NASA releases 400 page report on Columbia accident

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http://www.wftv.com/news/18381713/detail.html

The report paints a disturbing picture of what the astronauts went through and even says they didn't have some equipment and training that might have increased their chances of survival. The report found the astronauts knew for as long as 41 seconds that they did not have control of the space shuttle before they were likely knocked unconscious and killed as Columbia broke apart around them.It took almost six years for the report to come out. It's the first of it's kind because, instead of focusing on what happened to the shuttle that caused it to disintegrate, investigators looked at what killed the astronauts and what might have increased their odds of survival.

Read the report here.
 
Having only read the executive summary... Better seat restraints? Helmets? Pressure suits...? :frown2:

No, better accident prevention and decision making.
 
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I've not yet read the report but if previous reports hold true, the fault began with a missing tile which burned through sensors, wouldn't that have began with scenario training on the ground? And, if a heat sensor is failed due to immediate excessive heat, how would you know?

It will be interesting reading as how can you prepare for such an accident? The only possibility is to prevent the failures or have means to sense failures before they become worse.

Enough thought on this one. I get to go induce my own failures this next couple hours.
 
Am I the only one who thought Columbia (now Cessna) 350/400?
 
I thought of the Space Shuttle right away when I saw the thread.

But then I also have two pieces of the Columbia SRBs from STS-1 sitting right next to me in my desk.

Then clearly, you don't count. ;)
 
Before reading the report, I'm going to say that going in, I think it's a crock. Those astronauts were dead when the foam departed the ET on takeoff, they just didn't know it. Once that happened, there was not a damn thing that could have been done to save them. :no:
 
Before reading the report, I'm going to say that going in, I think it's a crock. Those astronauts were dead when the foam departed the ET on takeoff, they just didn't know it. Once that happened, there was not a damn thing that could have been done to save them. :no:

I actually spent a fair part of lunch reading the report over my sandwich, I'm kinda' nerdy that way.

The report makes that fairly clear. Some of their recommendations might help in a future, less-catastrophic event.

Much of their emphasis is on lack of integration. For example, the flight deck was originally designed for a short-sleeve flight environment :eek: and only after the Challenger disaster were crews required to remain clothed in various iterations of pressure suits for much of the mission. Problem is, the cockpit environment was in large measure not updated to reflect these changes - seats very narrow, flight controls very difficult to manipulate with bulky arms and gloves, on-board environmental systems that conflicted with pressure suit systems, etc.

To use their words: less-than-nominal conditions.
 
Before reading the report, I'm going to say that going in, I think it's a crock. Those astronauts were dead when the foam departed the ET on takeoff, they just didn't know it. Once that happened, there was not a damn thing that could have been done to save them. :no:

Well, the paper got something right:

Had all those procedures been followed, the astronauts might have lived longer and been able to take more actions, but they still wouldn't have survived, the report says.
 
My father worked on the orbiter program until he retired in 99. He was able to get a pass for us to see the shuttle that was in for maintenance. The irony was that it was Columbia and this was the first flight after that maintenance.

The report seems to be debating semantics in many places. In others, they seem to have spent a significant amount of time and money determining what I thought was trivial items. An example was cooking off boots to see at what temperature they melt. What purpose that served is beyond my simple mind.

They show in graphical detail the immense G and thermal loads that the CM was under. As pointed out above, the basic finding was that regardless of what interventions were taken, short of glueing on a new tile in orbit, there was nothing that would have saved the crew.

I will say that I am VERY impressed with the level of detail given to the investigation. These guys are pro’s.
 

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Before reading the report, I'm going to say that going in, I think it's a crock. Those astronauts were dead when the foam departed the ET on takeoff, they just didn't know it. Once that happened, there was not a damn thing that could have been done to save them. :no:

You're probably right, but I wonder if NASA had realized the magnitude of the problem right after launch, could they have implemented a solution that had any chance of saving the astronauts, if not the shuttle.

These are the same guys who brought the folks on Apollo 13 home. Certainly there was something they could have tried that would have given some (even small) chance of survival...
 
will say that I am VERY impressed with the level of detail given to the investigation. These guys are pro’s.

