Controller responding Negative to canceling radar services?

It was a long time in the past but I know that I would sometimes take off from an airport on the Front Range, IFR from the ground, then get vectored back and forth when going westbound because the airplane didn't have the climb capability to get right to the MIA. To avoid this zig-zagging I would ask for a VFR climb maintaining my own terrain separation. I can't remember being denied.

A VFR climb is a different animal. A pilot operating on an IFR clearance who is in VFR conditions can request a VFR climb. The instruction will likely include altitude limits; "climb VFR between 14,000 and 16,000", but would not likely include any mention of terrain or obstructions. The pilot would have to have VFR minimum visibility and cloud clearance up to 16,000. The pilot in this case made no such request and was not so cleared.
 
The intent was not to go to a VFR flight. It was to stay on the IFR flight plan, which I did.

Yes, requesting a VFR climb is like a self-cancelling VFR-on-Top clearance. You operate as a VFR flight within the restrictions of your clearance. If it's "climb VFR between 14,000 and 16,000" you would have to maintain VFR conditions between those altitudes. You would be responsible for avoiding terrain, obstacles, and other aircraft.
 
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A VFR climb is a different animal. A pilot operating on an IFR clearance who is in VFR conditions can request a VFR climb. The instruction will likely include altitude limits; "climb VFR between 14,000 and 16,000", but would not likely include any mention of terrain or obstructions. The pilot would have to have VFR minimum visibility and cloud clearance up to 16,000. The pilot in this case made no such request and was not so cleared.

I acknowledged that in post #359 and said that was the only questionable element. We don't know what the visibility or cloud clearance was and neither did the controller. They only knew that the pilot said that he could maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance.
 
Buddy.....

The controller asked him if he could provide terrain separation... He said YES... Once he cleared the Wind River Range , it was all down hill for the rest of the flight.. he planned on a fuel and bathroom stop in KRAP / Rapid City SD and then home to KMSP...

He was on a IFR fight with a VFR climb on course... Totally legal..:yes::yes:

He was under 180 , so not is Alpha airspace....

He screwed up and hit the far side of the mountain, not the front side...

He had CLEARED the highest terrain...

What part of " he screwed up" don't you get..:confused::confused::confused::confused::dunno:

Negative. The pilot did not request and did not receive a VFR climb. When the question, "...are you able to maintain your own terrain and obstruction clearance until reaching [altitude]?", is asked in the correct situation the IFR clearance that follows does not require the pilot to maintain VFR conditions until reaching the MIA. The question is being asked because it's already known that the pilot cannot climb in VFR conditions to the MIA.
 
You have got to be kidding me.

It took four people and almost 20 posts to get you to figure out that everyone is talking about a simple IFR aircraft VFR climb. You also admitted in previous posts that we can't know for sure whether or not the ZLC controller assigned 16,000 or 14,000 feet. Yet you continue to assume the worst out of the controller. Not unlike how you've assumed the worst out of controllers in all your previous posts (avoid FF to be "safe," no controller accountability, unnecessary vectors, worsening/rock bottom work culture, lavish pay/benefits).

Which makes me wonder: did you spend your years in the FAA working traffic, or did you spend your time watching (and auditing) others work traffic?

Instead of arguing worthless drivel, try adding something constructive. Like a suggestion of a correct procedure to get the desired outcome.

"N123, climb V F R at pilot discretion to 16,000."

This incident did not involve a VFR climb.
 
I can see how it could prevent delays in climb/descent and eliviate the need for circuitous routes to reach MIA/MEA. But I don't think it allows the controller to assign an altitude lower than the MEA/MIA, nor allow an IFR flight to continue on a route below MEA/MIA once it becomes apparent the pilot can't reach MEA/MIA. And it can't be initiated by the controller.

Guess I got off subject. Was just scanning through and read a few of the posts about "VFR Climb". It does not relieve the controller from the responsibility to assign appropriate altitudes. Just like Special VFR and Contact Approaches it can only be done at Pilot Request.
 
His explanation is wrong.
I don't think so, but I am not going to argue technical controller points here. I'll just say that when a pilot takes back responsibility for their own terrain and obstruction clearance it is all on the pilot.
 
