Beech 1900 down, let this be a lesson to you all.

[John Collins]

I'm sure you mean CFIIs But then 90% of the CFIIs I run into have very little real world experience in actual IFR. Maybe I'm just lucky enough to have flown a whole bunch of spur-of-the-moment-go-right-now-screw-the weather hours and got a lot of practice gleaning information from charts and plates.

So what of note do you glean from the relevant approach chart? I give you for free the TAA altitudes, the courses, and the minimum altitudes printed on the chart.

 

[Threefingeredjack]

So what of note do you glean from the relevant approach chart? I give you for free the TAA altitudes, the courses, and the minimum altitudes printed on the chart.

That unless I'm established on the approach inside ZEDAG 2000 feet probably isn't where I want to be considering the published MEA at UVAL is 3000. That MEA for a segment that close to the destination should have been a big flashing light. Just an opinion, but since the fact is they DID descend towards 2000 and left a big smoking hole in the muskeg I think it is a pretty valid one.

 

[alfadog]

• What was the assigned routing and altitude from King Salmon (PAKN) to Dillingham (PADL)
  [*]Where along this route was the aircraft when the approach clearance was issued and what was its then current assigned altitude
• What was the exact verbiage used by the controller when he issued the approach clearance

FWIW, I think you can glean the first two from the Flightaware link early in the thread. I posted a Skyvector link to a probable track based on that earlier.

 

[Bill Watson]

Not in my experience - In fact, I can't ever remember getting vectors to an IAF at all. I have caught a controller giving me a vector at an altitude below the FAF, questioned them, and had them amend it to the correct altitude, though. I also check my enroute altitudes pretty thoroughly, especially when I'm filing a non-direct route, so that I know when I can accept direct at my planned altitude.

A belated thanks for that bit of insight.

I had never quite realized that one never gets vectored to an IAF but rather only to intercept the localizer or a leg. I had a good example yesterday in VMC where I was clearly being vectored to the IAF for 18L ILS at KCLT. The strong winds required 2 adjustments to my vector until I was aimed exactly at the otherwise unmentioned IAF (I could see the IAF on my MFD since I had loaded the full approach. In fact all the traffic for 18L was aimed at the IAF. In my case, I was being scooted underneath 18C and 18R traffic at 3,000', well below the min alt for the IAF.

The simplest instructions for me to follow would have been "descend 3,000 without delay then direct (IAF)". But that would have had me navigating to an IAF 3,000' below it's minimum altitude, and that opens this whole can of worms. Makes sense now.

 

[mcheathe]

FWIW, I think you can glean the first two from the Flightaware link early in the thread. I posted a Skyvector link to a probable track based on that earlier.

It appears, based on the Flightaware track data that the flight took a track towards the IAF when the aircraft was about 30 miles ESE of PADL. If that location is where the approach clearance was issued, the aircraft would have been outside of the TAA and an altitude restriction for obstruction clearance was required to be issued. The one issued, to maintain 2000 or above, does not appear to be in compliance with obstruction clearance requirements.

 

[aterpster]

Well in the CFI world, maybe pilots sit down and look at an approach plate a week in advance because they feel like bringing a student there, that's great. But the majority, and I mean large majority of aviating that is done on this planet, is not like that. If any corporate, charter, freight, regional, major airline pilot told their bosses that they couldn't do the flight until they reread the AIM and needed to study all the approach plates they would be laughed at, then fired, and rightfully so.

I was a pilot for TWA for 27 years so I know a tad about airline flying. Had a TWA airport had even one RNAV TAA IAP when I was there it would have at the least been covered very carefully in a Flight Crew Bulletin, and/or been covered in recurrent.

Then again, maybe the TWA Training Dept. was a bunch of wussies, especially after the TWA 514 crash. (which caused all the rules that were not applied in this Alaska crash.)

 

[Inverted]

This was to be a short flight; the mileage between PAKN and PADL on V453 is 58NM. The MEA is 2100.

We are missing some factual data that would help us understand how the accident occurred.