If you ever get a chance, read the Challenger report. Granted these reports are summaries of a pile of other information they have however they're very systematic in their approach.
 
If you ever get a chance, read the Challenger report. Granted these reports are summaries of a pile of other information they have however they're very systematic in their approach.


Dad had a copy after the investigation was concluded. He also had a discarded tile (CarbonCarbon that was booted by QA) that he passed along to me. It was a Challenger tile, just never made the cut or flew.

God speed...
 
You're probably right, but I wonder if NASA had realized the magnitude of the problem right after launch, could they have implemented a solution that had any chance of saving the astronauts, if not the shuttle.

Nope.

Before Columbia, there wasn't really a way for the astronauts to get under the shuttle to make a repair. They were in a completely different orbit from the space station, so couldn't rendezvous there. There was not a shuttle anywhere near ready to launch, IIRC it would have taken them something like two months to get a shuttle launched to pick them up - Whatever it was, it was longer than they'd have been able to stay up to wait for rescue.

My sister's a NASA engineer, and those were the same questions I was asking her afterwards. Like I said, they were dead when the foam came off the ET. :frown2:
 
What really disturbs me is the apparently acceptable reentry procedure in reference to their equipment. They are required to wear pressure suits, but only 3 bothered to attach their gloves to their rings, and one was not wearing their helmet.

My question is what is the point of requiring the wearing of the suit if it is acceptable to wear it in such a fashion that renders it useless. They reference a late 60’s Mach 3 in flight breakup in which the pilot survived because of his pressure suit at a speed only 2% less than what Columbia was traveling. I sympathize that they suit, when worn properly, makes simple tasks rather difficult. However, the geeks at Canaveral could certainly work out a procedure that considered this.

The report states that at that altitude the occupants would have had approximately 12 seconds of Time Useful Consciousness (TUC). They go on to say that under the G-loads the CM was under, the TUC would have been less than 6 seconds. Not much time to don a helmet or lock on your gloves and activate emergency O2.
 
The report states that at that altitude the occupants would have had approximately 12 seconds of Time Useful Consciousness (TUC). They go on to say that under the G-loads the CM was under, the TUC would have been less than 6 seconds. Not much time to don a helmet or lock on your gloves and activate emergency O2.

Which would have done what for them, exactly? :dunno:
 
Which would have done what for them, exactly? :dunno:


I'll play along...What? ;)

It would appear that they were aware that the suits introduced problems is relation to operational tasks, and did not provide any real viable survival effects (as noted in their “dressed down” approach). So why require them to be worn in the first place. At first glance it would seem to be a knee jerk reactive solution post Challenger.

The inherent dangers involved in operating the orbiter are unimaginable. People with more degrees than a thermometer, and with access to more detail than we are, have looked into this stuff and it would be exceptionally arrogant to believe that somebody as neuronally challenged as me sees something that they have not. As I stated before, these guys are the experts.
Your sister must be a gifted engineer to be a member of this organization. I can only imagine the conversations that you two must have. Have you ever thought about putting your name in the hat for selection? :thumbsup:
 
It will be interesting reading as how can you prepare for such an accident? The only possibility is to prevent the failures or have means to sense failures before they become worse.

It is amazing to me that prior to this "accident" there was no inspection of the tiles prior to reentery. They just hoped they were okay? :yikes:
 
Once that happened, there was not a damn thing that could have been done to save them. :no:

While that is true about being in the orbiter when it broke up, at the time (I'm going by memory :yikes:) there was a shuttle on the ground that could have been readied in a few weeks for a rescue mission IF they had done an inspection prior to reentry and found the missing tiles. While they were waiting for the "rescue shuttle" they could have attempted a repair of the tile, although no procedure for in flight tile replacement existed at the time. The orbiter can be landed pretty much with the auto pilot with no one on board (I think that's right). At the very least they could have had just one pilot on board for landing.

In any event, they still may have lost the orbiter, but the loss of life was totally avoidable IF they would have found the damaged tiles.
 
