Note to self, don't follow approach plates.

:yikes: Anyone who flies IFR should read this and take a look at the home field for anything similar. The terror inducing thing for me is that 90% of the approaches I fly are at fields I only visit. WOW, just wow.
 
Saratoga springs probably didn't want to hurt precious trees.

If you've been there you know how frothy at the mouth some of those people can be at the idea of any tree cutting.
 
Don't they fly the plates?
I saw the comment about DXR Rwy 26. Anyone who flies there knows you must make a steep approach.
 
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Gee and here I thought an instrument rating would keep me out of trouble. :hairraise:

Unfortunately the first FAA reaction was to blame the pilot.

Cheers
 
Well, once you descend the MDA you are expected to use the eyeballs not to run into things. Not that these things shouldn't be there, but still. Even not withstanding the clearway violations, there might have been another aircraft there, there's not even [airspace formerly known as] a control zone there. The field can be at the approach minimums (860-1) and legal VFR.
 
Well, pilot error is the most likely cause.

Usually true but apparently not in this case. My thought was with facts presented by the pilot in this case to the FAA, some examination of facts before accusations would be appropriate.

If it is SOP for the FAA to assign blame to the pilot for some incident/accident immediately regardless of facts that is good to know.

Cheers
 
Usually true but apparently not in this case. My thought was with facts presented by the pilot in this case to the FAA, some examination of facts before accusations would be appropriate.

If it is SOP for the FAA to assign blame to the pilot for some incident/accident immediately regardless of facts that is good to know.

Cheers

You didn't know this?
 
You didn't know this?

No. Did the recent near misses at DCA or the 777 C-17's near New York City result in assigning blame immediately to the pilots involved? Does it change with the PBOR? I really don't know sonthat's why I ask.

Cheers
 
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Usually true but apparently not in this case.

Agreed.

My thought was with facts presented by the pilot in this case to the FAA, some examination of facts before accusations would be appropriate.

If it is SOP for the FAA to assign blame to the pilot for some incident/accident immediately regardless of facts that is good to know.

Well, when the pilot hits trees on an IAP and there are no other causal factors presented it pretty much points to the pilot flying a bad approach. Note that the FAA didn't try to hang the pilot, he was told straight away that there'd be no enforcement action, only that he'd have to take a 709 ride. When he told Albany FSDO he was convinced the IAP was flawed and he felt that agreeing to the 709 ride would be admitting an error he hadn't made, he was told to work it out with his local FSDO and whatever they decided would be fine.
 
For those of you on the DCPilots list, there was a recent string of posts about the IAD FSDO not approving certain ILS GS approaches where the planning criteria would be violated (even though it appeared that the actual clearance criteria would be satisfied). Apparently that's the reason that KHWY does not have a full ILS.

It would not surprise me if this case - or something like it - were behind that concern.
 
I will be really interested to see if John C. can shed some light on this.
 
Well, when the pilot hits trees on an IAP and there are no other causal factors presented it pretty much points to the pilot flying a bad approach. Note that the FAA didn't try to hang the pilot, he was told straight away that there'd be no enforcement action, only that he'd have to take a 709 ride. When he told Albany FSDO he was convinced the IAP was flawed and he felt that agreeing to the 709 ride would be admitting an error he hadn't made, he was told to work it out with his local FSDO and whatever they decided would be fine.

I thought the pilot explained in his initial report to the FAA the cause was trees in an assumed clear area but I may be wrong. Perhaps he did not, it wasn't clear when I read the article since he said his report gave the FAA "all the pertinent information it needed". If he didn't mention that, that is a different situation

I realize the FAA said there was no enforcement action planned but it looked to me the FAA did immediately assume the pilot was at fault and not meeting standards by requiring a 709 ride. Even a cursory reading of the facts would have had me ask for some more info before assigning any action but that's just me, not the FAA. At least the FAA did allow the pilot to work it out with the FSDO before officially doing anything. I could understand that if the tree intrusion was not in the initial report to the FAA but if it was, bad form by the FAA.

I also would have taken the same action the pilot did by refusing the suggestion but I don't know how many would have the perseverance to proceed to try and get the approach fixed with the potential for a more serious outcome to the next person flying that approach in similar circumstances.

