Larry Liebscher
Pre-Flight
Guest editorial in my hometown's Sunday paper. At least some people continue to question.
It doesn't take billions to keep airports safe
By FRED ABRAHAM
We need to get smarter about airport security. This year, the
Transportation Security Administration will spend about $5
billion, mostly on screening passengers. Great care is taken to keep
tweezers, folding scissors and pocket knives off planes. Most of it is
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unnecessary.
A poorly understood finding in the 9/11 Commission's report was that
9/11 was not a failure of airport security, but rather a failure of
imagination.
For decades, the response to hijacking was to let hijackers
dictate their terms and give in to them. Hijackings were generally of
two types: those designed to extort money from the airlines and those
seeking to provide free transportation.
Almost all the hijackings ended
peacefully with perpetrators ultimately being arrested. Hijackers didn’t really need
terrible weapons to take over the plane. Just threatening a passenger or
flight attendant with a knife was sufficient to succeed. We never
dreamed that anyone would hijack a plane to deliberately fly it into a
building. And that was the failure of our imagination on 9/11.
The 9/11 hijackers did not have firearms or bombs when they commandeered
the planes. Simple box cutters were enough because following past
practice, the planes were simply turned over to them on threats of
violence. That is, they didn't seize the planes; we gave the planes to
the hijackers.
As that terrible day wore on, we realized that these hijackings were
like none other. This wasn't for personal profit or transportation. This
was for blood. How quickly the heroic passengers of Flight 93 learned
this as they struggled in vain to retake their plane. There was no
failure of imagination among these brave people.
On another flight shortly after 9/11, shoe-bomber Richard Reid tried to
detonate explosives concealed in his shoe. He was immediately overcome,
not by airline personnel but by other passengers. It appears the best
security against hijackings now is other passengers on the targeted
plane. We have learned.
Does this mean that we should eliminate screening?
Absolutely not.
But,
let's get realistic about it. Of course guns and explosives should be
prohibited. We need to keep weapons off planes that can allow a hijacker
to overcome physical resistance and forcibly take over a plane. These
are weapons of force.
But instruments of extortion: knives, razor
blades, and other small, sharp objects are not really a threat to an
aircraft anymore. Current practice, since 9/11 is to NEVER give in to a
hijacker. We are spending billions when millions would do just as well.
Some argue that the increased security is worth it if it saves lives.
But, it's keeping guns and explosives off planes that makes you safer,
not eliminating plastic forks. Current screening is excessive and
expensive. Not just in terms of the TSA's costs but in the millions of
hours of wasted time waiting in line while your grandmother's purse is
searched.
Think of the lost production because we now require people to
report to their flights hours in advance. These people are foregoing the
opportunity to be working and producing things --- what economists call
opportunity cost --- because we insist on seizing many innocuous items in
their carry-on luggage or pockets.
What about people who don't want to hijack an airplane but are seeking
to destroy it in flight?
As we've seen, that can be prevented by keeping
guns and explosives off the aircraft which is not too difficult. Any
basic screening we do is pretty much sufficient to protect aircraft from
passengers with dangerous intentions.
The far greater risk is from
someone off the plane sitting in a van on the airport perimeter with a
shoulder mounted surface-to-air missile which can be easily purchased on
the world's weapons black market for a few thousand dollars. Or, from
nefarious individuals climbing the airport fence and completely
bypassing screening points to plant bombs on planes.
So, let's use our money wisely. Make cockpits extremely secure, realign
screening efforts to focus more on guns and explosives, and redeploy
some TSA resources to increase the patrolling of the area around the
airport.
Not only will we be safer, we will save an enormous amount of
money and valuable productive time in the process.
Fred Abraham is head of the Department of Economics at the University of Northern Iowa.
http://www.wcfcourier.com/articles/2006/07/02/columnists/guest_column/5a268c442e52e03f8625719d004c0759.txt
It doesn't take billions to keep airports safe
By FRED ABRAHAM
We need to get smarter about airport security. This year, the
Transportation Security Administration will spend about $5
billion, mostly on screening passengers. Great care is taken to keep
tweezers, folding scissors and pocket knives off planes. Most of it is
unnecessary.
A poorly understood finding in the 9/11 Commission's report was that
9/11 was not a failure of airport security, but rather a failure of
imagination.
For decades, the response to hijacking was to let hijackers
dictate their terms and give in to them. Hijackings were generally of
two types: those designed to extort money from the airlines and those
seeking to provide free transportation.
Almost all the hijackings ended
peacefully with perpetrators ultimately being arrested. Hijackers didn’t really need
terrible weapons to take over the plane. Just threatening a passenger or
flight attendant with a knife was sufficient to succeed. We never
dreamed that anyone would hijack a plane to deliberately fly it into a
building. And that was the failure of our imagination on 9/11.
The 9/11 hijackers did not have firearms or bombs when they commandeered
the planes. Simple box cutters were enough because following past
practice, the planes were simply turned over to them on threats of
violence. That is, they didn't seize the planes; we gave the planes to
the hijackers.
As that terrible day wore on, we realized that these hijackings were
like none other. This wasn't for personal profit or transportation. This
was for blood. How quickly the heroic passengers of Flight 93 learned
this as they struggled in vain to retake their plane. There was no
failure of imagination among these brave people.
On another flight shortly after 9/11, shoe-bomber Richard Reid tried to
detonate explosives concealed in his shoe. He was immediately overcome,
not by airline personnel but by other passengers. It appears the best
security against hijackings now is other passengers on the targeted
plane. We have learned.
Does this mean that we should eliminate screening?
Absolutely not.
But,
let's get realistic about it. Of course guns and explosives should be
prohibited. We need to keep weapons off planes that can allow a hijacker
to overcome physical resistance and forcibly take over a plane. These
are weapons of force.
But instruments of extortion: knives, razor
blades, and other small, sharp objects are not really a threat to an
aircraft anymore. Current practice, since 9/11 is to NEVER give in to a
hijacker. We are spending billions when millions would do just as well.
Some argue that the increased security is worth it if it saves lives.
But, it's keeping guns and explosives off planes that makes you safer,
not eliminating plastic forks. Current screening is excessive and
expensive. Not just in terms of the TSA's costs but in the millions of
hours of wasted time waiting in line while your grandmother's purse is
searched.
Think of the lost production because we now require people to
report to their flights hours in advance. These people are foregoing the
opportunity to be working and producing things --- what economists call
opportunity cost --- because we insist on seizing many innocuous items in
their carry-on luggage or pockets.
What about people who don't want to hijack an airplane but are seeking
to destroy it in flight?
As we've seen, that can be prevented by keeping
guns and explosives off the aircraft which is not too difficult. Any
basic screening we do is pretty much sufficient to protect aircraft from
passengers with dangerous intentions.
The far greater risk is from
someone off the plane sitting in a van on the airport perimeter with a
shoulder mounted surface-to-air missile which can be easily purchased on
the world's weapons black market for a few thousand dollars. Or, from
nefarious individuals climbing the airport fence and completely
bypassing screening points to plant bombs on planes.
So, let's use our money wisely. Make cockpits extremely secure, realign
screening efforts to focus more on guns and explosives, and redeploy
some TSA resources to increase the patrolling of the area around the
airport.
Not only will we be safer, we will save an enormous amount of
money and valuable productive time in the process.
Fred Abraham is head of the Department of Economics at the University of Northern Iowa.
http://www.wcfcourier.com/articles/2006/07/02/columnists/guest_column/5a268c442e52e03f8625719d004c0759.txt
