Boeing’s on a streak...

.....and another one. Of course the plane is 34 years old, but that doesn't change the headline.


File this under "truth is stranger than fiction"


The slide as a dropped object puzzles me. In the E-3 (707 airframe), the slide is part of the door, and there’s a bar that has to be manually attached to the floor once the door is closed. Once the door is closed, the entire assembly is surrounded by airframe.

How a slide turns into a dropped object seems like a procedural error or inadvertent deployment that should have been noticed at pushback or somewhere along taxi. I have a hard time seeing this as a manufacturing defect.
 
I have a hard time seeing this as a manufacturing defect.


BOEING!!!! BOEING!!!! BOEING!!!!

That's all that is required to almost guarantee a guilty verdict. (Only thing more ironclad would be if it had happened to a United flight.)
 
Eh. They kinda earned it, so I can't feel badly about. It will be interesting to see how long it lasts.

Also interesting that it's the whole company. I remember the DC-10 problems, and that didn't become a McDD thing, it was just a DC-10 thing. Then on the other hand, that was a maintenance problem, if I remember correctly, not a manufacturing problem, and I don't remember that companies management being exposed as covering it up. Similar with the Pinto. That was a Pinto thing, not a Ford thing, even if they did know about the problems. I was in grade school at the time, though, so not sure about any of the facts.
 
And the hits just keep on a comin'




Can you imagine how it must feel to be an astronaut strapped into a Boeing spacecraft this evening after seeing this story today? :eek:
 
Okay, this isn't really breaking, exclusive news...there's been a NPRM for an AD for about two months now and the Daily Mail just discovered it. Don't know if an AD has been published yet. Perhaps a bit of over-hyping from the press on this one?


 
Okay, this isn't really breaking, exclusive news...there's been a NPRM for an AD for about two months now and the Daily Mail just discovered it. Don't know if an AD has been published yet. Perhaps a bit of over-hyping from the press on this one?


The way I read it, Boeing has already implemented the fix on affected aircraft.
 
Auto throttle disengaged on takeoff


Boeing told investigators that the auto-throttle system on their 737 Next Generation jets had a "long history of nuisance disconnects during take-off mode engagements" - but that, when investigated, "usually, subsequent functionality checks on the system find no faults".
 
Auto throttle disengaged on takeoff


Boeing told investigators that the auto-throttle system on their 737 Next Generation jets had a "long history of nuisance disconnects during take-off mode engagements" - but that, when investigated, "usually, subsequent functionality checks on the system find no faults".
Reading that, I have to ask myself why the pilot flying didn’t abort the takeoff.
 
Sounds like the pilots ****ed up.

Auto throttles are nice when they work and help reduce workload. They are not required to operate the airplane and it’s standard procedure to verify thrust is set very early in the takeoff roll and if not set correctly to intervene.

Sounds like these guys trusted the computer and went for a ride.
 
Prolly listen to the CVR and hear one of the pilots say, "what's it doing now?" :eek:
 
Hopefully, this is just a one-off and not indicative of yet more design or mfg issues...


 
Reading that, I have to ask myself why the pilot flying didn’t abort the takeoff.
No need to abort. Just set takeoff thrust, like you're supposed to do.

I have ~5,400 hours in 737s, both the NG and the MAX. I don't say that to invoke the appeal-to-authority fallacy, but to say that, in that time, I've never had the autothrottles fail when setting TO thrust. It isn't something that happens often. When it does, it's likely because the flying pilot didn't hit one of the TOGA buttons as he is supposed to do.

Normal procedure is for the flying pilot to advance the thrust levers to 40% N1 until both engines have spooled. From there, advance to about 70% N1 before engaging the autothrottles by pressing one of the TOGA buttons. One TOGA button is located on each thrust lever. The autothrust system then sets the scheduled takeoff thrust.

The pilot monitoring verifies that the autothrust system is activated, by verifying [N1] is displayed on the FMA, and that takeoff thrust is set, -0.0%/+1.0%. If it isn't, the PM trims the thrust levers to set takeoff thrust. You don't reject the takeoff unless the PM is unable to set takeoff thrust.

At ~90kts, the autothrust system goes into [ARM] mode until reaching acceleration altitude. While in [ARM], the autothrottles will not move the thrust levels so that a failure can not cause a loss of thrust during takeoff. They reengage, [N1], at accelleration altitude and set climb thrust.
 
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