Lake Amphib, Oshkosh 2107

1) If you fly long enough you'll probably read an accident report to which you respond "There but for the grace of god go I."

I'll defend the old guy.

Maybe the old guy had made this same type of take off numerous times, knew what to expect, and didn't think it was as big a deal as the bystanders? According to the NTSB he had 888 hours seaplane time.

Maybe, after bouncing around for awhile something improperly maintained, that if properly maintained would otherwise not be an issue, broke?

We do not know what happened in that cockpit. Did he permit the 3000 hour (per NTSB report https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...ID=20170728X85948&AKey=1&RType=Final&IType=FA) CFI to perform the take off. Did everything look fine until the CFI started to porpoise and then there was not enough time to fix it? Did he have a sudden medical problem and the CFI took over and messed it up. There is no narrative description of the events from the CFI rated passenger.

Ignoring other people's advice. I like advice, I'll consider it, give it the weight it deserves, and make my own decision. I can no longer count the number of times an FSS briefer has said VFR not recommended and I've told them I'll call them in the air to open my flight plan - FSS must assume incompetent pilot. Same with IFR on occasion. On the other hand I've had airline dispatchers tell me to go and I've had to say - "I don't think so." "Or, I'll go if you give me more fuel," which can be and interesting discussion. Don't get me started on Part 135 owners. On another hand, I've had non pilot passengers cause me to reconsider my decision, I've had controllers cause me to reconsider my decision, I've had first officers cause me to reconsider.

Point is, no CVR, no FDR, not enough information to place blame. Can we learn from this accident? Probably. Is the analysis correct? Maybe.
 
Arnold said:
Maybe, after bouncing around for awhile something improperly maintained, that if properly maintained would otherwise not be an issue, broke?

We do not know what happened in that cockpit. Did he permit the 3000 hour (per NTSB report https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...ID=20170728X85948&AKey=1&RType=Final&IType=FA) CFI to perform the take off.
Click to expand...

My understanding is the CFI lived, and gave a play-by-play to the investigators, including the fact that the owner/pilot handled the takeoff....
 
Reported, published and truth are often three different things. But not always. Then again sometimes. Perhaps occasionally.
 
fasteddie said:
My understanding is the CFI lived, and gave a play-by-play to the investigators, including the fact that the owner/pilot handled the takeoff....
Click to expand...

do you think the CFI would’ve admitted being PIC if he knew no one could prove he was, with the outcome?
 
Much as with near everything else at Oshkosh, the seaplane base is a volunteer activity. I don't think they're any more inclined to force a pilot to stay than it is over at the main airport. I've seen people depart into thunderstorms, but as long as the FAA has opened the field and it has been determined that the airshow crowd has thinned out enough to be safe to move aircraft, we'll flag them out (and the FAA will clear them to go).
 
MauleSkinner said:
Fortunately the cockpit isn’t a democracy. If I didn’t fly every time people told me that something was too dangerous on their personal scale, I’d have spent a lot of time on the ground that I didn’t have to. If I had flown every time other people said it should be done, I’d be dead. In some cases, it was the same people on the same day telling me I should do the same trip their way instead of mine.

the problem isn’t not taking the advice of others...the problem is separating the wheat from the chaff, and applying the appropriate portions to the decision.
Click to expand...

You don't get what I was saying.

This is why in part why Part 121 ops are vastly safer then Part 91. The guy had no less than 6 people tell him no go. Imagine a 121 crew member saying, I don't care about anything your telling me I'm going! Yea 91 ops is the individual running the show, but I gotta tell you I've been flying for over 30 years and in my 2,600 hours I've never managed to have anyone tell I should not be going, never mind 6 of them saying all the same thing.

It's not that just one person told him not to got, it was a multitude of pilots, some with more experience in make/model. This is what disturbs me the most.
 
Larry Korona said:
You don't get what I was saying.

This is why in part why Part 121 ops are vastly safer then Part 91. The guy had no less than 6 people tell him no go. Imagine a 121 crew member saying, I don't care about anything your telling me I'm going! Yea 91 ops is the individual running the show, but I gotta tell you I've been flying for over 30 years and in my 2,600 hours I've never managed to have anyone tell I should not be going, never mind 6 of them saying all the same thing.

