Auburn Nebraska Crash?

Briar Rabbit

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A 41 year old student and his 21 year old instructor crashed in a single engine Cessna near Auburn Nebraska. The two departed from the Lincoln airport. The airplane had significant damage and both were fatalities yesterday. Any details on the crash?
 
Might get more response in the Aviation Mishaps section
 
A 41 year old student and his 21 year old instructor crashed in a single engine Cessna near Auburn Nebraska. The two departed from the Lincoln airport. The airplane had significant damage and both were fatalities yesterday. Any details on the crash?
https://www.ketv.com/article/nebraska-t ... y/42473893

Someone on Beechtalk had this to say about it.

Doesn't look like an upright impact to me. Looks more like a nose down hard impact. From news rpts, sounded like it wasn't reported missing until about 11pm local. If they left early enough in the evening and if my google-fu is working, weather was clear, then scattered, then overcast. Don't know if the aircraft (whose tail # I can't find from reports) was equipped for IFR.

Nearby METARS (AFK 13NM NNE of K01) from around the time:

KAFK 120155Z AUTO 02009G14KT 10SM CLR 00/M02 A2992 RMK AO2 T00001021
KAFK 120215Z AUTO 02015G18KT 10SM SCT120 00/M02 A2993 RMK AO2 T00001023
KAFK 120235Z AUTO 01015KT 10SM CLR 00/M02 A2993 RMK AO2 T00001025
KAFK 120255Z AUTO 01019G22KT 10SM SCT011 SCT120 00/M03 A2994 RMK AO2 T10051027
KAFK 120315Z AUTO 01017G22KT 10SM OVC011 M01/M03 A2994 RMK AO2 T10071030
KAFK 120335Z AUTO 01018G22KT 10SM OVC011 M01/M03 A2996 RMK AO2 T10131035
KAFK 120355Z AUTO 01016G23KT 10SM OVC011 M02/M04 A2998 RMK AO2 T10171040
KAFK 120415Z AUTO 01015G19KT 10SM OVC011 M02/M05 A2999 RMK AO2 T10251049
 
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https://www.ketv.com/article/nebraska-t ... y/42473893

Someone on Beechtalk had this to say about it.

Doesn't look like an upright impact to me. Looks more like a nose down hard impact. From news rpts, sounded like it wasn't reported missing until about 11pm local. If they left early enough in the evening and if my google-fu is working, weather was clear, then scattered, then overcast. Don't know if the aircraft (whose tail # I can't find from reports) was equipped for IFR.

Nearby METARS (AFK 13NM NNE of K01) from around the time:

KAFK 120155Z AUTO 02009G14KT 10SM CLR 00/M02 A2992 RMK AO2 T00001021
KAFK 120215Z AUTO 02015G18KT 10SM SCT120 00/M02 A2993 RMK AO2 T00001023
KAFK 120235Z AUTO 01015KT 10SM CLR 00/M02 A2993 RMK AO2 T00001025
KAFK 120255Z AUTO 01019G22KT 10SM SCT011 SCT120 00/M03 A2994 RMK AO2 T10051027
KAFK 120315Z AUTO 01017G22KT 10SM OVC011 M01/M03 A2994 RMK AO2 T10071030
KAFK 120335Z AUTO 01018G22KT 10SM OVC011 M01/M03 A2996 RMK AO2 T10131035
KAFK 120355Z AUTO 01016G23KT 10SM OVC011 M02/M04 A2998 RMK AO2 T10171040
KAFK 120415Z AUTO 01015G19KT 10SM OVC011 M02/M05 A2999 RMK AO2 T10251049

Made an account to post here. I was a student of the instructor in the accident. The plane was an old Cessna 150 with no new avionics, only VOR for navigation and afaik no ADS-B in. From talking with other folks familiar with the area, we were having a wind storm in Lincoln the night of. Is there a better story we can paint here of the weather in the area?
 
