Process and/or Talent

[dmccormack]

I've been thinking about methods to inculcate judgment, especially after reading about the recent string of GA accidents directly attributable to poor judgment.

The Rejected Takeoff discussion also made me consider this problem. While RTO practice can help a new pilot understand the limitations and possible consequences of slow speed, close to the ground flight, the personal anecdotes related to real world RTO were all judgment calls -- Can I make it?

In engineering we depend on process to help cover the multitude of sins humans commit as a matter of course. Thus we trust, but verify with design reviews, peer reviews, Independent Quality Control, configuration management, and the rest.

The Army trains to standards based on doctrine, modified as required with technique (which are simply ways to accomplish the mission without violating doctrine). Every soldier from the newest private to the Joint Theatre Commander is evaluated based on objective performance standards.

The Air Force and Navy also have quals and evals -- independent verification that the task will be accomplished as expected, and the mission accomplished.

In GA we have checklists and biennials, yet apparently both are inadequate to ensure judgement is being taught and practiced consistently across the pilot population.

What's missing (outside the PTS) is a commitment to disciplined processes -- standard ways of doing things that can be verified and evaluated objectively.

Is it because the conditions are so widely variable that there is no way to predict and therefore plan for a steady progression from condition X to condition Y?

Hardly.

Consider the standard flight profile -- startup, taxi, takeoff, climb, cruise climb, turns, descent, approach, landing, taxi, shutdown.

Sure there may be a few unexpected events along the way, but certainly each is forseeable to some degree? Aren't entire Sim sessions devoted to practicing the unlikley yet possible?

So, I'd like to start a dialog on this topic -- How have you taught/ observed / practiced / incorporated judgement and process into your flying? (And not just training sessions, but everyday flying)

What are the key differentiators between those pilots you have known who exhibit good judgement (beyond "total time") and those that do not?

(And we should all know the hazardous attitudes -- so hopefully we can dig a bit beyond that).

I'm sure there is plenty of insight to go around beyond the mandatory reading list -- let's hear it.

I'll start by suggesting an excellent read: Flight Discipline, Kern

 

[TMetzinger]

I'll second the Kern book, and his other two (which are similar). "Darker shades of blue" is particularly good.

In my opinion, the "process" you speak of gets embedded into flying for hire, both 135, 137, and 121 ops. Some of it comes down directly from the FAA, in form of regulations that further constrain operators beyond the basics of part 91. Then, because these are commercial operations, carrying potential litigants (and lots of them in the case of the majors), the operators (and their insurers) go further, striving to reduce their risk - this is a GOOD business decision in our market. Look at "flag carriers" in other nations where the public cannot sue the government - some of their airlines are so bad that other countries forbid them to visit.

The commercial operators go to the huge expense of developing and refining their processes because it has a direct, favorable, result on their operating costs (reducing insurance rates, limiting liability, etc.). Lots of corporate operators under part 91 nonetheless operate as if they were a 135 operation, and some operate as if they were under 121. This translates into an enviable safety record.

In my opinion (again), the freedom we are given under part 91 is appropriate. When a part 91 operator makes a bad mistake, the consequences to others is generally (not always) light. So we are given a fairly large operating envelope, and each pilot in command makes his own judgment within that envelope. Seems reasonable, as everyone aboard that airplane should understand that their life is in the judgment of that pilot, and often it's only the pilot aboard.

Ultimately, the amount of regulation we face comes down to the cost (in lives and property) of how we operate, compared to the cost (in terms of utility as well as the cost of implementing and enforcing the regs themselves) of limiting our choices with further regulation. I think we're at the point of drastically diminishing returns now - meaning a huge effort will give a small result. But we need to remain vigilant so that we don't slide back into worse behavior, while we continue to try for improvement.


We, as individuals operating under part 91, have the ability to set our own acceptable risk levels. We can lower risk by imposing our own restraints on how we operate. For example:

• No single engine IFR
• No single engine night flight
• No circling approaches
• Personal minimums for weather

We can lower risk by raising proficiency:

• IPC every 6 months even if we're current
• WINGS phase annually
• Additional Ratings/Endorsements
• Minimum recency of experience beyond the FAR.
• Advanced training (Sim work)

And of course, we can do some of each. I believe that participating in discussions like this help lower risk, because we get the chance to evaluate new ideas as well as be reminded of core truths.

