5 related adults dead in Cessna 340 crash

Actually, of the 6 FSS briefers I _SPOKE_ to this year (I usually use duats and / or foreflight) 1 of them really helped me with an interpretation, 1 was really helpful in examining a TFR, 2 were helpful in discussing flight conditions (1 regarding TFRs, 1 regarding weather), 1 didn't want to talk to me and basically shoved me off the phone and 1 read what was in the foreflight briefing.

If they discontinue FSS, I'll miss having a neutral party with whom to discuss flight conditions when necessary.

66% matches the bell curve and gives an overall score of “D+”. :)
 
I have done departures from a non towered airport, but with checking weather with FSS, which was on the airport.(Alaska). The FSS keeps close tabs on everyone in the class E area.
Wondering if that was Sitka. They sure go out of their was to update pilots of the current conditions..:thumbsup::thumbsup:

I haven’t found an FSS briefer who was doing anything more than reading already available information to me for years. I doubt some pilots even know they used to actually help interpret weather data.
Some of the most helpful briefers I have talked to were in Canadian Yukon Territory. I was told by one briefer if the visibility has not gotten better by "XY" you should consider returning to "YX"
 
Some interesting commentary excerpted from Dick Karl writing in Flying. Highlights mine:

https://www.flyingmag.com/two-airplanes-two-accidents

Two Airplanes, Two Accidents
By Dick Karl Yesterday at 8:00am

In July 1999, we departed Norfolk, Virginia (KORF) and headed northeast out over the Chesapeake Bay. It was a hazy day. The sky and the water were the same washed-out blue gray; there was no discernible horizon. I was flying our Cessna 340, my first twin. I’m guessing by that time I had about 2,500 hours of flying experience...

...The Cessna 340 accident was close to home, both emotionally and physically. A Cessna 340 attempted to take off from Bartow, Florida (KBOW) in fog. Close to home because Bartow is where I have had maintenance done on various airplanes for 35 years. I know the airport well. I know the 340 well, though I didn’t know the lawyer pilot or his family, or that airplane, which was maintained at a shop other than the one I used.

Early on a foggy morning, the 340 pilot loaded four passengers with a flight plan filed for Key West. Observers reported heavy fog. An employee at the airport told me the pilot had requested that all the seats in the airplane be moved as far forward as possible and that the airplane be topped off — he must have been concerned about the airplane’s center of gravity. A bystander tried to film the takeoff, but nothing could be seen. The airplane did not make it past the airport boundary. Five people died.

When I looked at the photos of the victims in the local newspaper, I saw a dad, two daughters (one a young mother), a son-in-law and a family friend. I estimated their weights from the pictures and entered them in the Cessna 340 weight-and-balance tool on fltplan.com.

No matter how I arranged the pax, the airplane was out of CG for takeoff. Did a sudden pitch up startle the pilot? Was somatogravic illusion involved? (Somatogravic illusion is a form of spatial disorientation that can occur during rapid acceleration. Without visual reference, this can feel like a sudden pitch up.) Like me taking off out of Norfolk, was the pilot incredulous at the instrument picture before him?...
 
Interesting. I wonder how far aft of the limit Karl came out with his estimates.

There are some airplanes I'm more comfortable with than others at the aft limit....300 and 400 series Cessnas I'd consider to be "others".
 
Interesting. I wonder how far aft of the limit Karl came out with his estimates.

There are some airplanes I'm more comfortable with than others at the aft limit....300 and 400 series Cessnas I'd consider to be "others".

Rearward CG limits are one thing To take seriously. Playing with CG in models was instructive.

I don’t have much experience with many different aircraft but used to load my Maule with 4 and luggage and carefully calculate the CG. Staying within the limit required a bag on the rear passengers’ lap until some fuel was burned. Takeoff at the aft limit was just a bit touchy as pitch control moved towards neutral stability. Once up at altitude I’d move the bag back and experience neutral and just slightly negative pitch stability. Not something to play with on a zero viz takeoff, or even a low ceiling.

Any experience with rearward loaded Maules ‘skinner?


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro
 
Any experience with rearward loaded Maules ‘skinner?


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro
Yeah, but by the time I got loaded to the CG limit I was also at max weight with the little M4 short wing, so it was ugly on both counts. ;)
 
This crash was discussed at a recent FAAST meeting I attended and Dick Karl isn't the only one to come up with this. Have to wonder what the total weights will show when NTSB finishes their investigation. Regardless, was not a smart move by the PIC to takeoff anyway.
 
