Not exactly sure what you are asking. However, from the district court's order, here is a very detailed description of the ATC controller's conduct (emphasis added):
Air traffic controller Fritz assumed responsibility for INDTRACON-E and was at his radar/computer console approximately ten minutes before the collision in question occurred. He controlled the progress of the Saratoga as it travelled south until he terminated radar service and instructed Bennett to change his transponder code from "0301" to "1200". Controller Fritz admitted that, after that transmission, he no longer monitored the flight path of the Saratoga aircraft. At approximately the same time, Fritz was also working another IFR aircraft and attempting to locate a missing flight strip for some military aircraft that were soon to be entering Fritz's area.
Approximately 45 seconds prior to first contact by radio from Mullen, the pilot of the MU-2, and approximately 75 seconds prior to the collision, Fritz had his last communication with the Saratoga. At that time, Fritz clearly knew the location, speed, and altitude of the Saratoga and its position relative to its declared destination of the Greenwood Airport. Fritz's instruments continued to track the Saratoga south toward its stated destination at a constant speed. By the time of the collision, the Saratoga had only varied in altitude by descending approximately 400 feet. It should have been evident to Fritz, without even observing his scope, that the Saratoga would be descending to achieve its stated goal of landing at Greenwood.
When Mullen contacted Indianapolis Departure Control, Fritz responded immediately and gave Mullen a discrete transponder code. The transponder code was available from Mullen's filed flight plan which was reduced to a flight strip which was in its proper location by Fritz's right hand. The immediate response by Fritz shows that he was aware of the MU-2's impending flight, either because he had reviewed the flight strips when he started work or because the strip was immediately handy to him. Although Mullen departed approximately an hour later than the estimated time on his flight strip, this was not an uncommon practice for pilots. Thus it was reasonable for Fritz to still expect the MU-2 to depart from Greenwood Airport for its planned IFR flight to Columbus.
Fritz testified that he knew the wind direction at the Indianapolis airport and that he generally knew that the Greenwood runway was a north-south runway. However, he stated that he did not know the direction of the winds at Greenwood (even though it is less then fifteen miles from the Indianapolis airport) or pilots' preferences for landing into the wind. The court notes that there was testimony from at least one ATC expert that a good ATC would know this information. However, at the very least, Mullen's "off Greenwood" transmission should have directed Fritz's attention to Greenwood Airport on his scope.
Fritz's radar scope projected radar returns as well as computer-generated target symbols and flight data including transponder coding, altitude, and speed. It showed the location of satellite airports in the Indianapolis area, including Greenwood. At a minimum, Fritz had a radar image and a computer-generated VFR target on his scope showing the MU-2 climbing and moving away from the north end of the Greenwood Airport with the MU-2's altitude displayed. At the same time, the Saratoga continued to be present on Fritz's scope tracking south toward the Greenwood area.
Fritz's instruments clearly showed that the Saratoga and MU-2 were on converging flight paths. Fritz had no obstructions to his view of these two aircraft on his scope. The information directly in front of Fritz clearly showed that there were two aircraft flying into the same airspace.
Measuring the elapsed time from the point at which Mullen announced "off Greenwood" (1956:48.0) (the latest event which should have caused air controller Fritz to look at his scope in the Greenwood area) until the probable time of impact (1957:07-1957:11) results in a minimum time of 19 seconds and perhaps as much as 23 seconds available to Fritz to issue a traffic alert or other warning.
The Court further infers that because Fritz had recently received transmissions from the Saratoga, and because Fritz expected or should have expected the departure of the MU-2 from Greenwood, Fritz should have scanned the Greenwood area on his radar scope at the time of the MU-2's first call up which was completed at 1956:44. Using this as a starting point, Fritz had between 21 seconds and 25 seconds in which to observe the situation and issue an alert.
*1534 At 10 seconds prior to the collision the aircraft were still more than ½ mile apart. Testimony showed that a warning even 3-4 seconds before the collision would have been helpful in the avoidance of the collision (which even Government pilot expert Coogan concedes). In fact, the 21-25 seconds even exceeds the time submitted in documents drafted by the FAA which provide that 12.5 seconds is sufficient time for an average unalerted pilot to see and avoid a potential plane. An alert would decrease this response time substantially. In the exercise of required vigilance, air controller Fritz had more than sufficient time to see and or hear indicia of the converging aircraft and issue an alert. His failure to do so was a proximate cause of the accident. Had Mullen been warned of the proximity of another aircraft, his chances of seeing and avoiding the other aircraft would have been greatly enhanced.
A videotape of a re-creation of the data available at Fritz's radar scope for the relevant time period shows that, for the 15 to 20 seconds following Mullen's radio transmission that the MU-2 was "off Greenwood", the MU-2 and the Saratoga continued on a converging collision course. During that period, Fritz never alerted either pilot of the presence of the other aircraft. It is reasonable for this court to infer that the reason Fritz failed to notice that the aircraft were on a collision course was that his full attention was not focused on the radar scope during the relevant period, nor was he correlating the recently heard destination of the Saratoga with the more recent audio information from the MU-2.
The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that, if Fritz had exercised reasonable care to observe and recognize that the aircraft were on a collision course, he could have issued a safety alert to the pilots in time for them to see the other aircraft and to take action necessary to avoid the collision.
Fritz's failure to become aware of the unsafe proximity of the aircraft under these circumstances was negligent. Specifically, he knew the Saratoga intended to land at Greenwood and less than 45 seconds later he was in radio contact with an aircraft stating that it was taking off from Greenwood. Both aircraft appeared on Fritz's scope which showed the aircraft were on a potential collision course. The court finds that Fritz's inattention to his radar scope was such that he was unaware of the unsafe proximity of the Saratoga and MU-2 and his resulting failure to issue a warning or safety alert to Mullen was a breach of his primary duty to prevent a collision between aircraft. The United States, through its agent, Fritz, was negligent in failing to remain vigilant, to observe and recognize that the two aircraft were in unsafe proximity to one another and on a collision course and to issue a safety alert or warning to Mullen in time for them to see and take action to avoid the collision.