Cheers
 
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For those of you on the DCPilots list, there was a recent string of posts about the IAD FSDO not approving certain ILS GS approaches where the planning criteria would be violated (even though it appeared that the actual clearance criteria would be satisfied). Apparently that's the reason that KHWY does not have a full ILS.

It would not surprise me if this case - or something like it - were behind that concern.

Oddly the RNAV (GPS) 15 has LPV down to 200'.
 
Oddly the RNAV (GPS) 15 has LPV down to 200'.

According to the thread, there are different standards for RNAV/LPV than ILS. I don't know enough about the TERPS criteria to opine.
 
Yeah, this is scary. Okay, some questions, asked in the spirit of trying to learn something:

1) The descent path from the VDP is supposed to be guaranteed clear on a 20:1 slope. Where is that slope measured from, i.e. where is it "anchored" at? The VDP? The runway threshold? Or some distance from the threshold?

2) How accurate is the flight director in calculating a glideslope? And does it use GPS altitudes or barometric? According to my calculations, if the airplane crossed ICOPA at 2100 MSL and immediately began a 3.0 degree descent, it would reach MDA (860 MSL) about 0.9 nm past the VDP, and so would be above the 20:1 slope starting at the VDP. Also it would remain above the 20:1 slope all the way to RW05 even though 3 degrees is steeper than 20:1. But if the altitudes the flight director uses are barometric, all that depends on outside temperature (probably not much of an issue during the summer).

3) Did this runway have a VASI? (The plate only mentions REILs and MIRLs but doesn't even have a real runway diagram.) If so, what slope was it set at? (And where does the VASI glide slope start from, the runway threshold or (I would presume) halfway between the VASI bars?) I wonder if the VASI was set to a steeper slope than normal, or else so far down the runway that the 3 degree slope from the VASI still cleared the trees?

Airnav shows a 3 degree VASI currently but also says "VASI RY 05 OTS INDEFLY." :idea:
 
A 709 is not an assignment of fault. They're free to give you one at ANY time. Around here the FSDO's will issue them for any gear up, for instance, even when it was shown to be a mechanical failure. A friend got one for a fuel exhaustion incident when it was pretty clear that there should have been enough based on the preflight planning and how much he had when he departed. I don't think they ever figured out why he ran short (ran too rich? leak? etc...) and he didn't have any memory of the things immediately prior to the crash.
 
A 709 is not an assignment of fault. They're free to give you one at ANY time. Around here the FSDO's will issue them for any gear up, for instance, even when it was shown to be a mechanical failure. A friend got one for a fuel exhaustion incident when it was pretty clear that there should have been enough based on the preflight planning and how much he had when he departed. I don't think they ever figured out why he ran short (ran too rich? leak? etc...) and he didn't have any memory of the things immediately prior to the crash.

It may not be an assignment of fault, but it certainly seems to imply fault to some degree. How many 709 rides have been given just because an inspector wants to take a ride in an airplane? I don't know the answer to that, but I can't say that I've heard of it happening, either.


JKG
 
Yeah, this is scary. Okay, some questions, asked in the spirit of trying to learn something:

1) The descent path from the VDP is supposed to be guaranteed clear on a 20:1 slope. Where is that slope measured from, i.e. where is it "anchored" at? The VDP? The runway threshold? Or some distance from the threshold?

2) How accurate is the flight director in calculating a glideslope? And does it use GPS altitudes or barometric? According to my calculations, if the airplane crossed ICOPA at 2100 MSL and immediately began a 3.0 degree descent, it would reach MDA (860 MSL) about 0.9 nm past the VDP, and so would be above the 20:1 slope starting at the VDP. Also it would remain above the 20:1 slope all the way to RW05 even though 3 degrees is steeper than 20:1. But if the altitudes the flight director uses are barometric, all that depends on outside temperature (probably not much of an issue during the summer).

3) Did this runway have a VASI? (The plate only mentions REILs and MIRLs but doesn't even have a real runway diagram.) If so, what slope was it set at? (And where does the VASI glide slope start from, the runway threshold or (I would presume) halfway between the VASI bars?) I wonder if the VASI was set to a steeper slope than normal, or else so far down the runway that the 3 degree slope from the VASI still cleared the trees?