So, if I'm interpreting this correctly, contrary to our peanut gallery Monday morning quarterbacking experts, it likely had nothing to do with the fog.

Amazing how that works.
 
So, if I'm interpreting this correctly, contrary to our peanut gallery Monday morning quarterbacking experts, it likely had nothing to do with the fog.

Amazing how that works.
That’s a big jump. Who’s to say a day vfr departure with the same CG issue would have been fatal.
 
So, if I'm interpreting this correctly, contrary to our peanut gallery Monday morning quarterbacking experts, it likely had nothing to do with the fog.

Amazing how that works.

The fog didn't cause the crash; there had to be a forcing function, and the CG might have been it. The fog limited or removed some options for dealing with a problem and might have turned a non-fatal problem into a fatal one.

The fog certainly didn't help matters.
 
No matter how I arranged the pax, the airplane was out of CG for takeoff
thanks for posting that! I had been checking on this once or twice a week actually to see if there was any new info on it, since I was firmly in the camp NOT advocating for illegalizing IMC departures. looks like you beat me to it, thanks!

it likely had nothing to do with the fog
This is a great illustration of human nature, I felt like I was in the gross minority of people not immediately advocating for FAA enforced part 91 take off minimums and it seemed that the consensus among many here was that any GA pilot taking off in really anything under marginal VFR was signing a death sentence (regardless of experience, rating, equipment, etc.).. yet.. it turns out, that maybe it was his CG all along that caused the crash on departure.. whether or not there was fog or not doesn't change that fact. Yes, we speculate on PoA, it's a collaborative community.. but until the facts are out it's very troublesome that some would immediately advocate for some draconian measures of no IMC departures

Who’s to say a day vfr departure with the same CG issue would have been fatal
I've always been told that flying a plane that is out of CG, especially one that is also heavy, or potentially over max gross, is more or less a death sentence.. especially if the CG is rearward. No amount of forward pressure on the yoke will get the nose down, and as you slow down the situation gets worse. Maybe, just maybe if it was clear VFR there could have been some last minute maneuvering to maybe make this survivable, but even at that point the fog would at best be a contributing factor... not a cause (it seems, if the CG thing is true). the fact that the plane came to rest pretty much right off the runway suggested things went wrong immediately after it became airborne

I wonder how far aft of the limit Karl came out with his estimates
Yeah, I am half tempted to load up a generic 340 in Foreflight and play around with the CG loading as well.. to find out if this was something that was sort of maybe on the cusp, or something grossly out of balance. I can't really see how moving some seats forward a few inches would have an appreciable impact

^^this also speaks to many of the psychological factors pilots face.. sure, the most primary one is the desire NOT to scrub a flight, especially if you have non flying pax with you, you hate to cancel or delay a flight and inconvenience people depending on you. In this case, weight makes it an even more awkward conversation to have. I felt really bad but a few months ago I uninvited my friend's girlfriend last minute after I saw the plane had an updated POH, somehow it had gained 90 lbs and that put us over. It was an SR20. I felt bad, but think, err, know I made the right decision
 
This is a great illustration of human nature, I felt like I was in the gross minority of people not immediately advocating for FAA enforced part 91 take off minimums and it seemed that the consensus among many here was that any GA pilot taking off in really anything under marginal VFR was signing a death sentence (regardless of experience, rating, equipment, etc.).. yet.. it turns out, that maybe it was his CG all along that caused the crash on departure.. whether or not there was fog or not doesn't change that fact. Yes, we speculate on PoA, it's a collaborative community.. but until the facts are out it's very troublesome that some would immediately advocate for some draconian measures of no IMC departures...
I saw some criticism of below minimums departures, but I don't recall seeing anyone advocating for that option to be taken away from pilots of Part 91 flights.
 
but I don't recall seeing anyone advocating for that option to be taken away from pilots of Part 91 flights

No one directly said "that should be illegal" (or at least I don't recall it), but there were several comments heavily indicting this person and insinuating that this either should have been illegal, or said pilot should not have been a pilot..

