Two Blackhawks Down, 3/29, Ft. Campbell, KY, 9 dead

Maybe screenshot that, I clicked on it and then it wanted me to download an app :eek:
 
A former Night Stalker friend of mine observed the exact same thing, noting the top rank was W-2 - apparently very unusual in his day.

The other thing is, formation flight isn’t done as much in MEDEVAC vs other units. It’s in their task list but they just don’t get the proficiency as say an air assault unit. And since they removed multi-ship training from the Black Hawk course years (2007 ish) ago, this was probably their first experience for the WO1s. Combine that with a more demanding mode (night/NVG) of flight and there’s some pretty elevated risk there.
 
The other thing is, formation flight isn’t done as much in MEDEVAC vs other units. It’s in their task list but they just don’t get the proficiency as say an air assault unit. And since they removed multi-ship training from the Black Hawk course years (2007 ish) ago, this was probably their first experience for the WO1s. Combine that with a more demanding mode (night/NVG) of flight and there’s some pretty elevated risk there.
If somebody --the unit or higher safety officer (or commander) was on the ball, they could have mitigated that risk ahead of time. Or maybe there just wasn't much aviator experience in the unit to balance crews.
 
Certainly there seems to be a lot of accidents whilst using night vision goggles.
There might be many more without them. That was a problem with the 1st Cav at Hood before googles were fielded. I participated in several boards during that era. It was a witch's brew of lack of visible reference at night over a remote training area, lack of pilot experience, and lack of command awareness of the risk. With current generation night vision devices and better situation awareness you get some improvement, but there is always the human factor. Always.
 
If somebody --the unit or higher safety officer (or commander) was on the ball, they could have mitigated that risk ahead of time. Or maybe there just wasn't much aviator experience in the unit to balance crews.

Well this crew mix isn’t completely off the wall but I still I would’ve liked to have seen a CW3 (IP) in that flight.

They were probably borderline “low” to “mod” risk on their RA. Then again, I’ve never been a fan of the RA process in the Army. Over time it’s become nothing more than a formality. An exercise in how fast you can whip one out, get a briefer (risk mitigator) to sign you off and your commander to approve it. I never put much weight in if I was a low or medium. It’s just a number and I already was aware of the inherent risks regardless of the number. Doesn’t matter what a piece of paper says, there’s nothing low risk about two aircraft in close proximity, at low altitude and at night.
 
The earliest part of my Army flying career the only paperwork we dealt with was a mission sheet and the CEOI before flying, and the logbook after. Not even a PPC. Admin requirements have mushroomed over the decades but that old G. Reaper out there doesn’t care about paperwork. Never has.
 
I remember when the risk assessment card was first introduced from the Safety Center…we sort of laughed it off. This was a young crew mix no way to get around it. My early career was with a night only unit that was the only NVG unit in Europe called the Nightstalkers (One word and unit patch included a black panther) it was also a ****ing match at the time with the 160th over names… one time I was the only mission trained Commissioned Officer that was NVG current. This was problematic when we deployed and as ILT AMC’s at the time were doctrinally Commissioned…that’s all changed, and WO are now commissioned as well. We flew full face ANVS-5’s but learned to cut them away ourself with a dremel tool to modify them. Flying multi ship with a mix of aircraft might be the most stressful mission I ever flew…night systems are infinitely better but without continuous practice flying these type of mission profiles is a recipe for disaster…my first glance was crew mix was the number one factor.
 
The earliest part of my Army flying career the only paperwork we dealt with was a mission sheet and the CEOI before flying, and the logbook after. Not even a PPC. Admin requirements have mushroomed over the decades but that old G. Reaper out there doesn’t care about paperwork. Never has.

Full Face Fives... You sir, are my hero. I'm an ANVIS-6 baby myself, but I have nothing but respect for the guys who lead the way.

Flew with some White Phosphorous goggles the other night, and they are pretty awesome. No more green.
 
Full Face Fives... You sir, are my hero. I'm an ANVIS-6 baby myself, but I have nothing but respect for the guys who lead the way.

Flew with some White Phosphorous goggles the other night, and they are pretty awesome. No more green.
I think you're talking about Warlock, but yes, I finally flew full face googles in the latter days of my career. Before that it was Mark I eyeball in the dark with panel lighting turned down low as it would go.
 
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Full Face Fives... You sir, are my hero. I'm an ANVIS-6 baby myself, but I have nothing but respect for the guys who lead the way.

