Controller responding Negative to canceling radar services?

To summarize: the only time they are required to ask whether you can maintain terrain and obstruction clearance is when you're below the MIA and they have reason to believe you can't climb in VFR conditions to the MIA. But at least some facilities ask it routinely for air pickups.

The book says "the pilot informs you, or you are aware, that they are unable to climb in VFR conditions" to the MIA. Reason to believe is a guess, to be aware is to know. The only way I'd ever know a pilot was unable to climb in VFR conditions was for him to say so and I never asked.
 
If you've filed, isn't most of that information already on the strip? (aircraft type and equipment, contact info, etc.)

To summarize: the only time they are required to ask whether you can maintain terrain and obstruction clearance is when you're below the MIA and they have reason to believe you can't climb in VFR conditions to the MIA. But at least some facilities ask it routinely for air pickups.

I was referring to a true pop up. One that hasn't filed. In that case you either has someone who is IFR rated approaching IMC...or they just want to pick up an approach for training. You either hand write a strip or have your data dude type them into the computer.

Your summary is essentially correct but they really need to ask the VMC question in order to truly know your situation. My only question in your case is to why Boston Center isn't giving you a clearance below 5400 ft. Makes no sense. Ch4 of the .65 specifically authorizes it. I've done it myself as a controller and later as a pilot.
 
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The book says "the pilot informs you, or you are aware, that they are unable to climb in VFR conditions" to the MIA. Reason to believe is a guess, to be aware is to know. The only way I'd ever know a pilot was unable to climb in VFR conditions was for him to say so and I never asked.
Okay, that puts a finer point on it, though if you knew conditions were widespread such that the bases were below the MIA (or less than 500 feet above the MIA in Class E, to put an even finer point on it), would you not ask the question?
 
I was referring to a true pop up. One that hasn't filed. In that case you either has someone who is IFR rated approaching IMC...or they just want to pick up an approach for training. You either hand write a strip or have your data dude type them into the computer.

Your summary is essentially correct but they really need to ask the VMC question in order to truly know your situation. My only question in your case is to why Boston Center isn't giving you a clearance below 5400 ft. Makes no sense. Ch4 of the .65 specifically authorizes it. I've done it myself as a controller and later as a pilot.
Yes, that's exactly my question too, particularly after reading section 4.2.8 of the .65. They do usually issue the clearance anyway, after repeated requests on my part, but sometimes they force me to level off as I said. It's to the point where I consider it less trouble to just call for my clearance on the ground when I'm likely to need one to get to the MIA.
 
Yes, that's exactly my question too, particularly after reading section 4.2.8 of the .65. They do usually issue the clearance anyway, after repeated requests on my part, but sometimes they force me to level off as I said. It's to the point where I consider it less trouble to just call for my clearance on the ground when I'm likely to need one to get to the MIA.

To answer your question. The reason they won't give you your clnc is the same reason you get unsolicited vectors when VFR in Class E.
 
Okay, that puts a finer point on it, though if you knew conditions were widespread such that the bases were below the MIA (or less than 500 feet above the MIA in Class E, to put an even finer point on it), would you not ask the question?

Nope. The guy's probably looking to pick up an IFR clearance because he thinks he'll have trouble maintaining VFR. I see nothing to gain with a query that might force him to stay down in the weeds.
 
I've got nothing against controllers making good money. But when the FAA gave controllers a very big pay raise, I thought they should have up the ante and raised the bar on performance and training standards.

But they didn't even keep it at the same level, they lowered the bar.

I'll bite. When did controllers receive a "very big" pay raise? Your words, your move.
 
Yes, that's exactly my question too, particularly after reading section 4.2.8 of the .65. They do usually issue the clearance anyway, after repeated requests on my part, but sometimes they force me to level off as I said. It's to the point where I consider it less trouble to just call for my clearance on the ground when I'm likely to need one to get to the MIA.


Just so I'm clear, ZBW isn't issuing you a clearance after you told them you can maintain terrain and obstruction clearance up to the MIA (sounds like 5,400 based on previous posts)?
 
This post would be 60 pages instead of 19 if Ron didn't leave!!!:rofl:



Mindboggling it has this much...:mad2:


Not really, controllers differ on .65 interpretation as much as anything else. I have the utmost respect for my colleagues on this board, even if I may disagree with their interpretation of the .65.
 
