FSDO access stories

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The uninformed BS assumption that all Federal workers are just lazy is … lazy. No one makes a lot of work -- and security plans definitely qualify if you have ever even seen one -- to avoid work.

Kinda like the seemingly PoA-prevalent assumption that all service members should be exalted...

(Not pointing fingers at you, MAKG)
 
Our local FSDO in DFW is pretty much like .... well ... I couldn't tell you because I have a slight accent, no US passport and thus have been denied access to FAA facilities as a potential terrorist threat. It's been 2 months since I requested clearance and so far no good news, only bureaucratic BS.

Once I gain access, I will let you know. Might be faster to get US citizenship, though. (wife keeps telling me that it's not too expensive to buy and I would have the same rights as her :) )
 
ATL is like Boston. Appointments only, metal detectors, full body wanding. They would not even let me park on the property, I had to park on the street far away instead of in the attached lot with hundreds of empty spaces.
 
It's been 5 or 6 years, but I don't remember the Sac FSDO being locked down. Buzzed in from the outside then open counters and friendly people.
 
ATL is like Boston. Appointments only, metal detectors, full body wanding. They would not even let me park on the property, I had to park on the street far away instead of in the attached lot with hundreds of empty spaces.

Funny story about that. I went to the Atlanta FSDO to get my student license rather than go to AME (since medical is not required for glider). I made an appointment, drove down there, pulled up to the gate and the guard waved me through. After parking up front and walking inside, the lady up front quickly asked where I was parked and I pointed to my car parked right in front of the doors.

Well, that pretty much created something bordering on a national security incident. I was escorted back outside, parked the car in the right place, went through the normal screenings, and the guard was summarily verbally berated and dismissed. Quite the experience for someone who, at the time, was new to all this aviation business.

I don't go and visit anymore.
 
Wasn't OKC a truck bomb parked out front?

How does hiding behind three layers of internal security protect the building from a truck bomb?
You and I have the same question

There is a wide spectrum of folks who have personal issues with The Gummint. Some quote Ayn Rand and post on message forums and occasionally get belligerent on the phone with gummint agents, but are generally harmless. Some rent panel vans and fill them with fertilizer and diesel fuel and blow up entire city blocks.

And some fall in-between.

Maybe a guard shack and some plexiglas won't protect against a panel van bomb, but those measures might go a long way to preventing some of the middle-spectrum kooks from doing harm with a knife or a pistol.

I'm curious to know what Jay has against receptionists. Does he consider them expendable? Deserving of lesser protection than better-paid bureaucrats?

Fair enough to argue about whether the described security measures are warranted. But if they are, what's wrong with protecting all the employees instead of just some of them? Kooks don't typically check GS levels before choosing who to harm and not harm.
 
I used to laugh when they put Jersey barriers all around the Leesburg AFSS and kept people from parking near it.
They put barriers around the Denver Centennial FSS too. But I'm sure that was after the OKC bombing not 9/11. I'm not even sure the FSS was there any more by 9/11.
 
Security implementations are different within each agency and each site. It's usually up to a particular individual on the site on how stringent or relaxed they want to make it. The employees are a mix of Civil Service (GS & SES) and contractors of all income and education levels. Always up to those responsible for the facility to make that call. I spent years of my life going through two armed guard checkpoints, 2 badge access doors, one being a vault and sitting at a desk with 3 cameras locked on me.

As for Civil Service employees being lazy... well just like within any profession you have top notch individuals, and the bottom of the barrel types just riding the position until retirement. No different than any industry, I will say private industry is usually more fiscally responsible and often do cyclic removal of employees. My company did this 2 months ago, 6 months before that and 6 months before that which totaled about 15% of the company workforce.
 
Should the DMV have more or less security than the FSDO?
 
Sounds similar to the Rapid City fsdo. There are like 4 flying inspectors and yet it takes a month to get a checkride scheduled because they're so busy. I was th. First cfi ride in 5 years for the examiner yet he's booked solid.... Yeah.
 
I don't get it either... What makes a FSDO special as opposed to National Park Service, Post Office, National Weather Service, etc.
 
...Fair enough to argue about whether the described security measures are warranted. But if they are, what's wrong with protecting all the employees instead of just some of them? Kooks don't typically check GS levels before choosing who to harm and not harm.

Damn good point
 
Is a Federal, or any other govt employee at greater risk from: 1. An intruder coming in the front door. 2. A truck or other vehicle delivered bomb. 3. A coworker going on a shooting spree?
 
Sounds similar to the Rapid City fsdo. There are like 4 flying inspectors and yet it takes a month to get a checkride scheduled because they're so busy. I was th. First cfi ride in 5 years for the examiner yet he's booked solid.... Yeah.

