UPS A300 down

The A300's that UPS operate use a EGPWS. It has several additional parameters and you don't get the false alerts as often on it as the old GPWS systems.

Here's a simple article on the difference.

Cool, I know the unit in our SR-22 cries wolf too
 
The A300's that UPS operate use a EGPWS. It has several additional parameters and you don't get the false alerts as often on it as the old GPWS systems.

Here's a simple article on the difference.

In your experience, does the EGPWS provide alerts that the pilot will typically need to do something about?
 
Could a simple altimeter setting error cause some of the confusion identified? It may be easy to discount he EGPWS warnings if both altimeters (set with the same erroneous baro) indicated a safe altitude.
 
Could a simple altimeter setting error cause some of the confusion identified? It may be easy to discount he EGPWS warnings if both altimeters (set with the same erroneous baro) indicated a safe altitude.

The 2 radar altimeters would be showing the actual altitude above the ground.

The local QNH was 29.97. And the FMS will alert the crew if they descend below the transition level and don't set local QNH, so it's highly unlikely their altimeters would still be set at standard (29.92)
 
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Hearing today. CVR http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=410477&docketID=55307&mkey=87780

Comments about fatigue and the cut out before the flight are ironic. Makes me ill.

I would love to see the corporate management of UPS (and FedEx as well) personally explain to the families of the deceased how it is cheaper for them to deal with the insurance claims of two dead pilots and some boxes than to comply with the 121 rest rules.

If anything positive comes out of this, I hope it is One Level.
 
Yep. EGPWS is tied to TAWS. If on an approach in IMC or night and it starts going off get the hell out of there now.

Problem in this case is that they were slam-dunked and intentionally diving for the runway and around the time EGPWS started going off they had the runway in sight. It started with 'sink rate', but the 'too low terrain' did not go off until AFTER first impact with the trees.
 
It started with 'sink rate', but the 'too low terrain' did not go off until AFTER first impact with the trees.

I'm curious if hearing "sink rate" twice (before the runway was in sight) would be a reason for them to immediately initiate a missed approach. I would think so, but I don't know.

They had 8 seconds from hearing "sink rate" to the first impact. It sounds like they grazed the treetops for several seconds before hitting anything really solid. Hard to say, but if the pilots had initiated a missed approach and pitched up 2-3 seconds after hearing "sink rate" they might have avoided an accident.

Maybe its because of their talk in the beginning of the flight about the cargo cut-out, but the pilots conversation during the approach sounds much like two fatigued pilots who were out of touch with what was going on around them. They were talking and cutting up a bit but they didn't necessarily violate the sterile cockpit rule, all of their conversation was about the approach and landing they were flying.
 
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Hearing today. CVR http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=410477&docketID=55307&mkey=87780

Comments about fatigue and the cut out before the flight are ironic. Makes me ill.

I would love to see the corporate management of UPS (and FedEx as well) personally explain to the families of the deceased how it is cheaper for them to deal with the insurance claims of two dead pilots and some boxes than to comply with the 121 rest rules.

If anything positive comes out of this, I hope it is One Level.

They're more concerned with explaining to all the customers and insurance about how they failed to protect the cargo value. That is where reform pressure will come from if it happens too many times.
 
Maybe its because of their talk in the beginning of the flight about the cargo cut-out, but the pilots conversation during the approach sounds much like two fatigued pilots who were out of touch with what was going on around them. They were talking and cutting up a bit but they didn't necessarily violate the sterile cockpit rule, all of their conversation was about the approach and landing they were flying.

Sounded like a couple of freight dogs taking the BOHICA approach.

Kinda like 'nobody cares about us, so we better just suck it up and get it done.'
 

WSJ
By ANDY PASZTOR
Feb. 19, 2014 8:20 p.m. ET

Federal investigators are expected Thursday to point to pilot error, coupled with outdated onboard technology, in the crash of a United Parcel Service Inc. cargo jet last August in Alabama, according to people familiar with the details.

The National Transportation Safety Board hearing is expected to highlight a major factor that until now hasn't received any public attention, according to people briefed on the specifics.

UPS, the country's largest cargo carrier, didn't upgrade the aging plane's terrain-avoidance system as recommended by officials at supplier Honeywell International Inc.

Experts agree that by linking new software with satellite-based positioning technology, the upgrade would have provided the pilots significantly earlier and more specific warnings to pull the plane up.

