I thought flight plans disappeared from the system without a trace after some short (a few hours or days at the most) time?
Database data truly getting deleted in the modern IT world? I doubt it. Maybe removed from operational view and archived, but rarely deleted. Especially in an RDBMS. No way to recover from a hardware failure if there's not continuous transaction logging.
Those logs may or may not be dumped at each snapshot though.
Multiply by however many databases a typical flight plan passes through to get to the controllers screen or be printed as a paper strip. (If paper's even being used anymore.) Example, the printer's out of toner but still tried to print anyway... you know there must be a "reprint" button. Thus, the data is stored.
Where, for how long, and who has access to it is the bane of every sysadmin everywhere these days, with PCI (credit card/financial), HIPAA (medical), and other auditor-driven requirements. (My employer must keep every single e-mail sent or received for the last seven years, starting soon, for example.)
In any case, there's nothing illegal about filing an IFR flight plan. As far as I know the only thing that would violate any FAR would be to accept an IFR clearance as PIC if you're not instrument rated. (and current, with a valid medical, and in an aircraft equipped to legally navigate the filed route...)
Great point, and that's the distinction I completely missed! I guess I'll give this wacky thing a try sometime.
I'm always up for mucking with data systems in ways not intended by their designers. It's how most bugs in software or business procedures are found these days.
Did ya know FireWire ports have direct access to system RAM, for example? Not useful information until you realize that the two most popular OS's on the planet both cache username and password data for "fast logins" and "fast user switching" in... system memory.
Unintended security breach. Plug in FireWire dongle, grab memorbruise a couple tricks to mark the memory location needed, and you don't even have to bypass the password encryption -- because instead of checking a hash (Unix) someone thought it was smart to cache the password in RAM in cleartext.
Oopsies. Hardware system design, fail. A old friend published a paper on it last week. Going to be a lot of FireWire ports disabled on machines in critically secure environments soon, I bet.