Consider it from the pilot's perspective, "if the controller said it, it must be ok." Pilots aren't required to know the limitations of 7110.65, therefore typically don't. While the controller may not be allowed to do some things, that does not preclude them from happening, and there is little guidance in the pilot end of the learning material that delves into what the controller may and may not do.

Sure. That's why forums like this should be useful in helping pilots learn that not everything that controllers do is correct. But this discussion shows that they aren't.
 
I don't think so, but I am not going to argue technical controller points here. I'll just say that when a pilot takes back responsibility for their own terrain and obstruction clearance it is all on the pilot.

I hear what everyone is saying about the pilot. Given the wx and limitations of his aircraft he probably should have asked for different routing or perhaps not even departed.

But ask yourself , if a friend or loved one was on that plane would you not be asking the FAA why an IFR flight that was 2000 below MIA allowed to get that far?
 
I acknowledged that in post #359 and said that was the only questionable element. We don't know what the visibility or cloud clearance was and neither did the controller. They only knew that the pilot said that he could maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance.

I think we know more than that. I think we know the pilot did not request and did not receive a VFR climb.
 
I don't think so, but I am not going to argue technical controller points here. I'll just say that when a pilot takes back responsibility for their own terrain and obstruction clearance it is all on the pilot.

No ****.
 
Consider it from the pilot's perspective, "if the controller said it, it must be ok." Pilots aren't required to know the limitations of 7110.65, therefore typically don't. While the controller may not be allowed to do some things, that does not preclude them from happening, and there is little guidance in the pilot end of the learning material that delves into what the controller may and may not do.

Which is why there are changes in the 7110.65 from time to time. Like how to handle VFR pop ups below MIA, some pilots would make the wrong assumption about terrain clearance responsibility.
 
But ask yourself , if a friend or loved one was on that plane would you not be asking the FAA why an IFR flight that was 2000 below MIA allowed to get that far?
I would have questioned it, but in the end I would have come to the conclusion that my friend or loved one was more to blame than ATC.
 
Negative. The pilot did not request and did not receive a VFR climb. When the question, "...are you able to maintain your own terrain and obstruction clearance until reaching [altitude]?", is asked in the correct situation the IFR clearance that follows does not require the pilot to maintain VFR conditions until reaching the MIA. The question is being asked because it's already known that the pilot cannot climb in VFR conditions to the MIA.
This is a point that has often confused me. When I've been asked that question, the clearance that followed has usually been worded as "Upon reaching <altitude>, cleared to..." where <altitude> is the altitude up to which I was asked if I could maintain my own terrain and obstruction clearance (and which I'm pretty sure is the MIA, typically 5400 around here). That seems to imply that I'd have to maintain VFR until reaching the MIA anyway.

There was one time I rather irritatedly replied that I was unable to maintain VFR to that altitude and the controller asked me to stand by, maintain VFR, and that he'd get back to me with a clearance in a few miles. I'm really not sure what was going on there, but I leveled off and waited for the clearance, which did come as promised and without an "upon reaching" limitation.

If it makes a difference, the facility is ZBW and these exchanges happened roughly between MPV and LEB.

Sorry for the thread divert here, but as you note, there's a lot of confusion among pilots on these issues (including, maybe especially me), and it might be useful to clear this up.
 
I don't think so, but I am not going to argue technical controller points here. I'll just say that when a pilot takes back responsibility for their own terrain and obstruction clearance it is all on the pilot.

Correct, actually the situational awareness for the route is always the pilot's responsibility. However what is confused here as with all these threads is the distinction and differences between responsibility and liability. One does not infer 100% of the other. Liability is proportional under our law. Just because you do not have responsibility, that does not necessarily absolve you of liability. That is why 7110.65 exists. For those controllers that say the FAA is not liability conscious, my experience with my 44709 ride says otherwise. They could have settled it very simply, and properly, on oral grounds since the issue was one of running myself too far into fatigue, the landing itself was perfect, just no wheels.:lol: it took a lot of effort and BS on their part to accomplish 3 laps around the pattern and .6 in a plane, and it was all over liability consciousness as per the head of the FSDO on counsel's advice. I held a CPL, we had to get in a plane, otherwise if I get a flying job and crash a plane, they would have a proportion of liability for not following the procedure as laid out. Had I had a PP, 'Incident closed with counseling of airman.' It took them 8 months to get that ride done.
 