UPS said the equipment update was optional, the current warning system on its aircraft "is [Federal Aviation Administration] compliant," and "there is no way to know" if the change would have averted the crash.

The NTSB previously disclosed that the Airbus A300's pilots, both of whom died when the plane went down in Birmingham, flew an unfamiliar descent to a backup runway that had only limited navigation aids and a sizable hill less than a mile in front.

The pilots violated basic safety procedures, according to people briefed on the investigation, by dropping below the minimum safe altitude, even though they didn't see the cloud-obscured runway, and then failing to react immediately to a last-second cockpit alert.

Spokesmen for Honeywell, the NTSB and the UPS pilots union all declined to comment.

As the crew continued its predawn approach without the benefit of precise vertical guidance from the ground, data gathered by the safety board indicate that the co-pilot reported seeing the runway lights three seconds after an automated warning that the plane was losing altitude dangerously fast.

Within a few more seconds, the wide-body aircraft hit a power line, slammed into some trees and burst into a fireball about three-quarters of a mile from the airport.

The NTSB won't formally decide on a probable case of the crash until later.

As configured on the plane, the ground-proximity warning system was designed to shut off about a mile from the runway, to avoid nuisance warnings during the final approach. Had it been upgraded, it would have continued to provide warnings of an impending collision until roughly a quarter mile before touchdown.

The crew could have had half a minute or more to react and climb safely away, rather than just a few seconds, according to people familiar with the details. One of these people said Honeywell offered to provide its share of the system upgrade free of charge.

On Wednesday, UPS said in a statement that "certification and implementation of the software" requires some investment, but the company is reassessing its position in the wake of the crash.

The safety board also is poised to examine whether fatigue degraded the performance of the pilots, who earlier that day talked about feeling tired. An early portion of the cockpit voice recorder captured the two aviators chatting about tiring schedules, according to people familiar with the details.

Roughly two hours before the flight took off from Louisville, Ky., Cerea Beal, the 58-year-old captain, complained to a fellow UPS pilot that "these schedules over the past several years are killing me," according to a person who has read a summary of NTSB interviews.

In addition, the board is delving into UPS training standards and pilot proficiency with the kind of non-precision approach used in Birmingham. Capt. Beal, a former military helicopter pilot, took longer than normal to be promoted to a UPS captain and withdrew from an earlier bid for promotion because of poor performance, according to people familiar with the probe.

At the hearing, a number of witnesses may be asked about what some industry and other experts have described as Capt. Beal's spotty training record and, at times, his difficulty mastering aircraft handling and manual flying skills.

In the past, UPS has emphasized that there is "no record of him failing" a test for promotion. UPS also reiterated that the crew's schedule complied with recently tightened FAA rules applicable to passenger carriers.

Pilots have asked the NTSB to delve more deeply into fatigue issues, according to people familiar with the specifics.

In Wednesday's statement, UPS said Capt. Beal "was an experienced and fully qualified pilot," adding that any training issues would have been "appropriately addressed at that time."

The company also said it encourages "the use of automation to reduce [pilot] workload," a principle the Birmingham crew relied on before the accident. But to enhance safety, UPS said it has "increased the non-precision approach landing scenarios" in recurrent simulator training sessions.

In light of advances in training and safety equipment, the crash of UPS Flight 1354 is a type of accident that once had been considered nearly impossible in the U.S: flying a perfectly functioning commercial aircraft into a hill or mountain. A similar FedEx Corp. freighter crash short of a Tallahassee, Fla., runway in 2002, however, alerted safety experts at Honeywell and elsewhere to the importance of upgrading older ground-proximity warning systems.

In Wednesday's statement, UPS said Capt. Beal "was an experienced and fully qualified pilot," adding that any training issues would have been "appropriately addressed at that time.

Lack of advance warning to the crew appears to be "a significant contributing factor" in the crash and is bound to be raised by NTSB, said industry consultant John Cox, a former airline pilot and accident investigator.

In announcing plans for the investigative hearing, the safety board disclosed that "despite not having reported the airport in sight," the pilots "continued the descent below the decision altitude" at which they should have opted to climb away from the strip.

More broadly, the public notice said the session also would cover issues including pilot proficiency, adherence to standard operating procedures, fatigue, fitness for duty, cockpit communication, flight path monitoring and UPS training.
 