It's not that just one person told him not to got, it was a multitude of pilots, some with more experience in make/model. This is what disturbs me the most.
Click to expand...
I do get what you’re saying. And I agree with your example. But keep in mind that “more experience in make and model” may also be limited by personal minimums that are far more conservative than necessary. I hear a lot of “that’s too dangerous”, but when pressed, its merely, “I wouldn’t do that, because it’s beyond my personal minimums.” That’s something that very seldom happens in 121 operations. The PIC is still responsible, still needs to evaluate the reliability of the advice, whether it’s one person or six, and still needs to make the decision.

Again, I’m not defending his actions or decisions that day, but I will defend his need to make those decisions for himself.
 
I was there the next day to do a photo shoot. So many people came up to me with tears in their eyes. They were telling me they practically begged him not to go. It was a tough day for a lot of witnesses.
 
MauleSkinner said:
Again, I’m not defending his actions or decisions that day, but I will defend his need to make those decisions for himself.
Click to expand...

problem was it was just himself in the plane. When you carry passengers you have to think beyond yourself. I've done my first time light GA aircraft flights for many folks. A few times I've cancelled the flight due to weather, days where I would have flown myself, but too windy or turbulent for someone's first GA flight. I alway approach every flight I've taken with the attitude that I don't have to do this flight today, there's always tomorrow.
 
Larry Korona said:
problem was it was just himself in the plane. When you carry passengers you have to think beyond yourself. I've done my first time light GA aircraft flights for many folks. A few times I've cancelled the flight due to weather, days where I would have flown myself, but too windy or turbulent for someone's first GA flight. I alway approach every flight I've taken with the attitude that I don't have to do this flight today, there's always tomorrow.
Click to expand...
Yes, considering your passengers is part of the decision process.
 
Last edited:
MauleSkinner said:
Yes, considering your passengers is part of the decision process.
Click to expand...

And their egress path if you screw up.

I always explain to the left rear passenger that if I’m still messing with something on my side, don’t wait... go out behind the right rear passenger the other way.

And of course, I have the “luxury” of two doors...
 
It may be posted a ways back. When you keep operating with reduced margins, odds go up for a mishap.

It may very well work out today, then you say, ‘see it wasn’t that bad’. Next time you attempt the same, even with slightly worse conditions. Then one day Mr Murphy comes a calling.

I get tired of the phrase ‘normalization of deviance’ but it does apply.
 
sourdough44 said:
It may be posted a ways back. When you keep operating with reduced margins, odds go up for a mishap.

It may very well work out today, then you say, ‘see it wasn’t that bad’. Next time you attempt the same, even with slightly worse conditions. Then one day Mr Murphy comes a calling.

I get tired of the phrase ‘normalization of deviance’ but it does apply.
Click to expand...
How so? What standards/normal behavior was he deviating from? How long had he been doing it?
 
MauleSkinner said:
How so? What standards/normal behavior was he deviating from? How long had he been doing it?
Click to expand...

Missing inspection cover and an excessivly leaking float are a couple examples right off the bat.
 
I have deliberately flown with an inspection cover removed. But, having an open hole on the bottom of the wing near the float (that leaks) for no apparent reason, and then landing on the water doesn't seem to be the best idea (or combination of ideas) that anyone ever had.
 
MauleSkinner said:
But one doesn’t constitute “normalization of deviance”.
Click to expand...

Agree but hints of it when someone has to go find an A&P FOR you instead of it being your first point of business once made aware of it.

Not like there’s a shortage of A&P help at that particular event... and that’s fairly obvious to anyone there.

Feels more like a “parts may be a day and I don’t want the airplane grounded but I knew it was gone before I left for here” decision to me.

Granted - guesswork. But it fits better than how most would handle a hole in their amphib upon arrival when someone helpfully said “you see you’re missing an inspection plate??”
 
The lesson to take away from this is when a group of your peers are questioning your decision making, perhaps it is a good time to pause and take a fresh look at your decision. They may be on to something.
 
midwestpa24 said:
The lesson to take away from this is when a group of your peers are questioning your decision making, perhaps it is a good time to pause and take a fresh look at your decision. They may be on to something.
Click to expand...
Gonna guest that Caption Million Hours didn't consider anyone speaking to him a "peer".
 
