Helicopter/Small Plane Down in Hudson

I'm not sure it has much to do with the accident, but it was just announced that the FAA suspended two air traffic controllers.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/08/13/new.york.plane.crash/index.html

A bizarre wrinkle... reminds me that I still don't get why he was handed off to Newark, then flew into the corridor... I wonder if that is normal? To me, that handoff implies that they were expected to remain within the class B, which would involve either climbing on that heading past 1800 ft. or heading more south to enter the 500-foot shelf.
But the radio transcript shows that he told the controller he was going to fly down the river, not fly into the the Newark Class B.

When I flew out of KTEB I generally headed for the north end of the corridor if I was doing a "Hudson scenic"- never made a beeline SE from there to the river- so I'm not sure. Maybe that handoff is SOP in the other case(?). Weird. I mean, it's not much different than if a KTEB controller advised me, as I departed VFR to the NE, to contact LGA tower and actually handed me off to them, even if I told them I was going down the river. Never heard of such a thing.

Whatever the case, I think these controllers have been scape-goated. Some blood to soothe Chicken Little. Once that Piper left the KTEB class D on that heading at 1100 feet it was in "Indian country". The pilot even transmitted that he was going out over the river. He was out of their hands.
 
I avoid climbs and descents in the corridors - it's hard enough spotting traffic without having the view blocked by the nose.

And I'd hate to think that a controller sent an airplane through the corridor.
 
One news station (I don't know which) had someone reading a transcript in which tower (Teterboro, presume) asked whether the pilot wanted to get clearance into Bravo or whether he wanted to take the corridor. The pilot replied he wanted whatever was most direct. ATC asked for intentions so that he would know who to hand him off to. Pilot replied that he would just take the corridor then. Last transmission from the airplane.

Sounded to me like the pilot hadn't really made a thorough plan for his departure.
 
To me it looked like the helicopter was closing in on the Lance from the lances left and a bit below. It appears as if the Lance saw the copter at the last moment and started to turn right. But there is nothing to against which to give one any perception as to distance or direction. I suspect the NTSB will be able to do so.

Tomorrow is the funeral here for Both Steven and Daniel Altman as well as Daniel's son who were in the Lance.I hope their family doesn't catch sight of the video. It had to be horrible for the folks watching in the boat as well.
 
A bizarre wrinkle... reminds me that I still don't get why he was handed off to Newark, then flew into the corridor... I wonder if that is normal? To me, that handoff implies that they were expected to remain within the class B, which would involve either climbing on that heading past 1800 ft. or heading more south to enter the 500-foot shelf.
But the radio transcript shows that he told the controller he was going to fly down the river, not fly into the the Newark Class B.

When I flew out of KTEB I generally headed for the north end of the corridor if I was doing a "Hudson scenic"- never made a beeline SE from there to the river- so I'm not sure. Maybe that handoff is SOP in the other case(?). Weird. I mean, it's not much different than if a KTEB controller advised me, as I departed VFR to the NE, to contact LGA tower and actually handed me off to them, even if I told them I was going down the river. Never heard of such a thing.

Whatever the case, I think these controllers have been scape-goated. Some blood to soothe Chicken Little. Once that Piper left the KTEB class D on that heading at 1100 feet it was in "Indian country". The pilot even transmitted that he was going out over the river. He was out of their hands.

yeah I can't figure out why they went to Newark Tower. If they were in the Bravo and not in the corridor I'd think they would have gone to NY APP. If they were in the Corridor they should have been on the Corridor Freq. Its all very confusing to me. I guess it could just be the press bungling things.
 
. But there is nothing to against which to give one any perception as to distance or direction. I suspect the NTSB will be able to do so.

I know basically where they were shooting from (I recognize the background seen before the camera titls up and zooms in), I know where the heli took off from, and I know where some of the debris ended up (some of it on dry land on the hoboken riverfront)... all of this indicates the heli had just taken up its course southbound over the west bank (routine, except maybe for the altitude) and the Piper had come more or less straight from KTEB to that point over the riverbank (not so routine, but perfectly legal, etc).

Aside from that, the investigation should tell us if the Piper was at least monitoring the CTAF... that would make a difference.
 
Read and watch the video
http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2009/08/airtraffic_controller_suspende.html

Couple of things. First:
The air traffic controller at Teterboro Airport was on the phone with his girlfriend during Saturday's deadly air collision.''
The controller's supervisor "was nowhere to be found at the time,'' the News reports. "Both have been suspended and will likely be fired.
I have not looked at exactly where this happened but was it even within the delta airspace of Teterboro and as has been discussed ad nasuem does ATC have any responsibility for separation in the air of the delta if they were indeed still in it?