Flew with some White Phosphorous goggles the other night, and they are pretty awesome. No more green.

I’ve been trying to get the company to go to WP but so far no luck. Everything I’ve heard is that the contrast is much better and easier to distinguish clouds (IIMC). Our ANVIS-6 are showing their age and really need to be replaced.
 
The Risk Assessment process is logical and common sense. I have applied it in a variety of contexts, and still use it all the time in business.

1. What can go wrong?
2. How likely is it to happen?
3. How bad would it be if it happened?
4. What can we do to make it less likely, not as bad, or both?

Unfortunately, like many parts of the military bureaucracy, it got turned into a paperwork drill by the staff and command, which then turned into an exercise in finding workarounds by everyone subject to it. I was an S3 in an SF battalion when it became a requirement there. Once one team broke the code and got one approved for a range, everyone else copied it and submitted it for their training, without making any changes. Ok for ranges, maybe not so smart for mountaineering training or a HALO jump.
 
Common sense. Now there’s a concept. And a simple checklist helps too.
 
I’ve been trying to get the company to go to WP but so far no luck. Everything I’ve heard is that the contrast is much better and easier to distinguish clouds (IIMC). Our ANVIS-6 are showing their age and really need to be replaced.

We did a side by side comparison a couple of years ago. I started the flight with the green ANVIS. Then I switched to the WP, and it was amazing. We landed about 150 feet from a chain link fence, and I could make out the links with the WP. Going back to the green ANVIS was horrible. It was like looking through pea soup.

@Piperonca, My bad, but ANYBODY who flew Full Face Fives is a hero in my book!

V/r,
Brad
 
The problem with most RAs that I’ve seen, is two fold. First, it doesn’t accurately reflect risk and they’re designed to be a “go.” That turns them into a check the block process. Unless I was flying formation, NOE, unaided, with a sling load, in the middle of a hurricane, on two hrs of sleep and a 2LT next to me, we were going. At least make RAs accurately represent the risk as moderate and if in combat, make them automatic highs. Even stuff like QRF in combat where I didn't have a clue what I was doing for the day, we’d worse case it and I’m still moderate. LTC looks at the RA brief, “OK got a WO1 with ya, if you get a mission be cautious, use good judgment and stick to the standards.” Gee, pretty much knew that already without his guidance.

Which is the second problem with RAs. The segments on the form that are supposedly making me “aware of things I wouldn’t otherwise know” is just simply incorrect. The planning process, whether it be FARs or military regs, already covers in detail factors that a PIC should be aware of. I don’t need a sheet to tell me that flying in low illum will be slightly more riskier than a full moon. I get that from my 175-1. Don’t need a sheet to tell me that flying with a copilot that has less than 50 hrs NVGs is going to be more of a threat to my health than a copilot with 2,000 hrs NVGs. I know that from common sense.

I was talking about this at work with a pilot at another base one day. Everyone wants to try and checklist out risk and errors. They also over use the “Swiss Cheese” model for everything. In reality, there are plenty of times a pilot just has one lapse in judgment and it ends in disaster. There’s no box on an RA that states “today I’m gonna make a bad decision based on incorrect assumptions that will end with a Class A accident.” It’s just the simple unknown that you have to guard against. I’ve always said, in the Army I looked at everyone (even myself) involved in a mission (ground & air) as being a threat to my existence. That attitude served me well.
 
The problem with most RAs that I’ve seen, is two fold. First, it doesn’t accurately reflect risk and they’re designed to be a “go.” That turns them into a check the block process. Unless I was flying formation, NOE, unaided, with a sling load, in the middle of a hurricane, on two hrs of sleep and a 2LT next to me, we were going. At least make RAs accurately represent the risk as moderate and if in combat, make them automatic highs. Even stuff like QRF in combat where I didn't have a clue what I was doing for the day, we’d worse case it and I’m still moderate. LTC looks at the RA brief, “OK got a WO1 with ya, if you get a mission be cautious, use good judgment and stick to the standards.” Gee, pretty much knew that already without his guidance.

Which is the second problem with RAs. The segments on the form that are supposedly making me “aware of things I wouldn’t otherwise know” is just simply incorrect. The planning process, whether it be FARs or military regs, already covers in detail factors that a PIC should be aware of. I don’t need a sheet to tell me that flying in low illum will be slightly more riskier than a full moon. I get that from my 175-1. Don’t need a sheet to tell me that flying with a copilot that has less than 50 hrs NVGs is going to be more of a threat to my health than a copilot with 2,000 hrs NVGs. I know that from common sense.

