Missed approaches and accidents

[gismo]

That wasn't this Ron who made that comment.

Yeah, re-reading your first post in this thread I see you said bad things happen on the second attempt not the third. A classic case of seeing what I expected to see.

I don't see the FAA doing that. They do give Part 91 flyers a good bit more freedom because they are willing to accept a lower level of safety in noncommercial flying, and in the long run, I don't think I'd like to give that up. If nothing else how would you differentiate between flying more approaches trying to get in versus multiple approaches for training? I've flown the same ILS as many as seven times in a row when someone's learning how to do it.

As to the training issue it wouldn't take more than someone in the plane stating that it's a training operation or including same in the flight plan remarks. But since you've suggested that even the temptations to go lower on a second approach attempt has too often led to serious consequences I guess the whole idea is moot. Won't be my first "good idea" that fizzled under the harsh light of reality.

 

[gismo]

Many factors come into play which have their root in poor training and lack of currency.

While I'm pretty much in agreement that lack of competency (which can be the result of poor training or the lack of recurrent training) is probably the largest factor I disagree that this is the only one (which is how I interpreted your remarks). The few factors I mentioned (and there are many more like them) hardly can be attributed to poor training unless you subscribe to the notion that good judgement can be trained or that training can eliminate the self imposed pressure to complete a flight when good judgement suggests that's not a wise choice.

And I can point out a larger number that do not. Once your average PP has his rating (IR) that's it. There are no regs to have him complete a true recurrent or further his training. His "proficiency" is left up to him.

I'll give you that. Instrument flying skills are highly perishable and I'm often surprised at how little effort some pilots put into remaining competent.

Introduce tougher recurrent requirements and listen to the wailing from the GA community of "how unfair" it is.

I hear ya. Kinda hard to combine making GA flying more affordable and making it safer.

 

[Everskyward]

One thing that doesn't get duplicated in training very well is doing an approach where the visibility rather than the ceiling is the limiting factor. It's nothing like taking off the hood and seeing the runway clearly. I think people have been fooled by seeing lights of some sort and thinking they were the approach lights or runway lights.

 

[poadeleted20]

Kinda hard to combine making GA flying more affordable and making it safer.

Especially when people who'll pay a golf pro $100 for a half-hour lesson complain loudly about paying more than $30/hour for a flight instructor.

 

[RotorAndWing]

While I'm pretty much in agreement that lack of competency (which can be the result of poor training or the lack of recurrent training) is probably the largest factor I disagree that this is the only one (which is how I interpreted your remarks). The few factors I mentioned (and there are many more like them) hardly can be attributed to poor training unless you subscribe to the notion that good judgement can be trained or that training can eliminate the self imposed pressure to complete a flight when good judgement suggests that's not a wise choice.

Judgement can be trained but requires more intensive training than is required under Part 91. There are no requirements under Pt 91 for training in Aviation Decision Making, Risk Management, Risk Assessment or Threat and Error Management. These at best are only learned if the CFII cares enough to implement it or the student cares enough to self study and become educated.

 

[poadeleted20]

There are no requirements under Pt 91 for training in Aviation Decision Making, Risk Management, Risk Assessment or Threat and Error Management.

Not under Part 91, but under Part 61 there most definitely is, and at the Private level, no less the IR. And that knowledge must be evaluated on both the PP and IR practical tests, too.

Sec. 61.105

Aeronautical knowledge.
...
(b) Aeronautical knowledge areas.
...
(12) Aeronautical decision making and judgment;

Satisfactory Performance​

Satisfactory performance to meet the requirements for certification is​

based on the applicant’s ability to safely:
...

4. demonstrate sound judgment and exercises aeronautical​

decision-making/risk management;

Single-Pilot Resource Management (SRM)​

The examiner shall evaluate the applicant’s ability throughout the​

practical test to use good aeronautical decision-making procedures​

in order to evaluate risks.

