Jaybird180
Final Approach
Speculate please.
NTSB Identification: ERA11FA101A/B
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, December 31, 2010 in Weyers Cave, VA
Aircraft: CESSNA 172H, registration: N2876L
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER DEUTSCHLAND GMBH EC 135 P2, registration: N312PH
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
History Of Flight
On December 31, 2010, about 1426 eastern standard time, an Eurocopter EC-135-P2 helicopter, N312PH, operated by Petroleum Helicopters Incorporated as AirCare 5, and a Cessna 172H, N2876L, collided in midair approximately 1/2 mile northwest of the Shenandoah Valley Regional Airport (SHD), Weyers Cave, Virginia. The Cessna airplane departed controlled flight after the right wing separated and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces at ground contact. The helicopter sustained minor damage and landed safely at SHD. The certificated commercial pilot and passenger on board the airplane were fatally injured. The certificated commercial pilot and two medical flight crewmembers on board the helicopter were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the airplane's local personal flight that originated from SHD, at 1402, and for the helicopters positioning flight that originated from the University of Virginia Medical Center (8VA5), Charlottesville, Virginia, about 1410. A company flight plan was filed for the helicopter positioning flight, and no flight plan was filed for the airplane flight, which were both conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
All three crewmembers aboard the helicopter were interviewed at the scene, and their statements were consistent throughout. They described departing 8VA5 after completing a patient drop-off, crossing "the ridgeline" at 4,500 feet, and approaching SHD from the east. They each described monitoring the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF), and how the announced traffic, two aircraft established in a left-hand traffic pattern for runway 23, were acquired both visually and on the helicopter's Skywatch Traffic Collision Avoidance Device (TCAD) system. The two crewmembers in the front seats correlated the landing-pattern traffic's announced positions both visually and on the TCAD. The third, aft-seated crewmember visually acquired the landing traffic based on their announced positions. The accident airplane was operating in the airport traffic area, but not in the established traffic pattern.
One flight nurse rode on the left side of the helicopter, behind the copilot's station, and faced aft. She stated that she was aware of two airplanes in the traffic pattern, one on "short final," the second airplane behind, and that the helicopter would be "the third aircraft to land." According to the flight nurse, "I was in the back under sterile cockpit procedures. Everyone was 'eyes-out' looking for traffic. I felt a bump and a shudder and the pilot said, 'What was that?'" She looked out and saw a white rectangle under the helicopter for "less than a millisecond."
File Photo
A second flight nurse who rode in the copilot (left) seat gave a similar account, and stated that he had visual contact with the two airplanes that were also displayed on the helicopter's TCAD device. He added, "We were talking to all of them." The helicopter was in a gradual descent, and the nurse had visual contact with the airplanes on the base and final legs of the traffic pattern when he felt a bump. He reported that he never saw anything outside the helicopter at the time he felt the bump.
The pilot described routine radio communication as the helicopter approached SHD, as well as a radio call to request fuel upon landing. He described two airplanes in the traffic pattern; one on the downwind leg, and one on short final. The pilot followed behind and north of the second airplane and continued to the west side of the airport to complete a landing at the west side helipad. During the descent, about 500 feet above ground level, the pilot "saw about 2 feet of white wing right outside." He "pulled power" and then felt the contact.
All three crewmembers stated that the TCAD did not alert them to the accident airplane. They all described the crew coordination efforts to assess the damage to their aircraft, and the completion of a safe landing.
Witness interviews and written statements provided were largely consistent throughout. The witnesses were familiar with the airport, and with what they described as the usual traffic pattern of aircraft around the airport. Most of the witness described their vantage points as being 90 degrees from the direction of flight for both aircraft, and that the aircraft were traveling from roughly north to south. Most described the aircraft in level flight, with some differences as to whether the helicopter was on the airplane's left, or right. Both aircraft were described as being "lower than usual," "awfully close," "almost even…next to each other." Consistently, witnesses described the helicopter as it overtook the airplane from behind, "barely touching" the airplane, and then watching as the right wing departed the airplane, and the remainder of the airplane "nose-dived" to ground contact.
Preliminary radar data identified the accident helicopter by its assigned transponder code. The helicopter's ground track and altitudes were consistent with what the crewmembers described. The other radar targets were all depicted with the visual flight rules (VFR) "1200" transponder code. The number of airplanes that these "VFR targets" represented could not be immediately reconciled.
Personnel Information
A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot in the airplane held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. He held a flight instructor certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first class medical certificate was issued June 23, 2010, when he reported 2,300 total hours of flight experience.
The passenger on board the airplane held no FAA certificates. However, a pilot logbook bearing his name was recovered and reflected 7 total hours of flight experience logged.
A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot in the helicopter held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for helicopter and instrument helicopter. He held an air transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land. His most recent FAA second class medical certificate was issued October 5, 2010. During an interview, he reported 6,803 total hours of flight experience, of which, approximately 700 hours were in the same make and model as the accident helicopter.
