The F4 Phantom as a reminder

[Pi1otguy]

I keep a picture of the F4 Phantom as my desktop at work as a reminder to consider the implications of changes we may make to software or procedures for others at my workplace. I draw parallels between the Phantom's early issues and changes/upgrades we make that could make things tough for our users.

I just wanted to sure I wasn't completely mischaractering the F4 when I explain it to coworkers (in fairly simple terms). Essentially this a small 5 min conversation about why I might be hesitant to get on board with a change right away or request extra testing time when working with other groups.

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The F4 (A lesson in managing systems and procedures)

Several decades ago the F4 was designed and built. It was an advanced fighter with very advanced electronics and missiles for it's time. The designers believed it would down enemies 20+ miles away and that guns were obsolete so decided not to include one.

Later on, this very advanced jet ended up in the Vietnam war but the rules from higher up the chain forced them to get close to and visually identify each enemy before taking them down. But that also wiped out their main advantage and often forced them to start fighting from a bad position since heat seeking missiles of that era had issues in certain dogfights. A few half second bursts from a gun would have made all the difference to a great many pilots.

They tried after the fact to add a gun pod on the bottom, but it wiggled in the wind so much that it was too hard to hit a target. Finally, after a few years they installed a proper gun and the Phantom went on to be great fighters of it's time and was still in use by several countries up until a few years ago. But on the way, many pilots suffered simply because someone higher up the chain slightly removed from work in the "real world" decided to remove a vital tool in the name of efficiency and such.

 

[35 AoA]

Here is my impression, which should be taken with a grain of salt since I never flew the thing:

1. Like you mentioned, it was designed as an interceptor that would be downing hordes of Soviet bombers from long ranges in a WWIII sort of scenario. That meant 1) it didn't need to turn with anything, and 2) ROE would have been relatively non-existent. It would have been able to employ radar guided missiles like the early Sparrow from long distances and it would be using those missiles against big juicy targets that would fly straight and level generally.

2. It was equipped with missiles only, which at the time were not really very reliable. They were subject to a lot of problems that stemmed from operational use in a real world environment. In other words, combat use didn't equate to the laboratory environment that the missiles had been tested in during developmental testing. In the real world, missiles have shelf lives, and get damaged by being banged around on a flight deck, or by living in humid hot environments for years.....or by being carried for hundreds of hours while being subjected to the loads of combat sorties.

3. Restrictive ROE drove aircrew into visual engagements that neither the aircraft nor the aircrew themselves were prepared for. The Phantom, prior to the "soft wing" (slats on the F-4E and later models), didn't turn well with anything, and definitely not when it got baited into a slow fight with a MIG-21 or MIG-17. Aircrew as a community hadn't trained to BFM for many years due to safety concerns. Combine those factors, and you have a bunch of guys that are learning to fight a jet in the heat of combat for the first time, and they have little idea how to capitalize on it's strengths and exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet bloc jets they were facing. Secondly, the Phantom was not optimized for WVR engagements, with respect to the "switchology" required to employ it's weapons. The task of just cueing a weapon, and shooting it was not easy under the stress and G's of a close in dogfight (when compared to a modern fighter with things like HOTAS, JHMCS, etc).

4. Aircrew really didn't have much of a sense of the limitations of their weapons, and the envelopes in which they could employ a weapon that would guide on the enemy. Guys were just hosing off shots well outside of the weapon's limitations, and simply assuming that the missile was at fault.

Basically all of this is spelled out in the Ault Report, but that is sort of a cliff's notes.

http://www.history.navy.mil/a-record/ault/sections1-4.pdf