​

Aeronautical Decision-Making​

References: FAA-H-8083-15, FAA-H-8083-25; AC 60-22.​

Objective:​

To determine that the applicant exhibits sound​

aeronautical decision-making during the planning and​

execution of the planned flight. The applicant should:​

1. Use a sound decision-making process, such as the​

DECIDE model, 3P model, or similar process when making​

critical decisions that will have an effect on the outcome of​

the flight. The applicant should be able to explain the​

factors and alternative courses of action that were​

considered while making the decision.​

2. Recognize and explain any hazardous attitudes that may​

have influenced any decision.​

3. Decide and execute an appropriate course of action to​

properly handle any situation that arises that may cause a​

change in the original flight plan in such a way that leads to​

a safe and successful conclusion of the flight.​

4. Explain how the elements of risk management, CFIT​

awareness, overall situational awareness, use of​

automation, and task management influenced the decisions​

made and the resulting course of action.​

​

Risk Management​

References: FAA-H-8083-25; FITS document, Managing Risk​

through Scenario-Based Training, Single-Pilot​

Resource Management, and Learner Centered​

Grading.​

Objective:​

To determine that the applicant can utilize risk​

management tools and models to assess the potential​

risk associated with the planned flight during preflight​

planning and while in flight. The applicant should:​

1. Explain the four fundamental risk elements associated with​

the flight being conducted in the given scenario and how​

each one was assessed.​

2. Use a tool, such as the PAVE checklist, to help assess the​

four risk elements.​

3. Use a personal checklist, such as the I’M SAFE checklist, to​

determine personal risks.​

4. Use weather reports and forecasts to determine weather​

risks associated with the flight.

5. Explain how to recognize risks and how to mitigate those​

risks throughout the flight.​

6. Use the 5P model to assess the risks associated with each​

of the five factors.

Sec. 61.65

Instrument rating requirements.
...
(b) Aeronautical knowledge. A person who applies for an instrument rating must have received and logged ground training from an authorized instructor or accomplished a home-study course on the following aeronautical knowledge areas that apply to the instrument rating sought:
...
(9) Aeronautical decision making and judgment

In the interest of brevity, I'll forego posting what it says in the IR PTS, but there's a good bit on it there, too. Granted, it may not be taught as intensely as it is in a Part 121 operation, and CFI's may not hit on it as hard as one might wish during flight reviews, but the requirements are most definitely there for everyone, not just air carrier crews.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Not under Part 91, but under Part 61 there most definitely is, and at the Private level, no less the IR. And that knowledge must be evaluated on both the PP and IR practical tests, too.

In the interest of brevity, I'll forego posting what it says in the IR PTS, but there's a good bit on it there, too.

Yep, it's there. The amount covered is equivalent to Cliff notes. During the oral or flight test how much is actually covered or evaluated? GA pilots hear the terms, know enough to pass the checkride and move on.

There is a difference from reading a few paragraphs in a pilot's handbook to actual courses that explore ARM, ADM, TAEM, Human Factors, etc. This is why professionals receive initial and recurrent training on these subjects and one reason the accident rate is lower in the professional ranks.

Again, lack of additional training or even meaningful recurrent training is the downfall of GA.

 

[gismo]

Especially when people who'll pay a golf pro $100 for a half-hour lesson complain loudly about paying more than $30/hour for a flight instructor.

Or moan about paying $80/hr for an A&P but are happy to take their Bimmer to the dealer for a $300 oil change.

 

[gismo]

Judgement can be trained but requires more intensive training than is required under Part 91. There are no requirements under Pt 91 for training in Aviation Decision Making, Risk Management, Risk Assessment or Threat and Error Management. These at best are only learned if the CFII cares enough to implement it or the student cares enough to self study and become educated.

I agree judgement can be taught but that doesn't necessarily mean it's likely to be learned. I know this from personal experience as I'm still trying to learn it.

 

[RotorAndWing]

I agree judgement can be taught but that doesn't necessarily mean it's likely to be learned. I know this from personal experience as I'm still trying to learn it.

It's not learned because the average GA pilot doesn't want to be bothered with it since it's not a requirement. He would much rather spend his time and attention on the latest gee whiz Ipad app or other cockpit goodies that will "help" him fly IFR.

For those who truly want to learn it and use it, I applaud them, but the reality of GA they are far and few between.

 

[poadeleted20]

[Judgment is] not learned because the average GA pilot doesn't want to be bothered with it since it's not a requirement.

Why do you keep saying that when judgment is a pass/fail item in every practical test standard and per Part 61 ADM is a required knowledge item for every certificate?

 

[RotorAndWing]

Why do you keep saying that when judgment is a pass/fail item in every practical test standard and per Part 61 ADM is a required knowledge item for every certificate?

How much time is spent on the average checkride discussing and evaluating ADM? How much material is the average student exposed to in learning and applying ADM?

It's a checkride, you cannot check every area of ADM and every scenario.