As for the video itself it does look as though at the last minute the Piper pilot sees that the collision is about to occur and takes steps to avoid. But it is all too late. Also at the end of the video the news talking head speaks of additional restriction in the corridor being considered by the FAA.
 
... Also at the end of the video the news talking head speaks of additional restriction in the corridor being considered by the FAA.

Of course. Makes sense since the plane wasn't flying the corridor.

ADS-B, too. That will have not prevented this so we need to push up making it mandatory.
 
I don't remember which thread the photo was on, but that was so painful to see.

I have been through the Hudson corridor before, July 2007 as a matter of fact. What a great day that was...
 
[FONT=arial,helvetica,geneva]
<H2>[FONT=arial,helvetica,geneva]Calls Intensify For Closing Of Hudson VFR Corridor[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[FONT=arial,helvetica,geneva]
hudson.jpg
The horrific midair accident above the Hudson River last Saturday that killed nine people in a Piper Saratoga and a Europcopter AS350 helicopter has prompted calls from officials across the Northeast to impose stricter restrictions on the VFR corridor through New York City's congested airspace. On Tuesday, 15 members of Congress sent a letter to FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt comparing the lack of regulation to the "Wild West" and saying "we should seriously consider banning all flights below 1,100 feet until radar systems are available to track them." The National Air Transportation Association said this week the media attention following the accident has been misplaced. "The characterization of the airspace as devoid of regulation is inaccurate," said NATA in a news release. "The airspace being referred to as 'uncontrolled' only indicates that there is no active radar-based control of flights. Operations in this airspace are still subject to numerous regulatory requirements."[/FONT]


[FONT=arial,helvetica,geneva]NATA President James Coyne added: "Until the NTSB releases their findings, I believe it is imperative that we follow the advice of Mayor Bloomberg and avoid unnecessary speculation." The letter from Congress suggested that all aircraft in the corridor should be required to file flight plans :dunno:, and "at a minimum, the FAA must require the installation of the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS-II), and a Mode C Transponder, on all aircraft that seat less than 10 people.:yikes:" The group called for the FAA to act not only to regulate the Hudson River corridor, but "to provide greater oversight of small aircraft operations throughout the country."[/FONT]
</H2>
From AvWeb

Here's the active link to the Congress Letter.


(Smilies added for effect.) Why is there always so much emphasis on flight plans? There are times when I can't get a response in the air to open it,... so I continue with FF which I think is better anyway.
 
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One of my favorites is on the list. Anthony "Weiner". Named appropriately, the Weiner part that is. :D
 
Not surprised at the letter at all - I'm only surprised it took this long.
 
Weiner has a long list of anti-GA rhetoric and support of anti-GA legislation.
 
I have written about this before; it seems to me the current trend is strongly headed towards increasing regulation......with the questionable goal of perfect insulation from any adverse event.

I think we have to accept that flying has risks and could kill us.

The alternative is to accept a continuing burden of regulation to the point that we can no longer fly. There are already many folks that cannot, or do not fly because of our existing level of regulation. We are headed to a point where, before long, no one will be flying.
 
What's his beef?

Or is he a typical Long Island afraid-of-everything kid?

Out there, they raise kids like veal.


You nailed it with the second sentence, and I don't want to get into specifics for fear of going into SZ territory.
 
I have written about this before; it seems to me the current trend is strongly headed towards increasing regulation......with the questionable goal of perfect insulation from any adverse event.

I think we have to accept that flying has risks and could kill us.

The alternative is to accept a continuing burden of regulation to the point that we can no longer fly. There are already many folks that cannot, or do not fly because of our existing level of regulation. We are headed to a point where, before long, no one will be flying.

Yep. If we get mandated to have $20,000 worth of avionics THAT WON'T FIX THE PROBLEM, but that happened with transponders in the first place.

We have to undertstand the public outrage though. There are 200-300 flights a day in NYC corridor and there have been TWO fatal accidents in the last handful of years!
 
We have to undertstand the public outrage though. There are 200-300 flights a day in NYC corridor and there have been TWO fatal accidents in the last handful of years!

It's not a simple calculus -- 9 people died where everyone can see. That always trumps the 9 people that also died in car crashes and in other "ordinary" accidents in the country during the same 2 minute span.

