aterpster
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Appears in today's Aviation Week eBulletin. Article appeared in BCA.
http://www.terps.com/be1900/padn.pdf
http://www.terps.com/be1900/padn.pdf
BE1900 CFIT in Alaska Last Year
- Thread starter aterpster
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dtuuri
Final Approach
I wonder what the "ask for direct, fly what you get" crowd has to say about this. 
dtuuri
dtuuri
Pedals2Paddles
Cleared for Takeoff
I wonder what the "ask for direct, fly what you get" crowd has to say about this.
dtuuri
Did you stop reading after you read the first line about asking for direct to the IAF? Because the rest of the report would have explained how going direct had nothing to do with the incident.
Turningfinal
Pre-takeoff checklist
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Turningfinal
^this^
John Collins
En-Route
I used this as an example of controllers clearing aircraft to fly charted procedures below the minimum charted altitudes at the most recent ATPAC last week. I personally received two clearances in the last few weeks to holding patterns at altitudes below the charted procedure minimum.
From the report, the aircraft was approximately 30 NM from the IAF fix and at or just inside the boundary of the TAA segment and at 5900 MSL. They received the clearance:
At the point the aircraft was at, the TAA charted minimum segment altitude is 5400 MSL and the aircraft was already on a published segment of the approach as the entire TAA segment is considered a published segment.
From the report, the aircraft was approximately 30 NM from the IAF fix and at or just inside the boundary of the TAA segment and at 5900 MSL. They received the clearance:
At the point the aircraft was at, the TAA charted minimum segment altitude is 5400 MSL and the aircraft was already on a published segment of the approach as the entire TAA segment is considered a published segment.
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Anyone have a link to the approach plate?
Not a good deal there, not good at all. Poor clearance and a lack of situational awareness on the part of the crew. You would think that after flying for them a few years the captain would have known that he was too low, I wonder what happened there...
John Collins
En-Route
The basic procedure is the same as the attached version back in August 2011 for Amendment 2. The only changes are in the circling notes.
View attachment padl rnav gps rwy 19.pdf
View attachment padl rnav gps rwy 19.pdf
dtuuri
Final Approach
They "flew what they got".
My point is, don't abdicate your responsibility to ATC. A more appropriate rhyme would be, "Don't file with neglect, don't trust what you get." In other words, do your homework, then stay on top of the situation.
dtuuri
Note the TWO designators for one aiport: DLG and PADL...they do that in Alaska.
roncachamp
Final Approach
In Illinois too; ORD and KORD. In 48 more states as well.
I thought ORD was the designator for the VOR and KORD the designator for the airport?
aterpster
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aterpster
I thought ORD was the designator for the VOR and KORD the designator for the airport?
Nope. ORD is the FAA designator, KORD is the ICAO designator.
Look at Maui: PHOG and OGG.
aterpster
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aterpster
All correct except the controller stated, "Maintain at or above 2,000" and the crew read back, "Maintain 2,000."
dtuuri
Final Approach
I thought ORD was the designator for the VOR and KORD the designator for the airport?
Technically, both are right. From Order 7350.8Y:
"At the same location, the same identifier may be assigned to one navigational aid (which must be located within the airport boundary), to the airport, to a manned air traffic control facility, and to an aviation weather station on the airport."
dtuuri
akpilot907
Pre-takeoff checklist
Aviation: A self cleansing fraternity...
jesse
Touchdown! Greaser!
That clearance that was given was worded in a way that would suggest the controller seriously thought 2,000 was safe when he issued it.
The crap about how he thought the airplane would do this or that, etc, etc, sounds like an attempt at covering his/her rather serious mistake.
Even with that mistake, the crew shouldn't have flown the plane into the ground cleared to do so or not.
The crap about how he thought the airplane would do this or that, etc, etc, sounds like an attempt at covering his/her rather serious mistake.
Even with that mistake, the crew shouldn't have flown the plane into the ground cleared to do so or not.
aterpster
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aterpster
It was a safe altitude until within a few miles of the airport. The center MIA charts are in the NTSB accident docket.
The NTSB didn't buy that, nor did FAA management. The ATC handbook is quite clear, too.
Yep, especially since they were well below the published TAA for the approach they had requested and been granted.
roncachamp
Final Approach
There was no need to include any altitude in the approach clearance as the aircraft was already within the TAA when that clearance was requested.
True.
azure
Final Approach
I'm not trying to shift more blame onto the controller than he deserves, but how could he expect the pilot to climb to 4300 to enter the hold if he hadn't noticed and wasn't aware that the plane had descended below 5400?
Dr. O
Pattern Altitude
Three trained people with certificates of competence and not a one noted that the airplane was below the published minimum altitude.
That is what we call complacency .
And the electronic warnings in both the cockpit and at the Center had to have been silenced. So besides complacency we have stupidity .
That is what we call complacency .
And the electronic warnings in both the cockpit and at the Center had to have been silenced. So besides complacency we have stupidity .
timwinters
Ejection Handle Pulled
Not to derail the thread but I know of numerous nav aids with the same identifier as the airport and that don't comply with what I bolded above.
Re: the accident. Read the article, reviewed the plate and had a real WTF? reaction. How they did this, I don't understand.