• What was the assigned routing and altitude from King Salmon (PAKN) to Dillingham (PADL)
• Where along this route was the aircraft when the approach clearance was issued and what was its then current assigned altitude
• What was the exact verbiage used by the controller when he issued the approach clearance

If the aircraft was already within the boundary of the TAA and was established on a segment of the approach, an altitude assignment for obstruction clearance is not required. (See APT 7110.65, Para 4-8-1-e)

If the aircraft was outside of the TAA depicted on the approach chart when the approach clearance was issued, the controller was required to include an altitude assignment that will provide obstruction clearance until the aircraft is established inside the TAA.

The altitude assignment of “2000 or above” by the controller is highly questionable. If they were already established on a segment of the approach, the assignment was unnecessary and likely caused confusion to the crew. If they were outside of the TAA, the altitude assignment was just flat wrong because it did not provide the required obstruction clearance.

The crew’s lack of realization of the dangerous situation they were entering into calls into question their training, knowledge and lack of situational awareness.

I suspect that when all is said and done there will be plenty of blame for everyone involved.

Well, they might not have been on V453 so the point could be moot. They were given a clearance direct the IAF at 2000 feet. My guess is that they departed IFR and were cleared direct shortly after. 2100 feet MEA there is pretty interesting on V453. It is only 2100 feet between DLG and AKN, which is fine, but odd to see such variances in altitude in a short area. The surrounding MEAs are 10,000, and 7000 respectively.

 

[aterpster]

It appears, based on the Flightaware track data that the flight took a track towards the IAF when the aircraft was about 30 miles ESE of PADL. If that location is where the approach clearance was issued, the aircraft would have been outside of the TAA and an altitude restriction for obstruction clearance was required to be issued. The one issued, to maintain 2000 or above, does not appear to be in compliance with obstruction clearance requirements.

Nor in compliance with Chapter 4 of the 7110.65U.

 

[Inverted]

I was a pilot for TWA for 27 years so I know a tad about airline flying. Had a TWA airport had even one RNAV TAA IAP when I was there it would have at the least been covered very carefully in a Flight Crew Bulletin, and/or been covered in recurrent.

Then why the shock about on the spot approach breifing/review an shooting an approach? There is really no other way to do it unless you have been in there before. For special approaches like STIPS etc you are specifically trained on them in recurrent. But for TAA approaches there are a bunch I am sure (not sure of the number). How could you possibly shoot every TAA approach in recurrent?

Every time I go back to recurrent we get 1 PRM, and 1 LOC BC as part of our additional training. There are several PRM approaches in the U.S. but we only shoot the one.

 

[aterpster]

Then why the shock about on the spot approach breifing/review an shooting an approach? There is really no other way to do it unless you have been in there before. For special approaches like STIPS etc you are specifically trained on them in recurrent. But for TAA approaches there are a bunch I am sure (not sure of the number). How could you possibly shoot every TAA approach in recurrent?

Every time I go back to recurrent we get 1 PRM, and 1 LOC BC as part of our additional training. There are several PRM approaches in the U.S. but we only shoot the one.

Sure there is, at least at a major airline under Part 121. It's called "airport qualification."

That is different than the simulator drill as you should know.

 

[roncachamp]

Well, they might not have been on V453 so the point could be moot. They were given a clearance direct the IAF at 2000 feet. My guess is that they departed IFR and were cleared direct shortly after. 2100 feet MEA there is pretty interesting on V453. It is only 2100 feet between DLG and AKN, which is fine, but odd to see such variances in altitude in a short area. The surrounding MEAs are 10,000, and 7000 respectively.

Not according to the preliminary report:

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel, as the airplane approached Dillingham, the flight crew requested the RNAV GPS 19 instrument approach to the Dillingham Airport about 0757 from controllers at the Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). The ARTCC specialist on duty subsequently granted the request by issuing the clearance, with instructions to proceed direct to the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) to begin the approach, and to maintain an altitude of 2,000 feet or above. A short time later the flight crew requested to enter a holding pattern at the IAF so that they could contact the Flight Service Station (FSS) for a runway conditions report, and the ARTCC specialist granted that request. The ARTCC specialist then made several attempts to contact the aircraft, but was unsuccessful and subsequently lost radar track on the aircraft."