Maybe I'm late on this -- TEB tower folks are suspects...?
 
Read and watch the video
http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2009/08/airtraffic_controller_suspende.html

Couple of things. First:
I have not looked at exactly where this happened but was it even within the delta airspace of Teterboro and as has been discussed ad nasuem does ATC have any responsibility for separation in the air of the delta if they were indeed still in it?

They were in the corridor, not the Class D. Based on the images |I've seen and the eyewitness reports, the collision occurred over the river, abeam of the Stevens' Tech campus in Hoboken. Some of the debris actually landed on Frank Sinatra Drive, which runs along the river, along the "bulge" where the campus sits.
If you look at the "NY heli inset" on the back of the NY terminal chart, that's just south of the large piers on the NJ side, almost halfway between the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels.

That area is inside the Hudson corridor... although just barely.

The chopper took off from the 30th St. pad, on the opposite bank. Apparently it crossed the river and had just turned south to follow the usual heli route along the edge of the corridor.
The KTEB airspace ends a few miles NW of there, and the space in between is all under the 1800-foot shelf of the Class B. It's uncontrolled airspace- Class E if I'm not mistaken.
 
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Read and watch the video
http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2009/08/airtraffic_controller_suspende.html

Couple of things. First:
I have not looked at exactly where this happened but was it even within the delta airspace of Teterboro and as has been discussed ad nasuem does ATC have any responsibility for separation in the air of the delta if they were indeed still in it?

No. Traffic advisorises: yes (assuming he's aware of the traffic); separation: no.

Of course, if it happened in the Class D, the helicopter would have been in violation of the requirement to establish communicatins with the tower.
 
To me it looked like the helicopter was closing in on the Lance from the lances left and a bit below. It appears as if the Lance saw the copter at the last moment and started to turn right.

Impact does appear to be between the rotor blades of the chopper and the wing of the aircraft.

Which makes one think... if you turn, instinctively, to avoid a collision, you're presenting a larger vertical profile. And we separate from other traffic via altitude. On a collision course, but 10 or 20 feet of altitude between you, you're going to need new underwear but you'll be alive.

So... armchair flying. If you think a collision is imminent, would you stand a better chance of avoiding the collision with a vigorous push or pull of the yoke, rather than a turn?
 
Impact does appear to be between the rotor blades of the chopper and the wing of the aircraft.

Which makes one think... if you turn, instinctively, to avoid a collision, you're presenting a larger vertical profile. And we separate from other traffic via altitude. On a collision course, but 10 or 20 feet of altitude between you, you're going to need new underwear but you'll be alive.

So... armchair flying. If you think a collision is imminent, would you stand a better chance of avoiding the collision with a vigorous push or pull of the yoke, rather than a turn?

I would say it's all a crap shoot. We're still assuming that the right action would be taken. It's not a bad idea, but in the end fate is probably involved. When I look at the video it appears to me as the Piper came with a foot or two of clearing the rotor.
 
Impact does appear to be between the rotor blades of the chopper and the wing of the aircraft.

Which makes one think... if you turn, instinctively, to avoid a collision, you're presenting a larger vertical profile. And we separate from other traffic via altitude. On a collision course, but 10 or 20 feet of altitude between you, you're going to need new underwear but you'll be alive.

So... armchair flying. If you think a collision is imminent, would you stand a better chance of avoiding the collision with a vigorous push or pull of the yoke, rather than a turn?


What if the other guy does the same thing?

The video appears to show the low wing Cherokee flying into a blind spot -- below and ahead. If the chopper was climbing as it moved forward along the same flight path as the Cherokee -- he was climbing into the Cherokee's blind spot unable to see because that's the chopper's blind spot (above and behind).

:confused:
 
What if the other guy does the same thing?

:confused:

I thought about that and made an assumption that if they see each other (which they would have to for the scenario proposed) then you might assume the lower guy would push over the higher guy would pull back. Now if they are at the same level, then all bets are off.
 
NTSB factual update is out, and it looks bad for the Teterboro controller.