This is a point that has often confused me. When I've been asked that question, the clearance that followed has usually been worded as "Upon reaching <altitude>, cleared to..." where <altitude> is the altitude up to which I was asked if I could maintain my own terrain and obstruction clearance (and which I'm pretty sure is the MIA, typically 5400 around here). That seems to imply that I'd have to maintain VFR until reaching the MIA anyway.

There was one time I rather irritatedly replied that I was unable to maintain VFR to that altitude and the controller asked me to stand by, maintain VFR, and that he'd get back to me with a clearance in a few miles. I'm really not sure what was going on there, but I leveled off and waited for the clearance, which did come as promised and without an "upon reaching" limitation.

If it makes a difference, the facility is ZBW and these exchanges happened roughly between MPV and LEB.

Sorry for the thread divert here, but as you note, there's a lot of confusion among pilots on these issues (including, maybe especially me), and it might be useful to clear this up.

How you get to MIA will be up to you. If the terrain/obstacle condition is such that you determine you couldn't safely make it in IMC (if that condition prevails) then you should wait. If you are intimately familiar with the area and have the right equipment maybe you feel you good safely reach MIA in the soup.

As I said earlier, ATC , previous to the change to the 7110.65 didn't have to ask that question of the pilot. I suspect a VFR pop up pranged into something that led to the change.

There have also been instances where VFR pilots departed under marginal conditions , requested IFR and didn't get it, leading to tragic consequences.
 
I plotted the routes he filed and the route he was given on Skyvector. The results are most illuminating. (I should have done this sooner.)

His first filed route:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.4537681...rt=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:V.K1.DNW:V.K1.BOY

His second filed route:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.5154123...rt=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:V.K1.DNW:V.K1.RIW

His second filed route seems a bit better for terrain avoidance than the first.

The route he was cleared for:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.5179618...=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:F.K1.KICNE:V.K1.RIW

The cleared route had the advantage of allowing a lot more time for the initial climb, but had the disadvantage of taking him right over the highest terrain in the area. :eek: Both of his filed routes had their highest MEAs at 14,000 feet, which he was able to get to, but the cleared route required about 16,000 feet, which he wasn't able to get to. Flying over a ridge with only 200 feet to spare, with winds over 30 knots at about a right angle to the ridge, is not a recipe for survival. It's hard to say whether the downdrafts on his filed route would have been manageable, but he would have had an additional 3,000 feet or so of terrain clearance, if he had enough performance to average 300 feet per nautical mile to 14,000.

We don't know whether he plotted his clearance on a VFR chart, but if he had, it seems like he would have seen the problem, and could have proposed a safer alternative. Given the mountain wave conditions, diverting well south to RKS would have been justified, although it probably would have been preferable to wait for more benign wind conditions.

http://skyvector.com/?ll=42.9615668...9&plan=V.K1.JAC:F.K1.KICNE:A.K1.KRKS:V.K1.DDY
 
This is a point that has often confused me. When I've been asked that question, the clearance that followed has usually been worded as "Upon reaching <altitude>, cleared to..." where <altitude> is the altitude up to which I was asked if I could maintain my own terrain and obstruction clearance (and which I'm pretty sure is the MIA, typically 5400 around here). That seems to imply that I'd have to maintain VFR until reaching the MIA anyway.

There was one time I rather irritatedly replied that I was unable to maintain VFR to that altitude and the controller asked me to stand by, maintain VFR, and that he'd get back to me with a clearance in a few miles. I'm really not sure what was going on there, but I leveled off and waited for the clearance, which did come as promised and without an "upon reaching" limitation.

If it makes a difference, the facility is ZBW and these exchanges happened roughly between MPV and LEB.

Sorry for the thread divert here, but as you note, there's a lot of confusion among pilots on these issues (including, maybe especially me), and it might be useful to clear this up.

The terrain / obstruction question ATC is asking you, should only be asked AFTER you already informed them that you are unable to maintain VMC until reaching the MIA. If you can maintain your own terrain / obstruction clearance while IMC and below the MIA, they can issue the clearance. Really shouldn't be much of a delay involved.
 