We're talking after the checkride, maybe many years after the checkride. The GA pilot has dumped most of the information he used on ADM segment and has been blissfully flying along maintaining minimum standards and hasn't bothered to do any additional reading or studying on ADM or RM. Too boring and besides, he has that new Ipad with the cool app to fly with.

Then comes the day he's out flying, gets to the destination and goes missed. His missed approach procedure is shaky at best because he wasn't ready for it, wasn't expecting the weather to go down. Now the pressure is building as he makes his way back around for another go at it. He's thinking he'll be late for that appointment, he looks at the fuel gauges and wishes he would have put more fuel in (but it was .25/gallon higher than his home field, so he declined). He's fumbling with his Ipad and trying to keep SA, but now he hears the weather has gotten even worse.

Now he tries a second approach and decides to "go down and bit" and hopes to break out. After he busts minimums and goes 100 feet below he panics, tries to go around...........

You know the rest of the story.

My point all along has been this: GA has minimum standards to become certified. Once certified the pilot no longer has to attend any recurrent training or pass any additional checks. It's entirely up to the pilot to better himself and work toward higher standards, but as the accident files at the NTSB point out, it's far and few in between.

 

[peerlesscowboy]

I'll buy that in a heartbeat. I see it all the time when I do a refresher with someone who's not done much instrument flying since the last training session or who have gone a very long time since then.
Agreed again -- the percentage of nonprofessional pilots who obtain recurrent training is abysmally low. Most of those who do, do so as a requirement of their insurer because of the size/complexity of the aircraft they fly (e.g., cabin-class twins). Many of those who do, do so out of genuine desire to maintain proficiency. But the vast majority of nonprofessional pilots do only the absolute minimum required by law -- two hours with a cooperative CFI every 24 months, and instrument work is not required as part of that flight review even if they are instrument rated and fly IFR regularly.
Sad but true. For those who don't remember, the original proposal for the flight review was an annual event, and the GA world went nuts. The second proposal was an annual review for PP's with under 400 hours and biennial for everyone else, and that still didn't stand up to the protests. And if you search a bit here, you'll see the moaning and groaning about a CFI who wouldn't sign a flight review with only the minimum two hours of training and/or wanted to cover more things than the wailer felt were necessary.

FWIW, on one hand I don't like to see more regulations but I think it'd be useful to require a bi-annual IPC in order to continue exercising the privileges of the instrument rating. Skills atrophy, regulations change and new generation avionics have a learning curve. There's active instrument rated pilots out there that have upgraded to GPS navigators and all they know is "--D-> to the fix, enter-enter". Throw something unexpected at 'em and it's "now what ".
Ya' gotta' have a BFR every two years to stay legal anyway, why not combine with an IPC also.

 

[Palmpilot]

I was a lot more proficient when they required six hours of instrument time in the last six months (in addition to six approaches). That's probably because I mostly filled up the time with additional approaches.

 

[Jimmy cooper]

How much time is spent on the average checkride discussing and evaluating ADM? How much material is the average student exposed to in learning and applying ADM?

It's a checkride, you cannot check every area of ADM and every scenario.

We're talking after the checkride, maybe many years after the checkride. The GA pilot has dumped most of the information he used on ADM segment and has been blissfully flying along maintaining minimum standards and hasn't bothered to do any additional reading or studying on ADM or RM. Too boring and besides, he has that new Ipad with the cool app to fly with.

Then comes the day he's out flying, gets to the destination and goes missed. His missed approach procedure is shaky at best because he wasn't ready for it, wasn't expecting the weather to go down. Now the pressure is building as he makes his way back around for another go at it. He's thinking he'll be late for that appointment, he looks at the fuel gauges and wishes he would have put more fuel in (but it was .25/gallon higher than his home field, so he declined). He's fumbling with his Ipad and trying to keep SA, but now he hears the weather has gotten even worse.

Now he tries a second approach and decides to "go down and bit" and hopes to break out. After he busts minimums and goes 100 feet below he panics, tries to go around...........

You know the rest of the story.

My point all along has been this: GA has minimum standards to become certified. Once certified the pilot no longer has to attend any recurrent training or pass any additional checks. It's entirely up to the pilot to better himself and work toward higher standards, but as the accident files at the NTSB point out, it's far and few in between.

This seems to be an excellent read of the problem. If you look up the retired executive and his son in a turbo commander attempting to land in conn. Not long ago, ending up dead in a house basement on missed approach you wonder why they even attempt this kind of thing with such poor skills. Beyond me.

