747 approach incident

This is the incident that happened last year, right?

I remember thinking that I couldn't quite figure out what the big deal was....
 
I couldn't google up any details. Sounds like a database problem ie a rnav approach...but wouldn't they be doing an ILS in the bay fog?
 
If I understand correctly, Taylor was the CO-pilot and that the pilot told him to initiate a go around. Sounds like they did all the right things. Bad database, not the first for honeywell (or any manufacturer for that matter).
Taylor sounds like he's just setting up his retirement account.
Computers lie. Trust but verify. That's the lesson here. What happens when NDBs are gone, ILSs are a thing of the past, and all we have left is GPS?
 
If I understand correctly, Taylor was the CO-pilot and that the pilot told him to initiate a go around. Sounds like they did all the right things. Bad database, not the first for honeywell (or any manufacturer for that matter).
Taylor sounds like he's just setting up his retirement account.
Computers lie. Trust but verify. That's the lesson here. What happens when NDBs are gone, ILSs are a thing of the past, and all we have left is GPS?

Well, a good plan would be to use a robust and redundant RNAV system - say, eLoran.
 
So flying an approach to minimum at SFO and seeing water and not the runway environment the pilots goes missed.

On the second approach they detect a problem and divert.

That sounds like a normal procedure to me?

This event causes the FO to experience so much trauma he can no longer fly.

How did he pass his IFR checkride?
 
Was it an approach to mins, or was it a Cat III approach (e.g "0/0")? If it's the former, I'm with the "Seriously?" line of thinking. If it was the latter, well, that's a brown shorts incident.

Cheers,

-Andrew
 
Was it an approach to mins, or was it a Cat III approach (e.g "0/0")? If it's the former, I'm with the "Seriously?" line of thinking. If it was the latter, well, that's a brown shorts incident.

Cheers,

-Andrew

If it was RNAV it can't go to 0/0 right? Only ILS has Cat III, 0/0.
 
but wouldn't they be doing an ILS in the bay fog?



So flying an approach to minimum at SFO and seeing water and not the runway environment the pilots goes missed.

On the second approach they detect a problem and divert.

That sounds like a normal procedure to me?

This event causes the FO to experience so much trauma he can no longer fly.

How did he pass his IFR checkride?
You see water at SFO all the way until the runway. I am confused by some of the things in this report. Like talking about the localizer. If they were on a LOC or ILS approach who cares what the database says? If it was a db problem and they were on an RNAV approach why were they the only plane affected? Lastly about the FO, seems like a pretty minor thing to go all PSTD over.
 
You see water at SFO all the way until the runway. I am confused by some of the things in this report. Like talking about the localizer. If they were on a LOC or ILS approach who cares what the database says? If it was a db problem and they were on an RNAV approach why were they the only plane affected? Lastly about the FO, seems like a pretty minor thing to go all PSTD over.

I think the localizer was mentioned by the tower while the plane must have been shooting one of the RNAV's to 28R.

Seems to me if the first one was that bad you might try the ILS or LOC on the second attempt?
 
Well, a good plan would be to use a robust and redundant RNAV system - say, eLoran.

While I'm strongly in favor of eLoran, chances are that in the integrated systems of an airliner, the DB would be identical for both nav receivers so it wouldn't help much in this case.
 
I've discovered several DB error since flying; it's why we do cross checks. With the GPS WAAS that isn't always possible. Doing an ILS, I would think one would have the localizer tuned in and would confirm that. How would an incorrect DB affect that?

Best,

Dave
 
Here's what a friend sent on this incident. I know, just rumors but it gives insight.

Best,

Dave
=====================================================

Talked to a friend who flies for UAL.. According to him, here's what happened. Cleared for 28R ILS at SFO, punched 28R into the FMS. What happened was this: FMS tuned to the 28R LDA freq. Happened twice, then they diverted to OAK. Now no one knows/will admit to which approach and freq were actually displayed and whether the pilots verified this. However, this anomaly was reproduced on the 747 sim.

Didn't have much positive to say regarding the pilot and PTSD,
 
That actually makes some sense. However, part of the approach briefing is radios tuned and IDENTIFIED. IF this is what actually happened, then two, maybe four, someone's screwed up twice. Sounds like crew error as much as or more than data base error to me.
 
That actually makes some sense. However, part of the approach briefing is radios tuned and IDENTIFIED. IF this is what actually happened, then two, maybe four, someone's screwed up twice. Sounds like crew error as much as or more than data base error to me.
It seems a lot of people forget that "identify" step and just get used to things working. You get away with that until you don't...and by then it might be too late.
 
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