I was talking about this at work with a pilot at another base one day. Everyone wants to try and checklist out risk and errors. They also over use the “Swiss Cheese” model for everything. In reality, there are plenty of times a pilot just has one lapse in judgment and it ends in disaster. There’s no box on an RA that states “today I’m gonna make a bad decision based on incorrect assumptions that will end with a Class A accident.” It’s just the simple unknown that you have to guard against. I’ve always said, in the Army I looked at everyone (even myself) involved in a mission (ground & air) as being a threat to my existence. That attitude served me well.
I am reminded of the “brooding introspective anticipators of trouble” from Harry Reasoner‘s immortal description of helicopter pilots.
 
The Risk Assessment process is logical and common sense. I have applied it in a variety of contexts, and still use it all the time in business.

1. What can go wrong?
2. How likely is it to happen?
3. How bad would it be if it happened?
4. What can we do to make it less likely, not as bad, or both?

Unfortunately, like many parts of the military bureaucracy, it got turned into a paperwork drill by the staff and command, which then turned into an exercise in finding workarounds by everyone subject to it. I was an S3 in an SF battalion when it became a requirement there. Once one team broke the code and got one approved for a range, everyone else copied it and submitted it for their training, without making any changes. Ok for ranges, maybe not so smart for mountaineering training or a HALO jump.

We use just those steps above in some IT risk assessments, and I add a 5th - "If this goes sideways, how would we explain this in a press conference". That helps a bit with some of the creative solutions to reduce risks that don't quite make the sniff test. Along the lines of you can't explain handing a prisoner a rifle, even if he doesn't have any ammo.

I don't want to change the subject, because this is interesting. For the military flight risk forms, are the people OK'ing the risk pilots?
 
A former Night Stalker friend of mine observed the exact same thing, noting the top rank was W-2 - apparently very unusual in his day.

Not at all unusual now, especially in Utility (Blackhawk) units. When I retired, I was the only CW4 in my Company and most of the line pilots were W2's. That was a Chinook unit, too, and they are known for having more experienced crewmembers.

When I was a WO1, I was a rare sight in a Chinook unit full of CW4 senior guys and maybe a CW3 or two. Yeah, that was back in the days of full-face PVS-5 goggles with one tube focused on the N1 gauges, to make sure the engines were still running during night autorotations...

Those days are gone and with the way the Army flight school has cut flight hours and direct-to-advanced aircraft, nobody comes out of Fort Rucker with enough experience to do anything but work on mission training once they get to a unit.

True, multi-ship operations are not heavily emphasized in Medevac units, but it is a mission task they must be able to perform under all conditions while working with a combined combat team composed of attack, cargo and utility helicopters. I have worked with some excellent Medevac units, and most of them were activated National Guard guys. They had their poopoo together.

Rest in peace, brothers. Know you will be missed...
 
We use just those steps above in some IT risk assessments, and I add a 5th - "If this goes sideways, how would we explain this in a press conference". That helps a bit with some of the creative solutions to reduce risks that don't quite make the sniff test. Along the lines of you can't explain handing a prisoner a rifle, even if he doesn't have any ammo.

I don't want to change the subject, because this is interesting. For the military flight risk forms, are the people OK'ing the risk pilots?

Pretty much all branches have similar risk management processes. For this particular accident being Army, there’s basically a three step process.

First, is the initial mission approval. That approval authority will vary depending on the level (company, battalion, brigade,etc) of the mission. This was most likely just a company level mission that the company commander (Captain) approved.

Second is the mission briefing process. That’s where the PIC or AMC (if multi-ship) gets briefed by a designated mission briefing officer. The MBO must be at least a PIC in the aircraft and most likely a senior IP/SP. Their job is to review the risk assessment / mission briefing worksheet and try to mitigate what they believe to be unnecessary risks. They sign the sheet and give it back to the PIC.

Finally, the RA / mission brief sheet is taken to the final approval authority. In this case, if they were low risk, they could go directly to their company commander. If moderate, battalion commander. High, brigade commander. Extremely high, first GO in CoC. This could be anything from the commander signing it quickly and saying “go have fun “ or a thorough Q&A about crew mix, contingencies, weather, etc, etc. After commander approval, they take the form to flight ops office and it gets filed away for a designated period.

There’s a lot more to it than that but that’s a down and dirty on the process. I used to wonder sometimes how we ever got off the ground with the amount of red tape involved in a basic mission.
 
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