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That's not true. At the time (I'm going by memory :yikes:) there was a shuttle on the ground that could hav been readied in a few weeks for a resue mission IF they had done an inspection prior to reenty and fould the missing tiles. They still may have lost the orbitor, but the loss of life was totally avoidable.
It was my understanding that there were not enough supplies to keep Columbia in orbit long enough for a 2nd orbiter to be made ready. It may have been possible to alter orbit and redevous with the space station though.
 
That's not true. At the time (I'm going by memory :yikes:) there was a shuttle on the ground that could hav been readied in a few weeks for a resue mission IF they had done an inspection prior to reenty and fould the missing tiles. They still may have lost the orbitor, but the loss of life was totally avoidable.

Columbia would have been out of food, water, and oxygen before the next shuttle could have been launched. As I said - Two months, few weeks, pretty much the same thing.
 
It was my understanding that there were not enough supplies to keep Columbia in orbit long enough for a 2nd orbiter to be made ready.

Wow Scott - We simul-posted!

It may have been possible to alter orbit and redevous with the space station though.

Nope - They were in a way different orbit than the ISS, wouldn't have even made it close. :frown2:
 
It was my understanding that there were not enough supplies to keep Columbia in orbit long enough for a 2nd orbiter to be made ready. It may have been possible to alter orbit and rendezvous with the space station though.

They could have gone into "Apollo 13 mode" and stretched supplies and 02. There was much conjecture about this at the time, and it was possible to get the second shuttle ready AND head to the space station for a life raft.

I see this as a NASA "We did everything right" cover up (again). . Not having a procedure for inspecting the tiles prior to reentry (SOP today) was the "Achilles heel". You'll never see a NASA report that says "We screwed up", it is not in their nature as an organization. The "Challenger o-ring disaster" is a perfect example.

Space travel is dangerous. I'm not picking on NASA, they are a dedicated bunch of engineers, but like any organization it gets very political and egos sometimes get in the way of rational decision making and when things go bad (as they are going to) NASA has a unique way of saying "It wasn't my fault, and you can't prove it!".

It is my opinion, had they known about the tile being damaged, lives could have been saved. A simple pre-reentry inspection with the orbitor's robatic arm would have found the fatal damage.

It is easy being an arm chair Monday morning QB though, and that is why I don't blame NASA entirely. Sometimes even our best efforts come up short.
 
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I noticed you're up too! :D

The grandkids are spending the night tonight. God love them, but the rascals turned the thermostat up to 85 before they went to bed. I didn't catch it until I woke up feeling like a broasting chicken. :mad3:
 
You'll never see a NASA report that says "We screwed up", it is not in their nature as an organization. The "Challenger o-ring disaster" is a perfect example.

That one was not on NASA, that one was on Morton Thiokol. NASA asked them if it was OK. One guy (at Thiokol) said no. Higher-up Thiokol guy says "We'll call you back in 10 minutes" and after they hung up says to the guy that said no "Take off your engineer hat and put on your manager hat." Thiokol called back, said OK, NASA took them at their word, and kaboom. This case is probably the most-used example in engineering ethics classes now. We were told "First thing you do after graduating, save up 6 months' salary so that you can still say no."

It is my opinion, had they known about the tile being damaged, lives could have been saved. A simple pre-reentry inspection with the orbitor's robatic arm would have found the fatal damage.

I'll have to ask again to be sure, but I'm almost positive that they had no way of doing that inspection before the accident. No astronaut had ever seen the belly of the shuttle in space before. They have the little footstool attachment for the end of the arm now, which they did not have before; and I don't think they had the cameras on board back then either.

Also, note that every single flight since the Columbia accident has been to the ISS, and they've done a back-flip with high-def cameras rolling on the station to inspect the tiles. There is only one more flight scheduled in the shuttle program that is not going to go to the station (STS-125, currently scheduled to launch in May), that is the final Hubble repair mission. This mission also will not be capable of changing its orbit to that of the ISS in the event of a problem, so Discovery will be standing by to act as STS-401, a rescue mission, if something goes wrong.
 
If I recall, before the next flight cameras were installed on the ISS. After the shuttle is detached, it rotates for a photo inspection. The cameras were delivered by a Russian supply ship.
 
Also, note that every single flight since the Columbia accident has been to the ISS, and they've done a back-flip with high-def cameras rolling on the station to inspect the tiles.