I had quoted a half dozen of the most aggressive messages, but I decided against it as I felt it would not be in good taste and decorum to rehash old wounds. But at least one person distinctly said "I really wish someone could explain to me why Part 91 operators are allowed to takeoff in 0/0. I've never understood it"

to me that implied a desire to make such a takeoff illegal. The trick is, for GA flying where the training and proficiency is less regulated it is difficult to enact an edict like that. In the commercial world the guys are trained to perform at standards XYZ.. so if the conditions are such then you are expected to go (imagine a DL pilot telling cancelling a flight because his personal minimums are 3 miles visibility, and the airport is reporting 2). In the GA world, where the training and proficiency is inconsistent, you can't really make a rule like that... unless it panders to the least common denominator. In this case an IR pilot who hasn't flown 5 months, and his last actual IMC was 6 years ago when he got his rating... if you write the law to that you'll basically prohibit part 91 GA to VFR departures only, and some absurdly high landing minimums. - THAT - or, training and proficiency costs would be far more expensive and the GA fleet would probably shrink to 10% of its current size. I don't want to live in a world like that
 
@Tantalum you are reading to much into my post. I’m pointing out that everyone is speculating without direct knowledge. It is possible to load out of CG to a point of uncontrollablity but that’s not a known fact in this case. There isn’t enough information to form a valid opinion. Just speculation
 
I don't want to live in a world like that
You already do! Or at least it seems like it to me.

Of all the crazy regs out there, takeoff mins are the least of my concern. Other than the fact they are a pain to keep straight.

I don’t care if Part 91 establishes t/o mins or not, but I wouldn’t consider them draconian since everyone else has to operate in accordance with them.
 
I explained my opinion (and that’s all it is) back in post 443. I don’t see anything in this latest speculation to change what I thought back then. The fog took away the ability to mitigate consequences of a problem. It’s possible that there might not have been any sufficient mitigation even without fog but it’s also possible that there may have been.

I think the pilot did a poor job of risk management and when a problem occurred (maybe CG, maybe something else) he was stuck at the “catastrophic” end of the scale.
 
I explained my opinion (and that’s all it is) back in post 443. I don’t see anything in this latest speculation to change what I thought back then. The fog took away the ability to mitigate consequences of a problem. It’s possible that there might not have been any sufficient mitigation even without fog but it’s also possible that there may have been.

I think the pilot did a poor job of risk management and when a problem occurred (maybe CG, maybe something else) he was stuck at the “catastrophic” end of the scale.

stock-vector-metal-broken-chain-d-freedom-concept-vector-illustration-323119571.jpg
 
There isn’t enough information to form a valid opinion
That's a fair point, but the mention of the amount of people in the plane plus the center of gravity, plus the comment about moving the seats around was an interesting and new angle I hadn't thought of

I think the pilot did a poor job of risk management
I completely agree with you on that part though, if the cause turns out to be simple loss of control in IMC, then he should have been more familiar with his own limitations. If the cause turns out to be weight and balance thing, then thats blatantly inexcusable
 
Of all the crazy regs out there, takeoff mins are the least of my concern
I guess my point was, that even if you establish takeoff minimums for 91 it might give some people a good rule of thumb, however without any way to keep proficiency to those minimums in a structured fashion you're still going to have people launch into conditions they shouldn't, or just ignore it. I've seen ODPs that also have ceiling and visibility minimums, so in that sense there are some iterations of TO minimums even for GA.. granted, those are for obstruction avoidance, but the landing minimums that many people use as their own take off minimum threshold are also for obstruction avoidance too..

a pilot's judgement is always needed to make that go, no-go decision, and I think a better outcome to this is better education around judgment and proficiency level as opposed to introducing another set of minimums

Would "unless stated otherwise by ODP all takeoffs require a 500 ft ceiling minimum and 1 mile visibility"

..could be helpful, but the people who will pay attention to that and follow it, are probably people that already have sound judgement, and the people without that sound judgment probably wouldn't follow that rule very closely anyway
 
...a pilot's judgement is always needed to make that go, no-go decision, and I think a better outcome to this is better education around judgment and proficiency level as opposed to introducing another set of minimums...

If it turns out there is validity to Dick Karl's speculations about W&B, it'll prove once again it is not possible to legislate good judgement. No matter how hard the FAA tries.
 
