NA Antivirus Warranty

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Dave Taylor
So all my APC devices have pretty darned good warranties; if the component they are protecting takes a hit and fails, they will replace the APC device and the component (up to $XXXX).
Just wondering if any anti- virus/malware/ransomware offers a warranty in case their product fails to perform.
 
Don't know of any with a warranty.

I've used them all at some point. Last year I changed from Norton to Malwarebytes.
 
I think Bit Defender might if you activate that feature. But it's pretty buggy.

The best protection is good backups with encryption and password-protection. And if you really want to be 100 percent safe, disconnect the backup device from the system between backups.

Rich
 
two concerns:
-ransomware is becoming a billion dollar industry apparently, because each amount stolen is so small there is little effort to track & punish (and its difficult to anyway) So as it grows more of us will be exposed to it.
-are backups perfect? Can ransomware hide in a backup then reveal itself when it is too late? So then you are going to older & older ones til you find an uninfected backup? (then try to reconstruct the recent activity, ugh)
 
two concerns:
-ransomware is becoming a billion dollar industry apparently, because each amount stolen is so small there is little effort to track & punish (and its difficult to anyway) So as it grows more of us will be exposed to it.
-are backups perfect? Can ransomware hide in a backup then reveal itself when it is too late? So then you are going to older & older ones til you find an uninfected backup? (then try to reconstruct the recent activity, ugh)

It would be difficult to infect a password-protected / encrypted backup made with good backup software. It would have to happen in such a way that the machine got backed up between infection and detection, so the infection got copied to the backups. Even then, it would only infect current and future backups, not past ones.

You do need to keep at least one "old" copy of the full backup, just in case your machine were to become infected right before a full backup was taken. So if you do a full every Sunday and incrementals in between, keep at least the previous week's full backup (and preferably more). This way if your machine gets infected on Saturday and you don't notice it until Monday, you can still use the previous Sunday's full backup and all the incrementals to bring it current as of Friday.

You can further minimize the risk by requiring the software to prompt you for the password before making the backup. That reduces the possibility of the possibility of an infected machine being backed up because the backup software doesn't have the password saved. But it's also a lot less convenient.

Rich
 
I'm no guru/geek, but I backup all files to a small raid drive and the truly important ones to DVD's. Neither are active unless I'm backing up or retrieving. I recently installed an SSD for the C drive. The old one is kept in a safe place just in case. If I should get hit, I can reinstall the old C drive and be current as of the date I made the change.
 
It would be difficult to infect a password-protected / encrypted backup made with good backup software. It would have to happen in such a way that the machine got backed up between infection and detection, so the infection got copied to the backups. Even then, it would only infect current and future backups, not past ones.

How long do these bad guys hang around before they are triggered? I would worry about backing up for a month, all infected but without our knowledge...then the ransom request appears - so that no recent backups are available.
If I had an uninfected backup a week ago, I could replicate most activity - but a month would be impossible.
 
Someone told me tonight at dinner about a series of businesses in my field, in Austin, which came in one morning to ransom requests. At least one said "their hardware was so damaged they were forced to trash it" and bought a new server.
Sound plausible? What happened to full disk erasure and re-loading?
 
Someone told me tonight at dinner about a series of businesses in my field, in Austin, which came in one morning to ransom requests. At least one said "their hardware was so damaged they were forced to trash it" and bought a new server.
Sound plausible? What happened to full disk erasure and re-loading?

It's still theoretically possible that malware can damage hardware at the motherboard level if it executes with admin privileges, especially since the demise of the floppy drive. Most hardware manufacturers now package their BIOS updates as Windows executables that re-flash the BIOS after rebooting the system. It's theoretically possible that the protections built in to that update system could be cracked, and the procedure used to trash the BIOS.

How likely that is, I can't say. I've experienced a very high failure rate installing legitimate BIOS updates from Windows. There are a lot of checks that have to be passed, and if even one of them fails, the update doesn't happen. I have had to run many legitimate BIOS updates from bootable media because the manufacturers' Windows-based update routines failed.

On the other hand, I do remember reading some time in late 2015 that Kasperksy had identified malware that was capable of detecting and re-writing the firmware on popular hard drive models. I haven't heard of it actually happening in the wild; but then again, I'm not as current on the latest malware as I was when I was in the repair end of the business.

Personally, I don't think it would be in the interest of ransomware writers to inflict hardware damage. They may be criminals, but they're not vandals. They're in it for the money; and ironically, the success of their criminal enterprise depends on a certain level of consumer confidence. Consumers have to believe that if they pay the ransom, their files will be restored. If word gets around that that's not true, people will stop paying, and that would be bad for business.

Rich
 
The "we had to trash the hardware" sounds more like a story from an underfunded IT department that made up the story to finally get someone to pay for needed upgrades and used the security "event" as the excuse. Seen that a million times in the biz. One malware hit, and someone in an exec office finally is convinced to poop out $50K for a firewall made sometime after the 1990s that has some features that'll actually help the staff protect things.
 
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