OBTW, about those back-flips near the ISS - The pictures they get are awesome! Ladies and gentlemen, say hi to Discovery (this pic is from STS-114):

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Is it any wonder that this picture has been my desktop background since the day I got it? Beautiful.
 

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I think I see my house:D
 
Do you think that it would have been wise to rush the launch of the 2nd
shuttle? What would have been the options had foam also damaged
the 2nd shuttle at launch?
 
Do you think that it would have been wise to rush the launch of the 2nd
shuttle? What would have been the options had foam also damaged
the 2nd shuttle at launch?

I believe they used the same insulation for all of the preceding flight of the shuttle. Statistically speaking it would not have been damaged.

If I you were a shuttle pilot, your fellow shipmates were in trouble, you could attempt to save them, and the shuttle was ready to go. What would you do? Obviously, the decision to fly is not the pilot's, but you get the point.
 
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I still believe that NASA failed that crew. There was an unprecedented foam strike and NASA *had* to check it out and didn't. They could have used spy satellites, an unpracticed, tethered EVA, whatever, but they needed to do something other than cross their fingers.

IF they had discovered the problem, I believe someone could have come up with a plan to give the shuttle *some* chance of surviving to bail out altitude. Pack the hole with anything - baggies of human excrement, anything. Then tear off one of the blankets from the fuselage and stuff that in there. Heck, tear off all the blankets from the fuse and stuff 'em in there. How 'bout the tiles that cover the engine bulges? Tear those off and pack the hole with that material - who cares if the engines burn off? Fly a descent profile that favors the bad wing and maybe over-temps something else. Just do something to give that left wing a chance - even a snowball's chance - of staying on until bailout altitude and speed.

NASA owed that to the crew.
 
I'll have to ask again to be sure, but I'm almost positive that they had no way of doing that inspection before the accident. No astronaut had ever seen the belly of the shuttle in space before. They have the little footstool attachment for the end of the arm now, which they did not have before; and I don't think they had the cameras on board back then either.
They had that footstool attachment before. They used it on the Hubble repair mission. What they did not have was the capability of getting the robotic arm into position to see under the shuttle. They may have that now.
 
That one was not on NASA, that one was on Morton Thiokol. NASA asked them if it was OK. .
Actually the report was also critical of NASA, it felt that NASA pressured them to say yes or face financial penalties.

Also going back to the Apollo 1 fire the accident report was critical of NASA and ended up with the reassignment and firing of a couple of NASA people.

NASA reprots lay the balme where it should be. The problem is usually that those reports are a result of an incident where NASA and their contractors forgot what was really important and instead bowed to budget and time pressures.

When you think how inherantly risky space travel is and so far, in space, in 48 years of flight the US has only lost 14* astronauts that is not too shabby of a safety record.






* I am not counting the 3 in Apollo 1 as that was a ground mishap on a plugs out test nor am I considering any of the astronaut lost in aricraft incidents.
 
I still believe that NASA failed that crew. There was an unprecedented foam strike and NASA *had* to check it out and didn't. They could have used spy satellites, an unpracticed, tethered EVA, whatever, but they needed to do something other than cross their fingers.

You act as if NASA is some behemoth machine. NASA is people. Those people do everything they possibly can to get the mission accomplished safely. That is their entire mission, their entire job. Those astronauts are not people on a picture to them, they're coworkers and friends. To insinuate that they did nothing but "cross their fingers" is an extreme insult - Those folks do a damn fine job.

They did not just "cross their fingers." They busted their butts, ran through many different scenarios, brainstormed, analyzed, and in the end came to the conclusion that to attempt re-entry was the right course of action. We can monday-morning quarterback this thing to death and criticize all we want, but the reality is that thousands of the smartest people in this country collectively reached that conclusion. We can speculate all we want, but in the end, the reality is that those astronauts got everything NASA had to give.
 
They had that footstool attachment before. They used it on the Hubble repair mission. What they did not have was the capability of getting the robotic arm into position to see under the shuttle. They may have that now.

Never mind - I knew there was a reason the arm wouldn't work, and now I know what it was: The arm wasn't even on board. :no:
 
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