Would "unless stated otherwise by ODP all takeoffs require a 500 ft ceiling minimum and 1 mile visibility"

..could be helpful, but the people who will pay attention to that and follow it, are probably people that already have sound judgement, and the people without that sound judgment probably wouldn't follow that rule very closely anyway
"Weather's too low to takeoff IFR...better go VFR," would start to become a common response.
 
If I was fighting (mushing) with a rearward CG I think it would be substantially easier to do in VMC where I could aggressively push the nose down while seeing the terra firma / obstacles right out the windscreen. It may still be unsuccessful but I would think it would be exponentially harder on instruments.
 
13 pages of posts and I don't see anywhere exactly where he ended up. Pictures seem like it could be off the side of the runway, which could mean loss of directional control, either due to pilot error or mechanical malfunction. If he ended up off the end of the runway, then maybe weight and balance did play a factor.
 
Without trying to come up with numbers, I'm gonna go out on a limb and just claim that typical instruments accurate enough to keep you on an IFR route are probably not accurate enough for guiding a pilot down a runway of whatever width for very long.

There are avionics systems available for departure guidance. I don't know how much relief the 121/135 operators get for it. The airline I work for has enhanced vision on a hud. When combined with inertial reference systems, a flight director, on a cat 3 runway with an active ILS (probably working back course), it will give the crews departure guidance cues, but I don't believe there is relief for zero visibility.

There is risk because you cannot return to the field you depart from. There is risk because you can't realistically guide an airplane on the ground like that for very log, in addition to transitioning to flight. It will be interesting to see what the NTSB findings are. I'm fine with everyone having an opinion. My take away is that deciding not to fly is still the part 91 operators best safety tool. I wonder if the pilot used any of the tools available for risk assessment to help with ADM.
 
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Without trying to come up with numbers, I'm gonna go out on a limb and just claim that typical instruments accurate enough to keep you on an IFR route are probably not accurate enough for guiding a pilot down a runway of whatever width for very long.

There are avionics systems available for departure guidance. I don't know how much relief the 121/135 operators get for it. The airline I work for has enhanced vision on a hud. When combined with inertial reference systems, a flight director, on a cat 3 runway with an active ILS (probably working back course), it will give the crews departure guidance cues, but I don't believe there is relief for zero visibility.
The good news is that the visibility reported by witnesses (as opposed to the visibility assumed by people who weren't there) was good enough to maintain directional control visually during the takeoff roll.
 
Without trying to come up with numbers, I'm gonna go out on a limb and just claim that typical instruments accurate enough to keep you on an IFR route are probably not accurate enough for guiding a pilot down a runway of whatever width for very long.

Actully, they are. At least mine are (or were) and they're just damned ol' standard steam gauges.

During my instrument training, my instructor put me under the hood a few times to practice 0/0 takeoffs. My question was, "why would anyone be stupid enough to do this?" His response, "I'm not sure but it's legal."

When, once airborn, I asked how I did, he told me that I kept the centerline between the mains. Three or four times, iirc.
 
Actully, they are. At least mine are (or were) and they're just damned ol' standard steam gauges.

During my instrument training, my instructor put me under the hood a few times to practice 0/0 takeoffs. My question was, "why would anyone be stupid enough to do this?" His response, "I'm not sure but it's legal."

When, once airborn, I asked how I did, he told me that I kept the centerline between the mains. Three or four times, iirc.

Yeah, I did that when I got my IFR too. I'm guessing that was under near ideal conditions. If you had to do any corrective steering at all, maybe because of crosswind, dragging brake, under inflated tire, steering system problems, surface conditions, etc, the lateral accuracy of gear, good enough to keep you on an airway is still not good enough. A Cessna 172 probably gets off in under 1000 ft on a good day. My 2017 Corolla seems to know when I change lanes though.
 
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Rearward CG limits are one thing To take seriously. Playing with CG in models was instructive.

We used to say, while hanging out at the flying field, "Nose heavy flies poorly. Tail heavy flies once." It's as true for full scale twins as for peanut scale balsa planes with rubber wound motors . . . . .
 
Kerbal Space Program is awesome for showing how CG/Center of Lift/Thrust Vectors have effects on performance (aircraft, spaceplanes, and rockets). A lot of fun to change the wing area/shape/position and add/remove weight to get the plane you make to fly straight. And then trying to make it have the same CG when full on fuel and empty is another challenge...
 
Always like my 40% RC planes a little on the tail heavy side with a more neutral stability for aerobatics
 
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