  • Like
Reactions: smv
Kenny Phillips said:
Gonna guest that Caption Million Hours didn't consider anyone speaking to him a "peer".
Click to expand...

Tantalum made a similar comment last week, but I'd be willing to bet this guy was like this long before he had tens of thousands of hours. I've flown with guys across a huge range of experience and from what I've seen, poor ADM and/or an unwillingness to listen to the advice of others exists pretty evenly across the spectrum.
 
kayoh190 said:
Tantalum made a similar comment last week, but I'd be willing to bet this guy was like this long before he had tens of thousands of hours. I've flown with guys across a huge range of experience and from what I've seen, poor ADM and/or an unwillingness to listen to the advice of others exists pretty evenly across the spectrum.
Click to expand...
True, though when I come across people who have that attitude and don't have the hours to back up their claims it's easy to just ignore them as shameless sycophants

The dudes with thousands of hours unfortunately can back up their hubris with the pious hope of their hours

Thing is.. flying requires a fair bit of confidence, it's really not something that is right for the generally nervous, second guessing, or book-only people. You do need a little bit of that "I know I can do this because dammit I rock!" attitude.. it just has to be tempered. Objectively what we do is crazy, even multimillion dollar commercial jets. So much has to work right, with such little room for error, that you really need a calm, confident head
 
Tantalum said:
True, though when I come across people who have that attitude and don't have the hours to back up their claims it's easy to just ignore them as shameless sycophants

The dudes with thousands of hours unfortunately can back up their hubris with the pious hope of their hours
Click to expand...

There are those who say that studies have shown that it is believed (is that enough weasel words? :D) that there is a difference between 10,000 hours and one hour repeated 10,000 times.

o_O
 
Yeah, one can try to split a few hairs. One thing that seems a given, it didn’t work out this time. I didn’t see any mention of an engine or flight control problem?

I think it will be light out at noon today, some things are facts, no getting around it.
 
Trying to give strong advice to a 20,000 hour pilot is usually a good way to start an argument...usually after the tempers cool , common sense will prevail...not in this case, unfortunately. Often a second set of eyes will see what I do not see...no room for big egos, IMO.
 
Doug Reid said:
Trying to give strong advice to a 20,000 hour pilot is usually a good way to start an argument...usually after the tempers cool , common sense will prevail...not in this case, unfortunately. Often a second set of eyes will see what I do not see...no room for big egos, IMO.
Click to expand...
More than once I've had a conversation with someone with way more experience than I and I've felt they weren't doing the right thing. But I would never state that. I always ask them to explain to me, because I'm a newbie and want to learn. People generally respond to that and sometimes they come around to a different decision, sometimes I learn new stuff. Of course, sometimes you just have to let people feel the pain of their decisions. It's tragic in this case that the pain of his decision involved drowning.
 
Tantalum said:
True, though when I come across people who have that attitude and don't have the hours to back up their claims it's easy to just ignore them as shameless sycophants
Click to expand...

Why sycophants? I don’t see who they are acting obsequiously to.
 
I haven’t read the entire thread, so pardon if this was asked and answered....

In the photos of the incident aircraft, theY showed something on the elevator that was sticking up at a pretty big angle. Was this a trim tab? Why such an big angle?
 
AggieMike88 said:
I haven’t read the entire thread, so pardon if this was asked and answered....

In the photos of the incident aircraft, theY showed something on the elevator that was sticking up at a pretty big angle. Was this a trim tab? Why such an big angle?
Click to expand...

Yeah covered above. Trim.
 
I fly a Lake - and yeah the trim tabs are huge and massively UP for take off. Porpoising is a real problem - if you don't take immediate and positive action it can get ugly in a hurry - and being inside a bouncing tin can can quickly overwhelm your physical ability to take positive action. Especially if you're small or frail.

I've had a very experienced CFI refuse to fly in it anymore after a somewhat exciting episode of bouncing.

That being said - it's ridiculously awesome once you get the hang of it - but in rough conditions there's very little margin for error.