Airnav shows a 3 degree VASI currently but also says "VASI RY 05 OTS INDEFLY." :idea:

Approach OCSs vary but in this case it's calculated from 200 ft from the threshold. Smaller airports that don't have instument approaches the OCS is from the threshold itself. It seems in this case there were two problems. First the OCS was calculated incorrectly and second the VASI was not located far enough down the runway. This VASI at 3 degrees was putting the aircraft into the trees. What I'd like to know is if the former VDP was putting him on GS? I'd say it probably was. This airport is crying for a displaced threshold or someone to get out there with a chain saw and cut down some trees.

Having flown in the back of an FAA Challenger 60 doing a flight check, I attest these guys know their stuff and their equipment is state of the art. If there's a problem those aircraft will find it. So how did an approach last this long with such flaws if it was flight checked on a scheduled basis?
 
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Having flown in the back of an FAA Challenger 60 doing a flight check, I attest these guys know their stuff and their equipment is state of the art. If there's a problem those aircraft will find it. So how did an approach last this long with such flaws if it was flight checked on a scheduled basis?

Who says approaches are getting flight checked on a scheduled basis, and what's the schedule? I've never seen one published.
 
Who says approaches are getting flight checked on a scheduled basis, and what's the schedule? I've never seen one published.

A flight check on a radar or Navaid isn't just done on initial. There are periodic times when another flight check is required. At NBC we had flight check come at least twice in the 4 1/2 yrs I was there. I know, I did PARs for them. Sometimes it's maintanence that was done that warrants a call. We had problems from Inbound aircraft reporting intermittent TACAN signals do our manager scheduled a FC. Could be just a flyover check as done in 2006 in the article. I find it hard to believe this thing survived since 1990 without being FC more than once.

If you want to read about when a flight check is scheduled see FAA 8200.1C chap 4. In this case an obstacle inspection should be done every 540 days.
 
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So the reason the VASI is now OTS is because the visual GS was putting planes into the trees? The NOTAM doesn't give the reason and it doesn't sound like the Learjet was following the VASI but rather a 3-degree descent path from the FAF. Like I said, that descent path would have been above the VDP but might have crossed the 3 degree VASI glide path depending on how far down the runway it started (and also what kind of altitude was being used by the Learjet).

But if the VASI was actually putting aircraft into the trees then the whole thing makes no sense at all since there would surely have been other incidents before the Learjet mishap and since. I can't believe that would even be possible if the approach was flight checked regularly.
 
I suppose one thing we need to take away from this is that if we see anything like this that seems amiss, we bring it immediately to the FSDO's attention so it gets investigated and fixed before someone gets hurt. Safety really is their middle name, and they take it very seriously, but they can't be everywhere and see everything all the time, so we have to provide them another 1.2 million eyeballs to help.
 
So the reason the VASI is now OTS is because the visual GS was putting planes into the trees? The NOTAM doesn't give the reason and it doesn't sound like the Learjet was following the VASI but rather a 3-degree descent path from the FAF. Like I said, that descent path would have been above the VDP but might have crossed the 3 degree VASI glide path depending on how far down the runway it started (and also what kind of altitude was being used by the Learjet).

But if the VASI was actually putting aircraft into the trees then the whole thing makes no sense at all since there would surely have been other incidents before the Learjet mishap and since. I can't believe that would even be possible if the approach was flight checked regularly.

Yeah it seems some info might be left out in all this. As you said it appears he wasn't flying the VASI because that thing was notam'd out in 2006 by the FC. I would think it would be turned off. It sounds like he was flying some sort of CANPA using his on board sytems. I know in the Chelton I can fly a nonprecision but if I follow the highway in the sky it will calculate my glidepath. If I fly it down it'll give me a 3 degree glidepath all the way to touchdown if I don't put in a min alt bug.

Like I said, this approach was either TERPed out wrong from the get go, or the had some trees grow real fast after the initial site survey. Flight Check should've caught it long ago.
 
Where do you find the FC history?