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John Collins
En-Route
At the time the clearance was issued, the aircraft was at 5900 MSL and reported to be 30 NM from the IAF. This puts the aircraft on a published segment of the approach with a minimum of 5400 feet, so "Maintain [Center controller dialing the DLG FSS] two thousand until a published segment of the approach Ace Air fifty-one" does not make any sense and points to the controller having a lack of knowledge of a TAA, or just as bad, clearing an aircraft to an altitude below the minimum charted altitude for an approach segment.
timwinters
Ejection Handle Pulled
Worse, according to the report, when the aircraft requested a hold so he could check runways conditions:
The hold attitude was 4,300'. The controller said nothing.
A lot of brain farts both in and out of the cockpit on this one.
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Where is the TAA published? Is that different from the MSA that appears on the approach plate?
roncachamp
Final Approach
The TAA is on the approach plate, it's what you're calling the MSA.
John Collins
En-Route
When a TAA is charted on an approach, it serves the purpose of an MSA with some very important distinctions. An MSA may only be used in the case of an emergency and one may not descend after receiving an approach clearance until established on a charted segment of the approach. The TAA is broken into segments that are 30 NM from an IAF. The entire TAA segment is considered as a charted segment of the approach. Once an aircraft is cleared for the approach, when there is a TAA charted, the aircraft is both authorized and expected to descend to the charted TAA segment altitude. The exception is if ATC specifically clears them otherwise, for example: maintain 4000 to ABCDE, Cleared RNAV 12 Approach.
Generally speaking, an approach based on ground navigation aids will have feeder routes from the airway structure to get to an IAF to commence the approach, unless of course the IAF is on an airway or radar is required. In the case of a TAA, one does not normally see feeder routes as any airway that passes thru the TAA (sometimes more than 60 NM across) can consider the TAA segment as the feeder route based on RNAV navigation. There are some cases, supposedly in Alaska, although I have not come across such an example where the TAA does not have an airway passing thru it and a feeder from the airway to the TAA boundary is provided.
Generally speaking, an approach based on ground navigation aids will have feeder routes from the airway structure to get to an IAF to commence the approach, unless of course the IAF is on an airway or radar is required. In the case of a TAA, one does not normally see feeder routes as any airway that passes thru the TAA (sometimes more than 60 NM across) can consider the TAA segment as the feeder route based on RNAV navigation. There are some cases, supposedly in Alaska, although I have not come across such an example where the TAA does not have an airway passing thru it and a feeder from the airway to the TAA boundary is provided.
That is sort of what I assumed. AIM 5-4-5 (c) deals with MSA, whereas 5-4-5(d) deals with TAA. That tells me that they are separate and distinct.
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/aim0504.html#FIG5-4-1
roncachamp
Final Approach
Yup, an MSA would be superfluous on an approach with TAAs.
azure
Final Approach
I thought it was "maintain at or above two thousand until established...", but otherwise I agree. My point was that the report has the controller seeming to talk out of both sides of his mouth, on the one hand not being aware that the aircraft had descended, and on the other expecting the aircraft to climb to an altitude lower than the one the controller claimed to have thought the aircraft was still at. The account doesn't make sense, and makes the controller look as if he is trying to weasel out of something. If that's the case then the controller deserves to be nailed to the cross, but otherwise, there is something missing from the report.
John Collins
En-Route
The clearance was a quote from the NTSB report. It was the initial clearance for the approach.
"Cleared to ZEDAG transition for RNAV one-nine approach into Dillingham. Maintain [Center controller dialing the DLG FSS] two thousand until a published segment of the approach Ace Air fifty-one."
This was issued at or near the TAA boundary, again according to the NTSB report, see quote from the report:
aterpster
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aterpster
John, from your own cite of the NTSB report:
"The controller told the pilot to maintain an altitude "at or above 2,000 feet msl until established on a published segment of the approach." The pilot read back, "Maintain two thousand until a published segment of the approach."
John Collins
En-Route
True, am I missing something.
Jaybird180
Final Approach
Multiple links in this accident chain.
Question: would vigilance by the crew to RTFM (chart) been sufficient to break the accident chain? In theory it's a simple, yes. However since I have zero practical experience, I'd like to know what those with experience have to say.
Question: would vigilance by the crew to RTFM (chart) been sufficient to break the accident chain? In theory it's a simple, yes. However since I have zero practical experience, I'd like to know what those with experience have to say.
dtuuri
Final Approach
The crew should have been out ahead the airplane and ahead of ATC. They should not have been simply responding to instructions "monkey see monkey do" style. when they asked for direct they should have already known their minimum acceptable altitude and not taken any thing less from ATC.
dtuuri
Everskyward
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Everskyward
Did you even read past the sentence where they asked for direct or look at the map of where they crashed (which was after they got to ZEDAG)? The problem was not the routing, but that the whole TAA had an MEA above 2,000'.
John Collins
En-Route
It is not clear to me that pilots and controllers understand the meaning of the TAA. If you don't understand what is required, it is difficult to break the chain. I have raised the issue with ATPAC regarding clearing an aircraft to fly a route or segment below the minimum charted altitude. I believe that one of the links in this chain involved this systemic failure.
dtuuri
Final Approach
Do you ever get tired of jumping my bones with snide remarks? The problem was the altitude, Ms. Direct or Bust. The altitude depends on the routing.
dtuuri
Everskyward
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Everskyward
I will point it out when you are clearly wrong, and don't understand the TAA concept, in this case.