rstowell
Pre-Flight
Yes, getting folks to think! I'm not sure how it confuses the issue, though, because ultimately the shape and quality of the arc are dictated by what the pilot chooses to do (or not do) with the elevator. Once banked, setting the elevator in position "X" will result in a turn with characteristics "A, B, C."
Perhaps the next question should be "what difference does it make?" (for dramatic effect, say that with the frustrated indignation of a former Sec of State being grilled by Congress).
The reason it's important for pilots to become acutely aware of what the controls do:
- More fatal accidents resulting from LOC-I than the next five accident categories combined.
- More LOC-I fatalities occurring while maneuvering than in any other flight phase.
- Pilots falling prey to the same types of LOC-I accidents over and over again.
If the turn is so obvious in its simplicity, how come pilots fall out of it with regularity, often with fatal results? What is going on during the overshot turn from base to final, or the engine failure on climb out with the attempted turnback, that causes LOC-I stall/spin fatalities?
My experience: lack of understanding of what the controls really do, which becomes most obvious during unusual situations. A pilot's internal dialogue during an overshoot on final:
I've overshot, but I don't want to go around. I can't steepen the bank because I was told never to exceed 30 degrees in the pattern. I guess I'll add inside rudder to speed up the turn.
In response, the nose of the airplane slices inward and downward through the horizon line.
I've got to get my nose up! Pull on the elevator.
In response, the turn tightens as G goes up and speed goes down -- after all, that's exactly what the elevator does.
It's getting worse! Pull HARDER!
Bingo, accelerated stall/spin from a banked, nose-low attitude, at a speed higher than the wings-level stall speed practiced ad nauseam for the check ride.
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But what if the pilot knew with all his/her being that, as Langewiesche and FAA and many others know, "the elevator pulls the nose around the turn"? Couple that knowledge with the knowledge that the elevator controls AoA.
Same scenario, assume still no go around. Internal dialogue:
Well, I screwed that turn up and overshot. Let's see, I could simply remain in this same exact turn and teardrop back to the centerline. I might have to increase power to reduce my rate of descent during the longer turn.
That could be a pretty safe option, provided there is altitude and distance to the runway for it.
I could steepen the turn with coordinated aileron and rudder, but I'll have to be mindful of how much pull I have available for the turn vis-a-vis the increased stall speed. Might also have to add some power to reduce the rate of descent.
Another safe option perhaps, if the conditions are right.
I can tighten the turn with some additional aft elevator, being mindful of the increased stall speed at this bank. Might have to add some power, too.
Another safe option provided the wing can tolerate additional G in its current energy state.
Ultimately, if it's that far off, just go around and set it up better the next time.
Whereas in the first scenario leading to the accelerated stall/spin, the pilot made exactly the inputs required for a stall/spin. They were not the proper inputs for a turn. In the other scenarios, the pilot knew exactly what the options were, and knew without a doubt what the outcome of each and every input would be.
Remember: 1-in-4 pilots think the rudder turns the airplane. Most think its the ailerons (talk about faulty thinking, consider the engine failure turn back maneuver: "I'll bank the wings, that'll take care of the turn. Now all I have to do is pull back on the elevator to hold altitude until I get turned around ... stall ... spin ... dead.)
That's why this is important.
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