I plotted the routes he filed and the route he was given on Skyvector. The results are most illuminating. (I should have done this sooner.)

His first filed route:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.4537681...rt=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:V.K1.DNW:V.K1.BOY

His second filed route:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.5154123...rt=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:V.K1.DNW:V.K1.RIW

His second filed route seems a bit better for terrain avoidance than the first.

The route he was cleared for:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.5179618...=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:F.K1.KICNE:V.K1.RIW

The cleared route had the advantage of allowing a lot more time for the initial climb, but had the disadvantage of taking him right over the highest terrain in the area. :eek: Both of his filed routes had their highest MEAs at 14,000 feet, which he was able to get to, but the cleared route required about 16,000 feet, which he wasn't able to get to. Flying over a ridge with only 200 feet to spare, with winds over 30 knots at about a right angle to the ridge, is not a recipe for survival. It's hard to say whether the downdrafts on his filed route would have been manageable, but he would have had an additional 3,000 feet or so of terrain clearance, if he had enough performance to average 300 feet per nautical mile to 14,000.

We don't know whether he plotted his clearance on a VFR chart, but if he had, it seems like he would have seen the problem, and could have proposed a safer alternative. Given the mountain wave conditions, diverting well south to RKS would have been justified, although it probably would have been preferable to wait for more benign wind conditions.

http://skyvector.com/?ll=42.9615668...9&plan=V.K1.JAC:F.K1.KICNE:A.K1.KRKS:V.K1.DDY

What was the actual weather? Looks like he was flying down wind through a wave, he would make it over no worries, it's the far side that's gonna slam him down.
 
I plotted the routes he filed and the route he was given on Skyvector. The results are most illuminating. (I should have done this sooner.)

His first filed route:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.4537681...rt=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:V.K1.DNW:V.K1.BOY

His second filed route:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.5154123...rt=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:V.K1.DNW:V.K1.RIW

His second filed route seems a bit better for terrain avoidance than the first.

The route he was cleared for:

http://skyvector.com/?ll=43.5179618...=301&zoom=6&plan=V.K1.JAC:F.K1.KICNE:V.K1.RIW

The cleared route had the advantage of allowing a lot more time for the initial climb, but had the disadvantage of taking him right over the highest terrain in the area. :eek: Both of his filed routes had their highest MEAs at 14,000 feet, which he was able to get to, but the cleared route required about 16,000 feet, which he wasn't able to get to. Flying over a ridge with only 200 feet to spare, with winds over 30 knots at about a right angle to the ridge, is not a recipe for survival. It's hard to say whether the downdrafts on his filed route would have been manageable, but he would have had an additional 3,000 feet or so of terrain clearance, if he had enough performance to average 300 feet per nautical mile to 14,000.

We don't know whether he plotted his clearance on a VFR chart, but if he had, it seems like he would have seen the problem, and could have proposed a safer alternative. Given the mountain wave conditions, diverting well south to RKS would have been justified, although it probably would have been preferable to wait for more benign wind conditions.

http://skyvector.com/?ll=42.9615668...9&plan=V.K1.JAC:F.K1.KICNE:A.K1.KRKS:V.K1.DDY

Yeah, he wasn't vectored into terrain but he was certainly re routed to higher terrain. He probably was aware of the MEA on his filed route, but since the reroute was off airway who knows what he knew. Another option would be once to KICNE, reverse course back up the SID radial and then go on the filed course. I think he was cleared the SID to KICNE becuase there was no other way to get him out.

One thing that puzzles me about this accident and why I would really like to see the ATC transcript, is that he was flat and level at 140 for a long time.
 
This is a key point. This was not a case of being vectored into terrain. This was a case of flying an aircraft with inadequate performance for the conditions, and in conditions that were conducive to downdrafts that were too strong for the airplane to handle. ATC did not make him do that. The winds at mountain top level were over thirty knots, for crying out loud. :eek:

BINGO.....:thumbsup::thumbsup:
 
BINGO.....:thumbsup::thumbsup:

Well, except for the fact that I wrote that before plotting the routes on Skyvector, and discovered that he had been rerouted over the highest terrain in the area. So while it's true that he was killed by mountain wave rather than CFIT, the downdrafts could have been more manageable at a lower crossing point.
 