 

[alfadog]

While FWIW (I am not an instrument-rated pilot), it seems to me that flying the airplane at a safe altitude in instrument conditions (or at any time), especially in mountainous terrain, has got to be one of the primary responsibilities of the PIC and he should be on top of it at all times (I equate it to a pilot taking the lineman's word that he fueled the airplane and not checking the fuel levels himself).

Anyway, that said, where does the controller come up with the 2000' altitude? The MEA on the airway is 2100', MEAs north of the VOR are higher, sector altitude on the TAA is 5400'. Just curious.

 

[gismo]

No. I already said there was no need to issue an altitude at all if they were within the TAA. "At or above 2000" did not require them to descend to 2000.

Agreed, but I sometimes get clearances from ATC that put me below the published min altitude for an airway or approach segment. AFaIK this is valid when the MVA is lower than the published altitudes on a chart. And with a field elevation of 80 ft, a pilot unfamiliar with the are might not give a second thought to a clearance to 2000 ft. But if they had actually examined the approach chart the error in such a low altitude should have been fairly obvious. This leads me to suspect that they hadn't checked the approach chart yet at all, perhaps because they wanted to check the weather before deciding to make the attempt to land there. If all they had looked at was the enroute chart they might have had no idea of the terrain hazards in the vicinity. Goes to show that it's worth paying attention to the terrain anytime you're in the soup.

 

[alfadog]

Agreed, but I sometimes get clearances from ATC that put me below the published min altitude for an airway or approach segment. AFaIK this is valid when the MVA is lower than the published altitudes on a chart. And with a field elevation of 80 ft, a pilot unfamiliar with the are might not give a second thought to a clearance to 2000 ft. But if they had actually examined the approach chart the error in such a low altitude should have been fairly obvious. This leads me to suspect that they hadn't checked the approach chart yet at all, perhaps because they wanted to check the weather before deciding to make the attempt to land there. If all they had looked at was the enroute chart they might have had no idea of the terrain hazards in the vicinity. Goes to show that it's worth paying attention to the terrain anytime you're in the soup.

Obviously no knowing what they were thinking or doing but they went off the airway. They had to know they needed some info on terrain. The sectional has it, the plate has it. Also the enroute chart holds a clue. They crossed V462 which has an MEA of 3000' (the V453 they were on was 2100') so they could have inferred something from that.

 

[gismo]

Obviously no knowing what they were thinking or doing but they went off the airway. They had to know they needed some info on terrain. The sectional has it, the plate has it. Also the enroute chart holds a clue. They crossed V462 which has an MEA of 3000' (the V453 they were on was 2100') so they could have inferred something from that.

Yes the information they needed was likely available, at least on the approach chart. OTOH, high MEAs on airways aren't necessarily an indication of high terrain, sometimes they're high just to guarantee reception. And AFaIK this crew wasn't required to have sectionals along (not a bad idea though) so it's quite possible the only terrain info they had was the approach chart. Like I said, they might have postponed the approach briefing to get weather info (that's why they requested a hold and the IAF.

IMNSHO, the controller is the one who made the mistake. The freight dogs simply failed to catch the mistake and paid a heavy price.

 

[vintage cessna]

The controller doesn't have to know TERPs; most don't.

But, they have to know a fundamental of IFR clearances: not to clear an aircraft below the center's MIA, which was 4,000 in that area. There is no option about that except on a route assignment with an MEA lower than 4,000. In fact, since the applicable TAA was 5,400 the assigned altitude should have been not less than 5,400. If the assignment had been the MIA (4,000) and the crew had been sharp, they would have requested a climb to at least 4,300 and, if in doubt about the direct clearance, they should have requested 5,400.

But, the crew didn't catch the gross mishandling by ATC and they paid the ultimate price for not being ATC auditors, so to speak. Maybe they were very tired. Who knows? The NTSB will track their duty and rest times.