Nope. The guy's probably looking to pick up an IFR clearance because he thinks he'll have trouble maintaining VFR. I see nothing to gain with a query that might force him to stay down in the weeds.
Gotcha. You know, but have plausible deniability because he hasn't told you, so you can expedite his clearance while adhering to the letter of the .65.
 
Just so I'm clear, ZBW isn't issuing you a clearance after you told them you can maintain terrain and obstruction clearance up to the MIA (sounds like 5,400 based on previous posts)?
They balk at first. Eventually they usually do, after saying they can't, but sometimes the clearance requires a VFR climb to the MIA anyway, which on one recent occasion was useless to me.

There are also radar coverage issues in this area, which I believe is the main reason for the high MIA. Not sure if that explains it though, since I've never had them give me any trouble when calling from the ground.
 
There are also radar coverage issues in this area, which I believe is the main reason for the high MIA. Not sure if that explains it though, since I've never had them give me any trouble when calling from the ground.

It shouldn't be. MIA/MVA is supposed to be based on just terrain, obstacles, and controlled airspace.
 
They balk at first. Eventually they usually do, after saying they can't, but sometimes the clearance requires a VFR climb to the MIA anyway, which on one recent occasion was useless to me.



There are also radar coverage issues in this area, which I believe is the main reason for the high MIA. Not sure if that explains it though, since I've never had them give me any trouble when calling from the ground.


It's tough to say, i would say if you advise on initial contact that conditions are VMC up to the MIA, there shouldn't be a problem issuing you a clearance.
 
Not really, controllers differ on .65 interpretation as much as anything else. I have the utmost respect for my colleagues on this board, even if I may disagree with their interpretation of the .65.
Yeah, I have noticed that before but it's especially apparent in this thread. ATC as a whole is more standardized than pilots or operators but there are definitely regional and individual interpretations of .65. And there are ATC folks who think their way is the correct way, period, much as we see with pilots.
 
Yeah, I have noticed that before but it's especially apparent in this thread. ATC as a whole is more standardized than pilots or operators but there are definitely regional and individual interpretations of .65. And there are ATC folks who think their way is the correct way, period, much as we see with pilots.

You seem to think that if a controller asks a pilot operating under IFR if he can maintain his own terrain separation, and replies yes, that relieves the controller of all terrain separation responsibilities.

Remember , this flight was IFR all the way. The pilot was not conducting a VFR climb, he couldn't even climb. He did NOT request a VFR climb nor did he receive one. And he was not a VFR requesting IFR.

Show me one rule in the 7110.65 that could be interpreted to make what you think is true under the given circumstances.
 
It's tough to say, i would say if you advise on initial contact that conditions are VMC up to the MIA, there shouldn't be a problem issuing you a clearance.
But what if conditions aren't VMC up to the MIA, but I can still maintain terrain and obstruction clearance in the climb? (e.g., by following the ODP, or because I'm already above the highest obstacle along my route)

Apparently they have a problem with that situation when picking up the clearance airborne, and I'm not sure why.
 
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You seem to think that if a controller asks a pilot operating under IFR if he can maintain his own terrain separation, and replies yes, that relieves the controller of all terrain separation responsibilities.

Remember , this flight was IFR all the way. The pilot was not conducting a VFR climb, he couldn't even climb. He did NOT request a VFR climb nor did he receive one. And he was not a VFR requesting IFR.

Show me one rule in the 7110.65 that could be interpreted to make what you think is true under the given circumstances.
No, I'm not going to go through .65 looking for some rule because for all practical purposes it doesn't matter to me as a pilot. I'm not going to run into terrain that I can see or avoid in other ways because I might think terrain separation is the controller's responsibility. If I do by mistake it will be my fault.
 
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Call the facility, the number is published. Ask to speak to the Quality Assurance department. That is the only way you will find out.

(This was meant for Azure)
 
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Call the facility, the number is published. Ask to speak to the Quality Assurance department. That is the only way you will find out.

(This was meant for Azure)

A better idea would be to tour the facility, and ask the controllers while on the tour.
 
I was at the airport that morning / afternoon... Snow squalls blew through all day... Strong winds dictated the pilots decision to depart to the south..

In hindsite, he should have departed with a tailwind and done the second route... He would be still with us today..:rolleyes:

I've been thinking about what my response would have been to the weather information that was available prior to this flight. I'm pretty sure the forecast of moderate icing would have been enough to make me wait for a better day. At least I hope so. Also, the NTSB report is a little vague about the winds aloft forecast, but if thirty knots at mountain top level was in the forecast, that also would have been enough to make me postpone the flight.