Now that I've expounded on my safety philosophy, I'll go through some of my processes.

First, I've taken the POH for all the airplanes I've flown, and built a custom checklist. I start with the POH items, and ADD things to standardize the way I fly. I've got a flight planning section as the first thing, reminding me to compute weight and balance, look up and check runway lengths, get a full weather briefing, check notams, and other stuff. Doesn't matter if I flew the same flight in the same airplane yesterday. Run the numbers again. It adds things like checking for documents beyond AROW (better have the AFM and any supplements like the handbook for your IFR GPS), checking the GPS database. It puts in things like when to call for clearance, maint items like tire and strut pressure, and a Vspeed table and Best Glide graph, as well as takeoff/landing and cruise performance.
So even though the airplanes are different, the flow from phase to phase is the same. An example is attached. I've got a bound booklet of these for all the airplanes I fly.

I have a risk management spreadsheet I use (also attached -zipped Excel) and fill out before every flight. It's a work in progress and I tweak it as I think of new things to "score". It helps me decide if I need further thinking before a flight.

I separate flying for proficiency from flying for "real". I do a WINGS phase every year. I get my six approaches in on proficiency flights every six months regardless of whether I need them or not, sometimes with a CFII and sometimes with a safety pilot. They are generally hand flown with raw data, unless I haven't flown a coupled approach in a while or am learning a new system. When I fly "for real" however, I use all the gadgets to their fullest potential. for IFR, the autopilot goes on at the minimum altitude and stays on until the approach is complete. I may hand fly enroute if I'm bored or if I can do a better job in bumps, but otherwise I let the silicon first officer do the job while I stay on top of traffic, weather, flight progress, and all the other "captain" jobs.

I fly any "new" trip in flight simulator first - practicing the approaches, looking at the terrain (I've got add-ons that give me accurate terrain), and the major landmarks like rivers and things. It's much nicer to know that on a VOR approach the runway will be off to your left because you did it before in flight sim.

Finally, I take every chance I get to learn more about flying. I also try to pay it forward by sharing what I know/think with the community. Even when I am not convinced by someone else's logic/argument, I'm better off for having heard it.

One final comment - if we do get a reorg and a safety forum, I think this belongs there.

 

[Everskyward]

In engineering we depend on process to help cover the multitude of sins humans commit as a matter of course. Thus we trust, but verify with design reviews, peer reviews, Independent Quality Control, configuration management, and the rest.

The Army trains to standards based on doctrine, modified as required with technique (which are simply ways to accomplish the mission without violating doctrine). Every soldier from the newest private to the Joint Theatre Commander is evaluated based on objective performance standards.

The Air Force and Navy also have quals and evals -- independent verification that the task will be accomplished as expected, and the mission accomplished.

In GA we have checklists and biennials, yet apparently both are inadequate to ensure judgement is being taught and practiced consistently across the pilot population.

What's missing (outside the PTS) is a commitment to disciplined processes -- standard ways of doing things that can be verified and evaluated objectively.

I think you are comparing apples and oranges here. You start out by mentioning engineering, which I assume is your job, and the military. In these kinds of organizations if you don't live up to their standards you are probably going to be gone, although neither the military, nor commercial aviation is immune from bad judgment. If you are flying recreationally, which I think is what we are talking about, there aren't as many people to answer to. You can apply all these philosophies to yourself and to students while they are still under your control but you can't impose them on pilots in general. You can advocate all you want, but that doesn't mean everyone is going to listen to you.

What are the key differentiators between those pilots you have known who exhibit good judgement (beyond "total time") and those that do not?

I think it's a combination of the person's own personality and the company culture. I'm using the word "company" in a loose sense here though. For people who don't actually work in aviation it might be the company that you keep, peer pressure, so to speak. I think people who regularly read and post here are more aware of some things than pilots out in the general population. They are certainly more aware of how to log time.

Despite all this, I think that anyone is susceptible to lapses in judgment. I also think there is definitely such a thing as having a bad day when nothing you could have done would have prevented a bad outcome.

 

[MauleSkinner]

The Rejected Takeoff discussion also made me consider this problem. While RTO practice can help a new pilot understand the limitations and possible consequences of slow speed, close to the ground flight, the personal anecdotes related to real world RTO were all judgment calls -- Can I make it?

