Here is what I told them:
1. While I support securing our nation’s borders, the proposed rule will do little to protect the United States and while significantly and unduly impact persons who present no threat to the United States. The requirement for clearance to leave the United States should be deleted. While one can see a benefit in keeping potentially dangerous persons from entering the country, requiring a clearance for a GA aircraft to leave the United States does nothing to increase security while adding cost and inconvenience to the traveling public. If a terrorist is already in the United States, he presents no more of a threat flying from Los Angeles to Mexicali than he does flying from Los Angeles to Phoenix or driving a rental truck in any American city. I think most Americans would prefer that terrorists leave the United States. If knowing who is leaving the country is important, then the Bureau should also be proposing to check the identities of everyone leaving the country by automobile.
2. It is readily apparent that the drafters of the rule have little understanding of General Aviation (GA) operations and the impact the rule would have on GA operators. For example:
a. While it says “This rule serves to provide the nation, private aircraft operators, and the international traveling public, additional security from the threat of terrorism and enhance CBP’s ability to carry out its border enforcement mission”; the rule does nothing to increase security for private aircraft operators and the international traveling public (the passengers on those aircraft) because, unlike commercial airline passengers, passengers aboard private aircraft know each other.
b. It assumes GA pilots have access to facilities (primarily computers with internet access) that do not exist at many of the airports GA aircraft operate from. Unlike the airlines, the operators of GA aircraft do not have their own facilities at the airports they operate from. Has CBP surveyed GA airports to determine the availability of the required equipment? The only work-around CBP offers is that operators will first have to fly to an airport that has the necessary facilities.
c. eAPIS requires the operator to provide the phone number of a 24-hour point of contact. GA operators normally don’t have operations centers (24-hour or otherwise). The examples given are absurd—a 24-hour broker? GA repair shops are not normally 24 hour operations and are not normally related to the operator of the aircraft. Even if a 24-hour point of contact was available, it would likely not be able to contact the pilot in the air or on the ground in a foreign country or even at some remote airports in the United States.
3. The Regulatory Analysis is deficient in that it doesn’t address numerous potential costs pilots incur in order to comply with the rule.
a. Having to fly to an airport with the required facilities. Even a small GA aircraft can cost well over $100/hour to operate.
b. Having to pay for computer/internet access either directly or through fuel and/or service charges greater than would otherwise be paid. In its analysis, CPB assumes free internet access.
c. The time spent waiting to use a shared computer (if available at all) to submit the required data and again to check for receipt of approval to take off. This could add considerably to the extra time spent comply with the proposed rule.
d. Paying a company to submit the notice of arrival and manifest data into eAPIS if the pilot doesn’t have access to a means to transmit it. Very few GA operators have operations centers.
e. Having to pay for a company to act as a 24-hour point of contact. eAPIS requires the operator to provide the phone number of a 24-hour point of contact. Very few GA operators have operations centers. Did the CBP really intend a family enjoying a 3-day weekend in Baja California to hire a company to perform this function?
f. CBP’s estimate that people will arrive at the airport 15 minutes earlier than they otherwise would doesn’t make sense, since they have to arrive at least 60 minute prior to takeoff. For departure from the United States to other countries, one should assume they will have to arrive 60 minutes earlier than they otherwise would because there is currently no requirement for transmitting information to CBP.
g. The cost estimate for instances where landing rights are denied need to be increased to account for the need for the parties to stay an additional night. Based on the CBP’s estimate that it will take 8 hours to resolve, the pilot(s) would likely need to rest before they could safely fly. Even if the delay is only a few hours, it may require an additional night’s stay because of some countries restrictions on flying at night. Additionally, did the CBP’s analysis take into account that police may not be normally stationed at or near an GA airport and that the police officers that may respond may not speak English, and therefore it may take more than 8 hours to resolve the issue?
h. CBP’s estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life are faulty because passengers in GA aircraft would not be willing to pay anything to reduce the risk of dying at the hands of a terrorist on their aircraft because, unlike airline passengers, they generally know the other people on the aircraft.
i. The potential losses described in Scenarios 1 (up to 1000 casualties) and 4 (21.9 billion in physical destruction) are not realistic for the vast majority of GA aircraft (World Trade Center example would seemingly require two airliner-size aircraft). Therefore, the probability of such attacks would be greatly reduced. Additionally, since people traveling on GA aircraft are generally know to each other, the probability of an aircraft being hijacked is extremely nil. That being the case, any attack would be a suicide mission so the value of the occupants lives should be considered to be zero.
4. Technical Issues
a. The rule specifies the use of eAPIS or another CBP approved transmission medium but give no hint as to what other media might be approved. E-mail? Facsimile? Telephone? What is a “batch manifest”?
b. Pilots need to input their transponder code into eAPIS, but they won’t know their transponder code until issued by ATC.
c. eAPIS has had problems accepting aircraft registration numbers (vice airline flight numbers) and does not accept non-ICAO airport identifiers (many GA airports only have FAA airport identifiers).
d. In order to properly plan the flight (and comply with the border crossing and arrival times given CPB) pilots need to be able to accurately predict their takeoff time. Does CPB guarantee that operators will receive a response within 45 minutes of transmitting the arrival information and manifest data so they can proceed to the aircraft, taxi and takeoff 60 minutes after they submit the information? If the response takes 70 minutes and the pilot can’t meet the times he provided, will he have to resubmit with new times and wait another 45 – 70 minutes for a response? GA operators do not have ground station personnel who can relay the CPB clearance.
e. Practically no GA aircraft (a few business jets) have the equipment needed to transmit an arrival manifest if they have to divert to an airport in the United States and it is likely not located in the cockpit. It is unreasonable to set an unobtainable requirement and then say that in an emergency, CBP will take into consideration the lack of equipment and nature of emergency. The threat of legal trouble could cause a pilot with an emergency to decide not to land in the United States when that would be the safest course of action.
