The invasion of Japan

John Baker

Final Approach
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...and a BIG 10-4 on the SECOND-GUESSERS (see article).



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Sent: Sunday, February 2, 2014 8:53 PM
Subject: Declassified Plans For WW II Invasion Of Japan




Now we know..Why we dropped the bomb...this is the first time I've read or even seen the prep. for the invasion of japan..great planning....







This is very long but extremely enlightening for those who may have historical interest or some recall of the times and events.

Declassified plans for WW II invasion of Japan

Deep in the recesses of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.,
hidden for nearly four decades lie thousands of pages of yellowing
and dusty documents stamped "Top Secret". These documents, now
declassified, are the plans for Operation Downfall, the invasion of
Japan during World War II.

Only a few Americans in 1945 were aware of the elaborate plans that
had been prepared for the Allied Invasion of the Japanese home islands.
Even fewer today are aware of the defenses the Japanese had prepared
to counter the invasion had it been launched. Operation Downfall was
finalized during the spring and summer of 1945. It called for two
massive military undertakings to be carried out in succession and
aimed at the heart of the Japanese Empire.

In the first invasion - code named "Operation Olympic"- American
combat troops would land on Japan by amphibious assault during
the early morning hours of November 1, 1945 - 61 years ago.
Fourteen combat divisions of soldiers and Marines would land on
heavily fortified and defended Kyushu, the southernmost of the
Japanese home islands, after an unprecedented naval and aerial
bombardment.

The second invasion on March 1, 1946 - code named "Operation
Coronet"- would send at least 22 divisions against 1 million Japanese
defenders on the main island of Honshu and the Tokyo Plain. Its goal:
the unconditional surrender of Japan.

With the exception of a part of the British Pacific Fleet, Operation
Downfall was to be a strictly American operation. It called for using
the entire Marine Corps, the entire Pacific Navy, elements of the 7th
Army Air Force, the 8 Air Force (recently redeployed from Europe),
10th Air Force and the American Far Eastern Air Force. More than
1.5 million combat soldiers, with 3 million more in support or more
than 40% of all servicemen still in uniform in 1945 - would be directly
involved in the two amphibious assaults. Casualties were expected to
be extremely heavy.

Admiral William Leahy estimated that there would be more than
250,000 Americans killed or wounded on Kyushu alone. General
Charles Willoughby, chief of intelligence for General Douglas
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific,
estimated American casualties would be one million men by the
fall of 1946. Willoughby's own intelligence staff considered this
to be a conservative estimate. During the summer of 1945,
America had little time to prepare for such an endeavor, but top
military leaders were in almost unanimous agreement that an
invasion was necessary.

While naval blockade and strategic bombing of Japan was considered
to be useful, General MacArthur, for instance, did not believe a
blockade would bring about an unconditional surrender. The
advocates for invasion agreed that while a naval blockade chokes,
it does not kill; and though strategic bombing might destroy cities,
it leaves whole armies intact.

So on May 25, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after extensive
deliberation, issued to General MacArthur, Admiral Chester Nimitz,
and Army Air Force General Henry Arnold, the top secret directive
to proceed with the invasion of Kyushu. The target date was after
the typhoon season.

President Truman approved the plans for the invasions July 24.
Two days later, the United Nations issued the Potsdam Proclamation,
which called upon Japan to surrender unconditionally or face total
destruction. Three days later, the Japanese governmental news
agency broadcast to the world that Japan would ignore the
proclamation and would refuse to surrender. During this same
period it was learned -- via monitoring Japanese radio broadcasts --
that Japan had closed all schools and mobilized its school children,
was arming its civilian population and was fortifying caves and
building underground defenses.

