Hawker 900XP Overrun at KTEX, 7/20/24

[AquaLand]

NTSB Final Report for N526FC

During the departure takeoff roll on the dry asphalt, the airplane did not attain 75% of the planned takeoff speed about halfway down the runway, so the copilot decided to abort the takeoff. The brakes, air brakes, and thrust reversers were used to slow the airplane; however, the airplane did not slow down. Maximum braking was then applied, and the airplane began to depart from the runway to the right. The airplane traveled over the engineered material arresting system (EMAS) and came to rest upright. After exiting the airplane, the pilot saw the wing flaps were fully retracted and were not extended to 15°. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage.

A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data found that during the startup, taxi, and attempted takeoff from runway 27, there was no discussion of checklist usage or configuration settings for the airplane. A review of the airplane flight manual (AFM) found two checklists where the flight crew sets and confirms the flap position before takeoff.

NTSB Probable Cause: The flight crew’s failure to properly configure the airplane for takeoff in a high-density altitude environment, which resulted in a loss of control and a subsequent runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s failure to use checklists.

 

[Flying Keys]

My understanding of the findings is a little fuzzy on this one. The takeoff was aborted halfway down the runway due to lack of speed, meaning they weren’t going flying, regardless of the configuration. Nothing noted about any lack of lift or attempt to rotate. Would setting the flaps properly have helped them achieve the correct speed by the predetermined go/no-go point? I would think it would have the opposite effect.

Still a miss, either way, and it could have ended up worse had they elected to go, but it sounds like other poor planning choices like a high density altitude and a tailwind were more responsible.

 

[AquaLand]

CVR contains Captain query to FO, “are you able to rotate.” Nothing in NTSB analysis or in flight crew 6120.1 statements about V speeds or failure to rotate. No further flight crew interviews beyond 6120.1 statements.

The cynic in me is thinking that the 75/50 line, which is identical in both pilots’ statements, is CYA for RTO well beyond V1 and the halfway point of the runway. Skeptical that a flight crew not using checklists was judiciously applying the 75/50 rule.

NTSB seems to have accepted the flight crew's version of events without any independent forensic investigation.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

My understanding of the findings is a little fuzzy on this one. The takeoff was aborted halfway down the runway due to lack of speed, meaning they weren’t going flying, regardless of the configuration. Nothing noted about any lack of lift or attempt to rotate. Would setting the flaps properly have helped them achieve the correct speed by the predetermined go/no-go point? I would think it would have the opposite effect.

Still a miss, either way, and it could have ended up worse had they elected to go, but it sounds like other poor planning choices like a high density altitude and a tailwind were more responsible.

Yeah. Lots wrong with this one. FWIW, I fly Hawkers, though I'm still relatively new to it.

They took off with a 12G17 tailwind - There's a hard limitation of 10 knots.

Based on performance, they should have taken off with 15º flaps. While most takeoffs are done this way, there are some high-altitude situations where it's actually better to do 0º flaps, but you've gotta run the numbers to see which way is best for the particular weight and conditions that day.

Also, it's not hard to stop a Hawker. I mean, I recently landed on runway 21 at Hilton Head and got off at taxiway A3, 2516 feet from the threshold... And I probably don't have 50 hours in the left seat yet. If they aborted halfway down and they weren't at 75% of liftoff speed yet, they were probably traveling around 110 KTAS/low 90s IAS with 3500 feet of runway in front of them. I find it hard to believe that they not only couldn't stop but went all the way through the EMAS. Like @AquaLand, this seems like an agreed-upon cover story very different from what actually happened - Unless the captain just waited and let the FO continue to accelerate without rotating, then said "are you able to rotate" well above Vr when she didn't do anything. And after watching the video, I don't see any airbrakes at all, and TRs don't come out until the last 1000 feet or so.

Too curious about this one, had to dig into the docket. A few things are interesting/suspect to me:

* The FO listed flight experience as 1,336 total time in all aircraft, 1,213 PIC... But 1,483 dual given. Also, 606 total time in type, with 603 PIC in type. Unless she was always the PF for some reason, that is highly suspect.

* They stated they couldn't shut the engines off with HP cocks or LP cocks. HPs will shut the engines down immediately, but cannot be fully closed if the TRs remain deployed so that's probably why they didn't work - They weren't fully closed. LP cocks will shut the engines down, but it takes a while.

* On the CVR transcript, the PIC calls out 80 knots, and then one second later says "Rotate. Stop." One second past 80 is WAY too early to rotate. Vr is usually around 120 plus or minus a few knots and it takes a bit to get there.

* It took 12 seconds from the "Rotate. Stop." call to the "are you able to rotate?" and then 5 more seconds from then until the FO swears and cuts engine power nine seconds prior to impact.

* Edit to add: Based on the conversations in the CVR, there was nothing even close to resembling CRM. And I hate to say it, but with a 59 year old male captain and a 28 year old female FO, there may have been some, uh, "social dynamics" in play.