I think this is a good example for what I see in the people I work with, and how I try to deal with the judgment issue.

At the most basic level, in order to exercise good judgment with regard to a potential flight hazard or risk, you have to SEE and IDENTIFY the risk. A pilot can't exercise judgment on the issue of his rpm being a little lower than normal at takeoff power if he doesn't know what the rpm is supposed to be, or even to look at it.

I've said many times that it takes a lot of effort to be objective about our own proficiencies and deficiencies, and the example I use is of a pilot who called me up to be a "safety pilot" for a couple of approaches. He had 450 hours in his airplane in the previous 18 months, and felt he was profiient. We decided to go ahead and do an IPC and Flight Review, since he was getting close that time anyway.

Well, he WAS proficient in the things he did every day, but he wasn't proficient in several of the items required for an IPC. It took a couple of flights to get him up to speed. He would have had no problem initiating a nonprecision approach to minimums, but there's no way he could have completed it successfully. Would this be poor judgment? I don't think so...I think "ignorance" would be a better term. After enlightening him as to his abilities and weaknesses, he then had the tools to begin exercising judgment.

Same goes for any operation...if we have no way to see the risks involved, I don't think we can exercise judgment in any fashion. But the vast majority of pilots I've worked with who could be accused of "poor judgement" seem to make the right decisions (the ones I would ) when they become aware of the risks involved in the operation.

...and I third the recommendation for Kern's books

Fly safe!

David

P.S...I think this is where the FAA's jumping on the "scenario-based-training" bandwagon is a good thing...the intent is to expose trainees to the decision making process, which involves identifying the risks and evaluating them, rather than simply executing the same maneuvers over and over again. I don't think 142 schools (FlightSafety, Simuflite, or Simcom are my experience) teach with an eye for identifying risks beyond those that involve aircraft systems. The FAA and insurance underwriters see these training events as "all you need", but they really aren't, IMO.

 

[poadeleted20]

I don't think I can list any specific qualities beyond what you've said. I guess it's a case of "I can't define it but I know it when I see it."

 

[SkyHog]

Why do I feel like I'm in school again....

 

[dmccormack]

I think you are comparing apples and oranges here. You start out by mentioning engineering, which I assume is your job, and the military. In these kinds of organizations if you don't live up to their standards you are probably going to be gone, although neither the military, nor commercial aviation is immune from bad judgment. If you are flying recreationally, which I think is what we are talking about, there aren't as many people to answer to. You can apply all these philosophies to yourself and to students while they are still under your control but you can't impose them on pilots in general. You can advocate all you want, but that doesn't mean everyone is going to listen to you.

Well, you know how engineers are -- everything is a solvable problem, given enough time and money.

Despite all this, I think that anyone is susceptible to lapses in judgment. I also think there is definitely such a thing as having a bad day when nothing you could have done would have prevented a bad outcome.

True, But I think some processes (such as GUMPS, as an example) can help prevent or at least mitigate those lapses in judgment.

 

[dmccormack]

Why do I feel like I'm in school again....

That's ok.. you can continue sleeping...

 

[dparter]

I've been thinking about methods to inculcate judgment, especially after reading about the recent string of GA accidents directly attributable to poor judgment.

The Rejected Takeoff discussion also made me consider this problem. While RTO practice can help a new pilot understand the limitations and possible consequences of slow speed, close to the ground flight, the personal anecdotes related to real world RTO were all judgment calls -- Can I make it?

I think it starts with training. For example, If/when teaching the rejected takeoff, are you (the CFIs out there) just teaching the skill, or do you devote an entire lesson (or more!) to takeoff scenarios, getting the trainee to start thinking about multiple options, how to avoid bad situations, to have thought through some alternatives for different situations?

Do CFIs do a pre-takeoff briefing with the trainee for every takeoff that includes the failed-engine/RTO options? Is it by rote, or does the trainee understand the thinking behind the emergency plan?

Do you compare the takeoff emergency options for the different airports you visit during training, and get the trainee to engage in the evaluation process -- what are the particular risks and alternatives at this airport, on this runway, in this place, today?

Getting the future pilot into the mindset that they have to be engaged in evaluating each situation in advance, with an eye to safety, not just rote following what they have always done is the idea.

