Air Asia Black Box info

...I get that the airbus is technologically advanced, and all that, but what kind of idiotic design allows the two pilots to do separate actions without proper feedback on what the other is doing???

You can do it in a Boeing too but of course you are going to feel the other guys inputs. There is no feedback through the Airbus controls but any conflict will trigger a "Dual Input" annunciation at which time either pilot can push the red button on his joystick and gain "Priority Left" or "Priority Right"
 
According to the report the pilots couldn't recognize the stall or recover from it because they were never trained for that.

They were merely trained on stall avoidance. The thinking was that it isn't necessary thanks to automation. I wonder if they will change that.
 
I guess all us pilots would consider avoiding Asian airlines at all costs....

But if business gives you no choice.....how far are your nuts up inside your body cavity and how much does your sphincter hurt when you get off the flight?

I'm sure it's not a pleasant experience.
 
I guess all us pilots would consider avoiding Asian airlines at all costs....



But if business gives you no choice.....how far are your nuts up inside your body cavity and how much does your sphincter hurt when you get off the flight?



I'm sure it's not a pleasant experience.


Asian crew don't have a monopoly on accidents like this. Air France 447 and Colgan Air 3407 pilots were not Asian.

Wonder if an AoA indicator would have helped these pilots in extremely stressful situations like these.


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Asian crew don't have a monopoly on accidents like this. Air France 447 and Colgan Air 3407 pilots were not Asian.

Wonder if an AoA indicator would have helped these pilots in extremely stressful situations like these.


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Geez....
Attitude indicator shows 6000fpm climb and pointed to the stars..

Airspeed bleeding off..

What part of push the nose over, level wings, accelerate... and fly away ..don't these idiots understand..:dunno:..

It is really hard to believe professional pilots can get that far in their career and not got out of a simple stall..:mad2::mad2::mad2:
 
That's what really gets me... they never needed to depart the envelope in this scenario. When they pulled the CB there was no one home (meaning actively scanning with hand near the sidestick) at all for 9 seconds as the airplane entered that 54 deg bank unusual attitude.

If someone's eye had been on the PFD and their hand on the sidestick it never would have gotten 'unusual' and they wouldn't have been faced with that most death-defying of aerobatic maneuvers... the stall recovery! :D

9 seconds! One Mississippi... two Mississippi...

I know I'm repeating myself now but it's just that incredible to me. :mad2:

It's amazing, it really is.
 
Asian crew don't have a monopoly on accidents like this. Air France 447 and Colgan Air 3407 pilots were not Asian.

Wonder if an AoA indicator would have helped these pilots in extremely stressful situations like these.


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Considering the artificial horizon would have been indicating exactly the same thing, I seriously doubt it. This is a situation of people freaking out. We don't test for this.
 
Wonder if an AoA indicator would have helped these pilots in extremely stressful situations like these.
I don't think so. If they weren't paying attention to other things, they would't pay attention to an AOA indicator.
 
The problem is the way we train...if someone in the jumpseat had said, "OK...time to do air work. Well start with unusual attitudes and an enroute configuration stall," I bet the outcome would have been different.
 
Asian crew don't have a monopoly on accidents like this. Air France 447 and Colgan Air 3407 pilots were not Asian.

Wonder if an AoA indicator would have helped these pilots in extremely stressful situations like these.


I was about to say...

I don't think so. If they weren't paying attention to other things, they would't pay attention to an AOA indicator.


This.

I think someone should add a whole lot more hand flying to the sim rides and a whole lot more scenarios where the aircraft ends up in or is just in, alternate law.

Seems like the combination of poorly trained pilots plus the words "alternate law" go hand in hand these days.

The problem with the Airbus mentality behind "laws" is that the assumption is there that the pilot understands what that means and how the airplane flies, and chooses to fly itself.

Something big is being missed in the learning building blocks in these folk's heads. Then slap the airplane's own "laws" on top of a missing foundation and it just goes all to hell real quick.

