TFR Violations

ScottM

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Saw this on AvWeb
According to data obtained from the FAA by AOPA, there have been 6,658 Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) violations between Sept. 11, 2001, and the end of last month. Broken down even further, 1,632 of these infringements are presidential TFR busts and another 3,254 are due to "Washington, D.C. security-related" breaches, AOPA said.
http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/12_49b/briefs/TFR_Violations_193937-1.html

That is an amazing amount of violations. There have to be multiple ones every day. Do you think someone would want to figure out why and fix the problem or at least notice the TFR do nothing?
 
The "why" is easy, but fixing the problems of obstinate and unproficient pilots is rather more complex, and my solutions (much more mandatory recurrent training and stricter currency requirements) aren't likely to be popular among many recreational (that's small "r") pilots.
 
The "why" is easy, but fixing the problems of obstinate and unproficient pilots is rather more complex, and my solutions (much more mandatory recurrent training and stricter currency requirements) aren't likely to be popular among many recreational (that's small "r") pilots.

You may be right about more training being required. I thought it was easy to stay away from the ADIZ, but all of my flying was north or east of it. When north, my course never took me near it. When flying on the east side, I knew that if I stayed clear of the "little water" (Chesapeake Bay), I was clear of the ADIZ.

My point, finally, is that there isn't a great demarcation on the land side of the ADIZ- it might be much easier to cross the line. Now that I'm in the Midwest, I can see how much I used shore features for navigation.

Is there any way to see if these were "clipping the edge" violations and how they happened? Which way were they coming? Maybe we need more Nav aids in addition to training to help pilots go around the edge of the ADIZ? Not everyone has GPS, and those that do don't might not realize that the line on the radar != the line on their GPS.

If more training is needed, lets make sure the training fixes the problem.
 
get rid of TFRs, get rid of TFR violations.
Outside of the fact that it is sheer fantasy to believe the security forces will "get rid of" the ADIZ and associated TFR's, we had Class B violations by the dozen before the ADIZ/TFR's existed. Thus, I stand by my point -- the problem is us, not them.
 
I know how to fix the problem with the Pres TFR.














Bring back the Presidential train.:D
 
My point, finally, is that there isn't a great demarcation on the land side of the ADIZ- it might be much easier to cross the line.
Since the ADIZ boundary on that side is the same as the Class B boundary, and we had dozens of Class B violations all the time before the ADIZ, and there are Class B violations all over the country with other non-geographical Class B boundaries, the problem is not the ADIZ, but rather pilots not smart enough to recognize the limits of their own navigational accuracy.

Is there any way to see if these were "clipping the edge" violations
Not for us, but the FAA can, and yes, the majority are such.

and how they happened?
Generally speaking, they involve folks trying to skirt the edge of the ADIZ while going from one side to the other (e.g., Richmond to Frederick).

Which way were they coming?
Virtually every direction.

Maybe we need more Nav aids in addition to training to help pilots go around the edge of the ADIZ?
How about recurrent training on basic pilotage/DR nav?

Not everyone has GPS, and those that do don't might not realize that the line on the radar != the line on their GPS.
They bloody well ought to by now!

If more training is needed, lets make sure the training fixes the problem.
Concur. Unfortunately, I don't know how many pilots are going to stand for having flight reviews increased in both frequency and required tasks (starting with DR/pilotage nav in unfamiliar territory).
 
Ron, I'm not sure that I agree with your posts about lack of training or even your assumption that the violations are mostly edge clipping violations.
Some of the violations are edge clipping, some are lack of awareness, (remember these are all TFR violations, not just ADIZ violations) some are failed pop ups, some are from pilots resetting their x-ponder to 1200 before landing. I'd say all are spread about equally.
There really are as many types of violations as there are violators.
Some cases involved an utter lack of training, some cases involved an unfortunate mistake, some involved confusion about the TFR itself some involved an over reliance on GPS or other technology, and some were totally and utterly unpreventable.

Sometimes you just aren't on your game, and make a stupid mistake. No amount of training is going to fix that. Violations have been made by pilots with all certificate levels.
I'm a careful thorough pilot (at least I'd like to think so) and I know you are too, but I would be willing to say that neither of us is guaranteed to avoid a TFR.
The way information about TFR's is dissipated is problematic, Notams can be hard to read online, and buried in useless data, and sometimes they can only be updated at the last min. In addition FSS briefings only cover an area 50 nm on either side of your route. A diversion can easily take you out of that 50 nm briefed area.
Your attitude makes it seem like pilots are always responsible for these violations and the continued existence of TFR's, and that is just not true. Even if there were to be ZERO violations from now on, that would only prove to the FAA and SS and TSA that the TFR's worked.
I don't know what the solution is. But the current system doesn't work.
 