 

[poadeleted20]

How much time is spent on the average checkride discussing and evaluating ADM? How much material is the average student exposed to in learning and applying ADM?

That's not the issue about which I questioned you. You said there is no requirement for ADM/judgment training/testing for GA, and that is not true. I agree that there is not as much training/testing in these areas in GA as there is under Part 121, and that the average GA pilot probably isn't as good on these areas as one might hope or desire. But to say it's not required is just not correct.

My point all along has been this: GA has minimum standards to become certified. Once certified the pilot no longer has to attend any recurrent training ...

Are you forgetting the requirements of 14 CFR 61.56? Again, not as rigorous as Part 121, and perhaps not as rigorous as one might hope for, but the requirement still exists.

Don't get me wrong -- I'd like to see those minimums raised for noncommercial pilots, both in initial training and in recurrent training, and that includes a lot besides ADM/judgment. And as one actively training pilots like that on nearly a daily basis, I do my best to encourage higher standards in these areas. If it were up to me, flight reviews would take at least a full day of work, and IPC's would be mandatory at least annually. There would also be additional requirements for even more frequent regular ground training such as that available through the faasafety.gov site just like doctors and teachers have to do continuing education on their own to maintain their credentials. Of course, the howls of protest from pilots and the alphabet groups would be deafening, just like they were when the FAA originally proposed an annual flight review requirement 40 years ago, later watered down to biennial in response to the protests.

But to say there is no requirement for any initial/recurrent training or any testing on ADM/judgment for Part 91 GA pilots is just not accurate.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Are you forgetting the requirements of 14 CFR 61.56? Again, not as rigorous as Part 121, and perhaps not as rigorous as one might hope for, but the requirement still exists.

And how many flight reviews are given by "buddies" done at the airport cafe and a few trips around the pattern?

You and I both know, and the accident statistics point out how inefficient the flight review standards are. Again, once after certification a large majority of the GA pilots never see any additional training, ever.

 

[poadeleted20]

And how many flight reviews are given by "buddies" done at the airport cafe and a few trips around the pattern?

Again, that is deflecting the issue. You said it wasn't required, but it is. The fact that some (or many) may cheat on the requirements isn't the point I was making.

You and I both know, and the accident statistics point out how inefficient the flight review standards are. Again, once after certification a large majority of the GA pilots never see any additional training, ever.

That may be true, but it's not for lack of regulation, just lack of compliance and enforcement. Making more regulations won't fix that problem -- something you as a former Inspector should know. What we need instead is a fundamental change in attitude towards recurrent training among the GA pilot population, and if you have any ideas on how to do that, I'd love to hear them.

 

[TMetzinger]

How much time is spent on the average checkride discussing and evaluating ADM? How much material is the average student exposed to in learning and applying ADM?

It's a checkride, you cannot check every area of ADM and every scenario.

We're talking after the checkride, maybe many years after the checkride. The GA pilot has dumped most of the information he used on ADM segment and has been blissfully flying along maintaining minimum standards and hasn't bothered to do any additional reading or studying on ADM or RM. Too boring and besides, he has that new Ipad with the cool app to fly with.

Then comes the day he's out flying, gets to the destination and goes missed. His missed approach procedure is shaky at best because he wasn't ready for it, wasn't expecting the weather to go down. Now the pressure is building as he makes his way back around for another go at it. He's thinking he'll be late for that appointment, he looks at the fuel gauges and wishes he would have put more fuel in (but it was .25/gallon higher than his home field, so he declined). He's fumbling with his Ipad and trying to keep SA, but now he hears the weather has gotten even worse.

Now he tries a second approach and decides to "go down and bit" and hopes to break out. After he busts minimums and goes 100 feet below he panics, tries to go around...........

You know the rest of the story.

My point all along has been this: GA has minimum standards to become certified. Once certified the pilot no longer has to attend any recurrent training or pass any additional checks. It's entirely up to the pilot to better himself and work toward higher standards, but as the accident files at the NTSB point out, it's far and few in between.

'
Not quite accurate... ga pilots are killing themselves more than pros, but most ga pilots don't kill themselves at all.

Sent from my Nexus 7 using Tapatalk

 

[RotorAndWing]

That may be true, but it's not for lack of regulation, just lack of compliance and enforcement. Making more regulations won't fix that problem --

Who said make more regulations? Not I.

What we need instead is a fundamental change in attitude towards recurrent training among the GA pilot population, and if you have any ideas on how to do that, I'd love to hear them.

