This, quite simply is where our regulatory model failed. The presumption was peak demand would incentivize generators and suppliers to prepare for the worst AND to keep up with base load requirements due to demand growth. That presumption was wrong. Then, add to it cases like our local city-owned utility; their peakers (much like a lot of other places down here) were off-line to begin with for long-term maintenance; even if they could have spun those peakers up in time because they heeded the weather dog’s warmings, some portion of those peakers weren’t going to be available anyways. And some, like ours, also did not heed the weather dog. That decision, to me, is a failure of the worst degree. A .gov entity whose sole purpose is to provide a public good chose to abdicate it’s responsiblity. Meanwhile the elected folks lay blame elsewhere in an effort to spin a good story and distract their constituents. I *think* where most of the level-headed people I know stand is that the crisis-response management double-speak and jargon is just a horseshît attempt at transparency. What we’d like to see is something we’re used to...the military style aircrew debrief. Let’s lay this failed mission on the table and dissect in plain English how each of us individually performed (both good and bad), find the root causes, and then fix the root causes so there isn’t a next time. Yep, it’s going to be costly. But when .gov monopolizes base load generation and delivery, that bill pretty much has to be paid.