The report says that the weather wasn't good enough for significant search activity until two days later.

By the way, here is a Skyvector plot that ends at the approximate crash location:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.4099945....KICNE:G.43.1618757316215,-109.56011247140587
 
Yeah, I have noticed that before but it's especially apparent in this thread. ATC as a whole is more standardized than pilots or operators but there are definitely regional and individual interpretations of .65. And there are ATC folks who think their way is the correct way, period, much as we see with pilots.

100 % correct. I don't hold it against those ATC folk, however. I've seen what the FAA was capable of years ago, when a punitive culture existed between controllers and management/QA. Heck, during some of the worst of those times, I had an airspace violation. I had a DC9 veered 3 miles east of the centerline of V11 between MZZ and FWA. I caught the error, turned the aircraft back on course, but the aircraft already flew within 2.5 NM of the neighboring sector boundary without approved coordination. I admitted to my supervisor that I didn't catch the error in time, and should have taken action earlier, or affected coordination sooner.

My supervisor recommended decertification, meaning I had to re-enter training to be eligible to work traffic again. The justification was, "you didn't catch the error quick enough."

After seeing things like that, paranoia ran rampant among some controllers. More than a few controllers developed a rigid "by the book" philosophy. Follow the book to the letter, common sense and safety be damned. As a result, services and efficiency suffered dramatically.

In 2008 the culture began to change, for the better in my opinion. The FAA and NATCA collaboratively worked together to create ATSAP (Air Traffic Safety Action Program), a new recurrent training program, and revamped the previously abysmal refresher training program. Controllers who self-reported using ATSAP were protected from any Agency disciplinary or negative action, provided the actions they were involved in didn't result from gross negligence or illegal activity. If ATSAP discovered a systemic problem in a facility, ATSAP had the ability to require that facility's management to undergo refresher training for the workforce. If ATSAP discovered a systemic regional/national problem, ATSAP had the ability to help create recurrent training classes to be held in each facility.

The purpose of these and other programs was to move from a punitive culture in the FAA into a just culture, or safety culture. Instead of going after the controller, figure out if there might be a systemic problem, and tackle the problem head on. Some haven't been able to accept the change in culture, both from the management side and the controller side. It happens...but they are now in the extreme minority.
 
I've been thinking about what my response would have been to the weather information that was available prior to this flight. I'm pretty sure the forecast of moderate icing would have been enough to make me wait for a better day. At least I hope so. Also, the NTSB report is a little vague about the winds aloft forecast, but if thirty knots at mountain top level was in the forecast, that also would have been enough to make me postpone the flight.

The report says that the weather wasn't good enough for significant search activity until two days later.

By the way, here is a Skyvector plot that ends at the approximate crash location:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.4099945....KICNE:G.43.1618757316215,-109.56011247140587

If he had gone on his filed routing over DNW, do you think he would have still caught a mountain wave, or would it be as severe? The terrain looks at lot less ominous on his filed route.
 
100 % correct. I don't hold it against those ATC folk, however. I've seen what the FAA was capable of years ago, when a punitive culture existed between controllers and management/QA. Heck, during some of the worst of those times, I had an airspace violation. I had a DC9 veered 3 miles east of the centerline of V11 between MZZ and FWA. I caught the error, turned the aircraft back on course, but the aircraft already flew within 2.5 NM of the neighboring sector boundary without approved coordination. I admitted to my supervisor that I didn't catch the error in time, and should have taken action earlier, or affected coordination sooner.

My supervisor recommended decertification, meaning I had to re-enter training to be eligible to work traffic again. The justification was, "you didn't catch the error quick enough."

After seeing things like that, paranoia ran rampant among some controllers. More than a few controllers developed a rigid "by the book" philosophy. Follow the book to the letter, common sense and safety be damned. As a result, services and efficiency suffered dramatically.

In 2008 the culture began to change, for the better in my opinion. The FAA and NATCA collaboratively worked together to create ATSAP (Air Traffic Safety Action Program), a new recurrent training program, and revamped the previously abysmal refresher training program. Controllers who self-reported using ATSAP were protected from any Agency disciplinary or negative action, provided the actions they were involved in didn't result from gross negligence or illegal activity. If ATSAP discovered a systemic problem in a facility, ATSAP had the ability to require that facility's management to undergo refresher training for the workforce. If ATSAP discovered a systemic regional/national problem, ATSAP had the ability to help create recurrent training classes to be held in each facility.