Friends of mine died in the 1974 TWA 514 crash for us to get all these conservative altitude rules. And, those guys in 1974 were far more to blame than this BE1900 crew.

Not enough detail in the prelim to know exactly what transpired with ATC. At or above 2000 may have in fact been a safe and legitimate altitude for a straight in approach with no PT. But if the pilot requested to hold rather than commencing the approach, one would think holding instructions would be issued with a new altitude assignment.

 

[vintage cessna]

ATC gave them direct the IAF at or above 2,000. There's no way that would have worked from any direction.

How so? Unless you know exactly where that aircraft was and have access to a controller chart for that sector, there is no way for you to know. However, once the pilot requested to hold, all bets are off, and a new clearance should have been issued.

 

[aterpster]

Not according to the preliminary report:

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel, as the airplane approached Dillingham, the flight crew requested the RNAV GPS 19 instrument approach to the Dillingham Airport about 0757 from controllers at the Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). The ARTCC specialist on duty subsequently granted the request by issuing the clearance, with instructions to proceed direct to the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) to begin the approach, and to maintain an altitude of 2,000 feet or above. A short time later the flight crew requested to enter a holding pattern at the IAF so that they could contact the Flight Service Station (FSS) for a runway conditions report, and the ARTCC specialist granted that request. The ARTCC specialist then made several attempts to contact the aircraft, but was unsuccessful and subsequently lost radar track on the aircraft."

The applicable TAA MEA is 5,400. So, does "2,000 or above" mean I can climb to 5,400 without further clearance? If so, at what position should the pilot commence that "without further clearance required" climb?

 

[aterpster]

Not enough detail in the prelim to know exactly what transpired with ATC. At or above 2000 may have in fact been a safe and legitimate altitude for a straight in approach with no PT. But if the pilot requested to hold rather than commencing the approach, one would think holding instructions would be issued with a new altitude assignment.

The MIA in that area is 4,000, and 5,000 a bit further west. It is 2,000 several miles east of the airport.

 

[Alexb2000]

I flew a TAA approach into 4O4 yesterday in actual. This thread was fresh in my mind and I was studying the plate like my first Playboy. Strangely I have never just been cleared to fly this approach using the TAA altitudes. ATC always makes me to go the IAF just like any other approach.

I wonder if there is some guidance internal to ATC about not using the TAA approaches as designed? Perhaps because of accidents like the OP referenced, or maybe just pilot unfamiliarity?

 

[aterpster]

I flew a TAA approach into 4O4 yesterday in actual. This thread was fresh in my mind and I was studying the plate like my first Playboy. Strangely I have never just been cleared to fly this approach using the TAA altitudes. ATC always makes me to go the IAF just like any other approach.

I wonder if there is some guidance internal to ATC about not using the TAA approaches as designed? Perhaps because of accidents like the OP referenced, or maybe just pilot unfamiliarity?

Nothing to do with the accident. Controllers don't like them, especially in a non-radar environment because they tie up too much airspace.

 

[vintage cessna]

The MIA in that area is 4,000, and 5,000 a bit further west. It is 2,000 several miles east of the airport.

So you have seen the controller chart that is used for that ATC sector?

 

[roncachamp]

The applicable TAA MEA is 5,400. So, does "2,000 or above" mean I can climb to 5,400 without further clearance? If so, at what position should the pilot commence that "without further clearance required" climb?

How do you know it required a climb? The preliminary report did not mention the previous altitude.

 

[bflynn]

First - yes, I agree this was the pilot's mistake. Clearly they should have been at 4300. But...

As a new IFR student still struggling to get out of the starting blocks, let me ask a question - could the design of the plate be partly to blame? I ask that because I read the text, then looked at the chart and my eyes went immediately to the 1900 number between ZEDAG and FIXUV and my brain said "so what's the problem"? That number 1900 is positioned almost the same way a MEA is on an enroute chart. You put up the enroute chart and switch to the approach plate, but does your brain change how it is thinking? Yes, 1900 is a "descend to" number, so can't we represent it in a unique way that doesn't cause confusion?