In engineering we depend on process to help cover the multitude of sins humans commit as a matter of course. Thus we trust, but verify with design reviews, peer reviews, Independent Quality Control, configuration management, and the rest.

Again, back to training. Either initial (private pilot) or later training. Engage the pilots in understanding the process, not just following it by rote.

In GA we have checklists and biennials, yet apparently both are inadequate to ensure judgement is being taught and practiced consistently across the pilot population.

More of the previous point: do the pilots think about the checklist, or just do it? Do they know what they are looking at? If they are lucky, their training aircraft had few problems (hah -- not likely) so they rarely had to exercise good judgement during the preflight inspection. And if they did find something new or unexpected, what was the CFI's attitude? Was that a teaching moment? Did they teach the pilot to followup and check the correct references, or did they teach them to "let it slide"?

Maybe each student pilot should have an assignment to make their own checklist for the plane they typically fly. I know that some object to this, since "the POH has all the right answers", and not following the POH and/or checklist provided by the flight school may raise other issues, but the exercise of researching everything on the checklist, and adding certain information, and understanding each item better, and making sure that the flow makes sense, would be good for the student.

What's missing (outside the PTS) is a commitment to disciplined processes -- standard ways of doing things that can be verified and evaluated objectively.

I think there is a difference between imposing discipline and standards, which is more appropriate outside part 91, and encouraging each pilot to have their own discipline and standardized processes, that are thorough and complete, and to understand the need to stick to their processes (which doesn't mean that they shouldn't be reviewed and modified as needed). Things like always doing the complete preflight, the same way, and not being interrupted, or if interrupted, knowing where to back up to and restart...

Consider the standard flight profile -- startup, taxi, takeoff, climb, cruise climb, turns, descent, approach, landing, taxi, shutdown.

Sure there may be a few unexpected events along the way, but certainly each is forseeable to some degree? Aren't entire Sim sessions devoted to practicing the unlikley yet possible?

But most part 91 pilots don't have Sim sessions. At best, they have some hangar flying, either in person or on the net like this forum.

Wings seminars try and get pilots thinking about these issues, but they can only go so far. The typical format -- a presentation with a little bit of discussion, or the newer "interactive" seminars are not really engaging the pilot in a deep discussion or analysis of the avoidable, or how excercize their judgement in scenarios that are more directly applicable to their flying. It is a start, but some kind of more in-depth followup would be a good thing.

In an entirely different setting I've been involved in a series of events at work that could have been the typical presentation/Q&A format, but instead incorporate 15-minutes or so of small-group discussion (usually with 2 questions) and a short verbal report back (to all the participants) when the small group session ends. It has been very sucessful.

Maybe that would be a good addition to the typical safety seminar -- break in to small groups with the 10 pilots in your immediate area, and have a discussion on ways they can improve their flying, or the applicability of the presentation to their flying, or "3 things I can improve on my checklist", etc (it depends also on what the exact topic of the seminar is). With a little nudge, I'm sure they'd be glad to talk and share ideas and get the topic more focused on their own situations.

So, I'd like to start a dialog on this topic -- How have you taught/ observed / practiced / incorporated judgement and process into your flying? (And not just training sessions, but everyday flying)

Back to my earlier point: by incorporating judgement, and an understanding of the process, checklists, etc into the training, and making judgement part of the process of every flight.

Too often all the focus is on the specific physical skills, or specific knowledge, and not an integrating approach to flying.

So -- those are my ideas...

--david

 

[TMetzinger]

I think it starts with training. For example, If/when teaching the rejected takeoff, are you (the CFIs out there) just teaching the skill, or do you devote an entire lesson (or more!) to takeoff scenarios, getting the trainee to start thinking about multiple options, how to avoid bad situations, to have thought through some alternatives for different situations?
--david

That really just struck a major chord with me. The FAASTeam leadership at the national level has said a "culture change" will be needed to make a major shift in the GA accident rate. Everything you said in your post (getting students THINKING, not just DOING) agrees with that. We need to emphasize ADM and the need to keep growing as part of our training beginning with primary students, so they think a BFR or annual evaluation is a good thing, not the aviation version of a trip to the dentist.

I've seen some online stuff lately that walks the student through several decision points in a flight, where there isn't necessarily a "right" answer, but as one progresses you can see how several marginal answers can lead to a problem. I like your idea of small groups in a seminar - I'm going to see if I can come up with a way to use that in a safety meeting.

