How good pilots makes bad decisions

This is a good article. Well worth the read.
 
JesseD said:
I liked the first part, reminds me of the Herbert quote:

"Ready comprehension is a knee-jerk response..."
Click to expand...

The basic takeaway that I got from it, and one that we should all be reminded of, is that it's not the thousand times that everything works the way it should. It's the one time that it doesn't.

It's an easy trap to fall into.
 
I'd say it's an "Okay" read. There appear to be a couple technical/conceptual problems. I know that sounds a little "over the top" or "picky" but I'm a technical editor in my professional society so every academic article gets viewed with a bit of jaundiced eye.

I suggest that the failure line doesn't move on the risk/time plot. The decision maker's behavior is what has moved.

Also, the statement that "Experienced airline pilots operate in an environment that is effectively free of failure," is fundamentally flawed. As noted later in the paper, failures (which I'll call minor failures) tend to be ignored (or otherwise neglected) as long as there is no major failure. It's sort of like saying that if the outcome is okay then everything is okay.

Anyway, I think many of us either like to or have to study accident prevention so this paper is a good read from that point of view. Maybe it gives a bit more insight on recognizing accident prone behavior. It'd be nice if the next researcher is able to build on this paper and give us some solid guidance on training and performance monitoring.
 
Clark1961 said:
It'd be nice if the next researcher is able to build on this paper and give us some solid guidance on training and performance monitoring.
Click to expand...
I have been doing quite a bit of safety management system work of late for various FAA pilot programs, and have found that the biggest deterrent is the lack of dependable data on both hazards and incidents. Accidents tend to be better documented, but incidents are the little brothers you don't want to grow up. Too much in the field of safety analysis is based on anecdotal evidence, incomplete evidence, or flat out "TLAR"*







*"That looks about right," for you acronym haters.
 
I know it's what researchers and behavioral scientists do, but I always think it's interesting how they are trying to measure something that's very subjective and reduce it to flow charts and graphs.
 
Everskyward said:
I know it's what researchers and behavioral scientists do, but I always think it's interesting how they are trying to measure something that's very subjective and reduce it to flow charts and graphs.
Click to expand...
It beats the heck out of enemas to prove fitness for flight under the Gemini program.
 
Richard said:
It beats the heck out of enemas to prove fitness for flight under the Gemini program.
Click to expand...
It's probably not a good idea for someone with and obstructed colon to be up in space. :idea:
 
Everskyward said:
It's probably not a good idea for someone with and obstructed colon to be up in space. :idea:
Click to expand...
Haha, well IIRC, the enemas were administered as part of the physical evaluation and not for pre-flight. I think colon obstruction is symptomatic in other ways such as abdominal pain which would be readily observed.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top