Granted, I may be the newest person here and not a lot of experience reading the chart, but I have to believe I'm not first to make that mistake, nor will be the last. If I made that mistake, isn't it reasonable to think that someone in actual IMC, distracted by trying to contact FSS made the same mistake? They started reading left to right down the chart, saw 1900, heard at or above 2000 and said "yup, we're good"?

Here is the approach plate :

 

[Aztec Driver]

The situation here is when the pilot first requested the approach,it was for a direct to IAF and into the approach from there. Depending on where they were, it is easily understood how the "at or above 2000" came from. After they requested the hold, they should have received an amended clearance, including another altitude. The pilot should have caught it, though, if they were briefing the plate at all. That 2550 altitude just outside the holding pattern depiction kind of gives it away.

 

[aterpster]

So you have seen the controller chart that is used for that ATC sector?

I saw an FAA summary of the accident that stated what I stated. But, I have not seen the MIA chart as of yet. Having said that all of us should be able to see current MIAs and MVAs on the Internet. They are IFR altitudes than can be a matter of life or death for pilots. In any case the applicable TAA altitude is 5,400.

 

[aterpster]

First - yes, I agree this was the pilot's mistake. Clearly they should have been at 4300. But...

As a new IFR student still struggling to get out of the starting blocks, let me ask a question - could the design of the plate be partly to blame? I ask that because I read the text, then looked at the chart and my eyes went immediately to the 1900 number between ZEDAG and FIXUV and my brain said "so what's the problem"? That number 1900 is positioned almost the same way a MEA is on an enroute chart. You put up the enroute chart and switch to the approach plate, but does your brain change how it is thinking? Yes, 1900 is a "descend to" number, so can't we represent it in a unique way that doesn't cause confusion?

Granted, I may be the newest person here and not a lot of experience reading the chart, but I have to believe I'm not first to make that mistake, nor will be the last. If I made that mistake, isn't it reasonable to think that someone in actual IMC, distracted by trying to contact FSS made the same mistake? They started reading left to right down the chart, saw 1900, heard at or above 2000 and said "yup, we're good"?

You need more experience with chart reading. You don't fly the profile view until you first flown the appropiate part of the plan view.

 

[aterpster]

How do you know it required a climb? The preliminary report did not mention the previous altitude.

You're the guy whose job it is to know the ATC aspects of this chart.

Humor me by assuming I was at 2,000 with a clearance of "at or above 2,000" Then subsequently then cleared me for the RNAV 19 some 35 miles prior to ZEDAG (I am pointed to enter the 5400 south TAA). May I then climb to the TAA MEA of 5400 without further clearance? If so, could you provide a 7110.65 cite?

Thank you.

 

[vintage cessna]

I saw an FAA summary of the accident that stated what I stated. But, I have not seen the MIA chart as of yet. Having said that all of us should be able to see current MIAs and MVAs on the Internet. They are IFR altitudes than can be a matter of life or death for pilots. In any case the applicable TAA altitude is 5,400.

I have no doubt that the MIA for where the aircraft impacted terrain was at least 4000. That does not mean that the original altitude restriction for an approach with no procedure turn was not valid.

 

[aterpster]

I have no doubt that the MIA for where the aircraft impacted terrain was at least 4000. That does not mean that the original altitude restriction for an approach with no procedure turn was not valid.

Coming from King Salmon he would almost certainly enter the south TAA sector, which would require the HILPT; i.e. 5400 to ZEDAG then 4300 until ZEDAG inound.

For someone arriving in the north (NoPT TAA) it's 6300 until 4 miles from ZEDAG, then 4300 until crossing ZEDAG NoPT.

Or, assuming the MIA is 4,000 in the vicinity of ZEDAG and lower to the east, ATC could clear an aircraft direct to ZEDAG at not less than 4,300. If the intercept angle is 90 degrees or less then the pilot could go straight-in crossing ZEDAG at not less than 4300. If the intercept angle is greater than 90 degrees then the HILPT would be required before going inbound to the FAF.