BTW before someone jumps on me: what I should have written is that the 3 degree descent path from the FAF could have crossed a 20:1 OCS surface, not the VASI glide path if it was 3 degrees. The 3 degree descent from the FAF would have reached THRE about 1400 feet down the runway, if based on true altitude. That would have been above the VASI (and the 20:1 surface too) the whole way. But later in the article he says that they followed the 3 degree descent from the VDP and that would give them a TCH of 43 feet (I checked and that's correct if the VDP is 1.2 nm from the threshold). So maybe they were effectively following the same glide path as the VASI would have given them.

If the VASI was NOTAMed OTS in 2006, then probably the trees just grew, someone noticed it during the FC, and it was NOTAMed OTS (but why not just set it to a steeper slope?). But then I'd think they should have changed the plate too, or declared the approach NA at night.
 
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If you want to read about when a flight check is scheduled see FAA 8200.1C chap 4. In this case an obstacle inspection should be done every 540 days.

The last flight check was April of 2006 prior to the incident in mid July of 2008. That means the flight check was already significantly overdue. Somewhere around 800 days depending on what day of April it was done in 2006.

Was the priority of the airport's periodic flight check moved to "1a" status, as required by that document when they are behind schedule?

And why wasn't the airport moved to 1a status following an accident as also required by the regulation?

If it was, does that show it was far down a list of higher priority 1a's which are already the top priority?

Frankly, since we can't see the list, we don't know.

But I have suspicions based on the number of new approaches being created (faster than flight check can grow their fleet, certainly), and the budget woes of the government.

I suspect the 1a urgent priority list is quite long. The regulation defines a list, it doesn't say the list has to be caught up. Quite typical of that type of document, from what I've seen of other Agencies. Never write a hard deadline into your Procedures. The lawyers will have a field day.

Anyone else think it'd be nice to know the exact date any particular approach was flight checked, perhaps adding it to the plate or an available addendum to the chart books? Or anyone know where that information can be found?
 
Yeah I'd be curious as to how many times this thing was flight checked through the years. I'd think we'd have to contact the flight check branch at the FAA. I agree, these guys are burdened with the increase in GPS approaches popping up all the time and with increasing budget cuts. Maybe this approach was neglected and somehow over looked for years?:dunno:
 
I thought the pilot explained in his initial report to the FAA the cause was trees in an assumed clear area but I may be wrong. Perhaps he did not, it wasn't clear when I read the article since he said his report gave the FAA "all the pertinent information it needed". If he didn't mention that, that is a different situation

I don't recall that he said so explicitly, but the emphasis in the article is on a flawed IAP as the cause. Second to last paragraph:

My main objective in writing this article is that it will prevent anyone from flying under the false impression that as long as you “fly the plate” you are protected. That might have been the case back in the good old days before we became so automated. Back then, all instrument approaches were flight checked. I have instructed and typed numerous pilots in Learjets, and for more years than I would like to admit I have preached to them, “Fly the plate and you won’t get hurt.” I quit preaching that on the night of July 13, 2008.

Note that when he hit the tree he wasn't "flying the plate" anymore, he had gone visual. Note also that the VASI for runway 5 had been shut down two years earlier.

The writer made a few other interesting statements:
Five days later, with temporary repairs completed and a ferry permit in hand, we were ready to fly the aircraft back to Nashville. The weather on departure was severe clear, with not a cloud in the sky. We called Albany Approach on departure and made a request to fly the GPS Runway 5 approach. They gave us vectors almost exactly like those we had received on the night of the incident. We intercepted the inbound course outside the IAF and continued the approach. I started the descent with reference to our glideslope indication, just as I had on the night of the incident. I wanted to maintain the three degrees as published on the approach plate. When we were approximately two miles from the runway it was clear we should no longer proceed: three degrees, if maintained, was going to put us into the tops of the trees. I broke off the approach and initiated a climb. Albany Approach cleared us on course and we departed.

Glideslope indication? There's no vertical guidance on this procedure. Approximately two miles from the runway is approximately 0.8 miles prior to the VDP. He seems amazed that continuing that three degrees would put him in the tops of the trees. But you don't maintain it, you stop the descent at the MDA.

