astanley
En-Route
I was cleaning out a closet when I found a stack of old notebooks. One had musings post a flight lesson in 2002, after which we were given the option to land now or land about 45 minutes later. Here was the situation:
Returning from the practice area, a transient C-310 declared an emergency (fuel leaking into cockpit) and landed at BED. We were communicating with the tower and instructed to remain clear of the Delta, over the NW quadrant (we did, circling above a pond). We did so for about 20 minutes, until the tower gave us the option: Make best speed to the fence or wait while all the stacked up IFR arrivals got metered through (this was about 8:30 in the morning, the peak of the early crush of bizjets at BED).
We opted to make best speed to the fence, holding 120 KIAS in our 172, descending with the flaps up and the throttle firewalled. We chopped the throttle over the fence, and kept the airplane in a nose down attitude while we slowly bled off speed. We landed long (of course), but made the third taxiway and turned off, with a GV landing pretty close behind us. (Actually, as we finished our post landing check and started up with ground I could hear the reversers fire off behind us).
My CFI asked me if what we did was considered safe, why or why not, and beyond that, how would I personally choose to manage that situation? Is it less safe to make best available speed in a situation like this?
My notes scribbled that while the risk for an accident was potentially higher (non standard approaches equal a higher potential risk, in my mind), overall that this was not an inherently risky activity, as it is potentially "required" if you fly in a congested terminal environment. However, upon rereading I wonder if it is inherently more risky - when we fly a nonstandard approach, mixed with high speeds and tighter tolerances (as we are burning up more usable runway due to our high speed), and we are operating at a higher speed closer to the ground (less room for control error, more likely to balloon and potentially stall close to the runway).
I'm still not sure where I stand on this, primarially because I do believe that it does carry more risk but shouldn't be any more risky than any of the unsual things we may have to do when pressed.
What are your thoughts? Would you act differently, and why?
Cheers,
-Andrew
Returning from the practice area, a transient C-310 declared an emergency (fuel leaking into cockpit) and landed at BED. We were communicating with the tower and instructed to remain clear of the Delta, over the NW quadrant (we did, circling above a pond). We did so for about 20 minutes, until the tower gave us the option: Make best speed to the fence or wait while all the stacked up IFR arrivals got metered through (this was about 8:30 in the morning, the peak of the early crush of bizjets at BED).
We opted to make best speed to the fence, holding 120 KIAS in our 172, descending with the flaps up and the throttle firewalled. We chopped the throttle over the fence, and kept the airplane in a nose down attitude while we slowly bled off speed. We landed long (of course), but made the third taxiway and turned off, with a GV landing pretty close behind us. (Actually, as we finished our post landing check and started up with ground I could hear the reversers fire off behind us).
My CFI asked me if what we did was considered safe, why or why not, and beyond that, how would I personally choose to manage that situation? Is it less safe to make best available speed in a situation like this?
My notes scribbled that while the risk for an accident was potentially higher (non standard approaches equal a higher potential risk, in my mind), overall that this was not an inherently risky activity, as it is potentially "required" if you fly in a congested terminal environment. However, upon rereading I wonder if it is inherently more risky - when we fly a nonstandard approach, mixed with high speeds and tighter tolerances (as we are burning up more usable runway due to our high speed), and we are operating at a higher speed closer to the ground (less room for control error, more likely to balloon and potentially stall close to the runway).
I'm still not sure where I stand on this, primarially because I do believe that it does carry more risk but shouldn't be any more risky than any of the unsual things we may have to do when pressed.
What are your thoughts? Would you act differently, and why?
Cheers,
-Andrew