Air France A330 - Missing over Atantic

I was about to edit my post.

In alternate law, if I recall correctly, yes it does. It has been over 14 years. However, if it went all the way to direct law, or whatever the direct mode is called, there are no automatic stall protections. The airplane can be stalled in Direct law.

Makes me wonder if it degraded all the way to Direct. Very conceivable, in my mind if the computers could not make sense of the inputs they were receiving.

And to answer the question about the 60 knots and the AoA, I think it is entirely plausible that if the computers sensed an unreasonably low speed the AoA inputs could have been ignored.


I think he managed to get it in such a deep stall that both AoA and AS inputs passed the "ignore" threshold function of the computer and it though it had input failures when in reality the inputs were correct to the situation, he was in a deep stall and falling, and since it didn't know what to make of it, it just kept on going.

Will a perceived "failure" of AoA and Pitot inputs cause a reversion to direct law?
 
A bunch of airline pilots stalled and crashed a perfectly good airplane. Yeah, right. Something smells indeed.
 
The only possible "pilot error" that jumps out on me was that if the stall warning sounded, why didn't we get a "forward stick" reaction from the pilot?

And I think that airplanes that HAVE AOA sensors should DISPLAY AOA somewhere, particularly when it approaches the stall AOA.
 
A bunch of airline pilots stalled and crashed a perfectly good airplane. Yeah, right. Something smells indeed.

Doctors have even more training and they screw the pooch killing people on a regular basis.
 
I think he managed to get it in such a deep stall that both AoA and AS inputs passed the "ignore" threshold function of the computer and it though it had input failures when in reality the inputs were correct to the situation, he was in a deep stall and falling, and since it didn't know what to make of it, it just kept on going.

I don't buy that. If the airplane was in normal law, it would not have been possible to stall it in the first place.

Will a perceived "failure" of AoA and Pitot inputs cause a reversion to direct law?

Like I said, it has been over 14 years but I would think so.
 
And I think that airplanes that HAVE AOA sensors should DISPLAY AOA somewhere, particularly when it approaches the stall AOA.

Amen. Doesn't the Airbus do this? Sounds like it doesn't.

When the poop hits the prop, or the feces hits the (turbo)fan in this case, the pilot should have access to raw data like AoA and all the airspeed inputs so as to make their own decision what should be ignored. Between the 3(?) airspeed systems and 1-2 AoA systems, a competent pilot should probably have been able to figure it out. A computer just gets confused and craps out entirely, while not giving the pilot enough information to fly the plane.
 
I don't buy that. If the airplane was in normal law, it would not have been possible to stall it in the first place.



Like I said, it has been over 14 years but I would think so.

Don't discount the possible combined effects of turbulence, hand flying and altitude.... That said, I'm not sure by the reading of the translation whether the autopilot disconnected or he disconnected it to hand fly the turbulence, but from the reading there was nothing wrong until the autopilot disconnect and it didn't start going wrong until after the pilot declared that he had the controls. They did not note specifically that he had taken them in reaction to a failure but rather that he took them and hit the disconnect button then things went directly into a stall from which he never recovered. The only thing they were talking about up to that point was that they were going to get into some turbulence and warning the FAs that it was going to be bumpier than before. I didn't see where they were having any airspeed issues to that point.

From what I read, the info points to a major turbulence hit just at the same time he was taking control and the plane got tossed into an attitude and energy state it couldn't recover from, and at the same time both the AoA and AS inputs rightfully passed through "reject" thresholds (even though they were accurate to the situation) sending the system into "Direct Law". At that point he never recovered from the stall because he was using a technique that won't allow recovery from a deep stall which is what he was in.
 
A bunch of airline pilots stalled and crashed a perfectly good airplane. Yeah, right. Something smells indeed.

It happened in Buffalo a few years back. And, with a little help from a malfunctioning radar altimeter, in Amsterdam not long before that. Experienced pilots stalling a plane seems about as likely as experienced pilots forgetting to set flaps on takeoff, or running out of fuel. I don't think airline pilots are immune to mistakes. I do think they make fewer mistakes than low time private pilots like me, but the accident statistics reflect that pretty clearly.
 
Actually, I should say no DIRECT indication of AoA. It is actually a function of the airspeed tape. There is an indication of where the stall speed is, given all the parameters, but there is no indication that says "The current angle of attack is X degrees."
 
