Bismarck Air Medical crash, 11/18/2018

[Everskyward]

When I started flying the Commander wasn’t all that long after the Air France crash. The chief pilot said “you don’t push the nose down when you stall a turbine. They have enough power to get out of it.” I looked at him and said “Have you read the reports on that Air France crash?” I didn’t agree with his recommendation.

They ended up changing the way they teach stall recoveries in turbines, at least where I was trained. The original goal was not to lose (or gain) any altitude. It was more of an aircraft control maneuver than a stall recovery. Then they discovered it was teaching the wrong reaction, especially when someone stalled inadvertently.

 

[Kristin]

When I started flying the Commander wasn’t all that long after the Air France crash. The chief pilot said “you don’t push the nose down when you stall a turbine. They have enough power to get out of it.” I looked at him and said “Have you read the reports on that Air France crash?” I didn’t agree with his recommendation.

Airplane is an airplane and you have to reduce the angle of attack to break a stall. Relying purely on power seems to risk the aircraft pitching up further and negating the added power to reduce the angle of attack. Even without that, additional power, at least in what I have flown, takes longer to break the stall than does reducing the pitch attitude. IMX, every airplane needs a different set of control inputs to optimally recover from a stall. I think that is why training is generally mandated to check out in new aircraft.

 

[bbchien]

Doesn't autopilot operations and sudden LOC in winter cloud remind us of Roselawn, IN?

 

[Tarheelpilot]

When I started flying the Commander wasn’t all that long after the Air France crash. The chief pilot said “you don’t push the nose down when you stall a turbine. They have enough power to get out of it.” I looked at him and said “Have you read the reports on that Air France crash?” I didn’t agree with his recommendation.

I don’t agree with either of you.

 

[Tarheelpilot]

They ended up changing the way they teach stall recoveries in turbines, at least where I was trained. The original goal was not to lose (or gain) any altitude. It was more of an aircraft control maneuver than a stall recovery. Then they discovered it was teaching the wrong reaction, especially when someone stalled inadvertently.

Everyone made those changes per FAA “request”

 

[Bill]

I have had people be aghast that I would hand fly an ILS to minimums. I, frankly, would not trust my family to a pilot that can't hand fly an ILS to minimums without breaking a sweat.

I’ll use my Ap at altitude, but keep very weary eye on it close to the ground. It’s old and I’ve seen it so some bizarre things. I might keep it on until I intercept the LOC or gps inbound, but inside the FAF? Not just no, but hell no. I trust myself far more than that old box of electronics.

 

[GRG55]

The modern over-reliance on the autopilot for light aircraft operations is problematic IMO. I have had people be aghast that I would hand fly an ILS to minimums. I, frankly, would not trust my family to a pilot that can't hand fly an ILS to minimums without breaking a sweat. Having served a couple of stints as a 135 check pilot, I could always tell which of my pilots used the autopilots too much. The checkrides always terrified them.

Agree. In aviation it's about contingent redundancy - we have dual magnetos, back up batteries for those lovely glass panels, back up instruments, alternate ways to get the gear extended, two comm radios, sometimes multiple engines, yada, yada.

The only redundant system for the autopilot is the human pilot. And if the human pilot can't do everything that the autopilot may become no longer capable of doing, including any approach the airplane is equipped to fly to published minimums, then there's insufficient redundancy.

This is a general observation, and in no way a commentary on the pilot in the tragic accident that is the original topic of this thread.

 

[GRG55]

When I started flying the Commander wasn’t all that long after the Air France crash. The chief pilot said “you don’t push the nose down when you stall a turbine. They have enough power to get out of it.” I looked at him and said “Have you read the reports on that Air France crash?” I didn’t agree with his recommendation.

Airplane is an airplane and you have to reduce the angle of attack to break a stall. Relying purely on power seems to risk the aircraft pitching up further and negating the added power to reduce the angle of attack. Even without that, additional power, at least in what I have flown, takes longer to break the stall than does reducing the pitch attitude. IMX, every airplane needs a different set of control inputs to optimally recover from a stall. I think that is why training is generally mandated to check out in new aircraft.

In the AF 447 incident I thought it was determined that the throttles were at full thrust and the airplane was still descending at about 10,000 feet per minute from more than 30,000 ft? Which would seem to prove your points...