Here it is:
In its continuing investigation of the midair collision of
an air tour helicopter and a small plane over the Hudson
River on Saturday, the National Transportation Safety Board
has developed the following factual information:
On August 8, 2009, at 11:53 a.m. EDT, a Eurocopter AS 350 BA
(N401LH) operated by Liberty Helicopters and a Piper PA-32R-
300 (N71MC) operated by a private pilot, collided in midair
over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The
certificated commercial pilot and five passengers onboard
the helicopter were killed. The certificated private pilot
and two passengers onboard the airplane were also killed.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight
plans were filed for either flight. The local sightseeing
helicopter flight was conducted under the provisions of 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part 136. The personal airplane
flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 91.
The helicopter departed West 30th Street Heliport (JRA), New
York, New York, for a sightseeing tour at 11:52 a.m. The
airplane departed Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New
Jersey, at 11:49 a.m.; destined for Ocean City Municipal
Airport (26N), Ocean City, New Jersey. The airplane pilot
requested an en route altitude of 3500 feet.
According to preliminary radar data, the helicopter turned
south from JRA and climbed to 1,100 feet, with a transponder
code of 1200. According to witnesses, the pilot of the
helicopter had transmitted a position report of "Stevens
Point" (Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New
Jersey) on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF),
123.05.
On the day of the accident, Teterboro Air Traffic Control
Tower staff consisted of five controllers. At the time of
the accident, the tower was staffed with two controllers:
one controller was working ground control, local control,
and arrival radar, and was also acting as the controller in
charge of the facility. The second controller was working
the flight data/clearance delivery position. Two other
controllers were on break and the front line manager had
left the facility at about 1145.
At 1148:30, the Teterboro tower controller cleared the
airplane for takeoff on frequency 119.50. The first radar
target for the airplane was recorded at 1149:55 as the
flight departed runway 19.
The tower controller advised the airplane and the pilot of
another helicopter operating in the area of each other and
instructed the pilot of the airplane to remain at or below
1,100 feet. At this time, the tower controller initiated a
non-business-related phone call to Teterboro Airport
Operations. The airplane flew southbound until the
controller instructed its pilot to turn left to join the
Hudson River. At 1152:20 the Teterboro controller instructed
the pilot to contact Newark on a frequency of 127.85; the
airplane reached the Hudson River just north of Hoboken
about 40 seconds later. At that time there were several
aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of
the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of
which were potential traffic conflicts for the airplane. The
Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call
at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential
traffic conflicts. The Newark tower controller observed air
traffic over the Hudson River and called Teterboro to ask
that the controller instruct the pilot of the airplane to
turn toward the southwest to resolve the potential
conflicts. The Teterboro controller then attempted to
contact the airplane but the pilot did not respond. The
collision occurred shortly thereafter. A review of recorded
air traffic control communications showed that the pilot did
not call Newark before the accident occurred.
The helicopter departed from the 30th Street Heliport at
1152 for what was planned to be a 12-minute tour. The
initial part of the tour was to be flown outside class B
airspace, so the pilot was not required to contact air
traffic control before or after departure. The first radar
target for the helicopter was detected by Newark radar at
about 1152:27, when the helicopter was approximately mid-
river west of the heliport and climbing through 400 feet.
According to recorded radar data, the helicopter flew to the
west side of the river, and then turned southbound to follow
the Hudson. According to Liberty Helicopters management,
this was the expected path for the tour flight. The
helicopter continued climbing southbound until 1153:14, when
it and the airplane collided at 1,100 feet.
As noted above, immediately after the Teterboro tower
controller instructed the airplane to contact Newark tower
on frequency 127.85, the Newark controller called the
Teterboro controller to request that they turn the airplane
to a heading of 220 degrees (southwest) and transfer
communications on the aircraft. As the Newark controller
was providing the suggested heading to the Teterboro
controller, the pilot of the airplane was acknowledging the
frequency change to the Teterboro controller. The Teterboro
controller made two unsuccessful attempts to reach the
pilot, with the second attempt occurring at 1152:50. At
1152:54, 20 seconds prior to the collision, the radar data
processing system detected a conflict between the airplane
and the helicopter, which set off aural alarms and a caused
a "conflict alert" indication to appear on the radar
displays at both Teterboro and Newark towers. During
interviews both controllers stated that they did not recall
seeing or hearing the conflict alert. At 1153:19, five
seconds after the collision, the Teterboro controller
contacted the Newark controller to ask about the airplane,
and was told that the pilot had not called. There were no
further air traffic control contacts with either aircraft.
The role that air traffic control might have played in this
accident will be determined by the NTSB as the investigation
progresses. Any opinions rendered at this time are
speculative and premature.
Radar data and witness statements indicate that the aircraft
collided at 1,100 feet in the vicinity of Stevens Point.
Most of the wreckage fell in to the Hudson River; however,
some small debris from the airplane, including the right
main landing gear wheel, fell on land within the city limits
of Hoboken. The collision was witnessed by numerous people
in the area of the accident and was immediately reported to
local emergency responders.
The helicopter was recovered on August 9, 2009. Most of the
helicopter components were accounted for at the scene, with
the exception of the main rotor and transmission. The
airplane was recovered on August 11, 2009. Most of the
airplane components were accounted for at the scene, with
the exception of both wings. The wreckages were subsequently
transported to a secure facility in Delaware.
The pilot of the airplane, age 60, held a private pilot
certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land,
airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane. His most
recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on May
14, 2009. At that time he reported a total flight experience
of 1,020 hours.
The pilot of the helicopter, age 32, held a commercial pilot
certificate, with ratings for rotorcraft helicopter and
instrument helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class
medical certificate was issued on June 16, 2009. At that
time he reported a total flight experience of 3,010 hours.
Digital photographs and a video recording taken by witnesses
to the accident have been provided to the NTSB. In
addition, a digital camera was recovered from the
helicopter. All of these were sent to the NTSB Vehicle
Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC for further
examination. Global Positioning System units were recovered
from both aircraft and also forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle
Recorders Laboratory.
The recorded weather at TEB at 1151 was wind variable at 3
knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 24
degrees Celsius, dew point 7 degrees Celsius, altimeter
30.23 inches of mercury.
 