Operation Olympic called for a four pronged assault on Kyushu.
Its purpose was to seize and control the southern one-third of that
island and establish naval and air bases, to tighten the naval
blockade of the home islands, to destroy units of the main
Japanese army and to support the later invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

The preliminary invasion would begin October 27 when the 40th
Infantry Division would land on a series of small islands west and
southwest of Kyushu. At the same time, the 158th Regimental
Combat Team would invade and occupy a small island 28 miles
south of Kyushu. On these islands, seaplane bases would be
established and radar would be set up to provide advance air
warning for the invasion fleet, to serve as fighter direction centers
for the carrier-based aircraft and to provide an emergency
anchorage for the invasion fleet, should things not go well on the
day of the invasion. As the invasion grew imminent, the massive
firepower of the Navy - the Third and Fifth Fleets -- would
approach Japan. The Third Fleet, under Admiral William
"Bull" Halsey, with its big guns and naval aircraft, would
provide strategic support for the operation against Honshu
and Hokkaido. Halsey's fleet would be composed of battleships,
heavy cruisers, destroyers, dozens of support ships and three
fast carrier task groups. From these carriers, hundreds of Navy
fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes would hit targets all
over the island of Honshu. The 3,000 ship Fifth Fleet, under
Admiral Raymond Spruance, would carry the invasion troops.

Several days before the invasion, the battleships, heavy cruisers
and destroyers would pour thousands of tons of high explosives
into the target areas. They would not cease the bombardment
until after the land forces had been launched. During the early
morning hours of November 1, the invasion would begin.
Thousands of soldiers and Marines would pour ashore on beaches
all along the eastern, southeastern, southern and western coasts of
Kyushu. Waves of Helldivers, Dauntless dive bombers, Avengers,
Corsairs, and Hellcats from 66 aircraft carriers would bomb,
rocket and strafe enemy defenses, gun emplacements, and troop
concentrations along the beaches.

The Eastern Assault Force consisting of the 25th, 33rd, and 41st
Infantry Divisions, would land near Miyaski, at beaches called
Austin, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Chrysler, and Ford, and move
inland to attempt to capture the city and its nearby airfield. The
Southern Assault Force, consisting of the 1st Cavalry Division, the
43rd Division and Americal Division would land inside Ariake Bay
at beaches labeled DeSoto, Dusenberg, Essex, Ford, and Franklin
and attempt to capture Shibushi and the city of Kanoya and its
airfield.

On the western shore of Kyushu, at beaches Pontiac, Reo, Rolls Royce,
Saxon, Star, Studebaker, Stutz, Winston and Zephyr, the V Amphibious
Corps would land the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Marine Divisions, sending half
of its force inland to Sendai and the other half to the port city of
Kagoshima.

On November 4, the Reserve Force, consisting of the 81st and 98th
Infantry Divisions and the 11th Airborne Division, after feigning an
attack on the island of Shikoku, would be landed -- if not needed
elsewhere - near Kaimondake, near the southernmost tip of
Kagoshima Bay, at the beaches designated Locomobile, Lincoln,
LaSalle, Hupmobile, Moon, Mercedes, Maxwell, Overland,
Oldsmobile, Packard, and Plymouth.

Olympic was not just a plan for invasion, but for conquest and
occupation as well. It was expected to take four months to achieve
its objective, with the three fresh American divisions per month to
be landed in support of that operation if needed. If all went well
with Olympic, Coronet would be launched March 1, 1946. Coronet
would be twice the size of Olympic, with as many as 28 divisions
landing on Honshu.

All along the coast east of Tokyo, the American 1st Army would
land the 5th, 7th, 27th, 44th, 86th, and 96th Infantry Divisions,
along with the 4th and 6th Marine Divisions.

At Sagami Bay, just south of Tokyo, the entire 8th and 10th Armies
would strike north and east to clear the long western shore of Tokyo
Bay and attempt to go as far as Yokohama. The assault troops landing
south of Tokyo would be the 4th, 6th, 8th, 24th, 31st, 37th, 38th, and
8th Infantry Divisions, along with the 13th and 20th Armored Divisions.
Following the initial assault, eight more divisions - the 2nd, 28th, 35th, 91st,
95th, 97th, and 104th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Airborne Division --
would be landed. If additional troops were needed, as expected, other
divisions redeployed from Europe and undergoing training in the United
States would be shipped to Japan in what was hoped to be the final push.

Captured Japanese documents and post war interrogations of Japanese
military leaders disclose that information concerning the number of
Japanese planes available for the defense of the home islands was
dangerously in error.

