Airline pilots relying too much on automation?

I want the FAA to require that the Airlines have to maintain a fleet of Extra 300s for us to maintain our stick and rudder skills in !
 
I'm outrageously unqualified to comment on this, but this is PoA, so maybe that makes me the most qualified of all?

It did surprise me reading about the Air France and SFO crashes the allusions to so many different "fallback" and failure modes of the automated systems. Whether it was autopilot turning off but still limited to a safe attitude envelope, or even that off, or autopilot on but autothrottle off, etc. And at least from my completely unfamiliar reading of reports, it seemed like in a few cases people got in trouble because they thought a safety feature was on when it had become disengaged.

Wouldn't it be simpler to have all of the bells and whistles, but with the single fallback mode of "this is entirely a hand-flown airplane now," allowing pilots to turn back on and evaluate whatever automated systems are still working?

I don't envy the pilot who has to learn which systems disengage at which time on which plane. Why not "if you hear this tone / feel the stick-shaker / whatever, it's all you. Turn automated systems back on as you'd like"?
 
Most airlines pilots that I've flown with do seem to rely on automation a lot and their stick and rudder skills doesn't seem to be as good. These guys flying an airliner are operating a computer and whoever is the best "computer geek" is the best pilot. Sure not all airline crashes happen because the pilot was expecting the computer to do his job, but a lot do.

This is also one of the reasons why I really try to avoid flying on airliners. Sitting in the back knowing if that computer fails I'm screwed.

Completely agreed with Art's comment regarding the Extra.
 
I want the FAA to require that the Airlines have to maintain a fleet of Extra 300s for us to maintain our stick and rudder skills in !

That would create a pilot and extra 300 shortage.:rofl:
 
Yeah, sometimes we do. That said, statistics are quite clear over the last decade that the (domestic) airlines are the safest transportation system the world has ever known. 25,000 flights daily and, save the odd Buffalo Dash 8, there hasn't been a fatality in what...10 years? By comparison, light airplanes are a lot more like motorcycles -- not that there's anything wrong with that.
 
Not to put too fine a point on it, but aerobatic airplane fatality stats are probably more like motorcycles...ridden from bar to bar.
 
Yeah, sometimes we do. That said, statistics are quite clear over the last decade that the (domestic) airlines are the safest transportation system the world has ever known. 25,000 flights daily and, save the odd Buffalo Dash 8, there hasn't been a fatality in what...10 years? By comparison, light airplanes are a lot more like motorcycles -- not that there's anything wrong with that.

I'm not trying to offend you or any airline pilot by saying this, so please do not take this the wrong way.
Airlines do indeed prove to be one of the safest ways of transportation. In my opinion the main reasons for it are; the jet engine itself is a lot more reliable than a piston engine, the computers on the actual airliners don't really fail that often, and if something does fail usually there is a redundant system on board for the failure to be insignificant.
 
Sure not all airline crashes happen because the pilot was expecting the computer to do his job, but a lot do.

This is also one of the reasons why I really try to avoid flying on airliners. Sitting in the back knowing if that computer fails I'm screwed.

"A lot" means what? 50%? 70%? It seems almost all of the recent airline accidents I am familiar with excepting AF 447 and Asiana 214 were caused by failed approaches in inclement conditions.
 
All the airline pilots I know also actively got GA, how common are those guys?
 
I think a lot of it depends on the culture of the airline, and of course the equipment and personalities involved.

At my first 121 job hauling passengers we had no autopilot. You better believe everybody there was a great stick. No issue hand flying an approach to minimums; that was normal every-day stuff.

I commuted (jumpseated) to that job and got to see a variety of cultures regarding autopilot use. There were certainly those who would turn it on climbing through 400' (or whatever the minimum engagement altitude was), and then back off at minimum disengage altitude, maybe 200', on a clear and a million day. Not good. There were others where I could tell over time that hand flying was encouraged - and you all might be surprised by this - the guys at United I had the pleasure of riding the jumpseat on tended to use the automation less -- when appropriate -- to keep the hand flying skills sharp.