That might explain why the terrain warning didn't come until after they were already hitting the trees.
 
Very sad. This story really bothers me because with such little regard for safety( clearly overworked crew, and Ill equipped airplane and ATC creating a dive to the deck situation) an accident was waiting to happen.

My understanding though is that the sink rate warning is more based on how quickly the plane is descending and does not always correspond to how close to the ground the plane is. You could clearly tell based on the CVR that the pilots realized they were much to high so I'm sure they were not alarmed by the sink rate warning as they knew they may need to descend rapidly to get on the decent path.

These accidents never make me feel good.
 
Very sad. This story really bothers me because with such little regard for safety( clearly overworked crew, and Ill equipped airplane and ATC creating a dive to the deck situation) an accident was waiting to happen.

Every crew is over-worked. This a/c EPWS may not be upgraded, but is far from and Ill equipped airplane. If ATC created a problem (and they do sometimes) its still the crews responsibility to make a decision or change if need be.

I feel like I am missing something with this whole thing.
 
Yes, the sink rate warning is just for excessive (in changes based on radio altimeter reading) descent rate. Nothing more. The too low, terrain warning is the "you're about to hit the rocks" warning. The reason why there's a sink rate call is because more than likely the "too low, terrain" call is next. An airlines procedures will dictate how to respond to a sink rate warning. In the MD-11, at high weights, we may get false warnings because the rate of descent required may brush up against the warning threshold. Unless briefed, it's an immediate correction or go around item. This is a briefing item for us. I bring this up because UPS is a large operator of MD-11's also. I don't claim to know their procedures.

The difference between the older GPWS and the EGPWS is the older units look just at radio altimeter. That's a look straight below the plane. The EGPWS has GPS and will detect things in front of the plane, like flying into the side of a hill while there's still plenty of clearance directly below the plane.

While it looks like this is a "pilot error" accident, you need to go deeper into why they made the error. Fatigue is clearly an issue. Why didn't they call in? I flew back side of the clock freight and you need a plan to get rest. It's more than did I get the required rest hours. Why did UPS dispatch the plane to an airport where the primary runway was closed, but would open less than an hour later? FedEx delayed their flight so as to have the ILS available. Why did ATC leave them high? Why did the crew feel like they had to "make it work"? I hope the right questions will be asked.



Very sad. This story really bothers me because with such little regard for safety( clearly overworked crew, and Ill equipped airplane and ATC creating a dive to the deck situation) an accident was waiting to happen.

My understanding though is that the sink rate warning is more based on how quickly the plane is descending and does not always correspond to how close to the ground the plane is. You could clearly tell based on the CVR that the pilots realized they were much to high so I'm sure they were not alarmed by the sink rate warning as they knew they may need to descend rapidly to get on the decent path.

These accidents never make me feel good.
 
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I feel like I am missing something with this whole thing.

What do you feel like you are missing?

Ultimately, the crew screwed up. I don't think anyone is denying that. They let multiple external pressures affect decision making and did what countless freight dawgs have frequently done. They took a bad situation and tried to power through it to get the job done.

What Pi$$es me (and a whole lot of other pilots) is that the cost cutting measures of UPS (and FedEx) are unquestionably responsible as contributing factors.

It is pure political BS to think that 121 rest rules should not apply to box carriers, and this accident needs to become a banner PSA in the fight to end the cut out.

We need to demand One Level of Safety for ALL 121 carriers.
 
We need to demand One Level of Safety for ALL 121 carriers.

Being a green GA pilot myself I would have assumed the requirements were the same for freight and passenger. :confused:

I learned something new from this thread, and agree there should be no difference regardless of how effective your lobbyist are or how deep your pockets may be.
 
Being a green GA pilot myself I would have assumed the requirements were the same for freight and passenger. :confused:

Nope. They were supposed to, but at the last minute, the lobbyists for FedEx and UPS managed to convince the right people that the cost burden on cargo carriers was too great for the benefit. So, they were 'cut out' of the new rule.
 
Nope. They were supposed to, but at the last minute, the lobbyists for FedEx and UPS managed to convince the right people that the cost burden on cargo carriers was too great for the benefit. So, they were 'cut out' of the new rule.

I would like to know specifically where Federal Express, in particular, is cutting corners on safety in the air.
 