One thing that puzzles me about this accident and why I would really like to see the ATC transcript, is that he was flat and level at 140 for a long time.

If you look at my third link to the VFR chart, it's clear that 14,000 was above the 91.177(a)(2) minimum altitude until he got within four nautical miles of the ridge.
 
Yeah, he wasn't vectored into terrain but he was certainly re routed to higher terrain. He probably was aware of the MEA on his filed route, but since the reroute was off airway who knows what he knew. Another option would be once to KICNE, reverse course back up the SID radial and then go on the filed course. I think he was cleared the SID to KICNE becuase there was no other way to get him out.

One thing that puzzles me about this accident and why I would really like to see the ATC transcript, is that he was flat and level at 140 for a long time.

140 likely clears the terrain. With a strong tailwind in the mountains, I doubt he had any trouble clearing terrain. I would hazard to guess he didn't have O2 therefor didn't take the climb he would have had and put the nose down for airspeed to maintain the lower crossing instead. This can leave you in a dangerous spot in the lee side rotor though. Safest thing in those conditions is turn parallel to the ridge and drop down a couple hundred feet in the lee and fly along to break out on the windward side of a peak. What you want to do is keep yourself in the leeward eddy until the edge of the next lenticular would form, and sneak out at that junction where the rotor will be most diffused, then dive down while you go through it to get out as quick as possible.

I don't know if this guy had O2 or not, but I meet a lot of guys who fly in the mountains without it. I hope that wasn't part of the accident chain here, but I see people taking that risk frequently. You may not need O2 to fly in the mountains, but not having it reduces the options that may be most critical to take.

No one should be dying in this accident if there was VMC present, which given the winds, is likely, but I'm not sure. Heck even if IMC existed with a tailwind like that, the conditions would have existed that he would clear any terrain by force of nature. If that was a typical WNW wind blowing 30-40, the upslope wind profile would have taken him to 190 easy. Always climb with the lift, and dive out of the sink. Nature has the ability to drive you up or down past the plane's capability to compensate, so rather than fight nature, ride with her. Thing is, to confidently exercise that option, you need pressure or O2.
 
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This is a point that has often confused me. When I've been asked that question, the clearance that followed has usually been worded as "Upon reaching <altitude>, cleared to..." where <altitude> is the altitude up to which I was asked if I could maintain my own terrain and obstruction clearance (and which I'm pretty sure is the MIA, typically 5400 around here). That seems to imply that I'd have to maintain VFR until reaching the MIA anyway.

You are correct. You would be without an IFR clearance until you climbed to the MIA so that climb would require VFR conditions. Mystifying, because the controller is required to ask the question only when he's aware aircraft are unable to climb in VFR conditions to the MIA.
 
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The terrain / obstruction question ATC is asking you, should only be asked AFTER you already informed them that you are unable to maintain VMC until reaching the MIA. If you can maintain your own terrain / obstruction clearance while IMC and below the MIA, they can issue the clearance. Really shouldn't be much of a delay involved.

Some controllers seem to ask this question whenever a VFR aircraft requests an IFR clearance while airborne. Even when the pilot calls moments after he's departed an airport from which he's filed an IFR flight plan.
 
Another option would be once to KICNE, reverse course back up the SID radial and then go on the filed course. I think he was cleared the SID to KICNE becuase there was no other way to get him out.

I thought about that too. Maybe the extra 3,000 feet of terrain clearance would have been enough to save him, but when it's me flying, I don't like "maybe"s. With that much wind aloft, I would go far enough south to bypass that mountain range altogether, or else wait for better conditions.
 
Well, except for the fact that I wrote that before plotting the routes on Skyvector, and discovered that he had been rerouted over the highest terrain in the area. So while it's true that he was killed by mountain wave rather than CFIT, the downdrafts could have been more manageable at a lower crossing point.

Agreed.....

And,,, the rerouting was at the PILOTS request,, the tower just amended the initial route...

That is why I don't get tower guy being thrown under the bus...:confused::confused::confused:..
 