Now on to my second job and the airplane has a rudimentary FMS and an 'OK' autopilot. It is used more than I could care for personally, but still on my last trip the captain hand flew an ILS to "approach lights, continue", and to runway in sight at about 150' AGL... hand-flown because the glideslope on that particular one is known to hunt around and the autopilot will just chase along after it like a fool.

My style with the new plane, in good weather (most weather is VMC) is to hand-fly up to at least 10,000 if not to the flight levels. I kick it off the moment cleared for a visual. I'm still new where I work so aside from training haven't done a whole lot of approaches.. that will change as the weather is changing and I'll be off "high mins" soon. But with that said my style is to not be overly dependent and to mix up hand-flown approaches with good judgement in use of George when it makes sense to do so. During longer stretches of good weather I'll stay inside on some approaches and fly ILSs down to minimums by hand to stay sharp. The skill is quite perishable unless practiced. And there's no way I'm using the damned thing on a visual approach. I can do better and in the terminal environment its often safer (wake turbulence avoidance down the glide path, for example).

..and as far as failures go: Stuff breaks. All the time! Most of the time equipment can be deferred (MEL'd) and the flight goes with little to no delay. A lot of equipment, automation included, can and is deferred. Some isn't deferrable, but still breaks. I've seen a couple cases of primary flight instruments (both mechanical and flat-screens) go out to lunch in flight.
 
Last edited:
It's a long and ongoing debate. This clip from 1997 illustrates that fact. Automation dependency is and has been a significant contributor to accidents. Perhaps more so than any other factor. I haven't heard much being done to mitigate it yet, but at least the awareness is picking up.

https://vimeo.com/64502012
 
You don't have much faith in your fellow pilots, do you?

I know one F-18 pilots who once said "everyone is out there to kill you." Sure their intent might be good (ATC, other pilots, ect...), but at the end of the day the more people you trust the higher the possibility of one of them making a mistake that will hurt you.
 
I'm no airline pilot and I'm in no position to judge them either. However, it does seem that major US carriers have an amazing safety record flying everyday of the year in all kinds of weather. Approaching perfection and yet still criticized.:dunno:
 
Ever see a car pull out in front of an airplane in flight? :no:

There's a video on youtube. Soccer-mom pulled her SUV out in-front of a 172. Despite STOP painted on the road. You can't fix stupid, I guess.

:goofy:
 
"A lot" means what? 50%? 70%? It seems almost all of the recent airline accidents I am familiar with excepting AF 447 and Asiana 214 were caused by failed approaches in inclement conditions.

I don't keep track.
Since you already mentioned those two, don't you think those two alone might be enough? Especially AF 447.
 
I know one F-18 pilots who once said "everyone is out there to kill you." Sure their intent might be good (ATC, other pilots, ect...), but at the end of the day the more people you trust the higher the possibility of one of them making a mistake that will hurt you.
But you can make a mistake just as easily. You are "other people" to other people.
 
But you can make a mistake just as easily. You are "other people" to other people.

Sure I can. I can also train enough to minimize the possibility of making that mistake and I know whether or not I am proficient enough to make a specific flight. I can't say the same for anyone else.
 
In the case of the air France tragedy I read several articles that pointed to the pilot in command, which was as I remember, the right seat at that time, not realizing that they had stalled. He kept pulling back on the controls after it had stalled. Very similar to the accident near buffalo as far as pilots reacting exactly the wrong way. Is this correct regarding air France?
 
Sure I can. I can also train enough to minimize the possibility of making that mistake and I know whether or not I am proficient enough to make a specific flight. I can't say the same for anyone else.
Not saying this about you in particular but self-evaluation is sometimes not the greatest. I'll bet a majority of pilots would put themselves over on the right half of the bell curve but there is a left half too.
 
Not saying this about you in particular but self-evaluation is sometimes not the greatest. I'll bet a majority of pilots would put themselves over on the right half of the bell curve but there is a left half too.