The insurance company carrying the policy for our aircraft conducted its own investigation, and its findings were startling. The factual summary stated: “Mr. Huddleston, the captain of the flight in question, was guaranteed by certification criteria a 20:1 obstacle clearance slope until the VDP (visual descent point) and a 34:1 obstacle clearance slope from the VDP to the runway threshold. A pilot flying a GPS approach with a VDP on the published approach plate is assured this margin of obstacle clearance. The subsequent tree survey showed the tree [that the aircraft struck] extended well into the 20:1 glideslope far in excess of the 34:1 required by this type of approach. The VDP feature of this type of approach assures the pilot that a 34:1 slope from the VDP to the runway threshold is free of obstructions.”

That's not quite correct, TERPS says to limit visibility to no lower than 4000 RVR or 3/4 SM if the 34:1 Obstacle Identification Surface is penetrated. The visibility minimum on the plate attached to the article is one mile, but that's a recent plate. I'd like to see the plate that was in use in July 2008.
 
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3) Did this runway have a VASI? (The plate only mentions REILs and MIRLs but doesn't even have a real runway diagram.) If so, what slope was it set at? (And where does the VASI glide slope start from, the runway threshold or (I would presume) halfway between the VASI bars?) I wonder if the VASI was set to a steeper slope than normal, or else so far down the runway that the 3 degree slope from the VASI still cleared the trees?

Airnav shows a 3 degree VASI currently but also says "VASI RY 05 OTS INDEFLY." :idea:

From the attached article:

Two years earlier, in April 2006, one email stated: “FAA flyover inspection shutdown VASI on Runway 05. Flight Inspection Report states, ‘Obstacle clearance unsatisfactory due to trees near threshold.’”
 
Having flown in the back of an FAA Challenger 60 doing a flight check, I attest these guys know their stuff and their equipment is state of the art. If there's a problem those aircraft will find it. So how did an approach last this long with such flaws if it was flight checked on a scheduled basis?

According to an email response received by the author the VASI on runway 5 was shut down in 2006 because a flight check found the clearance was unsatisfactory due to trees. What, exactly,were the flaws on this approach at the time of the incident that contributed to the Lear hitting that tree?
 
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A 709 is not an assignment of fault. They're free to give you one at ANY time. Around here the FSDO's will issue them for any gear up, for instance, even when it was shown to be a mechanical failure. A friend got one for a fuel exhaustion incident when it was pretty clear that there should have been enough based on the preflight planning and how much he had when he departed. I don't think they ever figured out why he ran short (ran too rich? leak? etc...) and he didn't have any memory of the things immediately prior to the crash.

and a 709 'Ride' may no be a ride at all. It can be a come in and let's talk about it to see what happened.
 
I wonder if the plane was off centerline on that approach. Although legal, it shows how for years everyone missed, although not by much, and that day the lear touched the trees.

Always have to make sure to be extra cautious at strange airports. But it could have happened to any one of us.

Scary.
 
According to an email response received by the author the VASI on runway 5 was shut down in 2006 because a flight check found the clearance was unsatisfactory due to trees. What, exactly,were the flaws on this approach at the time of the incident that contributed to the Lear hitting that tree?

Documents provided by Saratoga County showed that every runway and every approach had trees penetrating the Obstacle Clear Line, and documents proved that these discrepancies were known about as far back as 1999. One document dated September 1999 stated, “Obstruction analysis study of Runway 5 identified ‘numerous penetrations’ to the approach surfaces, both on and off airport, and determined that ‘to maintain a clear 20:1 approach surface, the Runway 5 threshold would have to be displaced 946.5 feet’ [almost twice the 500 feet calculated initially].”

It's simple. He was flying a 3 degree glidpath (CANPA) from the FAF to the VDP, to the runway. That should have kept him clear of trees and a TCH of 47 feet. During his practice approach he was going to meet the TCH but the angle didn't keep him clear of trees because the trees penetrated the angle. Same reason why the VASI was shutdown. The runway needs to be displaced (along with the VASI) or someone needs to do some tree clearing. I'm not sure how they modified the approach or the runway since I don't have any info on either.
 
Documents provided by Saratoga County showed that every runway and every approach had trees penetrating the Obstacle Clear Line, and documents proved that these discrepancies were known about as far back as 1999. One document dated September 1999 stated, “Obstruction analysis study of Runway 5 identified ‘numerous penetrations’ to the approach surfaces, both on and off airport, and determined that ‘to maintain a clear 20:1 approach surface, the Runway 5 threshold would have to be displaced 946.5 feet’ [almost twice the 500 feet calculated initially].”

