm UTC, perhaps not "unlikely".
Not to quarrel, but was that time futszing around at the runup area, or waiting for release, or.... who knows what?
I couldn't say, just relaying my experience there at the airport last night and that of a mechanic that was there. I was in my hangar when he was doing his run-up so couldn't say how long he was there. I did hear different planes going through run-ups but have no idea how long that particular one took as I can't see the run-up area from inside my hangar.
My thought at takeoff and probably every 10-15min while I’m in the air in any plane as pilot or passenger. I don't obsess about it to the point of distraction, but it’s a little whisper in the background
To which I would add, twin pilots should never forget that reducing or completely removing the power on the good engine (thereby reducing or eliminating Vmc) and landing under control, wings level, straight ahead at something approaching stall speed is always an option. That outcome is no worse than if one had an engine failure at the same time on the same runway while flying one of those "safer" single engine airplanes. And it beats the hell out of rolling the airplane a wing span or three above the ground.
One of the variables is what specific twin engine airplane are you flying. They are not all "equal" by any means in a single engine situation.
The Duke has powerful engines - 380 hp per side - so the catastrophic failure of an engine or prop in a full take-off power situation would be quite a handful in any circumstance. And if it happened just after leaving the ground I doubt there's much margin to recover with the one good engine firewalled in that airplane. The time to recognize a problem and get the nose down from climb attitude might be more than allowable in the circumstance. It's one of the reasons I habitually climb my twin at a shallower angle and higher airspeed than Vy, unless there's a good reason precluding that.
Between 1967 and 1970 Beech built about 95 Barons (Model 56TC) with that same 380 hp engine - ostensibly as engine test beds during the development of the Duke. One of our now retired long time Club members owned one for many years, and it was a screamer (both the noise and the speed). I always wondered if Beech added any more rudder authority to the C55 airframe the 56TC was derived from to deal with the much greater asymmetric thrust from the Duke engine. Times were different back then...
I'm sure, like a lot of published information for airplanes, that figure is at gross weight.
Yes. A failed engine on one side with the other developing full power will definitely cause the aircraft to swerve. That is why a multi-engine pilot keeps his/her hand on the throttles: any loss of directional control during the takeoff roll must be aborted immediately. Once airborne (above Vmc and accelerating to blue-line (Vy se) without remaining runway to land, the gear comes up, and the pilot repositions his hand to be ready to push-up the "balls" (M-P-T) -- a failure now will be managed as an in-flight emergency (NB: identify(dead foot, dead engine)- verify (pull the throttle on your failed engine to make sure) - and feather (the dead engine). All of this is done in an organized, deliberate manner; it should not be raced. Stay curious.
This pleasure-only pilot decided long ago that the ongoing requirement for multi-engine proficiency exceeded my capacities and desires. The basics are very doable but proficiency in single engine failure procedures is demanding and ongoing.
I like challenges but prefer Bonefish.
Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro
Watson (I presume)...you seem like an accomplished airman, being able to recognize the amount of recurrent training and drilling that goes into proficient (and safe) multi-engine procedures.
I like the complexity of twins (and all that goes with that), but I got sick of paying the full hourly rate when I was flying it on one engine about half the time.
All the discussion aside, it is tragic that accidents like this continue to occur and tear apart families. It seems blindingly obvious the pilot should have closed the throttles and accepted whatever consequences an excursion across grass and taxiways would have entailed.
For that I'm saddened.
Well, you are well ahead of the information curve because despite the discussions, we really don’t know yet.
Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro
That is horrifying...
As a twin guy that is always learning and striving to stay as trained and proficient as possible, is the guess here that he rotated and climbed out initially below red line and when it quit, it went from 100% to 0% power abruptly?
Guesses aside, as a regular multi guy I don't start to rotate until I'm halfway between red and blue line, lifting off close to blue line and then pitch for blue line +5 for reaction time. My brain is trained to push forward on the yoke at the first indication of power loss and if I can't get it cleaned up and climb at blue, I'm bringing it back to earth like a single engine driver. Here's hoping I can perform in that matter if I lose one in those crucial 15 seconds from rotation to 200-300 feet agl. If the conditions suggest I can't accelerate to that speed safely then I choose to not fly into that airport. Even at Gaston's I had a safe margin of speed at rotation with the plan being to put it in the river if things went terribly wrong and I couldn't climb above the rising terrain.
What I keep thinking about is the same as you - GET THE NOSE DOWN.
Even if one is "ready" for it, it still takes a second or three to recognize/confirm a problem and to react. In this instance, if indeed it was a catastrophic loss of thrust on one side right after lift-off, with something like 380 hp pulling him around there was hardly time for even that.
3 seconds to live.
Someone mentioned control lock, I hope that wasn't what happened.
Here's a control lock accident at Fullerton, 2004:
Yeah, my guess is the Duke's performance - both good and bad - played heavily into the result here. KFUL is about the minimum runway a Duke needs, so he probably was used to rotating at the lowest rotation speed in the book - or even lower. That means that this exact type of engine failure probably left no margin for error.
I know more now. It is, indeed, sad.
I just built up the nerve to watch that Instagram video. That is absolutely horrifying.
There's a big difference between the 180 HP per side and counter rotating props on a Seminole and the 380 HP per side and same direction props on a Duke.