 

[hooligan]

The situation here is when the pilot first requested the approach,it was for a direct to IAF and into the approach from there. Depending on where they were, it is easily understood how the "at or above 2000" came from. After they requested the hold, they should have received an amended clearance, including another altitude. The pilot should have caught it, though, if they were briefing the plate at all. That 2550 altitude just outside the holding pattern depiction kind of gives it away.

I agree! First thing I saw when I looked at the procedure was the race track pattern and the highest point nearest it...2550 feet.

 

[roncachamp]

You're the guy whose job it is to know the ATC aspects of this chart.

Humor me by assuming I was at 2,000 with a clearance of "at or above 2,000" Then subsequently then cleared me for the RNAV 19 some 35 miles prior to ZEDAG (I am pointed to enter the 5400 south TAA). May I then climb to the TAA MEA of 5400 without further clearance? If so, could you provide a 7110.65 cite?

Thank you.

Sorry, I can't make that assumption. "At or above 2,000" implies the aircraft was at some higher altitude, else the instruction "maintain 2,000 until" would likely be used.

 

[Inverted]

How so? Unless you know exactly where that aircraft was and have access to a controller chart for that sector, there is no way for you to know. However, once the pilot requested to hold, all bets are off, and a new clearance should have been issued.

Well, we don't know what IAF they were given direct to. If they were coming from the south and going to FIXUV as the IAF and doing the procedure turn outbound that is fine, but they were off-airway. The wreckage was found 20nm north of the airport putting them several miles north of ZEDAG. If they were heading to FIXUV, then wanting to hold at ZEDAG you are absolutely correct they should have been issued a new clearance. We still have some missing pieces of the puzzle. They could have been told to hold as published which would make this entire thread change. We can already agree there is some blame to the crew, the question now is how much. Where were they coming from? Which IAF were they going to? Either way we can agree that going to ZEDAG from ANY direction at the altitude clearance they were given is grossly incorrect and proved to be deadly. An altitude clearance to the clearance limit should never conflict with terrain.

 

[vintage cessna]

Well, we don't know what IAF they were given direct to. If they were coming from the south and going to FIXUV as the IAF and doing the procedure turn outbound that is fine, but they were off-airway. The wreckage was found 20nm north of the airport putting them several miles north of ZEDAG. If they were heading to FIXUV, then wanting to hold at ZEDAG you are absolutely correct they should have been issued a new clearance. We still have some missing pieces of the puzzle. They could have been told to hold as published which would make this entire thread change. We can already agree there is some blame to the crew, the question now is how much. Where were they coming from? Which IAF were they going to? Either way we can agree that going to ZEDAG from ANY direction at the altitude clearance they were given is grossly incorrect and proved to be deadly. An altitude clearance to the clearance limit should never conflict with terrain.

You've lost me. The prelim states the pilot was given direct to the IAF, which is ZEDAG, FIXUV is the FAF. I can't agree that direct ZEDAG and executing a straight in approach from any direction AOA 2000 would be unsafe.

Flying the pattern depicted on the chart at 2000 would definitely be dangerous .

 

[roncachamp]

Well, we don't know what IAF they were given direct to. If they were coming from the south and going to FIXUV as the IAF and doing the procedure turn outbound that is fine, but they were off-airway. The wreckage was found 20nm north of the airport putting them several miles north of ZEDAG. If they were heading to FIXUV, then wanting to hold at ZEDAG you are absolutely correct they should have been issued a new clearance. We still have some missing pieces of the puzzle. They could have been told to hold as published which would make this entire thread change. We can already agree there is some blame to the crew, the question now is how much. Where were they coming from? Which IAF were they going to? Either way we can agree that going to ZEDAG from ANY direction at the altitude clearance they were given is grossly incorrect and proved to be deadly. An altitude clearance to the clearance limit should never conflict with terrain.

There is only one IAF, ZEDAG.

 

[vintage cessna]

Coming from King Salmon he would almost certainly enter the south TAA sector, which would require the HILPT; i.e. 5400 to ZEDAG then 4300 until ZEDAG inound.

For someone arriving in the north (NoPT TAA) it's 6300 until 4 miles from ZEDAG, then 4300 until crossing ZEDAG NoPT.