It's simple. He was flying a 3 degree glidpath (CANPA) from the FAF to the VDP, to the runway. That should have kept him clear of trees and a TCH of 47 feet. During his practice approach he was going to meet the TCH but the angle didn't keep him clear of trees because the trees penetrated the angle. Same reason why the VASI was shutdown. The runway needs to be displaced (along with the VASI) or someone needs to do some tree clearing. I'm not sure how they modified the approach or the runway since I don't have any info on either.

Because you feel it should or because it's written somewhere? The AIM says Vertical Descent Angles on nonprecision approaches are for information only, they are strictly advisory in nature, "there is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA." See paragraph 5-4-5.i. NACO plates show a gray shaded arrow in the profile view between the VDP and runway when the 34:1 slope is clear of obstacles. Absence of this shaded area indicates the 34:1 slope is not clear. The RNAV RWY 5 approach at 5B2 does not have this shading. I believe this symbology is relatively recent, it may not have been in use in 2008.
 
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Because you feel it should or because it's written somewhere? The AIM says Vertical Descent Angles on nonprecision approaches are for information only, they are strictly advisory in nature, "there is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA." See paragraph 5-4-5.i. NACO plates show a gray shaded arrow in the profile view between the VDP and runway when the 34:1 slope is clear of obstacles. Absence of this shaded area indicates the 34:1 slope is not clear. The RNAV RWY 5 approach at 5B2 does not have this shading. I believe this symbology is relatively recent, it may not have been in use in 2008.

The VDP feature of this type of approach assures the pilot that a 34:1 slope from the VDP to the runway threshold is free of obstructions.”

I'm going by this statement and the fact the pilot didn't say anything about the approach not having shading. Like I said I don't have a pre 2008 approach plate so I don't know if it had shading or even if it was used back then.

The thing is if the VASI was bringing people into the trees I would think the VDP was coinciding with the VASI. Also you have an FAA inspector saying the approach should have had a 47 ft TCH 500 ft down the runway. Based on that statement and the fact the approach was changed, it sure seems like the VDP was in the wrong spot. Either that, or trees grew into the OCL after initial cert.
 
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Because you feel it should or because it's written somewhere? The AIM says Vertical Descent Angles on nonprecision approaches are for information only, they are strictly advisory in nature, "there is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA." See paragraph 5-4-5.i. NACO plates show a gray shaded arrow in the profile view between the VDP and runway when the 34:1 slope is clear of obstacles. Absence of this shaded area indicates the 34:1 slope is not clear. The RNAV RWY 5 approach at 5B2 does not have this shading. I believe this symbology is relatively recent, it may not have been in use in 2008.

Based off that, night IFR operations should be illegal for those non-precision approaches, or all obstacles that are in the decent path drom VDP to TDZ should be lighted. Otherwise just how the F are we suppose to detect a random tree or dirt mound during an night approach without NVG's?



Some day the AIM will state that operations while being vectored by ATC won't guarantee collision avoidence with other aircraft and that PAPI's might cause a collision with buildings and terrain "use caution"

Maybe " no naviads are monitored, use is at your own risk.
 
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I'm going by this statement and the fact the pilot didn't say anything about the approach not having shading. Like I said I don't have a pre 2008 approach plate so I don't know if it had shading or even if it was used back then.
On the red board someone posted a version of the approach from early 2008 and it did have the shading symbol. Apparently it was removed later.

It's attached below.
 

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On the red board someone posted a version of the approach from early 2008 and it did have the shading symbol. Apparently it was removed later.

It's attached below.

Well that clears it up. Apparently it used to be obstruction free. I'd say they had a VDP and a VASI that used to work fine until the trees grew. They solved the problem by shuting down the VASI and removing the shaded area. The expensive way would be to displace the threshold, but with houses on the departure end of 5, I'm not sure if that would be doable. Still, without a VASI and a VDP that keeps you clear of obstacles, going in there at night would be a little dicey. I guess you just make sure nothing blocks your view of the runway end identifier lights and land long! :rolleyes:
 
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