The purpose of these and other programs was to move from a punitive culture in the FAA into a just culture, or safety culture. Instead of going after the controller, figure out if there might be a systemic problem, and tackle the problem head on. Some haven't been able to accept the change in culture, both from the management side and the controller side. It happens...but they are now in the extreme minority.

What utter BS. It doesn't matter what the stated purpose of ATSAP is, what matters is the result. And the result is basically no performance accountability .

When I started the job, you had three errors in a 30 month period and you were done. They would find an office job for the indivual. Punitive ? It is a safety related occupation.

We weren't running around paranoid, most controllers loved their job. It is down right embarrassing what goes on now.

Thank God TCAS came along before things really started going down hill.
 
If he had gone on his filed routing over DNW, do you think he would have still caught a mountain wave, or would it be as severe? The terrain looks at lot less ominous on his filed route.
If you want to play that game, the departure going north has an even steeper climb gradient. It's 450'/nm to 14,000 or 4400-3 for climb in visual conditions. Since the weather was not 4400-3 he would have had to climb at an average of 563 fpm at 75 knots or 750 fpm at 100 knots all the way to 14,000. He would have been taking off with a tailwind so 100 knots groundspeed would definitely be plausible. You also don't know if there was potentially more icing in that direction.
 
What utter BS. It doesn't matter what the stated purpose of ATSAP is, what matters is the result. And the result is basically no performance accountability .

When I started the job, you had three errors in a 30 month period and you were done. They would find an office job for the indivual. Punitive ? It is a safety related occupation.

We weren't running around paranoid, most controllers loved their job. It is down right embarrassing what goes on now.

Thank God TCAS came along before things really started going down hill.
I'll bet you feel the same way about programs such as the NASA report for pilots, and the ASAP programs for airline pilots....

I'll say, that as a pilot, I'm glad that ATC has these kinds of programs too.
 
If you want to play that game, the departure going north has an even steeper climb gradient. It's 450'/nm to 14,000 or 4400-3 for climb in visual conditions. Since the weather was not 4400-3 he would have had to climb at an average of 563 fpm at 75 knots or 750 fpm at 100 knots all the way to 14,000. He would have been taking off with a tailwind so 100 knots groundspeed would definitely be plausible. You also don't know if there was potentially more icing in that direction.

I already suggested a routing option that would have been appropriate for the pilots filed altitude. Fly the SID, at KCINE, reverse course back on the SID radial, then proceed as filed over the lower terrain .
 
If he had gone on his filed routing over DNW, do you think he would have still caught a mountain wave, or would it be as severe? The terrain looks at lot less ominous on his filed route.


The filed route would require the aircraft to climb 8,000 feet in 22 miles. Assuming a climb speed of 80 knots, the mooney would travel that distance in just over 16 minutes. That would require the mooney to climb at a sustained 485 FPM rate to legally cross DNW at the MEA altitude of 14,000. The POH for the mooney states it would climb at a rate of 350 FPM between 9,000 and 14,000 in ideal conditions.

The cleared route, on the other hand, requires the mooney to be out of 14,000 in more than twice that distance.
 
I'll bet you feel the same way about programs such as the NASA report for pilots, and the ASAP programs for airline pilots....



I'll say, that as a pilot, I'm glad that ATC has these kinds of programs too.


Again, folks like vintage Cessna are in the extreme minority, which is why I take his "editorials" with a grain of salt.
 
I already suggested a routing option that would have been appropriate for the pilots filed altitude. Fly the SID, at KCINE, reverse course back on the SID radial, then proceed as filed over the lower terrain .


If your suggestion were a good one, why wouldn't the TETON SID include such a transition?
 
I'll bet you feel the same way about programs such as the NASA report for pilots, and the ASAP programs for airline pilots....

I'll say, that as a pilot, I'm glad that ATC has these kinds of programs too.

I know the NASA form may be able to get you one free get out of jail card. ATSAP is unlimited.
 
I already suggested a routing option that would have been appropriate for the pilots filed altitude. Fly the SID, at KCINE, reverse course back on the SID radial, then proceed as filed over the lower terrain .
And I'm suggesting that the pilot should have never taken off at all. I don't know how busy KJAC was at the time but having the Mooney reverse course like that might be holding up other traffic on the Teton departure.
 
I know the NASA form may be able to get you one free get out of jail card. ATSAP is unlimited.
I'm pretty sure ASAP for airline pilots gets you out of a violation too, unless whatever you did was obviously intentional.
 
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