During the sea battle at Okinawa alone, Japanese Kamikaze aircraft sank
32 Allied ships and damaged more than 400 others. But during the summer
of 1945, American top brass concluded that the Japanese had spent their
air force since American bombers and fighters daily flew unmolested over
Japan. What the military leaders did not know was that by the end of July
the Japanese had been saving all aircraft, fuel, and pilots in reserve, and
had been feverishly building new planes for the decisive battle for their
homeland.

As part of Ketsu -Go, the name for the plan to defend Japan -- the Japanese
were building 20 suicide takeoff strips in southern Kyushu with underground
hangars. They also had 35 camouflaged airfields and nine seaplane bases.
On the night before the expected invasion, 50 Japanese seaplane bombers,
100 former carrier aircraft and 50 land based army planes were to be launched
in a suicide attack on the fleet. The Japanese had 58 more airfields in Korea,
western Honshu and Shikoku, which also were to be used for massive suicide
attacks.

Allied intelligence had established that the Japanese had no more than 2,500
aircraft of which they guessed 300 would be deployed in suicide attacks. In
August 1945, however, unknown to Allied intelligence, the Japanese still had
5,651 army and 7,074 navy aircraft, for a total of 12,725 planes of all types.
Every village had some type of aircraft manufacturing activity hidden in mines,
railway tunnels, under viaducts and in basements of department stores, work
was being done to construct new planes. Additionally, the Japanese were
building newer and more effective models of the Okka, a rocket-propelled
bomb much like the German V-1, but flown by a suicide pilot.

When the invasion became imminent, Ketsu-Go called for a fourfold aerial plan
of attack to destroy up to 800 Allied ships. While Allied ships were approaching
Japan, but still in the open seas, an initial force of 2,000 army and navy fighters
were to fight to the death to control the skies over Kyushu. A second force of
330 navy combat pilots was to attack the main body of the task force to keep
it from using its fire support and air cover to protect the troop carrying
transports. While these two forces were engaged, a third force of 825
suicide planes was to hit the American transports.

As the invasion convoys approached their anchorages, another 2,000
suicide planes were to be launched in waves of 200 to 300, to be used
in hour by hour attacks.

By mid-morning of the first day of the invasion, most of the American
land-based aircraft would be forced to return to their bases, leaving the
defense against the suicide planes to the carrier pilots and the shipboard
gunners. Carrier pilots crippled by fatigue would have to land time and
time again to rearm and refuel. Guns would malfunction from the heat of
continuous firing and ammunition would become scarce. Gun crews would
be exhausted by nightfall, but still the waves of kamikaze would continue.
With the fleet hovering off the beaches, all remaining Japanese aircraft
would be committed to nonstop suicide attacks, which the Japanese hoped
could be sustained for 10 days. The Japanese planned to coordinate their
air strikes with attacks from the 40 remaining submarines from the Imperial
Navy - some armed with Long Lance torpedoes with a range of 20 miles –
when the invasion fleet was 180 miles off Kyushu.

The Imperial Navy had 23 destroyers and two cruisers which were operational.
These ships were to be used to counterattack the American invasion. A number
of the destroyers were to be beached at the last minute to be used as anti-
invasion gun platforms. Once offshore, the invasion fleet would be forced
to defend not only against the attacks from the air, but would also be
confronted with suicide attacks from sea. Japan had established a suicide
naval attack unit of midget submarines, human torpedoes and exploding
motorboats.

The goal of the Japanese was to shatter the invasion before the landing.
The Japanese were convinced the Americans would back off or become
so demoralized that they would then accept a less-than-unconditional
surrender and a more honorable and face-saving end for the Japanese.

But as horrible as the battle of Japan would be off the beaches, it would
be on Japanese soil that the American forces would face the most rugged
and fanatical defense encountered during the war.

Throughout the island-hopping Pacific campaign, Allied troops had always
out-numbered the Japanese by 2 to 1 and sometimes 3 to 1. In Japan it
would be different. By virtue of a combination of cunning, guesswork, and
brilliant military reasoning, a number of Japan's top military leaders were
able to deduce, not only when, but where, the United States would land
its first invasion forces.