Your attitude makes it seem like pilots are always responsible for these violations and the continued existence of TFR's, and that is just not true.
I'm half in agreement -- pilots are not responsible for the continued existence of TFR's -- terrorists are. And not all TFR violations are the responsibility of pilots, as I know of a couple of cases of FSS failing to brief a pilot about a TFR. However, the overwhelming majority of TFR/ADIZ violations involve pilots flying into published ADIZ/TFR airspace without anyone else's assistance.

Even if there were to be ZERO violations from now on, that would only prove to the FAA and SS and TSA that the TFR's worked.
Not exactly, since eliminating TFR violations is not the point of TFR's. The only thing that will prove the ADIZ and TFR's don't work is a successful terrorist attack.

I don't know what the solution is. But the current system doesn't work.
Since there has not been a successful terrorist air attack since the ADIZ and TFR's were cranked up, it is clear to the security folks that TFR's do work in the way in which they were intended.
 
Since there has not been a successful terrorist air attack since the ADIZ and TFR's were cranked up, it is clear to the security folks that TFR's do work in the way in which they were intended.
Yeah that's the problem isn't it? Groan.
 
The "why" is easy, but fixing the problems of obstinate and unproficient pilots is rather more complex, and my solutions (much more mandatory recurrent training and stricter currency requirements) aren't likely to be popular among many recreational (that's small "r") pilots.

Not all of these TFR violation are due to just the ADIZ. TFRs pop up all over the place and have grown so large that it could be argued they are unmanageable.

Before we jump on the pilots there is some blame to also be shared with the poor implementations of TFRs, over use of TFRs, the NOTAM system, and the design of some of the TFRs. I don't think there is one problem but several systemic ones.
 
There have been studies demonstrating lowering the speed limit does not statistically decrease the accident rate, only the ticketing rate.

Conversely, raising the speed limit does not statistically increase the accident, but does decrease the ticketing rate.

I suppose this is due to bad drivers when the speed limit is arbitrarily low and good drivers when the speed limit is arbitrarily high.
 
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I am writing my final English paper on this sort of thing, can anyone give the original source of the information in the AvWeb article? I can't find their citation.
 
I'd be interested in seeing a breakdown of TFR violations by time of TFR implementation vs wheels-up time of the violator. The data breakdowns probably don't exist, but how many violations are of TFRs in existence at wheels up? That is, how many violations could be avoided by a quick call to FSS. My own guess is that the last minute pop-up TFRs are rather rare (although likely to have greater than average violation rates). If my hypothesis is correct, then pre-flight briefings would be the solution.

I don't know if Ron's solution will work. There are already so many options available for pilots to get TFR info. I think, and I have no data to back this up other than personal opinion, that many violators are just going up without checking anything -- FAA website (which of any source should be the most up-to-date, but isn't:mad:), FSS briefing, etc. Short of yanking licenses, how do you drag the horse to the water AND make it drink? If pilots aren't actively searching for all of the latest flight info, what are you going to do?
 
Not all of these TFR violation are due to just the ADIZ. TFRs pop up all over the place and have grown so large that it could be argued they are unmanageable.

Before we jump on the pilots there is some blame to also be shared with the poor implementations of TFRs, over use of TFRs, the NOTAM system, and the design of some of the TFRs. I don't think there is one problem but several systemic ones.

49% of the busts were ADIZ-related. 24% were busts of Presidential TFR's. Those two sources account for three-quarters of these busts. By implication the other quarter are violations of the more "traditional" TFR's (airshows, disasters) as well as other new security TFRs (Stadiums, Mickey Mouse, etc.) but we don't know the breakdown.

I agree with you that there are some systemic problems, but the huge problem is the pilots. The ADIZ hasn't changed in years and people still bust it - regularly. Whenever the President spends the weekend at Camp David you can make book there will be a couple of busts of the expanded P-40. When He travels the NOTAMs are out on the wire three days ahead of time and people still don't get the message. I don't get it.

Regards,
Joe
 
I am writing my final English paper on this sort of thing, can anyone give the original source of the information in the AvWeb article? I can't find their citation.