It's not going to happen in my or your lifetime. GA pilots would rather spend their time and money on gee whiz toys in the cockpit than to try to educate themselves on ADM or RM, or have their flight reviews done on a weekend hamburger run with a buddy.

 

[poadeleted20]

Who said make more regulations? Not I.

But you did say it wasn't required to be taught or tested, and that is not correct.

It's not going to happen in my or your lifetime. GA pilots would rather spend their time and money on gee whiz toys in the cockpit than to try to educate themselves on ADM or RM, or have their flight reviews done on a weekend hamburger run with a buddy.

No argument there.

 

[RotorAndWing]

But you did say it wasn't required to be taught or tested, and that is not correct.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Report: Air France B772 at Paris on Nov 16th 2011, continued to descend despite go-around


​

An Air France Boeing 777-200, registration F-GSPP performing flight AF-471 (dep Nov 15th) from Caracas (Venezuela) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France), was on a Category III ILS approach to CDG's runway 08R, low visibility procedures were in effect, descending through 320 feet AGL at 136 KCAS and 1 degree nose up attitude, when a Master Caution Warning was issued and the flight mode announciators reverted from "LAND 3" to "LAND 2". The captain (ATPL, 14,370 hours total, 6,645 hours on type) was pilot flying, the relief pilot (7,490 hours total, 5,271 hours on type) on the observer seat called out "Alarm", the first officer (7,823 hours total, 3,258 hours on type) called out "go-around", the captain responded by pushing the throttles forward to initiate the go-around disconnecting autothrottle in the process. A nose up pitch command on the control yoke is recorded however insufficient in strength to disconnect the autopilot. While the aircraft began to accelerate the attitude changed from +1.15 degrees to -0.5 degrees. The captain ordered the flaps to be reduced to 20 degrees, the pitch decreases further to 2 degrees nose down. The relief pilot called out "Pitch!" 10 seconds after the go-around was initiated both crew pulled the yoke now resulting in the autopilot disconnecting, the aircraft pitched up sharply resulting in +1.84G vertical acceleration, the attitude changed from 2 degrees nose down to 7 degrees nose up and subsequently reducing to 4 degrees nose up when the control yoke was returned to neutral, speed was now 169 KCAS. The relief pilot again called "Pitch!". The crew applied nose up input on the control yoke, the aircraft reached its lowest point of 63 feet AGL at 180 KCAS, the nose rose to 11 degrees nose up in 2 seconds and subsequently 19 degrees nose up and the aircraft climbed out to safety. Climbing through 870 feet the gear is retracted and the crew positioned the aircraft for a second approach, that resulted in a safe landing.

The French BEA released their final report in French (English version released on Jan 29th 2014) complaining, that the cockpit voice had been deleted prior to the BEA getting access to it although the crew initially had preserved the recordings, and concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

inadequate monitoring of flight parameters by the flight crew.

Contributing factors:

- Partial execution of the go-around procedure
- Inadequate management of the automatic systems during execution
- The conflict of plans of action between respecting the operators instruction and continuing the landing, which seemed to be safely possible according to the manufacturer.

The BEA reported that regardless of the weather the continuation of the approach could be considered provided the automation remained in "LAND 3" or "LAND 2" mode. However, with the Master Caution Warning a go-around was mandatory by procedures.

The BEA reported that the captain said in post flight interviews, that the flight had been generally smooth, the aircraft was on final approach descending through about 350 feet AGL with the crew trying to gain visual contact with the approach lights, when the relief pilot called out "Alarm" and the first officer "go-around". Instead of pushing the TOGA button the captain mistakenly operated the autothrottle disconnect button resulting in the autothrust system to disengage, he pushed the throttle levers forward to maximum thrust manually. He did have ground view and estimated the landing was possible, the "NO LAND3" indication however created confusion. He noticed that the autopilot had disengaged, he couldn't tell whether this was the result of an autopilot disconnect button pushed or whether this was an automatic disconnect as result of control inputs. The landing gear was retracted at 400 feet AGL.

The first officer reported he did not monitor the pitch attitude after calling go-around because he became busy configuring the flaps. Most of the go-around activity occurred after the relief pilot had called "Pitch!"