You do realize "Ops" Inspectors (not flying Inspectors) have other responsibilities other than giving check rides? :rolleyes:
 
More people express ire at the DMV than the FSDO (mostly I suspect because there are way more drivers).
 
As a former federal employee (US District Courts, so I admit the security is a bit more warranted) I have a bit of prospective on this subject I'd like to think.

First as for security. As was previously mentioned a lot of this security is more or less designed and implemented by an external agency. Unless you are the FBI the security is largely handled by the GSA and Federal Protective Services. Their job is to secure all the federal services. For this reason you will see similar techniques applied to all federal buildings. There is also a bit of the mentality of worst case scenario for these agencies. Good or bad they see legitimate attacks on their properties and tend to try to ensure that there are NO foreseeable vulnerabilities for the properties they are responsible for.

Do I agree that a FSDO needs the same security levels as a federal courthouse? Probably not. However I can understand why they do it the way they do.

Secondly about risk. You cant imagine the type of crazies you will run into at a government office. I saw this VERY frequently when i worked for the courthouse. There were regular bomb and suspicious powder incidents. To the point where the clerk working on the mail is locked in a room when they open the mail, and if there is something unusual they are not to leave the room till the US Marshals service has cleared the room. I did not envy those who were on mail duty rotation. Beyond the concrete incidents there were just the loonies who would write long rambling manifestos about how the CIA and NSA are stealing their precious bodily fluids, or even better showing up to tell everyone what the voices in their head was telling them.

Thankfully these individuals were easy to identify and deal with. The more difficult ones who felt "wronged" by the system. They didn't stand out as clearly. They in my mind were the most dangerous because you didn't always know who they were. These are the individuals that probably prompts the level of security that the FPS places on the FSDO. Who knows when someone ****ed about losing their certificate is going to snap and take it out on the office. On top of that you have a fringe mentality where it is US vs the Government and that we have the right and responsibility to take arms against the government when it infringes on our personal liberties. This is the element that makes the difference between a government office and a private entity. Do i agree 100% with the approach, no. I don't think its truly effective, but the idea is to make the appearance of impenetrability so that those middle group of individuals who are ready to snap think that they are untouchable and hopefully cool down before doing anything rash.
 
Kabuki theater
The illusion of security

Locked doors, impact-resistant windows, and armed guards are more than an illusion of security. There are many threats that these measures will provide good protection against.

The question is simply whether those measures are warranted at a FSDO.
 
I think the thing that gets me most is the impact resistant window.

If the first 2 layers of security are effective then it shouldn't be necessary. Alternatively the impact resistant window and locked doors themselves are pretty effective we should be able to dispense with the being buzzed in and wanded parts. I'm all for redundancy but there's also an aspect of openness that is completely missing.
 
I think the thing that gets me most is the impact resistant window.

If the first 2 layers of security are effective then it shouldn't be necessary. Alternatively the impact resistant window and locked doors themselves are pretty effective we should be able to dispense with the being buzzed in and wanded parts. I'm all for redundancy but there's also an aspect of openness that is completely missing.

They are all designed to protect against the "person who feels wronged" who decides to take it out on the government. The glass and doors don't protect against against someone who has an appointment.
 
I think the thing that gets me most is the impact resistant window.

If the first 2 layers of security are effective then it shouldn't be necessary. Alternatively the impact resistant window and locked doors themselves are pretty effective we should be able to dispense with the being buzzed in and wanded parts. I'm all for redundancy but there's also an aspect of openness that is completely missing.

That's real easy to say when it's someone else's life you're risking.

Keep that in mind when you armchair analyze someone else's security situation without any of the input nor analysis nor training nor technique that went into it.
 
That's real easy to say when it's someone else's life you're risking.

Keep that in mind when you armchair analyze someone else's security situation without any of the input nor analysis nor training nor technique that went into it.


BAhahhahahaahahah:goofy::rofl::rolleyes::goofy:
 
I'll say it again. Stick to something you know about.

Jay has lifetime membership in the Teabagger Party. No point in trying to correct his follies.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk HD
 
That's real easy to say when it's someone else's life you're risking.

Keep that in mind when you armchair analyze someone else's security situation without any of the input nor analysis nor training nor technique that went into it.

Nope. Being buzzed in through wooden doors, wanded, and then passing through impact resistant glass adds very minimal security to anything. And yes, I am qualified to evaluate that.
 
Nope. Being buzzed in through wooden doors, wanded, and then passing through impact resistant glass adds very minimal security to anything. And yes, I am qualified to evaluate that.

Correct. Some of that is a deterrent factor. Plus crooks don't want their faces or names registered on cameras or copied into visitor logs. Aka Terrorist who is making a "test run" and goes inside to "ask about job openings"

This is akin to fake dummy cameras and "Protected by ACME Security" signs at your house.
 
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