It's no longer on the AOPA web site. It was on their home page a couple of days ago but is no longer there. http://www.aopa.org/

Regards,
Joe
 
Nick, I know this thread is very old but my company has a solution and I would like to see what you came up with in your report if you do not mind.
 
Since there has not been a successful terrorist air attack since the ADIZ and TFR's were cranked up, it is clear to the security folks that TFR's do work in the way in which they were intended.

I'm based inside the Washington SFRA and have been based at the same airport since well before any such concept existed pre-9/11. I used to rant on this topic myself and I even testified at the public hearings held on the ADIZ about the effect on aviation related businesses based in and near the ADIZ. When these rules and procedures first went in to place, they (and their enforcement) were draconian.

But there's one persuasive point that cooled my jets a bit about advocacy aimed at removing these things. It's that the TFRs are also meant to protect us from the people that have been tasked with protecting Washington based assets. Those forces that are tasked with protecting are well armed and skilled in using force to complete their mission - protecting the our seat of government. If the SFRA and FRZ around DC didn't exist they'd be forced to make decisions about perceived threats in much less response time. In other words, the SFRA makes their trigger finger a bit less poised to fire if they know that the nearby traffic is doing something predictable due to the SFRA rules and procedures. So the corollary to Ron's remark about "no terrorist attacks" is that there also hasn't been anyone shot down for blundering over the national mall either.

Now, to buy in to any of that you have to accept the premise that our seat of government needs protecting by forces like that but since I'm not a counter-terrorism expert I don't have an informed opinion about that. I do agree with Ron though that the current implementation of the SFRA requires no special skills that pilots shouldn't already be proficient in when operating around busy airspace. The violations are an ugly black mark on our brethren and wouldn't inspire much confidence in anyone that we are well behaved when we need to be. You're never going to convince the Secret Service to "lighten up" so we might as well get on with something we can have an affect on - our competence in navigation.
 
I'm based inside the Washington SFRA and have been based at the same airport since well before any such concept existed pre-9/11. I used to rant on this topic myself and I even testified at the public hearings held on the ADIZ about the effect on aviation related businesses based in and near the ADIZ. When these rules and procedures first went in to place, they (and their enforcement) were draconian.

But there's one persuasive point that cooled my jets a bit about advocacy aimed at removing these things. It's that the TFRs are also meant to protect us from the people that have been tasked with protecting Washington based assets. Those forces that are tasked with protecting are well armed and skilled in using force to complete their mission - protecting the our seat of government. If the SFRA and FRZ around DC didn't exist they'd be forced to make decisions about perceived threats in much less response time. In other words, the SFRA makes their trigger finger a bit less poised to fire if they know that the nearby traffic is doing something predictable due to the SFRA rules and procedures. So the corollary to Ron's remark about "no terrorist attacks" is that there also hasn't been anyone shot down for blundering over the national mall either.

Now, to buy in to any of that you have to accept the premise that our seat of government needs protecting by forces like that but since I'm not a counter-terrorism expert I don't have an informed opinion about that. I do agree with Ron though that the current implementation of the SFRA requires no special skills that pilots shouldn't already be proficient in when operating around busy airspace. The violations are an ugly black mark on our brethren and wouldn't inspire much confidence in anyone that we are well behaved when we need to be. You're never going to convince the Secret Service to "lighten up" so we might as well get on with something we can have an affect on - our competence in navigation.

Ok. But history has (should have) taught us that big aircraft cause big destruction and loss of life (9/11) and small aircraft cause minimal destruction and loss of life (except for the pilot - 1/5/02 etc.). And, large aircraft go in and out of DCA all day long passing within spitting distance of the high value targets.

All it would take is one rogue airline pilot and about 35 seconds.

If the Secret Service was serious about security, Washington National would have gone the way of Meigs.
 
Ok. But history has (should have) taught us that big aircraft cause big destruction and loss of life (9/11) and small aircraft cause minimal destruction and loss of life (except for the pilot - 1/5/02 etc.). And, large aircraft go in and out of DCA all day long passing within spitting distance of the high value targets.

All it would take is one rogue airline pilot and about 35 seconds.

If the Secret Service was serious about security, Washington National would have gone the way of Meigs.