 

[dmccormack]

First, I've taken the POH for all the airplanes I've flown, and built a custom checklist. I start with the POH items, and ADD things to standardize the way I fly. I've got a flight planning section as the first thing, reminding me to compute weight and balance, look up and check runway lengths, get a full weather briefing, check notams, and other stuff. Doesn't matter if I flew the same flight in the same airplane yesterday. Run the numbers again. It adds things like checking for documents beyond AROW (better have the AFM and any supplements like the handbook for your IFR GPS), checking the GPS database. It puts in things like when to call for clearance, maint items like tire and strut pressure, and a Vspeed table and Best Glide graph, as well as takeoff/landing and cruise performance.

This is a very good exercise for every pilot -- make your own checklist for each airplane you fly.

Usually the commercial checklist flow is not your own, or adds or eliminates steps that are important for that specific model airplane.

I like the Air Force Blue checklist books. I can read the text in various conditions and can quickly flip to the appropriate page for that phase of flight.

 

[TMetzinger]

One Caveat when you make your own checklist - don't leave any vendor items out, and think hard about reordering them. You don't want to expose yourself to post-accident criticism that you "weren't operating in accordance with approved flight manual". Adding personal "don't forget" items isn't an issue.

Commercial operators can and do alter things - but they also have an FAA signature approving it.

 

[dmccormack]

One Caveat when you make your own checklist - don't leave any vendor items out, and think hard about reordering them. You don't want to expose yourself to post-accident criticism that you "weren't operating in accordance with approved flight manual". Adding personal "don't forget" items isn't an issue.

Commercial operators can and do alter things - but they also have an FAA signature approving it.

Is there a single accident on record where the user-developed checklist was the accident cause or implicated?

 

[TMetzinger]

Who cares? I'm just saying that you are exposing yourself to additional scrutiny. Decide if the benefits are worth it. If you add something to the list, that's one thing. If you pull something OFF the "official" list from the AFM, that's where you have potential for trouble. Checking the flap before the aileron on preflight - no big deal. Leaving the carb heat off the checklist, different story.

Where this can be a gotcha is for renters - they may require in the rental agreement you to use their checklist, or their insurance may (MAY) look at the use of a non-approved checklist as a basis to subrogate.

I had a school CFI tell me I had to cycle the prop three times on a new 182. I explained that the AFM called for cycling it once. He argued, I pulled out the AFM for the airplane, and showed him. He still wasn't happy, and I pointed out that it was a change from previous model years. I don't have a problem cycling it three times, but Cessna said otherwise, and I had called them on it, got to speak with a production test pilot, and he said once was all that was required, it was NOT a misprint, and reflected that engine and prop combination, which was new to the airframe.

 

[dmccormack]

Who cares? I'm just saying that you are exposing yourself to additional scrutiny. Decide if the benefits are worth it. If you add something to the list, that's one thing. If you pull something OFF the "official" list from the AFM, that's where you have potential for trouble. Checking the flap before the aileron on preflight - no big deal. Leaving the carb heat off the checklist, different story.

Right -- make sure the checklist reflects the POH.

Though the order can be changed to suit your own personal flow (this is most likely on pre-flight and shutdown -- for example, I like to turn the swinging meat cleaver off as soon as possible -- so resetting manual trim happens after engine shutdown).

The POH needs to be in the airplane, so if you like the checklist to be on little yellow stickies with one item per sticky -- well, that's your deal.

I really don't worry about somebody tapping me on the shoulder and asking to compare my checklist to the POH -- first because the personal use checklist is a superset of the POH items, and second because I have the POH in the airplane and it is avalable as a reference.

The only time I've caught flack for using a "non standard checklist" was in CAP and the Army.

The CAP A/C checklist had no IFR items (even though it was an IFR bird). I made my own and had it approved by the wing check pilot.

As an armor Platoon Leader I made up my own M1A1 startup/shutdown checklist because the issue checklist was a mess (an buried deep in the bulky handbook). Few drivers/TCs were using the procedure and there were many turbine problems from poor shutdown procedures.

The checklist was picked up by the Armor center and duplicated and sent out army-wide.

 

[dmccormack]

Dan,

Good discussion. I'll summarize it down to one sentence that I normally use to begin all of my aviation weather workshops...