 
Last edited:
wanttaja said:
Got a bit curious. Took my homebuilt accident database, and split it into two. First one included all accidents where the PIC had 20,000 or more hours. Got 140 hits (out of ~4,200 accidents). Then I generated another set where the pilots had 40 to 100 hours. This gave me 148 hits.

About 30% of the 20,000+ hour accidents occurred due to Pilot Miscontrol (stick and rudder errors vs. judgement issues). Over half (51%) of the low-time accidents involved Miscontrol. Here's a breakdown as to the actual number of accidents.

_____________________|_40-100 Hours_|_20K+ hours_|
__Total Mishandling__|______76______|_____42_____|
________Stall________|______22______|______6_____|
________Winds________|______16______|______6_____|
_Takeoff Directional_|_______5______|______2_____|
_Landing Directional_|_______5______|_____18_____|
___Any Directional___|______10______|_____20_____|
___Bad Flare/Bounce__|______14______|______6_____|
__System Management__|_______5______|______2_____|
_______Approach______|_______6______|______2_____|

Note that the number of accidents is about the same (148 vs. 140), so comparing numbers (vs. percentages) directly is a decent way to do it.

The low-time pilots are obviously stalling more than the high-time set. But look at the "Landing Directional" cases. These are where the pilot loses directional control on landing...typically a ground loop. THREE TIMES AS MANY cases for the high-time crowd.

Eighteen cases. Fourteen were taildraggers. You think maybe driving that 747 from Apathy to Tedium every five days maybe doesn't prepare you for flying a taildragger....? :)

Three out of the five low-time cases were taildraggers.

BTW, 21 out of the 140 high-time cases had 30,000 hours or more.

Ron Wanttaja
Click to expand...



Is there a link to these numbers? I think looking at numbers only is not an accurate way to look at accidents by hours of experience. Most GA pilots are in the 100's of hours so most accidents are in low number pilots because there is more of the around to screw up. A percentage is going to more accurate no? Here is what I found from the FAA:
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/201503.pdf
 
Flying Doc said:
Is there a link to these numbers? I think looking at numbers only is not an accurate way to look at accidents by hours of experience. Most GA pilots are in the 100's of hours so most It's accidents are in low number pilots because there is more of the around to screw up. A percentage is going to more accurate no?
Click to expand...
The data itself is extracted from the NTSB accident database.

When I looked at the homebuilt accidents from 1998 through 2018, I found there were 140 accidents involving pilots with 20,000 or more hours. I then looked at the low-time pilots to find an hour range that saw a similar NUMBER of accidents. I was lucky enough to find that the 40-100 hour range had almost the same number of accidents... 148.

So a comparison based on percentages would have produced approximately the same relative results. For the "Landing Directional" accidents, I saw five for the low-time set and 18 for the high-time set. The percentages would have been 3.3% vs. 12.8%...still between 3x and 4x higher. I just think a number-to-number comparison is better, when one has about the same totals.

There's no question that a lot more accidents occur to lower-time pilots. It's just more straightforward when you have similar-sized data sets to compare.
pilot hours.JPG
(Compiled with 50-hour resolution)

Of course, while we have these statistics for pilots involved in accidents, we don't have similar figures for non-accident operations. While ~5% of the homebuilt pilots involved in accidents have around 300 hours, we don't know how many pilots with ~300 hours are flying homebuilts.

Ron Wanttaja
 
MauleSkinner said:
I find it interesting that there are spikes at every 500-hour interval. Apparently quite a few people say “I have 1500 hours” instead of “I have 1643.8 hours”.
Click to expand...
Or the NTSB investigators are paging through the deceased pilot's logbook and approximating. I rarely add mine up, and ballpark it when needed a number of hours for insurance or whatnot.

You actually do find cases, though, where the NTSB investigator has estimated to the tenth of an hour (GAA19CA015).

For those keeping score, out of 3,651 homebuilt accidents where the NTSB recorded a pilot total time:

47% were even multiples of ten (e.g., last digit was zero)
30% were even multiples of 100 (last two digits were zero)
11% were even multiples of 1,000 (last three digits were zero)

And 46 (~1.3%) were even multiples of 10,000

Ron Wanttaja
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top