And,,, the rerouting was at the PILOTS request,, the tower just amended the initial route...

Where do you see a mention of the pilot requesting that? It was much different from his second filed route.
 
If you look at my third link to the VFR chart, it's clear that 14,000 was above the 91.177(a)(2) minimum altitude until he got within four nautical miles of the ridge.

Yes. Also, the Tower controller must have been aware of the higher MIA on the reroute becuase he amended the filed altitude of 140 to 160. He asked the pilot if he could accept 160. The pilot didn't say no, but did say he preferred 140, and the Tower controller changed it back to 140.

After KICNE the controller changed the route to the next closest fix on the FP, to shorten up the route I suppose.

But , this guy was level at 140 for quite some time, and nothing is said by the pilot or controller about altitude until the MSAW alert.
 
Where do you see a mention of the pilot requesting that? It was much different from his second filed route.
I was at the airport that morning / afternoon... Snow squalls blew through all day... Strong winds dictated the pilots decision to depart to the south..

In hindsite, he should have departed with a tailwind and done the second route... He would be still with us today..:rolleyes:
 
Yes. Also, the Tower controller must have been aware of the higher MIA on the reroute becuase he amended the filed altitude of 140 to 160. He asked the pilot if he could accept 160. The pilot didn't say no, but did say he preferred 140, and the Tower controller changed it back to 140.

After KICNE the controller changed the route to the next closest fix on the FP, to shorten up the route I suppose.

But , this guy was level at 140 for quite some time, and nothing is said by the pilot or controller about altitude until the MSAW alert.

I don't know why he would have waited for an MSAW alert to issue a climb instruction, but the distance from KICNE to the ridge was over 50 miles.
 
I don't know why he would have waited for an MSAW alert to issue a climb instruction, but the distance from KICNE to the ridge was over 50 miles.

There are two most likely possibilities. One, the controller thought the pilot was cleared to 160, but wasn't. Two , the pilot was cleared to 160 but never climbed above 140.

On either scenario , why did the pilot fly so long flat and level at 140, with nothing being said by either party?
 
I don't know why he would have waited for an MSAW alert to issue a climb instruction, but the distance from KICNE to the ridge was over 50 miles.


I think that was the segment of the flight when the radar outage happened...

We are also guessing he was carrying a load of ice and was too embarrassed to admit it to anyone...

Further speculation is he was NOT in VFR conditions but assumed he was barely high enough to clear the terrain and that no one would be the wiser..
 
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I think that was the segment of the flight when the radar outage happened...

We are also guessing he was carrying a load of ice and was too embarrassed to admit it to anyone...

Further speculation is he was NOT in VFR conditions but assumed he was barely high enough to clear the terrain and that no one would be the wiser..

Except for in a rotor cloud, how much low IMC do you see around there with winds like that? I agree that accepting a routing that put him over the highest terrain was foolish. If I am correct in understanding that the route flown was a route issued, not filed for, then I completely concur that the controller was negligent in issuing that routing and bears liability.
 
I think that was the segment of the flight when the radar outage happened...

We are also guessing he was carrying a load of ice and was too embarrassed to admit it to anyone...

Further speculation is he was NOT in VFR conditions but assumed he was barely high enough to clear the terrain and that no one would be the wiser..

At 1336, he is last observed on radar at 140. At 1340, the pilot makes a report to FSS that he is level at 140. At 1346, he appears back on radar level at 140. He hasn't even moved a couple of hundred feet.

If he was cleared to 160, he said nothing at that point to the controller that he was topped out and couldn't go any higher.

If the controller had cleared the aircraft to 160, and the last observed altitude was 140, once the flight goes non radar you should start asking for reports. Report leaving 150 ( would give an indication of the progress of the climb), report reaching 160, report x miles west of xxx ( some point prior to change in MIA).

Just difficult to understand why this flight got to the point it did.
 
After reading the report, I would say that it only summarized the interaction between the pilot and controller so we can't really say what their actual conversation was. During the period the airplane was out of radar coverage the controller may have assumed that the pilot was climbing at the minimum IFR climb gradient for enroute. Above 10,000' it is 100' per nm.
 
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