I read the report, which mentioned the plane was flying under "Alternate Law".

At 2 h 10 min 16, the PNF said "so, we’ve lost the speeds" then "alternate law […]".
Note 1: The angle of attack is the angle between the airflow and longitudinal axis of the airplane.
This information is not presented to pilots.
Note 2 : In alternate or direct law, the angle-of-attack protections are no longer available but a
stall warning is triggered when the greatest of the valid angle-of-attack values exceeds a certain
threshold.




Here's what I found about Airbus's "Alternate Law"

ALTERNATE LAW If Multiple Failures of Redundant Systems occur, the flight controls revert to Alternate Law.
The ECAM displays the message: ALTN LAW: PROT LOST


Ground
Mode

The ground mode is identical to Normal Law.


Flight
Mode

  • In pitch alternate law the flight mode is a load factor demand law similar to the Normal Law flight mode, with reduced protections.
  • Pitch alternate law degrades to pitch direct law when the landing gear is extended to provide feel for flare and landing, since there is no flare mode when pitch normal law is lost.
  • Automatic pitch trim and yaw damping (with limited authority) is available.
  • Turn coordination is lost.
  • When pitch law degrades from normal law, roll degrades to Direct Law - roll rate depends on airspeed.
Protections
  • All protections except for load factor maneuvering protection are lost.
  • The load factor limitation is similar to to that under Normal Law.
  • Amber XX's replace the green = attitude limits on the PFD.
  • A low speed stability function replaces the normal angle-of-attack protection
    • System introduces a progressive nose down command which attempts to prevent the speed from decaying further.
    • This command CAN be overridden by sidestick input.
    • The airplane CAN be stalled in Alternate Law.
    • An audio stall warning consisting of "crickets" and a "STALL" aural message is activated.
    • The Alpha Floor function is inoperative.
  • The PFD airspeed scale is modified:
    • VLS remains displayed
    • VALPHA PROT and VALPHA MAX are removed
    • They are replaced by a red and black barber pole, the top indicating the stall warning speed VSW
  • A nose up command is introduced any time the airplane exceeds VMO/MMO to keep the speed from increasing further, which CAN be overridden by the sidestick.
  • Bank angle protection is lost.
  • Certain failures cause the system to revert to Alternate Law without speed stability.
  • Yaw damping is lost if the fault is a triple ADR failure.


http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm
 
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Actually, I should say no DIRECT indication of AoA. It is actually a function of the airspeed tape. There is an indication of where the stall speed is, given all the parameters, but there is no indication that says "The current angle of attack is X degrees."
This is what our AOA indicators look like.

LR-35 - There are no units but you get an idea from the colors
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CE-680
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We also have the indications on the airspeed tape of the 680 if you mean the red low speed awareness zone.
 

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I am still very confused abou this one....lots of talk about airspeed indication failure and angle of attack, but what was the status of the rest of the instruments? Heading, altimeter, AI???? Did I miss it in the report? I don't think they addressed the other indications. I find it extremely hard to believe that they would keep pulling the stick back if the ASI was the only thing that failed.

I'm wondering if the black boxes really do have all of the info.....if this was an NTSB investigation, I'm betting they would be ranting about the need for cameras in the cockpit right now.
 
I'm not clear on why the AoA was available for recording but not presented to the pilots at the time, nor why it would not have been affected by icing. Was it determined from an AoA vane? Pressure differential between two tubes? Some other mechanism?

(I suppose in theory one very low-tech "never again" backup would be to put an AoA vane directly in front of the cockpit window where jet pilots can always see it. Kind of like the yaw string glider pilots can use because there is no prop on the nose messing with the airstream.)
 
I'm not clear on why the AoA was available for recording but not presented to the pilots at the time,

There is no direct indication of AoA in the cockpit. Don't know why.

nor why it would not have been affected by icing.

Theoretically they are heated. I am not sure why the Pitot tubes iced up, however.

Was it determined from an AoA vane? Pressure differential between two tubes? Some other mechanism?

More than likely the vane. I don't think there is any other way to get that info.

(I suppose in theory one very low-tech "never again" backup would be to put an AoA vane directly in front of the cockpit window where jet pilots can always see it. Kind of like the yaw string glider pilots can use because there is no prop on the nose messing with the airstream.)