Certainly at their level it isn't that they can't hand fly the plane. It's something more subtle. Like a trust of the systems instead of a light mistrust and expectation of automation failure, and a need to "DIY".

Dunno but the pattern of something wrong in the thought process and addition of "alternate law" has led to a couple of flights just completely coming off of the rails.

Not that disconnected auto-throttles were any better outcome in the Boeing thing...

Maybe the video game thing is right. Maybe they just think they'll respawn and get to try it again. Works in the sim...
 
That's what really gets me... they never needed to depart the envelope in this scenario. When they pulled the CB there was no one home (meaning actively scanning with hand near the sidestick) at all for 9 seconds as the airplane entered that 54 deg bank unusual attitude.

If someone's eye had been on the PFD and their hand on the sidestick it never would have gotten 'unusual' and they wouldn't have been faced with that most death-defying of aerobatic maneuvers... the stall recovery! :D

9 seconds! One Mississippi... two Mississippi...

I know I'm repeating myself now but it's just that incredible to me. :mad2:

Multiple steps in the accident chain:

1) Eastern/Everglades L-1011 redux. The crew was engrossed in chasing a minor problem and nobody was flying the plane.

2) Air France redux: Once the airplane departed normal flight, nobody on the flight deck was capable or recognizing and/or correcting the problem.
 
I was about to say...




This.

I think someone should add a whole lot more hand flying to the sim rides and a whole lot more scenarios where the aircraft ends up in or is just in, alternate law.

Seems like the combination of poorly trained pilots plus the words "alternate law" go hand in hand these days.

The problem with the Airbus mentality behind "laws" is that the assumption is there that the pilot understands what that means and how the airplane flies, and chooses to fly itself.

Something big is being missed in the learning building blocks in these folk's heads. Then slap the airplane's own "laws" on top of a missing foundation and it just goes all to hell real quick.

Certainly at their level it isn't that they can't hand fly the plane. It's something more subtle. Like a trust of the systems instead of a light mistrust and expectation of automation failure, and a need to "DIY".

Dunno but the pattern of something wrong in the thought process and addition of "alternate law" has led to a couple of flights just completely coming off of the rails.

Not that disconnected auto-throttles were any better outcome in the Boeing thing...

Maybe the video game thing is right. Maybe they just think they'll respawn and get to try it again. Works in the sim...

Alternate law is my airplane's only law. :D

Hell even alternate law provides some envelope protection in terms of pitch, bank and roll limits. When I flew the A320 sim at United, the instructor disabled the whole FAC and I still couldn't do a commanded aileron roll. But apparently you can stall the **** out of it and then it will do whatever physics dictates. :D

These guys should fly normal airplanes once in a while. Maybe the grueling career path of US pilots busting their asses as CFIs flying spam cans has more merit than many (not least said CFIs) think! :D
 
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Multiple steps in the accident chain:

1) Eastern/Everglades L-1011 redux. The crew was engrossed in chasing a minor problem and nobody was flying the plane.

2) Air France redux: Once the airplane departed normal flight, nobody on the flight deck was capable or recognizing and/or correcting the problem.

Good analogy on the glades crash. I'd forgotten about that one.
 
Don't forget the UAL DC-8 in Portland in 1978, often cited as the incident that motivated development of CRM:

[...] when the landing gear was lowered, a loud thump was heard. That unusual sound was accompanied by abnormal vibration and yaw of the aircraft. The right main landing gear retract cylinder assembly had failed due to corrosion, and that allowed the right gear to free fall. Although it was down and locked, the rapid and abnormal free fall of the gear damaged a microswitch so severely that it failed to complete the circuit to the cockpit green light that tells the pilots that gear is down and locked. It was those unusual indicators (loud noise, vibration, yaw, and no green light) which led the captain to abort the landing, so that they would have time to diagnose the problem and prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. While the decision to abort the landing was prudent, the accident occurred because the flight crew became so absorbed with diagnosing the problem that they failed to monitor their fuel state and calculate a time when they needed to return to land or risk fuel exhaustion.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_173

United-173-e1404804178495_zpssauszgiz.jpg
 
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