Flight 3407 accident Sunshine Hearing.

Interesting text in the ALPA report:

As a result of improper training due to incorrect interpretation of the PTS by Colgan instructors, Colgan pilots’ approach to stall recovery techniques were negatively affected. Colgan pilots are on record stating they would need to hold or increase pitch attitude and maintain altitude during a recovery or risk failure of the checkride. Another Colgan Check Airman stated, “initially relax pressure on the yoke and then were trying for 10 degrees pitch attitude.” A Colgan First Officer, described recovery pitch attitude as, “hold 4 degrees or possible just at horizon to prevent altitude loss.” Other Colgan pilots also described a variety of pitch-up recovery techniques.
 
Any Airline pilots care to comment on this statement form the ALPA report?

Each Colgan stall profile is an “approach to stall” followed by an “approach to stall” recovery. This is the only maneuver relating to stalls required by the FAA for airline training. Recognition and recovery from fully developed stalls were not a part of the Colgan stall training profile, and are unlikely to be found in any airline training . The crews were not provided any practical training on recovery from a full stall. “Stall recovery requires lowering the nose of the airplane to reduce the angle of attack while simultaneously adding power and then smoothly applying elevator control to recover to level flight.” Recognition and recovery from fully developed stall is required during basic instruction for private and commercial airmen certificates. This may be the last time airline pilots receive actual stall training in their careers.
 
From the ALPA report:

The Q400 did not have, nor was it required to have certain systems that would have alerted the pilots that the airspeed was abnormally low and approaching stick shaker. An explicit angle of attack indication including pitch limit indication, although not required, would have assisted the pilots in stall recognition and recovery had one been available. Low airspeed alert and minimum maneuvering speed display provide both visual and aural alerts and indications that the aircrafts speed is unusually low.
These systems could have alerted the pilots to make an airspeed correction before reaching stick shaker.


GMAFB.


Trapper John
 
I'm not an airline pilot but that's the way they have taught stalls in all of the jets that I have flown (I realize the Q is not a jet). Stalls are taught more as a proficiency maneuver than a true recovery. Once you get the shaker the technique is to maintain your pitch attitude and power out of it without changing altitude. This requires pulling on the yoke until the speed has built up enough to accelerate. I agree that this is negative learning and I have heard lots of people say so. I watched the test pilot go to a full stall in the Sovereign and it had a very pronounced break, wing down, and he had to move the yoke forward to recover, which took at least a few seconds.
 
I'm not an airline pilot but that's the way they have taught stalls in all of the jets that I have flown (I realize the Q is not a jet). Stalls are taught more as a proficiency maneuver than a true recovery. Once you get the shaker the technique is to maintain your pitch attitude and power out of it without changing altitude. This requires pulling on the yoke until the speed has built up enough to accelerate. I agree that this is negative learning and I have heard lots of people say so. I watched the test pilot go to a full stall in the Sovereign and it had a very pronounced break, wing down, and he had to move the yoke forward to recover, which took at least a few seconds.

It makes sense not to "practice" stalls where the practice may cause an emergency!

But it does seem incredible that a most basic -- yet counter-intuitive -- lesson as "get the nose down!" would be skipped.
 
It makes sense not to "practice" stalls where the practice may cause an emergency!
I should have clarified. The "practice" stalls were all done in a sim. The only full stall was with the test pilot in the airplane. I have done other practice stalls to the shaker in a real airplane but I know enough not to try a full stall on my own in a jet.
 
In my check ride (Lear 35A sim) there was a series of 3 approach to stall recoveries required in 3 different configurations. You are not supposed to lose (or gain) any altitude in any of them, so you cannot pitch down. It is somewhat contrived as far as real world stall recovery is concerned, but it an excellent exercise in aircraft control.

You also in training are put in a wind shear on approach scenario. You pitch up to the shaker and hold it there until out of the shear.

We did nothing where the recovery technique involved pitching down. If the Q400 training was the same, then maybe the pilots followed SOME of their training. For sure, the thrust levers go forward to the stops; and you do not retract any flaps you may have out.
 
The only full stall was with the test pilot in the airplane.

Were you in the right seat during this, or were two test pilots required? We have to change a stall vane on one of our 24s, and it requires a test pilot flight. I'm wondering if I can go along and maybe even be the PNF. I think this would be a great experience, but perhaps :yikes:!
 