Well, it would have to be WAY out in front because the fuselage would disturb the airflow enough to make it ineffective.
 
More than likely the vane. I don't think there is any other way to get that info.

AFaIK there are three types of AoA sensors. One is a simple hinged trailing vane coupled to a rotary transducer. Another has two ports on a cone shaped probe with a servo to rotate the probe so that equal pressure on the two ports is maintained. The third type has a spherical probe with multiple ports feeding pressure transducers and a computer (or a part of the ADC) which computes the AoA based on the pressures in the ports.
 
It seems unlikely but one scenario which fits the pilot's aft stick input is the incorrect expectation that this will produce a pitch attitude safely below the stalling AoA. I believe this is the system's response in normal law but AFaIK that's not what happens in alternate law. Could a "well trained" Airbus pilot make such a mistake in the heat of the moment?
 
AFaIK there are three types of AoA sensors. One is a simple hinged trailing vane coupled to a rotary transducer. Another has two ports on a cone shaped probe with a servo to rotate the probe so that equal pressure on the two ports is maintained. The third type has a spherical probe with multiple ports feeding pressure transducers and a computer (or a part of the ADC) which computes the AoA based on the pressures in the ports.

LOL. I meant on the airbus. It has the vanes but not the others.
 
It seems unlikely but one scenario which fits the pilot's aft stick input is the incorrect expectation that this will produce a pitch attitude safely below the stalling AoA. I believe this is the system's response in normal law but AFaIK that's not what happens in alternate law. Could a "well trained" Airbus pilot make such a mistake in the heat of the moment?

In alternate law, it can be stalled just like any other plane.

As far as well trained Airbus pilots? I don't know. He knew he was in alternate law and didn't have the protections. What he apparently did seems counter intuitive to me.
 
As I read the description of alternate law, it looks like the stall protection shifts from AoA to airspeed based? Couple that with erroneous airspeed information, and perhaps you have a situation where the stall warning is firing but it's in error?
 
NoHeat. Thanks for posting that. It's very helpful for those of us trying to understand this plane's systems.

Best,

Dave
 
word on the street ............

1- the captian was in first class conversing with some friends.
2- there are kids voices heard from the cockpit during this event.
3- apparently the captain never got back up front due to the extreme motion, pitch and rotating forces inside the airplane.

That came from a pretty realible source......
If true that secure cockpit door thing is gonna get a serious reviewing.. YMMV.:yes:

Sounds eerily like Michael Chrighton's novel "Airframe"

Secure door isn't the problem. Competent crew on the wrong side of the door is.
 
word on the street ............

1- the captian was in first class conversing with some friends.
2- there are kids voices heard from the cockpit during this event.
3- apparently the captain never got back up front due to the extreme motion, pitch and rotating forces inside the airplane.

That came from a pretty realible source......
If true that secure cockpit door thing is gonna get a serious reviewing.. YMMV.:yes:

not according to the cvr
or are you saying they put out false transcriptions

looks to me that they had faulty pitot tubes, they froze over (bad or outside of design limits), then the boys just forgot to fly the plane, power back nose up does not work well on most aircraft for prolonged periods
Air France may be gone after this one.
 
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There is a good post here.

To zoom climb to 38k at +7000fpm, at/above their operating ceiling, they were obviously at high power and high speed to start with.

That post explains a way to get to this, with the AP disconnecting once the pitch force got too high. I haven't read or even understood every line by any means but if e.g. you fly level, high power, AP on altitude hold, and you push the stick forward (perhaps because you see IAS=60kt), the pitch trim system will wind the elevator trim backwards, while the autopilot will drive the elevator itself down, with an increasing pitch servo torque, until the pitch servo hits the current limit, and the AP disconnects, leaving you with a severely upwards-trimmed aeroplane which will now shoot upwards, and when it runs out of speed it will stall.

You can do that in my TB20. The yoke push/pull causing the trim wheel to run, is a standard preflight test.

So the three pitot tubes, filled with ice crystals, is what started it all.

What you should get, in any aeroplane, is a TRIM IN MOTION message after about 10 secs of continuous pitch trim movement, but they were probably inundated with error messages.

I can kind of see how it happened, but I don't get why they apparently sat there totally baffled, with so little dialogue or commentary. The 3 of them never realised they were stalled, and (this bit I don't get at all) never realised they were losing altitude at such a fantastic rate. As I said earlier, both the PFD altitude tape and any backup altimeter would have been whizzing round very obviously. -10000 FPM is hard to miss.