With cockpit door security and potentially armed deterrent onboard, and combined with all the other airport security now, I'm guessing they're less worried about another 9/11 style attack than something else. Clearly the ring wouldn't need to be 30 miles for something that travels as slow as I do so I'm just guessing that the size of the areas have to do with that nefarious Lear that points itself at some high value target from just outside the circle of trust.

And, if you really want to see how to do airport security well, visit Tel Aviv. It took a little extra time and was a total invasion of my personal privacy that would bristle the most laid back AFLCIO lawyer, but it certainly works. When I was there, every passenger was interrogated for about 5 - 10 minutes before clearing security. I was interrogated by a lovely young blue eyed blond girl that asked me every detail about my weeklong stay there - where we'd stayed, who's wedding we'd been to, what we saw when we visited the location of Jesus' sermon on the mount, etc...
 
Since the ADIZ boundary on that side is the same as the Class B boundary, and we had dozens of Class B violations all the time before the ADIZ, and there are Class B violations all over the country with other non-geographical Class B boundaries, the problem is not the ADIZ, but rather pilots not smart enough to recognize the limits of their own navigational accuracy.

Not for us, but the FAA can, and yes, the majority are such.

Generally speaking, they involve folks trying to skirt the edge of the ADIZ while going from one side to the other (e.g., Richmond to Frederick).

Virtually every direction.

How about recurrent training on basic pilotage/DR nav?

They bloody well ought to by now!

Concur. Unfortunately, I don't know how many pilots are going to stand for having flight reviews increased in both frequency and required tasks (starting with DR/pilotage nav in unfamiliar territory).
Geeze Ron. I don't need a GPS to navigate. People flew oceans without GPS since sometime after WWI. Besides, the GPS position doesn't have to match the RADAR position (based on hearsay, but people believed to be knowledgable).
 
I know how to fix the problem with the Pres TFR.
Bring back the Presidential train.:D

At the least, he won't EVER be on time for ANYTHING!
If there was a Congressional train and a Senate train, it might take 4 years just to go across the country.
Hmmmmm, If we could just get the Class I railroads on board with this. The accommodations on board the railroad executive cars are quite presidential, too.
 
To all, we are thinking of designing a version of our UK CAA Award winning airspace warning system which is very low cost and its only job is designed to keep you from wandering into airspace accidently, it has proved very popular in the UK as the airspace is complex and alot of it. If we had one that could be uploaded with airspace data including TFR's (with no subscription cost for this) from any FBO or at home or even GPRS connected (might be a fee for this as it is not available to us free) at around $200 where the sole job is to depict where you are on a sectional and give you ample warning if you are to stray into the airspace based upon your altitude is this something that would be of interest. Don't hold our British heritage against us though.

Type Airspaceaware into google and you will find our UK site.

Thanks
 
With cockpit door security and potentially armed deterrent onboard, and combined with all the other airport security now, I'm guessing they're less worried about another 9/11 style attack than something else.
Maybe, but they shouldn't be worried about other things since the airport "security" measures haven't actually improved security at all.

And, if you really want to see how to do airport security well, visit Tel Aviv. It took a little extra time and was a total invasion of my personal privacy that would bristle the most laid back AFLCIO lawyer, but it certainly works.
Maybe over there, but it wouldn't work over here. That level of privacy invasion would not be acceptable to the American public. Besides that, that airport is relatively small in terms of passengers/year. That sort of system doesn't scale.
 
Israel is roughly 20% smaller than new Jersey... And less than one tenth the size of Texas... Historians a thousand years from now are going to be baffled by its influence and flummoxed by the Western industrial countries overt favoritism towards them, even to the point of detriment to business relations with our crucial trading partners for oil... Come to think of it, so am I...

Yes, Israeli air traffic security screening method is the best in the world, driven by pure survival- but as pointed out, it sure as heck will not scale up to the morning push at KORD...

As far as the encroachment of ADIZ, and Restricted airspace, Prohibited airspace, and rolling TFR's - as long as we do not use the courts and our elected representatives to protest the exapansion of mindless 'security' it will continue to grow... This is a Representative Democracy... The government changes it's course ONLY in response to political and citizen pressure... GA as a whole has not so much as made a single squeak since 9/11 started the big, brown, hyper-security ball rolling downhill... As long as we fail to put our money and our mouths in opposition to this hyper-security movement, nothing will change...