Facing the 14 American divisions landing at Kyushu would be 14 Japanese
divisions, 7 independent mixed brigades, 3 tank brigades and thousands of
naval troops. On Kyushu the odds would be 3 to 2 in favor of the Japanese,
with 790,000 enemy defenders against 550,000 Americans. This time the bulk
of the Japanese defenders would not be the poorly trained and ill-equipped
labor battalions that the Americans had faced in the earlier campaigns.
The Japanese defenders would be the hard core of the home army . These
troops were well-fed and well equipped. They were familiar with the terrain,
had stockpiles of arms and ammunition, and had developed an effective
system of transportation and supply almost invisible from the air. Many of
these Japanese troops were the elite of the army, and they were swollen
with a fanatical fighting spirit.

Japan's network of beach defenses consisted of offshore mines, thousands
of suicide scuba divers attacking landing craft, and mines planted on the
beaches. Coming ashore, the American Eastern amphibious assault forces
at Miyazaki would face three Japanese divisions, and two others poised for
counterattack. Awaiting the Southeastern attack force at Ariake Bay was
an entire division and at least one mixed infantry brigade.

On the western shores of Kyushu, the Marines would face the most brutal
opposition. Along the invasion beaches would be the three Japanese
divisions, a tank brigade, a mixed infantry brigade and an artillery
command. Components of two divisions would also be poised to launch
counterattacks. If not needed to reinforce the primary landing beaches,
the American Reserve Force would be landed at the base of Kagoshima
Bay November 4, where they would be confronted by two mixed infantry
brigades, parts of two infantry divisions and thousands of naval troops.

All along the invasion beaches, American troops would face coastal batteries,
anti-landing obstacles and a network of heavily fortified pillboxes, bunkers,
and underground fortresses. As Americans waded ashore, they would face
intense artillery and mortar fire as they worked their way through concrete
rubble and barbed-wire entanglements arranged to funnel them into the
muzzles of these Japanese guns.
On the beaches and beyond would be hundreds of Japanese machine gun
positions, beach mines, booby traps, trip-wire mines and sniper units. Suicide
units concealed in "spider holes" would engage the troops as they passed
nearby. In the heat of battle, Japanese infiltration units would be sent to
reap havoc in the American lines by cutting phone and communication lines.
Some of the Japanese troops would be in American uniform; English-speaking
Japanese officers were assigned to break in on American radio traffic to call
off artillery fire, to order retreats and to further confuse troops. Other infiltration
with demolition charges strapped on their chests or backs would attempt to
blow up American tanks, artillery pieces and ammunition stores as they were
unloaded ashore.

Beyond the beaches were large artillery pieces situated to bring down a
curtain of fire on the beach. Some of these large guns were mounted on
railroad tracks running in and out of caves protected by concrete and steel.

The battle for Japan would be won by what Simon Bolivar Buckner, a
lieutenant general in the Confederate army during the Civil War, had
called "Prairie Dog Warfare." This type of fighting was almost unknown
to the ground troops in Europe and the Mediterranean. It was peculiar
only to the soldiers and Marines who fought the Japanese on islands all
over the Pacific -- at Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Prairie Dog Warfare was a battle for yards, feet and sometimes inches.
It was brutal, deadly and dangerous form of combat aimed at an under-
ground, heavily fortified, non-retreating enemy. In the mountains behind
the Japanese beaches were underground networks of caves, bunkers,
command posts and hospitals connected by miles of tunnels with dozens
of entrances and exits. Some of these complexes could hold up to 1,000
troops.

In addition to the use of poison gas and bacteriological warfare (which the
Japanese had experimented with), Japan mobilized its citizenry.

Had Olympic come about, the Japanese civilian population, inflamed by a
national slogan - "One Hundred Million Will Die for the Emperor and Nation"
- were prepared to fight to the death Twenty Eight Million Japanese had
become a part of the National Volunteer Combat Force. They were armed
with ancient rifles, lunge mines, satchel charges, Molotov cocktails and
one-shot black powder mortars. Others were armed with swords, long
bows, axes and bamboo spears. The civilian units were to be used in
nighttime attacks, hit and run maneuvers, delaying actions and massive
suicide charges at the weaker American positions.