Agreed. I have that problem sometimes and I try to correct it.
A while back I made myself a risk assessment sheet. Before each flight I stop for a few minutes and fill it out step by step, then I look it over and make my decision.
Once I even cancelled (postponed actually) a 1500nm flight to my vocation because I didn't have enough rest and wasn't too familiar with the destination. I only realized that after filling out the risk assessment sheet. Now that was a personal flight that I can cancel and screw it. What about flights where you work? I fly private charter and I can't always do that for every flight. And I bet you those airline pilots got the same problem.
 
Last edited:
Agreed. I have that problem sometimes and I try to correct it.
A while back I made myself a risk assessment sheet. Before each flight I stop for a few minutes and fill it out step by step, then I look it over and make my decision.
One I even cancelled (postponed actually) a 1500nm flight to my vocation because I didn't have enough rest and wasn't too familiar with the destination. I only realized that after filling out the risk assessment sheet. Now that was a personal flight that I can cancel and screw it. What about flights where you work? I fly private charter and I can't always do that for every flight. And I bet you those airline pilots got the same problem.
I work as a pilot. Today the office called me and asked what I thought about going to Dallas since they had freezing rain last night. I got the weather which didn't seem too bad this afternoon. But I called a couple FBOs who said their ramps were like sheets of ice so I called the office back and told them it was not a good idea.
 
I work as a pilot. Today the office called me and asked what I thought about going to Dallas since they had freezing rain last night. I got the weather which didn't seem too bad this afternoon. But I called a couple FBOs who said their ramps were like sheets of ice so I called the office back and told them it was not a good idea.

Yeah but do all pilots think that way?
I'm sure you know that there are those pilots who will be tempted to fly anyways because they want to get paid. And I'm sure you know that there are companies who will want their pilots to fly even when the pilot says it's not a good idea.
The point is when you are sitting in the back of that airliner you have no idea what the situation is, you can only hope that the pilot made the right call.
 
Yeah but do all pilots think that way?
I'm sure you know that there are those pilots who will be tempted to fly anyways because they want to get paid. And I'm sure you know that there are companies who will want their pilots to fly even when the pilot says it's not a good idea.
The point is when you are sitting in the back of that airliner you have no idea what the situation is, you can only hope that the pilot made the right call.

NO passenger hauling airline is EVER going to force a pilot to fly if the PIC deems it to be unsafe. For the simple reason that it puts ALL of the liability on them. You seem to have a pretty simplistic view of things - just compare the Part 91 safety record to that of the Part 121. You may continue to choose to be fearful of airline travel if you like but the numbers and simple LOGIC do not support your fears.
 
NO passenger hauling airline is EVER going to force a pilot to fly if the PIC deems it to be unsafe. For the simple reason that it puts ALL of the liability on them. You seem to have a pretty simplistic view of things - just compare the Part 91 safety record to that of the Part 121. You may continue to choose to be fearful of airline travel if you like but the numbers and simple LOGIC do not support your fears.

I am not going to trust a pilot who I never met and that's the end of it, I don't care how safe his aircraft is. You can agree with me or you can't, your life, your decisions.

The thread is about pilots depending on automation, lets stick to that.
 
I am not going to trust a pilot who I never met and that's the end of it, I don't care how safe his aircraft is. You can agree with me or you can't, your life, your decisions.

The thread is about pilots depending on automation, lets stick to that.

Well that's easily remedied - as you board the airliner just introduce yourself to the cockpit crew. There, now you have just spent more face time then you get with most physicians that are about to do surgery on you !
 
Well that's easily remedied - as you board the airliner just introduce yourself to the cockpit crew. There, now you have just spent more face time then you get with most physicians that are about to do surgery on you !

lol
..
 
I am not going to trust a pilot who I never met and that's the end of it, I don't care how safe his aircraft is. You can agree with me or you can't, your life, your decisions.

The thread is about pilots depending on automation, lets stick to that.

OK, lets do stick to that. Please tell me how many 121 training events you have personally attended (Initial, upgrade, recurrent) and for which airline?
 