Those things that you have control over must be controlled, and exposure to those that you don't, must be minimized.

It is unfortunately not always black and white.

Excellent point -- and I suppose knowing the difference comes down to judgment!

 

[dmccormack]

A better angle...have there been any accidents or incidents where the official AFM checklist was flawed and was partly to blame for the accident or incident?

True -- but that would only be caught if there was a CVR, I'm assuming?

The later Beech POHs usually leave out Short and Soft field takeoff and landing.

Of course the FAA's AFH and the various PTS all specify standards (1.3 Vso during Short field landings, land within 200 feet of touchdown point, etc).

So I made up a short checklist for those events, using the PTS standards as objectives, and came up with the optimal Power-Attitude-Configuration for each airplane so the event could be repeated.

A Checklist makes sense for shorts and softs, because it's good to run through and ensure gear is down, flaps are set (full), target airspeed is (78 KIAS GW in A36), Prop and power are set, and ensure cowl flaps are closed, and switches and seatbelts are set.

So this would be the case where there is no manufacturer approved or sanctioned Short Field landing checklist or method, and yet the data can be extracted from the book (stall speed/configuration/weight) and/or through experience.

In the BE77 POH, the final approach airspeed is "AS DESIRED"."

You have to go through the performance tables to find out they recommend 63 Knots at GW.

 

[Richard]

As I read Dan's OP I kept having the thought that it is motivation that distinguishes GA from the military, et al. Mari summed it up quite nicely.

Good thread. I've always wondered why the incidence for error is so much higher in GA. And I always conclude that the typical GA pilot doesn't exist in that culture based on peer review. GA is more tolerant of error. Or perhaps it is simply non-standard procedure since we are all on our own personal mission (no one governing standard could possibly cover all).

Now I'm thinking about an article Rod Machado wrote about the "centerline is our friend". He was speaking of precision and each pilot establishing for himself a standard to adhere to consistently. Why, I ask, would each pilot have to do that? The answer is because there isn't a review board grading our performance therefore it is up to the individual.

 

[dmccormack]

As I read Dan's OP I kept having the thought that it is motivation that distinguishes GA from the military, et al. Mari summed it up quite nicely.

Good thread. I've always wondered why the incidence for error is so much higher in GA. And I always conclude that the typical GA pilot doesn't exist in that culture based on peer review. GA is more tolerant of error. Or perhaps it is simply non-standard procedure since we are all on our own personal mission (no one governing standard could possibly cover all).

Now I'm thinking about an article Rod Machado wrote about the "centerline is our friend". He was speaking of precision and each pilot establishing for himself a standard to adhere to consistently. Why, I ask, would each pilot have to do that? The answer is because there isn't a review board grading our performance therefore it is up to the individual.

Good point -- there is no (or little) oversight beyond the minimal after all the ratings are secured (and for more than half GA pilots, the PP is as far as it gets). The questions that come to mind are: How much longer will the be the case? Will the insurance industry/ courts be the de facto regulator of GA in the future?

Another area where oversight is minimal, risk is high, and yet standards are promulgated is the volunteer fire service.

In my short experience after retirement from the Army (2 1/2 years, and then we moved), I found that some stations were very competent and qualified, with a large percentage of active FT firefighters on the volunteer staff, and other stations were populated by the members of one or two families who "always were firefighters," and so "didn't need any of that fancy trainin, thank you."

The fact that these folks showed up was enough for the poor people watching this or that burn down. In one case we were tanker support and watched as the lead station (ladder) sprayed into the one fire vent, thereby assuring the fire would spread even further inside the structure.

Our chief saw that, grabbed a couple of us, and we climbed up on the roof and hacked a new vent down the roof line.

Meanwhile our Assistant Chief convinced the ladder Co chief to attack from the root of the fire.

Fortunately that structure (a large wood-frame hotel) was saved with minimal damage and no injury or loss of life.

But the result could have been much different.

Since the Fire Service doesn't rat on each other, and the general public doesn't know any better, everything is swept under the rug.

This is somewhat analogous to the GA population. While we may be a bit more free with our criticisms among pilots, our public language is one of safety and "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain." and "Everything is fine, nothing to see here, move along..."

While I agree completely that aviation is for many recreational, and therefore should not be encumbered onerous regulations, I think the absence of oversight makes the requirement for self-discipline even more critical.