Nope. They were supposed to, but at the last minute, the lobbyists for FedEx and UPS managed to convince the right people that the cost burden on cargo carriers was too great for the benefit. So, they were 'cut out' of the new rule.

So air carrier crews don't have a responsibility to do the right thing unless the government or company tells them to? I guess maybe in aviation that can be a life-ending experience.

UPS appears to be alleging that even if the same work rules applied to them, the crew in question would have been in compliance with those rules. It also appears that at least the FO made the choice not to rest when she was provided ample opportunity to do so before returning to duty. I understand that the off-daylight shifts can really be hard on an individual, but that comes with the territory in cargo flying.

No legislation occurs without lobbying, be it by corporations, unions, media, individuals, or politicians themselves. Everyone has their own self-serving agenda.


JKG
 
UPS appears to be alleging that even if the same work rules applied to them, the crew in question would have been in compliance with those rules. It also appears that at least the FO made the choice not to rest when she was provided ample opportunity to do so before returning to duty.
Indeed that's the other side of the story. It's like the 1500 hour rule that would not help Colgan crash one bit, but hey, in the world of politics something needs to be done, and this is something, therefore it shall be done.
 
So air carrier crews don't have a responsibility to do the right thing unless the government or company tells them to? I guess maybe in aviation that can be a life-ending experience.

Go back and read my comments again. No one, myself included, is saying that the crew was innocent. Simply stating that it is BS to say that the same rest rules that apply to pax carriers should not apply to cargo because it would be too much of a financial burden. Do you honestly think it us any less of a financial burden for pax carriers?

The corporate leadership has banked on the attitude of folks that say 'who cares, it is just a couple of pilots carrying boxes'
 
Does FedEx comply with the same 121 rest rules as pax carriers?

Couldn't tell ya, I simply asked for information after reading an accusation that "cost cutting measures of UPS (and Fedex) are unquestionably responsible as contributing factors".
If I can't get an answer, and the only response is another question, I will consider the original accusation as baseless.
 
If I can't get an answer, and the only response is another question, I will consider the original accusation as baseless.

I gave you an answer in the original accusation. Like UPS, they lobbied to get themselves removed from the rest requirements. And apparently you are unable to refute that.
 
I gave you an answer in the original accusation. Like UPS, they lobbied to get themselves removed from the rest requirements. And apparently you are unable to refute that.

I'm not refuting anything. I am simply in no position to know the difference in rest requirements between say, a Delta heavy driver and a Fedex 767 captain. All I asked for were some specifics regarding safety. BTW, can you tell me exactly what the rest requirements are for the above mentioned crewmembers? Not just that there is a "difference", but specifics.
 
I'm not refuting anything. I am simply in no position to know the difference in rest requirements between say, a Delta heavy driver and a Fedex 767 captain. All I asked for were some specifics regarding safety. BTW, can you tell me exactly what the rest requirements are for the above mentioned crewmembers? Not just that there is a "difference", but specifics.

Read 14 CFR Part 117, and 14 CFR Part 121, Duty and Rest Requirements for Supplemental, Domestic and Flag operations.
 
Go back and read my comments again. No one, myself included, is saying that the crew was innocent. Simply stating that it is BS to say that the same rest rules that apply to pax carriers should not apply to cargo because it would be too much of a financial burden. Do you honestly think it us any less of a financial burden for pax carriers?

That really isn't the point, though. The point is that regardless of what rules do or don't apply, pilots have a responsibility to determine their fitness to operate safely, and an obligation to decline to fly when they know that safety may be compromised. Duty time rules don't guarantee that crews will obtain adequate rest. No carrier wants to crash airplanes, as it is never good PR.


JKG
 
That really isn't the point, though. The point is that regardless of what rules do or don't apply, pilots have a responsibility to determine their fitness to operate safely, and an obligation to decline to fly when they know that safety may be compromised. Duty time rules don't guarantee that crews will obtain adequate rest. No carrier wants to crash airplanes, as it is never good PR.


JKG

In a perfect world, yes. Companies will exploit the rules to the far corners of "legal" in order to satisfy the marketing people who are the ones that actually control the schedule.

Marketing wants this or that flight to move on their schedule, and they don't care how crew scheduling has to accomplish it.
 
So air carrier crews don't have a responsibility to do the right thing unless the government or company tells them to? I guess maybe in aviation that can be a life-ending experience.