At the early stage of the invasion, 1,000 Japanese and American soldiers
would be dying every hour.

The invasion of Japan never became a reality because on August 6, 1945,
an atomic bomb was exploded over Hiroshima. Three days later, a second
bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. Within days the war with Japan was at a close.
Had these bombs not been dropped and had the invasion been launched as
scheduled, combat casualties in Japan would have been at a minimum of the
tens of thousands. Every foot of Japanese soil would have been paid for by
Japanese and American lives.

One can only guess at how many civilians would have committed suicide in
their homes or in futile mass military attacks. In retrospect, the 1 million
American men who were to be the casualties of the invasion were instead
lucky enough to survive the war. Intelligence studies and military estimates
made 50 years ago, and not latter-day speculation, clearly indicate that the
battle for Japan might well have resulted in the biggest blood-bath in the
history of modern warfare.

Far worse would be what might have happened to Japan as a nation and as
a culture. When the invasion came, it would have come after several months
of fire bombing all of the remaining Japanese cities. The cost in human life
that resulted from the two atomic blasts would be small in comparison to the
total number of Japanese lives that would have been lost by this aerial
devastation.

With American forces locked in combat in the south of Japan, little could
have prevented the Soviet Union from marching into the northern half of
the Japanese home islands. Japan today could be divided much like Korea
and Germany.

The world was spared the cost of Operation Downfall, however, because
Japan formally surrendered to the United Nations September 2, 1945, and
World War II was over.

The aircraft carriers, cruisers and transport ships scheduled to carry the
invasion troops to Japan, ferried home American troops in a gigantic
operation called Magic Carpet. In the fall of 1945, in the aftermath of
the war, few people concerned themselves with the invasion plans.
Following the surrender, the classified documents, maps, diagrams and
appendices for Operation Downfall were packed away in boxes and
eventually stored at the National Archives. These plans that called for
the invasion of Japan paint a vivid description of what might have been
one of the most horrible campaigns in the history of man. The fact that
the story of the invasion of Japan is locked up in the National Archives
and is not told in our history books is something for which all Americans
can be thankful.
...................

I had the distinct privilege of being assigned as later commander of the
8090th PACUSA detach, 20th AAF, and one of the personal pilots of
then Brig General Fred Irving USMA 17 when he was Commanding
General of Western Pacific Base Command. We had a brand new
C-46F tail number 8546. It was different from the rest of the C-46 line
in that it was equipped with Hamilton Hydromatic props whereas the
others had Curtis electrics. On one of the many flights we had 14
Generals and Admirals aboard on an inspection trip to Saipan and
Tinian. Notable aboard was General Thomas C. Handy, who had
signed the operational order to drop the atomic bombs on Japan.
President Truman's orders were verbal. He never signed an order to
drop the bombs.

On this particular flight, about half way from Guam to Tinian, a full
Colonel (General Handy's aide) came up forward and told me that
General Handy would like to come up and look around. I told him,
"Hell yes, he can fly the airplane if he wants to, sir".

He came up and sat in the copilot's seat, put on the headset and we
started chatting. I asked him if he ever regretted dropping the bombs.
His answer was, "Certainly not. We saved a million lives on both sides
by doing it. It was the right thing to do."

I never forgot that trip and the honor of being able to talk to General Handy.
I was a Lt at the time. A postscript about General Irving; he was one of the
finest gentleman I ever met. He was the oldest living graduate of West Point
when he passed on at 100+.

He was one of three Generals who had the honor of being both the "Supe"
and "Com" of West Point. I think the other gentleman were BG Sladen,
class of 1890 and BG Stewart, Class of 1896.

I am very happy the invasion never came off because if it had I don't think I
would be writing this today. We were to provide air support for the boots on
the ground guys. The small arms fire would have been devastating and
lethal as hell to fly through... Just think what it would have been like on
the ground.....

***As I have mentioned to many, had Truman not dropped the A-bombs
on Hiroshima & Nagasaki, I would not be here. Any of you who had
fathers serving in the military in 1945 probably wouldn't be here either.
For all of the historical "second guessers" who try to indict America
& Truman as criminals for dropping the bombs, this proves their
ignorance.
 