 

[AuntPeggy]

The need for judgement calls is reduced by more training.

The Rejected Takeoff discussion also made me consider this problem. While RTO practice can help a new pilot understand the limitations and possible consequences of slow speed, close to the ground flight, the personal anecdotes related to real world RTO were all judgment calls -- Can I make it

Without the understanding of limitations and consequences, what can judgement be based upon? I remember a story about a young Navy pilot who successfully brought his badly damaged bird back to the ship. But along the way, he deviated from training by making a judgement call. Well, he should have stuck with his training because the limitations and consequences had all been thought out on the ground by more expert minds without the stress of trying to survive. He got disciplined.

If you (CFI, etc.) can tell me how and why, then when the time comes, I can make the judgement call of when or whether. Otherwise, I have to make up the procedure on the spur of the moment. As a weekend GA pilot, my training and experience is necessarily quite limited when compared with a professional or military pilot.

These training threads may save my life someday. Thanks.

 

[dmccormack]

The need for judgement calls is reduced by more training.

Without the understanding of limitations and consequences, what can judgement be based upon? I remember a story about a young Navy pilot who successfully brought his badly damaged bird back to the ship. But along the way, he deviated from training by making a judgement call. Well, he should have stuck with his training because the limitations and consequences had all been thought out on the ground by more expert minds without the stress of trying to survive. He got disciplined.

If you (CFI, etc.) can tell me how and why, then when the time comes, I can make the judgement call of when or whether. Otherwise, I have to make up the procedure on the spur of the moment. As a weekend GA pilot, my training and experience is necessarily quite limited when compared with a professional or military pilot.

These training threads may save my life someday. Thanks.

Any training in how needs to include why (Though these days its rare to meet an American student who doesn't ask that question -- often).If the student doesn't ask "why?" I'll ask the student -- Why are we practicing steep turns? Why do you add flaps on final? Why are you pulling up the nose as the airspeed slows?

In some cases the student has been able to perform the task but turns and says, "I don't know."

I'm sure I explained it, but he/she was so mentally engaged in doing that comprehension/analysis didn't happen.

As they progress from ohmygodImflyingwhatdoIdonext??!! to muscle memory airplane control, there should be a subtle but inexorable shift from mere skill acquisition to comprehension and then to application, which is the precursor to judgement.

 

[markb5900]

This is has been an excellent discussion and I agree with most of the thoughts put out so far.
I do think it is on the shoulders of the CFI to at least start the good judgement chain for students. Just a simple thing, like a student seeing a CFI just check the oil and jump in a plane and go somewhere and not do a complete pre-flight, starts a chain for bad judgement IMHO on the part of the student.
On the other side of the coin, someone who has bad "life" judgment may not be able to "change" their ways no matter how much they are taught.
The whole idea of ADM fortunately or unfortunately depending on how you look at is, really is up to the CFI to teach in primary training. I KNOW the judgement I use when flying was "given" to me by my primary CFI and has been added to by many great instructors that I have been lucky enough to fly with.
Even the military has changed their way of "teaching" in boot camp from the DI's just SCREAMING from beginning to end, to screaming at the beginning then a transition to more of a mentor of recruits. If CFI's use this method of not just teaching the muscle memory and basic skills but also being a mentor for their students I personally think that would go a LONG way towards helping everyone.
I can say that the best CFI's that I have had, were all more mentors to me than really teachers.

Mark B

 

[TMetzinger]

As they progress from ohmygodImflyingwhatdoIdonext??!! to muscle memory airplane control, there should be a subtle but inexorable shift from mere skill acquisition to comprehension and then to application, which is the precursor to judgement.

Very well said.

 

[ApacheBob]

This is a good thread. The 900 pound gorilla in the room is lack of proficiency due to high fuel prices. Flying has always been expensive, but these fuel prices are debilitating.

 

[wabower]

This is a good thread. The 900 pound gorilla in the room is lack of proficiency due to high fuel prices. Flying has always been expensive, but these fuel prices are debilitating.

Aren't those mutually exclusive? Isn't part of judgement knowing that you need to maintain proficiency, or if you feel you are no longer proficient, to obtain the training and/or rust removal necessary to regain it?

Of the accidents that have drawn attention during the past year, how many can you identify as stemming from lack of proficiency as opposed to plain stupidity re ADM?