Were you in the right seat during this, or were two test pilots required? We have to change a stall vane on one of our 24s, and it requires a test pilot flight. I'm wondering if I can go along and maybe even be the PNF. I think this would be a great experience, but perhaps :yikes:!
I was in the right seat. This was actually the first conformity flight during the delivery. I watched the test pilot test all kinds of things which was interesting because it was my first time in the real airplane. One of the things I think he tested was if the AP would disconnect at the shaker. Then he asked me if I wanted to see a full stall. I said, "sure" since I'm game for a lot of things.

I'm pretty sure the Lear test pilot will let you go on the stall test flight. When they come to our office to test our Lears one of our pilots always goes along as the PNF. I never got to do that, but according to some who have it's an interesting experience. :)
 
Then he asked me if I wanted to see a full stall. I said, "sure" since I'm game for a lot of things.

So is it not normal procedure to test these aircraft to a full stall when produced? Just wondering since he asked you first.
 
Perhaps I am missing something. I realize there is ample power available to recover from an impending stall, and maybe that is the difference, but why would you not want to pitch down slightly to regain flying speed quicker, then recover the small amount of lost altitude when you have more of a safety margin? It seems that if you allow a stall to progress too far, and then try to power out of it, it could go south while you are waiting for the power.

Of course, I don't fly kerosene burners, so I am unfamiliar with the "proper" procedures.:D
 
I am curious as to your opinions whether the Roselawn accident has had any negative effect here. In Roselawn, the plane experienced tailplane stall, and if I am correct, the recovery includes pitching up to get the tail plane flying again. I know a lot of effort went into passing along the information learned from Roselawn... is it possible the pilots on 3407 reacted correctly to a mis-diagnosed stall?

-Skip
 
So is it not normal procedure to test these aircraft to a full stall when produced? Just wondering since he asked you first.
I'm sure it had been tested after it had been produced, before they let the customer fly in it. There were 5 hours on the airframe before I saw it. I couldn't say whether or not that included stalls, though.
 
Perhaps I am missing something. I realize there is ample power available to recover from an impending stall, and maybe that is the difference, but why would you not want to pitch down slightly to regain flying speed quicker, then recover the small amount of lost altitude when you have more of a safety margin? It seems that if you allow a stall to progress too far, and then try to power out of it, it could go south while you are waiting for the power.
I am not the one who came up with the parameters, but I think it was designed as more of a proficiency maneuver than teaching you how to recover in an unexpected stall. It seems like after the Colgan incident we got an addition to the emergency procedures with more of a normal stall recovery added. However, I still haven't been tested on that even though I have gone to recurrent since then. However it seems to me that anyone who gets to that point as a pilot should know how to recover instinctively... but that's just my opinion. Obviously it was not true in that situation.
 
In my check ride (Lear 35A sim) there was a series of 3 approach to stall recoveries required in 3 different configurations. You are not supposed to lose (or gain) any altitude in any of them, so you cannot pitch down. It is somewhat contrived as far as real world stall recovery is concerned, but it an excellent exercise in aircraft control.

You also in training are put in a wind shear on approach scenario. You pitch up to the shaker and hold it there until out of the shear.

We did nothing where the recovery technique involved pitching down. If the Q400 training was the same, then maybe the pilots followed SOME of their training. For sure, the thrust levers go forward to the stops; and you do not retract any flaps you may have out.
That's exactly what our training was.

I am not the one who came up with the parameters, but I think it was designed as more of a proficiency maneuver than teaching you how to recover in an unexpected stall. It seems like after the Colgan incident we got an addition to the emergency procedures with more of a normal stall recovery added. However, I still haven't been tested on that even though I have gone to recurrent since then. However it seems to me that anyone who gets to that point as a pilot should know how to recover instinctively... but that's just my opinion. Obviously it was not true in that situation.

That's exactly how it has been explained to me.

I am curious as to your opinions whether the Roselawn accident has had any negative effect here. In Roselawn, the plane experienced tailplane stall, and if I am correct, the recovery includes pitching up to get the tail plane flying again. I know a lot of effort went into passing along the information learned from Roselawn... is it possible the pilots on 3407 reacted correctly to a mis-diagnosed stall?

-Skip

That's what we all thought at first, but the NTSB report seems to indicate otherwise.
 
One thing the video says in two different instances is the time of captains. The captain of 3407 said he was hired by Colgan at 6xx hours. He had an ATP, wouldn't that mean he had at least 1500 hours? One of the other pilots said he had 4xx hours and made captain in less than 9 months. To be type rated, don't you need an ATP and have at least 1500 hours?

Ah, never mind... did the mental math on times and found he must have worked on his hours in the two years prior to his ATP certificate. The second guy, though, says that he made captain in nine months and had 5xx hours and his first officer had 4xx hours. So how is that one possible?
 
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