Made an account to post here. I was a student of the instructor in the accident. The plane was an old Cessna 150 with no new avionics, only VOR for navigation and afaik no ADS-B in. From talking with other folks familiar with the area, we were having a wind storm in Lincoln the night of. Is there a better story we can paint here of the weather in the area?
Sorry to hear that, it's sad what happened.

@luvflyin posted the historical METARs for the area above, and those readings don't seem to suggest a windstorm (gusting 20-25kts). Was there other historical data you were thinking could paint a better picture?
 
Sorry to hear that, it's sad what happened.

@luvflyin posted the historical METARs for the area above, and those readings don't seem to suggest a windstorm (gusting 20-25kts). Was there other historical data you were thinking could paint a better picture?

Thanks, Tom. It's definitely sad what happened. According to another one of his students and looking at historical metar at KLNK it was definitely a bit windy, though it might not be a windstorm by definition:
> KLNK 120654Z 36017G29KT 7SM OVC009 M02/M05 A3010 RMK AO2 PK WND 35030/0632 SLP205 T10221050

I flew in N22859 twice the weekend before and noticed issues with the cabin lighting (or lack thereof). Not sure how much I should say since NTSB is still investigating on things. They were doing a student cross country night flight and must have flown into freezing clouds, which makes me think possible icing too.
 
An experienced instructor ought to be able to deal with 25kt winds, but icing... yeah, that would be bad.
 
I'm very sorry that your instructor died in a plane crash. I've had that experience, too.

It sure looks like a combination of dark-night flying combined with VFR into IMC. Here's why:

The flightaware link posted above shows that the plane was flying at a steady altitude of 3700 feet at the last recording, Wed 08:16:28 PM EST on Jan 11, which is Thur Jan 12 01:16:28 Z That's about 90 minutes after sunset, and the moon hadn't yet risen, so it was surely very dark out there among the farms.

A nearby airport was Nebraska City KAFK, based on coordinates in the flightaware log. Historical METARs can be found at ogimet.com, with dates DD/MM/YYYY. Link. Below, I bolded three METAR. It went from clear to 1100' overcast quickly between 02:35 and 02:55 Z at KAFK, and winds picked up then, too. Maybe a different timing at the location where they crashed.

The main point is that it looks like low ceiling clouds moved in, so that they could have suddenly lost sight of the ground, and it was dark. So sudden IMC and darkness, which is a really bad combination for a VFR flight. On top of that, there might have been icing as well, since the temp on the ground was at the freezing point.

SA 12/01/2023 03:55->
METAR KAFK 120355Z AUTO 01016G23KT 10SM OVC011 M02/M04 A2998 RMK AO2 T10171040=

SA 12/01/2023 03:35->
METAR KAFK 120335Z AUTO 01018G22KT 10SM OVC011 M01/M03 A2996 RMK AO2 T10131035=

SA 12/01/2023 03:15->
METAR KAFK 120315Z AUTO 01017G22KT 10SM OVC011 M01/M03 A2994 RMK AO2 T10071030=

SA 12/01/2023 02:55->
METAR KAFK 120255Z AUTO 01019G22KT 10SM SCT011 SCT120 00/M03 A2994 RMK AO2 T10051027=

SA 12/01/2023 02:35->
METAR KAFK 120235Z AUTO 01015KT 10SM CLR 00/M02 A2993 RMK AO2 T00001025=

SA 12/01/2023 02:15->
METAR KAFK 120215Z AUTO 02015G18KT 10SM SCT120 00/M02 A2993 RMK AO2 T00001023=


SA 12/01/2023 01:55->
METAR KAFK 120155Z AUTO 02009G14KT 10SM CLR 00/M02 A2992 RMK AO2 T00001021=

SA 12/01/2023 01:35->
METAR KAFK 120135Z AUTO 02011KT 10SM SCT120 00/M02 A2991 RMK AO2 T00001020=

SA 12/01/2023 01:15->
METAR KAFK 120115Z AUTO 01012KT 10SM SCT120 00/M02 A2990 RMK AO2 T00001020=
 
@NoHeat Assuming they did VFR into IMC, and possibly ran into icing conditions, what could have happened to lead to loss of control? Colton had his CFII rating and should have been up to date with instrument flying, though we typically flew out of a different plane (a 172 with garmin avionics) which was in for repair, the 150 was just on loan for two weeks during that time.