Excellent summary, thanks for posting. The numbers are simply jaw-dropping.

'Gimp
 
Wasn't that top secret. My dad turned 18 on August 14, 1945. He told me once he and every boy he knew expected to die invading Japan.
 
Any idea why we couldn't just naval blockade and starve them to death?
 
Any idea why we couldn't just naval blockade and starve them to death?
We wanted unconditional surrender, it was thought a blockade would not accomplish that. Sometime read tales of how the japs conducted themselves in China.
 
While not in this level of detail, that is how things were presented to us in history class. The bomb(s) were assumed to have saved lives.
 
While not in this level of detail, that is how things were presented to us in history class. The bomb(s) were assumed to have saved lives.

The bombs saved lives on both sides.
 
Truman made all of this very clear several times. He consulted his top military that told him we would lose at least 500,000 troops if we had to invade. We had already fire bombed Tokyo causing many many deaths but it made no impression. The soviets were getting ready to get involved which we did not want to happen. If you read " the rape of Nanking" you get a good idea of the Japanese mind set. They were fanatics.
 
As a young boy we heard stories of the envision and how estimated casualties would be in the millions. To anyone who thinks less of this country for having dropped the bomb, please reread the invasion details.

Thanks for posting.
 
For the bomb second guessers, here's a thought....if we hadn't dropped the bomb when we did.....how bad do you think it would have been when someone finally did do it? Say 5-10 years later? It's not like folks would have been satisfied with the size in 1945 and just left it on the shelf.

The world learned a lot about how bad nuclear warfare could be on a much smaller scale than we would have seen later.

Just a thought.
 
I thought it was common knowledge that we would have invaded Japan if they hadn't surrendered. That was the rationale for the bombs. I remember doing a term paper on this in HS.
 
I remember our teachers saying that this bomb would end all wars.

Yeah, that has even after Korea.

but it should have, but no leader had the balls to pull the trigger during the cold war, or even after.
 
While not in this level of detail, that is how things were presented to us in history class. The bomb(s) were assumed to have saved lives.

I believe the bombs did save a lot of lives. But the posted article includes a lot of hyperbole and innuendo.

For instance - Japanese subs were armed with long lance torpedoes, which did have a 20+ mile range. The problem is that WWII sub's had no way to aim torpedoes over that distance.

Similarly, the kamikaze threat was largely obsolete aircraft and trainers flown by pilots with just enough training to get their aircraft off the ground and follow a lead aircraft to the combat site. Not a recipe for success, even if we assume the allies would have just left those airfields unmolested.

Again, the conclusion is good, some of the supporting "facts" are a little dodgy.
 
I believe the bombs did save a lot of lives. But the posted article includes a lot of hyperbole and innuendo.

For instance - Japanese subs were armed with long lance torpedoes, which did have a 20+ mile range. The problem is that WWII sub's had no way to aim torpedoes over that distance.

Similarly, the kamikaze threat was largely obsolete aircraft and trainers flown by pilots with just enough training to get their aircraft off the ground and follow a lead aircraft to the combat site. Not a recipe for success, even if we assume the allies would have just left those airfields unmolested.

Again, the conclusion is good, some of the supporting "facts" are a little dodgy.

The kamikaze was effective against our ship, far more than most know. The real damage was classified for decades. Even if the planes were obsolete, the numbers they were going to use would have overwhelmed our ship board air defenses of the time.

One of the great mysteries was why they only used suicide planes one at a time. Had several attacked at the same time they would have been more successful, but used more planes and pilots. Almost certainly, their success ration would have been higher.

Interesting anyway you look at it. Fascinating to study.
 
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The kamikaze was effective against our ship, far more than most know. The real damage was classified for decades. Even if the planes were obsolete, the numbers they were going to use would have overwhelmed our ship board air defenses of the time.

One of the great mysteries was why they only used suicide planes one at a time. Had several attacked at the same time they would have been more successful, but used more planes and pilots. Almost certainly, their success ration would have been higher.

Interesting anyway you look at it. Fascinating to study.