UPS appears to be alleging that even if the same work rules applied to them, the crew in question would have been in compliance with those rules. It also appears that at least the FO made the choice not to rest when she was provided ample opportunity to do so before returning to duty. I understand that the off-daylight shifts can really be hard on an individual, but that comes with the territory in cargo flying.

No legislation occurs without lobbying, be it by corporations, unions, media, individuals, or politicians themselves. Everyone has their own self-serving agenda.


JKG

Mariners as well. If you don't know how to get rest when you can, you should stay out of the business.
 
Mariners as well. If you don't know how to get rest when you can, you should stay out of the business.

You've obviously never been in the airline business.

In the past before we tightened up scheduling protocol I've had schedules where I flew at 9pm and finished at 3am, then went back on duty at noon and worked until midnight. The next morning I had a show at 9:30 am for another 8 hours. All "legal" by the FAR's.

This was all last minute scheduling changes and I had been up since 8am on my first day (I was scheduled off on the second day originally) In that 72 hour period I had an estimated 11 hours of sleep due to transitions from day to night and disruption of the circadian clock.

Most humans I know don't have a switch that turns them off for sleep on demand. Dr. Rosekind and NASA have done in-depth studies on this and have made recommendations, but for the airlines there is a cost.

FRMS (Part 117) was implemented to reduce fatigue in the cockpit. It's not perfect, but it is a step in the right direction. Unfortunately UPS and FedEx both lobbied hard for the cargo carve out.
 
I read the transcript while looking at the approach plate for LOC RWY 18 at KBHM.

I can't tell what went wrong between these times:
04:47:05.4 the pilots remarked upon the MDA of 1200
04:47:24.5 "sink rate" annuciation by EGPWS

In the 19 sec between those times there was not much said -- and nothing about altitude, airspeed, descent rate.

What happened in those 19 seconds?
 
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You've obviously never been in the airline business.

In the past before we tightened up scheduling protocol I've had schedules where I flew at 9pm and finished at 3am, then went back on duty at noon and worked until midnight. The next morning I had a show at 9:30 am for another 8 hours. All "legal" by the FAR's.

This was all last minute scheduling changes and I had been up since 8am on my first day (I was scheduled off on the second day originally) In that 72 hour period I had an estimated 11 hours of sleep due to transitions from day to night and disruption of the circadian clock.

Most humans I know don't have a switch that turns them off for sleep on demand. Dr. Rosekind and NASA have done in-depth studies on this and have made recommendations, but for the airlines there is a cost.

FRMS (Part 117) was implemented to reduce fatigue in the cockpit. It's not perfect, but it is a step in the right direction. Unfortunately UPS and FedEx both lobbied hard for the cargo carve out.

Try working 6 hrs on, or 12 hrs on from 6pm-6am every day, day after day for a minimum of a month straight. You bury the fatigue clock day two and stay there till yo finally get off on vacation a minimum of 28 days later for 14 off. When weather hits and work continues a 72hr duty cycle is not uncommon with just catching naps on the chart table during lulls in activity.

Pilot duty time is hard for me to take great pity on, but I do understand that it is still a problem issue as much better as it is. Fatigue is an ugly issue, lots of accidents are based in fatigue. Gulf Coast Oil&Gasfield mariners have been subject to great fatigue abide by the < 600mile for reduced manning rules for decades requiring the 2 man wheelhouse schedule. With a 3 man everyone is 4 on 8 off and fatigue is eliminated. That would cost $1000 a day extra and put a few hundred people to work in good jobs.
 
Try working 6 hrs on, or 12 hrs on from 6pm-6am every day, day after day for a minimum of a month straight. You bury the fatigue clock day two and stay there till yo finally get off on vacation a minimum of 28 days later for 14 off.


Airlines don't do schedules that gives one the option to do the same schedule for weeks straight. The switching of day/night transitions with sprinkled in days off takes it's toll on the circadian clock. On a ship you can get up, move around, eat, drink, etc. plus you are only a short distance to your sleeping quarters where you live.

Airlines travel multiple time zones in one duty period. A ship does far less than that.
 
We need to demand One Level of Safety for ALL 121 carriers.
I don't see a problem having higher standards for flying people vs boxes. And if you insist on the same requirements for freight as paying passengers the next thing will be a cry for applying the same restrictions to GA as part 121.
 
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