NTSB factual update is out, and it looks bad for the Teterboro controller.

Here it is:

... so sad.

I can't help but wonder: there you are, departing TEB, under positive control, in one of the busiest areas in the NAS, listening to a very busy ATC frequency... do you monitor the CTAF for the known VFR area? That's a great deal of extra workload . . .

Cheers,

-Andrew
 
... so sad.

I can't help but wonder: there you are, departing TEB, under positive control, in one of the busiest areas in the NAS, listening to a very busy ATC frequency... do you monitor the CTAF for the known VFR area? That's a great deal of extra workload . . .

We can guess if you're not from around there when you hear "Contact Newark on 12n.n.." you might not even know about the CTAF much less have it tuned in to monitor.
 
1) Nine deaths. How many on I95 in that time?

2) Helo seemed to be about 90ish degrees, pointed at/close to at the Lance. Pilot is, IIRC, in the right seat in a helo. I would think he'd have a pretty good view, what with all the perspex in the cockpit of a helo.

3) Appears to me that Lance sees Helo at last second, tries to pull up/away.

4) Never rely on ATC 100% for traffic avoidance.

Sad. Tragic. Terrible. But when you get right down to it -- it was an accident. Pure and simple. **** happens. Learn from it. Move on. No need to, for example, ban all GA from the Hudson corridor.
 
BOHICA:



http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/14/AR2009081400432_2.html

I say again: BOHICA. More restrictions and regulations... Is there anything that this Administration doesn't want to regulate?

I'm not sure the previous administration(s) would have been any different. Media stirs up ****, politicians react.
Bill, let's not take this to the SZ. We have Politicians doing their typical knee-jerk reactions. Big surprise. (NOT!)
 
We can guess if you're not from around there when you hear "Contact Newark on 12n.n.." you might not even know about the CTAF much less have it tuned in to monitor.

On the one hand, I see you. On the other, the New York TAC has a nice inset on it that covers the Class B exclusion. At the end of the day, 9 people are dead because the accident chain wasn't stopped. So very sad.

Andrew/Adam/Rob/other Wings fliers: Sorry to hear of your airport's loss. Whenever a crew is lost from your home base, it hits close to home.

Cheers,

-Andrew
 
NTSB factual update is out, and it looks bad for the Teterboro controller.

Here it is:

This isn't the only NTSB report in which I've read that the controllers reported not hearing or seeing the automated collision alerts.

Is there a controller on this board that can tell us how visually or aurally invasive the alert is?
 
This isn't the only NTSB report in which I've read that the controllers reported not hearing or seeing the automated collision alerts.

Is there a controller on this board that can tell us how visually or aurally invasive the alert is?
Betcha if they can they turn off or turn down alerts outside the Bravo. It would be nonstop otherwise.

What range would be appropriate? 2-3 mile separation would non-stop.

Maybe they only get alerts for transponder tracked aircraft with transponder codes other than 1200, ie. on FF or IFR flight plans.
 
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