The ADS-B also doesn't paint a very clear picture and stops reporting at 3700". K01 is 900" field elevation. There clearly is some data missing, and I assume we will have to wait for KOMA or KLNK to provide radar history to NTSB.
 

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@just_a_studentpilot, thanks for the panel photo. It looks like just enough instruments for legal IFR flight.

VFR into IMC is a big killer. One recommended recovery is to engage the autopilot immediately and command a 180 degree standard-rate turn. With a good autopilot setup, and regular practice in a particular plane, that probably gives you a good chance of survival, especially in daytime without icing.

But this situation must have been a lot more difficult.

Nighttime plus IMC is a huge combination by itself, even if you plan on it. (Like many IFR pilots, I never plan a flight where both are expected. The motto is "clouds, night, mountains, choose one".) The suddenness of unexpected IMC makes the challenge a lot worse. If the plane had no autopilot, that made sudden IMC harder, less survivable. Then there's possible icing, which can be a brutal killer if it happens, but even if icing didn't happen everything else may have been one big difficulty on top of another big difficulty, combining suddenly.
 
@just_a_studentpilot, thanks for the panel photo. It looks like just enough instruments for legal IFR flight.

VFR into IMC is a big killer. One recommended recovery is to engage the autopilot immediately and command a 180 degree standard-rate turn. With a good autopilot setup, and regular practice in a particular plane, that probably gives you a good chance of survival, especially in daytime without icing.

But this situation must have been a lot more difficult.

Nighttime plus IMC is a huge combination by itself, even if you plan on it. (Like many IFR pilots, I never plan a flight where both are expected. The motto is "clouds, night, mountains, choose one".) The suddenness of unexpected IMC makes the challenge a lot worse. If the plane had no autopilot, that made sudden IMC harder, less survivable. Then there's possible icing, which can be a brutal killer if it happens, but even if icing didn't happen everything else may have been one big difficulty on top of another big difficulty, combining suddenly.

Maybe I'm naive in questioning this (no instrument rating yet) but wouldn't a current CFII be amongst the most qualified people to deal with such a scenario, even hand flown? (assuming icing wasn't the cause)
 
Maybe I'm naive in questioning this (no instrument rating yet) but wouldn't a current CFII be amongst the most qualified people to deal with such a scenario, even hand flown? (assuming icing wasn't the cause)

I would expect the same thing. I'm also not completely sure what the instrument or cockpit lighting was like. N22859 had an aftermarket LED strip installed and plugged into a cigarette lighter port facing down on the avionics. Maybe something could have happened in flight, they lost lighting.

Also Colton was 24, not 21 as stated by @Briar Rabbit.
 
I would expect the same thing. I'm also not completely sure what the instrument or cockpit lighting was like. N22859 had an aftermarket LED strip installed and plugged into a cigarette lighter port facing down on the avionics. Maybe something could have happened in flight, they lost lighting.

Also Colton was 24, not 21 as stated by @Briar Rabbit.
Just an opinion, but I think there is precisely zero chance a panel lighting issue is going to cause any decent instructor to crash. Lights never work right in flight instruction aircraft. There is also zero chance that 29 knot winds were a concern. Those details are just another day at the office for an active Nebraska instructor. Both of those people would have had cell phones with flashlights, among other ways.

I certainly did my fair share of instructing out of LNK at about the same age he was. Inadvertent entry into IMC is very easy to do at night this time of year.

Did the instructor normally fly fuel injected airplanes? The ONLY times I ever experienced carb ice were in conditions just like this at night as an instructor in Nebraska. You get so damn focused on managing the VFR into IMC potential that you don’t notice the RPM dropping (ever so slowly).

I could easily see a VFR into IMC as the beginning of this, followed by some carb ice, airframe ice, and general difficulty of trying to fly in IMC with an airplane that is very poorly equipped for it. Suddenly you can’t find the airport, you can’t see ****, you can’t make horsepower, and you are draggier than normal. Gets pretty hard to put it down in a field in a manner that you can walk away from.

