DouglasBader
Line Up and Wait
- Joined
- Apr 11, 2012
- Messages
- 896
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Doug
That's an interesting observation. I'll be sure to inform my present and past employers who have provided agency training, corporate training in-house, and training through substandard services such as Flight Safety International and CAE Simuflite. Perhaps it's coincidence that this training has been universally the same in various types of turbojets, turboprops, and piston aircraft, including large four engine radial aircraft.
Perhaps everyone is doing it wrong, except you. As a check airman, I must be doing it all wrong, but you've already said that. Clearly my flight and ground instruction given has been in error, as have my operations as a commercial pilot and ATP. FSI and CAE Simuflite got it wrong too, it seems. I won't be informing them, but you probably should. My present and previous employes apparently don't have it right, either. We do this daily all over the world, day in, day out in all kinds of weather, thousands of times a year, but I'm more than willing to concede that you've probably got it pegged, and we've all got it wrong. I've done this, taught this, practiced this, and been taught this all over the globe, on every continent but antarctica. I get regular checkrides and recurrent training, including rides with the FAA on occasion; all are apparently in error. I'm very fortunate to have found your guidance. You've already spotted glaring errors in our aircraft flight manual, an FAA approved document by which we're bound, and now you've seen what none of the rest of us could see. Thanks!
The only problem I see with your point of view, of course, is the basic concept that the decision to go around isn't made before decision height, but at decision height. MDA is a hard deck, and DH is not. Therefore, what's seen on the way down to DH isn't relevant (unless one sees the runway early, of course, or a spurious mountain goat in mid air on final, both of which may assist in making a proper decision). What one sees at DH, however, is very relevant; if one sees the required visual references at DH, then one may continue. If one does not, one must execute the missed approach.
The approach procedure must be flown with close attention paid to the needles on the way to DH. While a two-pilot crew can have the FO looking out, the person doing the flying should concentrate on flying. If, at arrival at DH, one doesn't have the references, cob the power, avoid the towers, and climb. Up, preferably.
If this basic, common sense, legal, correct way of flying bothers you, one can only imagine how you'd react to some of the other procedures I've needed, such as flying one or two dots right and high on ILS and PAR into Mosul, to avoid ground fire on final, or the development of distance and altitude letdowns in sandstorms in combat areas when there was nowhere else to go. Rather than get your blood pressure up, we'll stick with the basics, like making a decision at DECISION altitude, that hallowed place where one can't really make a decision without the basic criteria with which to decide; namely, whether one sees the required visual references upon arrival at DH.
You'll argue the point, of course, even in the face of quoted material from our B747 AOM. Perhaps you can set the FAA straight on all that too, and change our procedures: after all, we won't need to limit pitch attitude on the missed approach if ground contact isn't a possibility. Be sure to pick up a 747 type rating and try it yourself a few times first, of course. Let us know how it works out, after you get done lecturing our training department and cadre of check airmen about your procedures, and understanding thereof. They'll be thrilled that you stopped by.
When Ron's done lecturing everyone, I guess you're next in line. They'll be thrilled that you stopped by, too.
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