Either put money into law suits and into electing friendly congressmen, or sell the plane take up boating...

denny-o
 
Either put money into law suits and into electing friendly congressmen, or sell the plane take up boating...
I live next to the most restrictive airspace in the country, and with the exception of one time I would like to have landed at DCA (but had to go to CGS instead to catch the Metro), I have yet to be unable to go where I want, when I want, due to those restrictions. There may be more annoying hoops through which to jump than before, but it's been just annoyance, not actual denial of access. As one who can remember flying over LaGuardia airport above their Airport Traffic Area in a C-150 not talking to anyone in 1969, I've watched airspace rules change dramatically over the years, mostly for the betterment of safety. Yes, these Security TFR's are a pain, and probably an expensive waste of the military's time and effort, and I agree that the courts and Congress should be moved to make them go away (and yes, I donate to the AOPA PAC to help lobby for GA causes and elect Congresspersons sympathetic to GA), they do not make my plane so useless that it makes me want to trade it for a boat.
 
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I live next to the most restrictive airspace in the country, and with the exception of one time I would like to have landed at DCA (but had to go to CGS instead to catch the Metro), I have yet to be unable to go where I want, when I want, due to those restrictions. There may be more annoying hoops through which to jump than before, but it's been just annoyance, not actual denial of access. As one who can remember flying over LaGuardia airport above their Airport Traffic Area in a C-150 not talking to anyone in 1969, I've watched airspace rules change dramatically over the years, mostly for the betterment of safety. Yes, these Security TFR's are a pain, and probably an expensive waste of the military's time and effort, and I agree that the courts and Congress should be moved to make them go away (and yes, I donate to the AOPA PAC to help lobby for GA causes and elect Congresspersons sympathetic to GA), they do not make my plane so useless that it makes me want to trade it for a boat.

Yet...
 
get rid of TFRs, get rid of TFR violations.
And since we're apparently unable to do a pre-flight briefing and maintain a clue about our location, we should get rid of B, C, and D airspace, SUAs, and bad weather, too. That will eliminate all kinds of problems that victimize us poor helpless pilots.
-harry
 
And since we're apparently unable to do a pre-flight briefing and maintain a clue about our location, we should get rid of B, C, and D airspace, SUAs, and bad weather, too. That will eliminate all kinds of problems that victimize us poor helpless pilots.
-harry

One key difference between B, C, D airspace, SUAs, and TFRs is that
TFRs serve no actual purpose.

You can pre-flight all you want and know exactly where you are
and still get caught with a pop-up TFR. How much B, C, D airspace,
and SUAs suddenly appear out of nowhere?

edit: I was overly broad in dissing TFRs. The TFRs that I believe
are useless are those post-911 TFRs. Clearly TFRs for firefighting, etc
have value (but blundering into one doesn't make the pilot
run the risk of being shot down).
 
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And since we're apparently unable to do a pre-flight briefing and maintain a clue about our location, we should get rid of B, C, and D airspace, SUAs, and bad weather, too. That will eliminate all kinds of problems that victimize us poor helpless pilots.
-harry

B,C, and D airspace exist for safety, and no one is arguing that they should be done away with. TFRs and the SFRA exist for perceived security, provide virtually no security against terrorists, are an abomination on the body politic, and should go away as soon as possible.
 
One key difference between B, C, D airspace, SUAs, and TFRs is that
TFRs serve no actual purpose.

You can pre-flight all you want and know exactly where you are
and still get caught with a pop-up TFR. How much B, C, D airspace,
and SUAs suddenly appear out of nowhere?

edit: I was overly broad in dissing TFRs. The TFRs that I believe
are useless are those post-911 TFRs. Clearly TFRs for firefighting, etc
have value (but blundering into one doesn't make the pilot
run the risk of being shot down).

I'm gonna go out on a limb here and just guess that very, very few of the violations are due to TFRs that popped up between the time the pilot got their pre-flight briefing and when they busted it. I've heard of it happening once but your point is hardly valid vis a vis the "danger" TFRs pose to certificates.

I agree that many TFRs are difficult to understand. Like the one that used to be over Dick Chaney's Eastern Shore home - it was a one mile radius up to 1500'. What's that going to do? Jeez, you could hit his house with a flour bomb from outside of that TFR.

But Harry's point is right on target - we're our worst enemy if we can't learn to pre-flight properly and know where we are when we're flying.
 
Like the one that used to be over Dick Chaney's Eastern Shore home - it was a one mile radius up to 1500'. What's that going to do? Jeez, you could hit his house with a flour bomb from outside of that TFR.

It's there to make photography difficult.
 
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