Or, assuming the MIA is 4,000 in the vicinity of ZEDAG and lower to the east, ATC could clear an aircraft direct to ZEDAG at not less than 4,300. If the intercept angle is 90 degrees or less then the pilot could go straight-in crossing ZEDAG at not less than 4300. If the intercept angle is greater than 90 degrees then the HILPT would be required before going inbound to the FAF.

Or, coming from King Salmon the pilot may have filed V506 Rages, anticipating the GPS 19 approach. ATC does not have to adhere to the TAA altitudes but rather the controllers charted minimum altitudes when issuing the altitude to maintain until established on the approach. I don't believe the controller picked AOA 2000 out of thin air or made that flagrant of a mistake.

 

[Inverted]

You've lost me. The prelim states the pilot was given direct to the IAF, which is ZEDAG, FIXUV is the FAF. I can't agree that direct ZEDAG and executing a straight in approach from any direction AOA 2000 would be unsafe.

Flying the pattern depicted on the chart at 2000 would definitely be dangerous .

Oops sorry. I was looking at the picture of the plate on my iPad and it looked like it could maybe be an IAF as well. Well The FAA seems to agree that you need to be at 4300 right? A clearance of at or above means that it is safe to go down to 2,000. It doesn't mean fly the route as published. I don't know how you cant agree that 2,000 is an unacceptable altitude to start that approach at but hey, I am just a dumb pilot.

 

[aterpster]

Sorry, I can't make that assumption. "At or above 2,000" implies the aircraft was at some higher altitude, else the instruction "maintain 2,000 until" would likely be used.

But, what I gave you is a hypothetical. The hypothetical is what it is. Are you perhaps dodging the question?

 

[mcheathe]

We are all speculating as to the true facts that led to this crash. We do NOT have many facts to support our theories.

Flightaware’s tracking data

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/AER51/history/20130308/1615Z/PAKN/PADL

of the flight indicates that the flight requested 6000 for altitude and tracking data shows that flight was conducted at or above that altitude. The requested routing was V453 and tracking data indicates that the flight was aligned with V453 from departure from PAKN until about 30 NM ESE of PADL. At that point the track took a turn of about 30 degrees to the right and indications are that it was proceeding to the IAF ZEDAG, still at 6000.

We do not factually know where the flight was when the approach clearance was issued, but the assumption is that the clearance for approach was issued at about the same time as the track data indicates the flight turned towards ZEDAG.

Based upon the tracking data we can make the following assumptions:

• Flight was outside the TAA (more than 30 miles from ZEDAG) at the time approach clearance was issued
• Flight was at assigned altitude of 6000 when it received approach clearance
• Upon proceeding direct to ZEDAG, flight was on a random track, not established on a defined segment of the IAP
• Upon entry into the South Sector of the TAA, minimum Sector altitude is 5400
• Unpublished to the public IFR altitude charts in use by ARTCC may have provided lower altitude restriction than depicted on IAP chart. (Just a guess, but I’ll bet a $1.00 that the Minimum Vectoring Altitude chart for the flights location at time of issuance of approach clearance is 2000.)
• Flight was not being vectored to ZEDAG
• Track of flights angle of arrival at ZEDAG required flight to make at least entry into holding pattern (procedure turn not authorized)
• Minimum depicted altitude for flight in the holding pattern is 4300
• Approach clearance altitude restriction of “Maintain 2000 or above” did not provide for required obstruction clearance.

The Flightaware tracking data opens some more questions. How factual is the data portrayed? There are timing issues between their clock times and as times reported by NTSB. It also indicates that the flight was still at 6000 at the time the trace ceased.

 

[aterpster]

Or, coming from King Salmon the pilot may have filed V506 Rages, anticipating the GPS 19 approach. ATC does not have to adhere to the TAA altitudes but rather the controllers charted minimum altitudes when issuing the altitude to maintain until established on the approach. I don't believe the controller picked AOA 2000 out of thin air or made that flagrant of a mistake.

If not a flagrant mistake why is there a smoking hole?