The Japanese did use swarms of kamikazes in the Philippine, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima campaigns. As time went on, air defenses got better and the quality of the Kamikazes got worse due to pilot skill and the performance of the available aircraft. Coordinating the launch of 300 (or whatever) aircraft is pretty tough when your airfields are under constant attack. Even if you get them launched, there were guys like David McCampbell to deal with the ones that got airborne.

Were Kamikazes a threat? Of course. But the article ignores the realities and limitations of the Kamikaze threat (and others) and the Allies' opportunities to mitigate the threat(s).
 
My father had some knowledge of the planning for invasion, but was loathe to discuss it... and never did. I do know that he, who never countered my mom on anything, issued an absolute and withering denouncement when she expressed shame that the US had dropped the bombs. Scared me to death, when he told her, "Midge, you have no idea what you're saying. We saved lives with the bombs."

Edit: I sure miss him.
 
I recall hearing about plans for strategic atomic bombing of mass divisions in southern Japan had the surrender not occurred. I'm certain they would have been using nukes just as fast as they could be built. Yes, the bomb certainly saved lives. Moreover, its use was utterly inevitable. Was Truman really going to say with a straight face to the million widows of the invasion that we had a super weapon but didn't use it for fear of killing too many Japanese?
 
My father was in the mule pack artillery in the European theater. The thought was that the Germans would retreat to the Alps and we would have to dig them out. When this did not happen his unit was sent to a port in France where they were loading up for the invasion of Japan (they would be needed in the Japanese terrain), when VJ Day occurred. He was then moved to Austria where he spent his occupation duty playing football. His division lost over 700 men in one day in Europe. To say he was relieved that the bomb was dropped would be an understatement.
I am also in the camp that believes our dropping the bombs probably saved us from a major nuclear war in the 20th century.
 
Almost forgot my wife's grandfather. He was shot down in a Navy patrol bomber over Viet Nam in late June 1945 and captured by the Japanese. He was badly injured and the Japanese were going to execute him but the prison camp got word that the war had ended before they could carry it out.
As a side note, other crews that saw the airplane go down assumed no one survived so his wife was told he was KIAed. Communications being what they were back then she was never told about the change in his status and she was rather surprised when he showed up at the door. Fortunately she had not moved on.
 
...One of the great mysteries was why they only used suicide planes one at a time. ...

Sorry for the side-track, but when I initially read that, my brain skipped over the " at a " and was ready to post a "well, DUH!" :)
 
I recall hearing about plans for strategic atomic bombing of mass divisions in southern Japan had the surrender not occurred. I'm certain they would have been using nukes just as fast as they could be built. Yes, the bomb certainly saved lives. Moreover, its use was utterly inevitable. Was Truman really going to say with a straight face to the million widows of the invasion that we had a super weapon but didn't use it for fear of killing too many Japanese?

It's also been suggested that Truman would have been impeached and removed from office if he had not used the bomb.
 
I believe the bombs did save a lot of lives. But the posted article includes a lot of hyperbole and innuendo.
...
Similarly, the kamikaze threat was largely obsolete aircraft and trainers flown by pilots with just enough training to get their aircraft off the ground and follow a lead aircraft to the combat site. Not a recipe for success, even if we assume the allies would have just left those airfields unmolested.

Again, the conclusion is good, some of the supporting "facts" are a little dodgy.

You need to study up on the Battle of Okinawa. Kamikazes sunk 20 ships in that one battle.

We captured about 60% of an island that is roughly 60 miles long and about a mile and a half wide. The price:

Allied forces: ~12,000 killed, ~38,000 wounded
Japanese forces: ~110,000 killed, ~ 7000 surrendered, somewhere between 40,000 and 150,000 civilians killed.

Certainly had we invaded the mainland of Japan the Allies would have come close to a million casualties and the Japanese would have lost several million people.

It's easy to say 'we could have just starved them out'. Easy that is, unless you were one of the thousands of prisoners and slaves held by the Japanese, or were among the millions of people living under the boots of Japanese occupiers.

Remember, even after two A-bombs the Japanese military did not want surrender, and they attempted a coup when the emperor decided to throw in the towel.

Original Source Documents
 
You need to study up on the Battle of Okinawa. Kamikazes sunk 20 ships in that one battle.