The relief pilot reported that after seeing "NO LAND3" on the EICAS he saw no reaction by the flight crew and called "Alarm" in accordance with the category III procedures for any anomaly below 1000 feet AGL, the first officer responded by calling "go-around", the captain made a gesture coincident with the application of go-around procedures (pushing the throttle levers forward). However, the flight mode announciators continued to indicate G/S (indicating the autopilot was still tracking the glideslope) and the pitch attitude remained low. Upon calling "Pitch" the captain applied nose up control inputs, however these inputs were insufficient to get the aircraft climb out, he therefore called "Pitch" a second time which resulted in satisfactory action to conduct the go-around.

The BEA analysed that there were 4 different phases in the crew reactions to the NO LAND3 indication. First was the first 8 seconds following the indication which went undetected until the relief pilot called out "Alarm". Only then the first officer called "Go-Around" and the captain applied maximum thrust, the yoke position however did not change, the autopilot continues to track the glideslope.

The second phase, the subsequent 9 seconds, was characterized by lack of crew actions, the speed increasing, the nose attitude decreasing and insufficient control inputs to disengage the autopilot. The BEA analysed that the crew did not monitor the flight parameters and did not intervene to adjust the flight trajectory, effectively losing control of the flight trajectory.

The third phase, following the first call of "Pitch", sees both pilots pulling the yoke resuling in +1.84G vertical acceleration, probably in response to the "Pitch" call by the relief pilot, however insufficient to arrest the descent and initiate the go-around. While the first officer seemed to now be monitoring the flight parameters with respect to a go-around, it appeared the captain was following a different plan to continue the approach when he pushed the yoke forward against the force of the first officer returning the yoke to neutral.

The fourth phase, following the second call of "Pitch", sees the captain relinquishing the forward force on the yoke with the force to pull the yoke still applied by the first officer resulting in the aircraft pitching up, stopping the descent and starting to climb out.

The airline took an immediate safety action by issuing an information circular to all Boeing 777 crew relating to a go-around without TOGA selection.

No safety recommendations were released as result of the investigation.

 

[Jaybird180]

Nonsequitar?

 

[Jaybird180]

I tell my trainees much the same about a partial panel approach -- you pick the best approach and best weather you can find, and you land even if that means planting on the airport surface the plane blind because all the other options are worse. At that point, you're better off with a controlled crash on that airport surface with all the emergency gear standing by than you are crashing into a neighborhood full of buildings in Queens or losing control on the missed due to lack of instrumentation.

Please allow me to back into my question by -->D

Do you follow this same advice?
Discussion to follow, pending your response.

 

[poadeleted20]

Please allow me to back into my question by -->D

Do you follow this same advice?
Discussion to follow, pending your response.

I've never had to face that situation personally. The one time I had a partial panel situation in actual instrument conditions, I broke out well above MDA.

 

[Jaybird180]

Would you have followed that advice if you didnt break out? Why or why not? Shirley you thought it through beforehand.

 

[poadeleted20]

Would you have followed that advice if you didnt break out?

That would be my intention.

Why or why not?

For the reasons I stated above.

Shirley you thought it through beforehand.

And don't call me "Shirley"!

 

[Jimmy cooper]

How much time is spent on the average checkride discussing and evaluating ADM? How much material is the average student exposed to in learning and applying ADM?

It's a checkride, you cannot check every area of ADM and every scenario.

We're talking after the checkride, maybe many years after the checkride. The GA pilot has dumped most of the information he used on ADM segment and has been blissfully flying along maintaining minimum standards and hasn't bothered to do any additional reading or studying on ADM or RM. Too boring and besides, he has that new Ipad with the cool app to fly with.

Then comes the day he's out flying, gets to the destination and goes missed. His missed approach procedure is shaky at best because he wasn't ready for it, wasn't expecting the weather to go down. Now the pressure is building as he makes his way back around for another go at it. He's thinking he'll be late for that appointment, he looks at the fuel gauges and wishes he would have put more fuel in (but it was .25/gallon higher than his home field, so he declined). He's fumbling with his Ipad and trying to keep SA, but now he hears the weather has gotten even worse.

Now he tries a second approach and decides to "go down and bit" and hopes to break out. After he busts minimums and goes 100 feet below he panics, tries to go around...........

You know the rest of the story.

My point all along has been this: GA has minimum standards to become certified. Once certified the pilot no longer has to attend any recurrent training or pass any additional checks. It's entirely up to the pilot to better himself and work toward higher standards, but as the accident files at the NTSB point out, it's far and few in between.

Exactly! An IFR certificate is only the license to learn. Many are not emotionally equipped to handle an emergency or even a missed approach,and or don't do it often enough to be proficient. The accident reports are full of these. It's why so many military cadets don't make it thru to completion.