I’ve also seen really confusing things happen on instruments when water unexpectedly freezes in the static system.

Could also be fuel, medical, judgement, mechanical, etc. There are a lot of ways to die in an airplane. So please, nobody latch onto the above, as I have no evidence of any of this. Wait for the NTSB. I just know what surprised me more than once in those conditions.
 
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Jesse, there are a lot of factors to consider leading up to the accident and I think that your post does a good job at conveying that. Seems like we will have to wait for final reports to come out and can only speculate on what actually happened.

Reading up on what can happen to avionics if the static air system freezes, seems like an aircraft in that situation would unfortunately be in a lot of trouble, and combined with possible carb ice and everything else already stated could be too much for a current CFII to navigate.

I hope that the NTSB report will shed some light on what happened. The not knowing is always difficult.
 
but wouldn't a current CFII be amongst the most qualified people to deal with such a scenario, even hand flown? (assuming icing wasn't the cause)

I do not know about this particular instructor, but a lot of (not all) instructors are low time with very little real life flight experience. Personally, I had less than 1.5 hours of actual IMC after I took my CFII check ride.
 
For anyone still interested, the METAR provided in this thread was an incorrect assumption on the current weather at Auburn. Weather data suggests high ceilings and clear visibility but high probability of icing conditions. Crash data suggests 20° nose down attitude, and heading consistent with left downwind for runway 16. ADS-B report shows that they were at 1900' MSL which is pattern altitude for the airport. NTSB investigation of the cockpit shows that throttle, mixture, cabin heat were all set for cruise/descent configuration, but the carb heat was in the OFF position.
 

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For anyone still interested, the METAR provided in this thread was an incorrect assumption on the current weather at Auburn. Weather data suggests high ceilings and clear visibility but high probability of icing conditions. Crash data suggests 20° nose down attitude, and heading consistent with left downwind for runway 16. ADS-B report shows that they were at 1900' MSL which is pattern altitude for the airport. NTSB investigation of the cockpit shows that throttle, mixture, cabin heat were all set for cruise/descent configuration, but the carb heat was in the OFF position.
If there was clear weather, I question the high probability of icing conditions.
 
For anyone still interested, the METAR provided in this thread was an incorrect assumption on the current weather at Auburn. Weather data suggests high ceilings and clear visibility but high probability of icing conditions. Crash data suggests 20° nose down attitude, and heading consistent with left downwind for runway 16. ADS-B report shows that they were at 1900' MSL which is pattern altitude for the airport. NTSB investigation of the cockpit shows that throttle, mixture, cabin heat were all set for cruise/descent configuration, but the carb heat was in the OFF position.
What makes you think they were on a left downwind for 16? The report you attached says the wind was 010 at 12 knots. Given the choice between runway 16 and 34 - most folks would choose 34. The crash location described in the report was "1.2 miles south of the runway 34 threshold". This would suggest to me that they were trying to land on runway 34 and smacked the ground somewhere on final or base to final.

The report suggests all was well prior to them descending below pattern altitude (no emergency communications seemed to be have heard by anyone). If they would have had an emergency approaching the airport, I think they would have just landed on 16. Given that they chose 34, I think there was no emergency prior to them beginning maneuvering for the runway.

Who knows what their power setting truly was, crashes can do stuff to levers, but lets assume its where the levers were after the crash (the most likely). In that case, that is a power setting that would be about right for a descent to land in a 150.

Given the details of the report - I think they lost the situational awareness of what their actual AGL altitude was while maneuvering to land. It can be VERY dark in Nebraska at these rural airports at night, so dark that it is essentially IMC. It's all a big dark hole. You won't see the ground until you hit it.

That said, I would bet 0 money on my analysis, given its based entirely on a report with very limited data.
If there was clear weather, I question the high probability of icing conditions.
Agree - if icing were a problem they would have landed straight in/base on 16 and would have never been south of the airport. They'd also have likely communicated their situation.
 
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