The Japanese had a better "cut" of Kamikazes available for Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and the Philippines. As they moved towards the bottom of the kamikaze barrel (and as the US improved its air defenses), the odds of success for every kamikaze sortie went down. Were they still a threat? Absolutely.
 
War is a terrible thing.

Use to be we went to war to win. Ever since Korea the US seems to have lost the ability to see the end goal of war is winning. We are so afraid to upset the enemy that we go out of our way to avoid blow up a mosque or mud hut today, at the cost of American lives. We use to keep killing people until the enemy surrendered before we rebuilt their country. :lol:
 
Interesting read. What jumped out at me was the UN resolution for unconditional surrender. My how things have changed at the UN. (see: syria)

Granted, threatening total destruction to am island nation is easier than doing so to a landlocked nation....
 
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I haven't read any of the linked documents, but I thought unconditional surrender came from the Potsdam Conference and the resulting Potsdam Declaration. I don't think the UN was a formal entity until after VJ Day.


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To the original poster, thanks for sharing this article. It prompted me to do some research on my father's military experience in Japan.

In a nutshell, he would have hit the beach on November 4, 1945. The odds of me being here would have been close to nil.

I remember one of his favorite quips was that when Hirohito heard that "Ace" Orear was on a boat headed for Japan, he decided to surrender.

Dad spent the remainder of his service in the occupational forces in Aomori Prefecture. He was a first lieutenant and among other things, spent his time riding a horse previously owned by a Japanese officer. Rough duty, but somebody had to do it!
 
One of the letters my grandfather sent home towards the end of WW2 (His parents kept all his letters and we still have them today) expressed intense relief that he was too injured to invade Japan.
 
Myself, I do not believe American troops should be fighting in any war where we are not seeking "unconditional surrender".

-John
 
Myself, I do not believe American troops should be fighting in any war where we are not seeking "unconditional surrender".

-John

+1.

If all we seek in a shooting war (regardless of whether is is "declared" or not) is some sort of political compromise, perhaps we ought to revisit the reasoning for being there at all.
 
Myself, I do not believe American troops should be fighting in any war where we are not seeking "unconditional surrender".

-John

+1.

If all we seek in a shooting war (regardless of whether is is "declared" or not) is some sort of political compromise, perhaps we ought to revisit the reasoning for being there at all.
 
Myself, I do not believe American troops should be fighting in any war where we are not seeking "unconditional surrender".

-John
Ditto.

War is supposed to suck so much that you really don't want to do it because the human cost is so high.

The XBOX wars we fight now are not 'successful' when compared to WWII precisely because we lack the intestinal fortitude to engage in total war.

If the outcome isn't worth total war with an objective of unconditional surrender, it isn't worth risking our men and women in uniform.

This is not meant in any way to denigrate the service and sacrifice given by our soldiers, airmen and sailors, I have nothing but respect for them - this is really a commentary on the political vs. military aspects of war IMO.

'Gimp
 
+1.

If all we seek in a shooting war (regardless of whether is is "declared" or not) is some sort of political compromise, perhaps we ought to revisit the reasoning for being there at all.
Don't bring a knife to a gun fight and don't EVER start something you're not committed to finish. If we ever get into another fight, the only result our leders need to keep in view is WIN! WIN! WIN! All out or stay out.
 
Interesting read. What jumped out at me was the UN resolution for unconditional surrender. My how things have changed at the UN.

Not the same UN. FDR coined the term "United Nations", during the war it referred to the Allied nations. The intergovernmental organization known as the United Nations was established in October 1945.
 
Not the same UN. FDR coined the term "United Nations", during the war it referred to the Allied nations. The intergovernmental organization known as the United Nations was established in October 1945.

Yup. My UN assignment back in the 90's (in Africa) was an eye opener. Corrupt, inept and anti semitic. Probably the only saving grace was those running it recognized this and, though an inept, corrupt 3rd world officer might be in "command" thr critical positions such as S-2/3 were almost always filled by NATO officers.
My three lessons learned: 1. Don't let a Nigerian officer handle money. 2. Don't let a CHICOM officer drive. 3. Don't drink with the Russians.
 
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