One Q is how to recover from such a deep stall. It may be that engine power alone (with full forward yoke/stick) won't do it if the elevator trim is wound all the way back. This came out after the Turkish 737 which crashed at Amsterdam. In that case the only way may be to roll the aircraft onto one side and commence a spiral dive, which will bring the nose down and once you have forward speed, you can level off, trim forward, etc.
 
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Is it possible the pilots thought they had severe airframe icing and that is why they were dropping out of the sky and did not consider they could be stalled? Obviously they noticed icing of the instruments and this is possibly why they initially climbed, maybe they were trying to get out of the ice. Then ignored stall warnings b/c they knew they were having instrument issues. Once they were stalled and falling they thought they were iced up which might explain nose up and full power ... Perhaps they were trying to maintain climb attitude. Then the wallowing in the stall and buffets associated with it could have been mistaken for turbulence in the storm hey were descending through
 
Static / pitot icing could affect the alt. Maybe they were ignoring this instrument? Obviously their gps altitude could be trusted but possible they did not consider this. Possible the pilot flying was half paying attention while trying to figure out other stuff and was trying to keep nose up Att. And not noticing he had full nose up trim
 
Plain and simple.... when confronted by a crisis, you will not rise to the occasion. You will sink to the level of your training.

These guys may have been well trained on the things they were trained on, but that doesn't mean they were well trained and well practiced on the things they should have been.

Do the airliner guys actually fly and recover from deep stalls in the sim? (with multiple system failures?).... I realize that every single conceivable failure mode is not going to be taught to every single pilot in such an operation, but is it possible that the skill set they had to work with did not have enough fundamental elements in their tool box?

Or were they not proficient systems-ologists (since the HAL-9000..er.. airbus... apparently can be quirky compared to mechanical linkages...)

Or maybe its something simple like not understanding what maneuvering speed and what control deflections you can do with regards to it?
 
At -43°C, structural icing of any type is highly unlikely, especially with this kind of "over the ocean" tropical convection that has lower vertical velocities than their continental counterparts. Supercooled liquid water just doesn't occur at those temps. The more likely scenario was ice crystals that clogged the pitot tubes. They were flying through a lot of convective debris which contains lots of these fine ice crystals.


Actually they say it is more likely to get supercooled water where they were. They called it the perfect place.
 
Who is "they"?

on the nova special they had a meteorologist that was going over the data, they do have the temps. at that time or at least a close estimate
 
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Well, we don't have exact temperatures at that location...need to see the aircraft's temperatures that were recorded. But...

There are a couple of reasons that I don't agree with what "they" say. The closest radiosonde launch showed the temperature at a pressure altitude of 35,000 feet to be -43°C. While not at the site of the accident, the temperature in the tropical areas at this altitude are likely to be fairly consistent.

The coldest that supercooled liquid water has been seen in nature is -37.5°C by Environment Canada. The theoretical limit is -40°C. At temperatures colder than -40°C homogeneous freezing occurs.

Remember that this is very warm-based convection with high mixing ratios. This can produce a high liquid water content in the cloud, but because it is out over the ocean, the clouds are relatively clean. Clean clouds produce large drops and they tend to precipitate out very effectively unless the updrafts can carry them to higher levels.

Updrafts in this kind of tropical convection over the ocean are relatively weak compared to what we see in their continental counterparts. That means that supercooled liquid water doesn't get carried very high into the cloud and that is evidenced by the lack of lightning in these storms including the MCS environment they were flying through on that evening.

All in all, it is actually no where near the "perfect" place for supercooled liquid water. However, ice crystals are extremely likely in this environment and have been known to clog pitot tubes. Based on the BEA report they were in IMC and likely in some light to moderate chop. That sounds to me like they were flying through a convective debris field. So if I were a betting man, I'd vote for the ice crystal theory and not the supercooled liquid water theory.

if your a meteorologist then you know more than I do about it, but the one they had seemed to disagree with you
 
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Actually they say it is more likely to get supercooled water where they were. They called it the perfect place.
I was under the impression that the pitot clogging issue was the combination of very cold temps, frozen water, high airspeed, and insufficient pitot heat. My guess would be that the result was ice crystals melting and refreezing in the pitots.
 
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