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Discussion in 'Flight Following' started by Ted DuPuis, Feb 5, 2019.
I thought this was a good video. It's written for big jets, but still has some useful points.
I have watched this series many times at three different airlines, during ground school. It is amazing how timeless this topic presentation is.
Interesting note was that it was found to be partially at fault for AA 587, which I think was a bit silly but there were some improvements.
This comment, plus this article that I found because I was curious about AA587, are what make this board invaluable for a newbie like me. Thanks.
I'll add that there's a whole series of these videos - they're all worth watching.
A close read of both the NTSB report, and a viewing of the video, shows that nothing Capt Vanderburgh advocates for would have led the FO in the AA accident to make multiple rapid stop-to-stop rudder movements (which was the actual root cause of the accident).
I agree fully. He even made some cautions in the video about overuse of the rudder. Apparently the criticism was because some pilots failed to understand you could overstress the aircraft with the rudder. Well, an A300 isn't exactly a Japanese car used in a drifting competition.
The NTSB report goes into a lot of detail about the FO’s history of overcontrolling the airplane, too.
The A300 fleet currently flies with a "Stop Rudder Inputs" warning light, thanks to that accident.
In my opinion one of the dumber mechanical "fixes" to a purely pilot-induced problem. Maybe they could have put in a "Stop making bad airmanship decisions" or "Stop crashing the airplane" light instead?
Selective reading on your part because the NTSB report brings to light a ton of controversy about the AAMP that existed even before the accident, such as this:
[In a May 27, 1997 memorandum], the company’s managing director of flight operations technical to the company’s chief pilot and vice president of flight [stated that he had] “grave concerns about some flawed aerodynamic theory and flying techniques that have been presented in the AAMP.” The memorandum also stated that it was wrong and “exceptionally dangerous.”
The Boeing chief test pilot said that he “vehemently disagreed” with [the AAMP's suggested] aggressive use of rudder at high AOAs.
The McDonnell Douglas chief test pilot expressed “serious concerns and disagreement” about the rudder theories presented in the AAMP.
In addition, the memorandum stated that American Airlines was conducting high AOA training in simulators that did not accurately replicate the behavior of the airplane and was “very likely” to provide a false sense of confidence to pilots.
Only some of numerous criticisms against the AAMP.
How do you figure I have "selective reading"? I didn't say there wasn't controversy about AAMP, I said (in the other thread) that it was in my opinion incorrectly and unfairly maligned. I'm quite familiar with the accident report and the A300 both.
None the less, none of those quotes has anything to do with linking anything advocated in the AAMP video to the actual rapid, multiple, stop-to-stop rudder inputs which were actually responsible for the failure of the vertical stabilizer. Vanderburgh doesn't advocate that at all, in any way whatsoever, despite the other criticisms.
Why are the criticisms incorrect and unfair?
Looking at a 38-minute segment in isolation, when it was part of an all-day groundschool combined with a booklet and simulator scenarios, and drawing conclusions, seems to be a "selective" application of evidence.
For some reason there are pilots that love to be a little over excited on the rudders.. I'm really not sure why. I've safetied for, and flow with, a fair amount of low-ish time GA pilots (75-200 hrs) and a handful of people love to be overzealous on their feet. I don't get it. Some flight regimes you need it (single engine multi, crab, slip, takeoff in a SE, etc.,) but you can feel some people go crazy with the rudder even when just initiating a small bank..
There's a misconception out there that below maneuvering speed you can't "break the plane" no matter what you do.. which, is just that, a misconception
Which makes you wonder... why did they keep doing what they were doing? When you have chief test pilots telling you something, it's generally smart to listen to them! Why any level headed person would think it's smart to cram the rudder stop to stop over and over again is beyond me
..and back on topic, thanks for posting these. I'm still watching that 717 video and sending it around to local pilots
A while ago we had a thread about what we wish we'd learned more about in PPL training.. topics included flying on instruments, buying your own fuel at a fuel dock, more about how the engine works, etc., but I firmly believe that PPL pilots need more experience flying the airplane at the limits of it's envelope. This whole "first indication of stall" is not realistic.. nor is the 10 minute "set up for a power off stall" either.. stalls / spins / LOC in real life don't occur after you've prepared for it for 5-10 minutes.. there needs to be more accurate and realistic training so that if and when you do have an LOC it is second nature on recovering it
We always did full stalls. The first indication is good to practice too since you’ll actually be flying that way, but the full stall gives you the practice with how the plane actually flies (and recovery) if you end up in that situation.
GA? Push, power, rudder, roll.