Yeah but do all pilots think that way?
I'm sure you know that there are those pilots who will be tempted to fly anyways because they want to get paid. And I'm sure you know that there are companies who will want their pilots to fly even when the pilot says it's not a good idea.
The point is when you are sitting in the back of that airliner you have no idea what the situation is, you can only hope that the pilot made the right call.

With this post you have clearly demonstrated you have zero concept or knowledge of a 121 operation.

Not surprising. :nonod:
 
Here is the question, are we seeing such a high proportion of accidents due to over reliance on automation because automation is bad or because it has eliminated or reduced the other causes so much?
 
I'm outrageously unqualified to comment on this, but this is PoA, so maybe that makes me the most qualified of all?

It did surprise me reading about the Air France and SFO crashes the allusions to so many different "fallback" and failure modes of the automated systems. Whether it was autopilot turning off but still limited to a safe attitude envelope, or even that off, or autopilot on but autothrottle off, etc. And at least from my completely unfamiliar reading of reports, it seemed like in a few cases people got in trouble because they thought a safety feature was on when it had become disengaged.

Wouldn't it be simpler to have all of the bells and whistles, but with the single fallback mode of "this is entirely a hand-flown airplane now," allowing pilots to turn back on and evaluate whatever automated systems are still working?

I don't envy the pilot who has to learn which systems disengage at which time on which plane. Why not "if you hear this tone / feel the stick-shaker / whatever, it's all you. Turn automated systems back on as you'd like"?

Who says it doesn't happen?

Every recurrent (I go twice a year) we simulate complete failures which drives the pilot into a hand flown no automation approaches (raw data).

My last recurrent covered wet runway with a 25 knot direct cross wind, a wet runway with a 20 knot crosswind single engine with a go around at 20 feet (balked landing), several ECAM events, V1 cuts, windshear on takeoff, TCAS and RA, emergency descent, emergency evacuation and a dual FMGS failure resulting in a raw data hand flown ILS to minimums, plus several non precision approaches (OEI and two engine). Also had to practice and demonstrate a rejected takeoff on a 25 knot crosswind wet runway with the engine failure below 60 knots, which if done incorrectly will leave you in the grass on the side of the runway.
 
Most airlines pilots that I've flown with do seem to rely on automation a lot and their stick and rudder skills doesn't seem to be as good. These guys flying an airliner are operating a computer and whoever is the best "computer geek" is the best pilot.

So if I put you in front of a 757, 767 or an A320 you would ace it first time out? I don't think so, you're talking a different skill set.

Sure not all airline crashes happen because the pilot was expecting the computer to do his job, but a lot do.

Define "a lot".

This is also one of the reasons why I really try to avoid flying on airliners. Sitting in the back knowing if that computer fails I'm screwed.

Same reason I wouldn't sit in the back of your 421 while you flew through an area of convective weather or tried to fly an approach to minimums. There is no structure or standards to your "training" or your recurrency. There is no one there to say "sorry, you don't meet minimum requirements" and you are now grounded until you do.

There is a huge difference between 121 training and part 91 training.
 
Here is the question, are we seeing such a high proportion of accidents due to over reliance on automation because automation is bad or because it has eliminated or reduced the other causes so much?

I'd say the last couple 121 accidents were an over reliance on automation. However, with only one 121 fatal accident in the U.S. in the last ten years, I don't see it being an epidemic. I'll take those stats any day of the week.
 
OK, lets do stick to that. Please tell me how many 121 training events you have personally attended (Initial, upgrade, recurrent) and for which airline?

With this post you have clearly demonstrated you have zero concept or knowledge of a 121 operation.

Not surprising. :nonod:

Since you seem to know everything why don't you tell us how often airline pilots work on their stick and rudder skills? And how well will they be able to fly their airplane without the computer doing their job?
You take a random airline pilot and tell him to fly from NY to LA without computers of any kind, will he be able to do it without spending the previous three weeks on preparation? Because when something fails in flight you ain't got time to study.
 
Back
Top