Fatal Crash at First Flight, 9/28

Concerning the out of trim full power go around: Never do anything fast in an airplane, as in rushing things. In normal situations, where most crashes happen. Gentle works.

Generally agree, but on a go-around after a bounce you do have to be pretty prompt in order to catch the plane before it comes down on the nosewheel. (Not related to this incident, obviously.)
 
Sorry, that doesn’t make much sense. They stalled while in the turn, somehow managed to complete the turn and fly straight on final, but stayed in the stall and did not recover for 700-800 feet down and a mile forward?

I don’t know where the idea of the base to final stall crept into the conversation (maybe based on incomplete flightaware data?), but the more complete ADS-B data doesn’t support that, nor does the NTSB saying the wreckage was located in the trees to the left of the runway.

Here’s a pic that might help illustrate, the data pulled straight from ADS-B Exchange. Note there are two finals. The signal is lost for both right about 100’ and the threshold (which is typical LOS blockage for the receivers that forward the data), so it doesn’t illustrate the events over or along the runway for either approach (this we can’t see the actual path of the crash). Both approaches were fairly steep, but pretty straight.

View attachment 133986

I added a blue arrow representing the general reported wind direction and an orange circle representing the trees adjacent to the left side of the runway into which the NTSB said the airplane crashed.

Note: the AWOS is located near the segmented circle on the west-southwest side of the runway, however a wind as reported from 170 true would be along the shown azimuth to the runway 21 threshold. There is a large clearing along that azimuth during short final, but the hill and the monument, then the stand of trees that begin complementary to that azimuth and the threshold could complicate an already gusty wind situation as you’re crossing the threshold.
I have limited confidence in ADS-B data for micro flight path, especially near the ground.

But I agree, if the wreckage was located in the area you indicate with the orange circle, then it was not a base-to-final stall.

Whatever the case, I think "poor stick and rudder skills" are probably the root cause.
 
I have limited confidence in ADS-B data for micro flight path, especially near the ground.
I understand that. There are ways to overcome some of that, verification as it were. Some sites offer more in the way of that than others. Altitude can always be a little sketchy, but you can eliminate outliers, look for trends and averages more for verification and a broad overview of what was going on. Either way, in pretty much every case that I’ve felt confident in estimating the flight path using ADS-B data, the NTSB has done the same in their preliminary report. They’re not necessarily drawing the same conclusions, just “here’s what the ADS-B data show,” so it seems they’re finding it useable/reliable enough to at least get started.
 
SOMETHING likely got them in “startle response” mode. At that point, all bets are off.

What happens after that isn’t the topic of discussion. It’s what caused that startle response.

Having the correct startle response is more of a historical question, and a result of training years ago.
 
The Cirrus SR has mild stall characteristics, but I would say if you get slow on it and drop a wing, many have said it spins violently, which is why the only spin recovery option per the POH is to pull CAPS. In the Cirrus forums though, there's a post from 2006 of a guy that spun an SR2x out of Sedona airport but managed to recover it without CAPS (did the P.A.R.E. response).
 
where have you seen that? Do you have another source? All I’ve seen in both FlightAware and ADS-B Exchange were two landing attempts, one which appears to result in a go around and a second which ends on final (presumably with the crash).
The observations I cited in post #63 were based on data from ADS-B Exchange “history” option. This feature provides a data block with time stamp for each ADS-B point as the selected aircraft moves along the flight path. The 40 second figure is simply the final time stamp subtracted from the time stamp as the aircraft completes the turn to final.
 
The observations I cited in post #63 were based on data from ADS-B Exchange “history” option. This feature provides a data block with time stamp for each ADS-B point as the selected aircraft moves along the flight path. The 40 second figure is simply the final time stamp subtracted from the time stamp as the aircraft completes the turn to final.
Yes, I know it does. I posted a photo of part of it But I saw what I described - two landing attempts with the crash on the second one at 21:18:29Z.

We may be describing the same thing. That last entry is after the base to final turn. Which makes sense - I’ve seen reports that the Cirrus hit a tree.
 
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I'm not understanding this any better with the discussion here.

I need that YouTube ashhat that has crashed or been in crashed planes a couple times to explain things better to me, perhaps with banjo music!
 
Ran across a news article stating the wreckage was near the departure end of 21, close to the pilot lounge. Witness says aircraft impacted a tree. Looks indeed like botched go-around.
 
SOMETHING likely got them in “startle response” mode. At that point, all bets are off.

What happens after that isn’t the topic of discussion. It’s what caused that startle response.

Having the correct startle response is more of a historical question, and a result of training years ago.
Are you thinking of birds? Or something else?
 
Are you thinking of birds? Or something else?
The startle response can be due to anything that was not expected to happen, but is particularly dangerous with anything happening close to the ground. Pilots like to believe that they can override it and practice at altitude (e.g. stall recovery), but what you're practicing for isn't "startling" if you're practicting for it.

I would think that birds would be low on that list, unless you're thinking engine ingestion or windshield penetration, for instance.
 
I've not personally landed at FFA yet but spent enough time there and around the monument (used to live near there) to know how the weather can be...plus, my current home airfield has a tree situation not unlike FFA. I'm thinking, as alluded to before that the wind was pretty much directly from the monument hill. That, plus some wind deflection caused by the trees probably caused quite the wind-stir. Also note (if you haven't been there) the first couple hundred feet of the approach end is open field. Then, short transition to high trees. Pilot came in steep, slow, overloaded, on a slight crosswind on the challenging side...oh, and flew the wrong pattern on a short, skinny runway.

I hate to hear that it was a 6 year-old child. Not so much because of the already obvious tragedy, but rather I had it in my mind that there was no way there would be 5 human-sized bodies in a 4-seat aircraft fully loaded with fuel after a short hop across the Sound. I was thinking maybe an infant in mom's lap but no...pilot clearly made a long series of really poor decisions. I've never been in a Cirrus but I'm willing to bet the old saying "you can fill the seats or fill the tanks, not both" probably still applies. None of the names match, either. Illegal charter? Maybe someone with more FAA search experience than I can look at the PIC's certs?
 
pilot clearly made a long series of really poor decisions.

So it would seem.

Whatever precipitated the event, he’d placed himself in a compromised position for dealing with it. Several holes in the Swiss cheese had to align, but he’d already lined up a couple himself before they even took off.
 
I've not personally landed at FFA yet but spent enough time there and around the monument (used to live near there) to know how the weather can be...plus, my current home airfield has a tree situation not unlike FFA. I'm thinking, as alluded to before that the wind was pretty much directly from the monument hill. That, plus some wind deflection caused by the trees probably caused quite the wind-stir. Also note (if you haven't been there) the first couple hundred feet of the approach end is open field. Then, short transition to high trees. Pilot came in steep, slow, overloaded, on a slight crosswind on the challenging side...oh, and flew the wrong pattern on a short, skinny runway.

I hate to hear that it was a 6 year-old child. Not so much because of the already obvious tragedy, but rather I had it in my mind that there was no way there would be 5 human-sized bodies in a 4-seat aircraft fully loaded with fuel after a short hop across the Sound. I was thinking maybe an infant in mom's lap but no...pilot clearly made a long series of really poor decisions. I've never been in a Cirrus but I'm willing to bet the old saying "you can fill the seats or fill the tanks, not both" probably still applies. None of the names match, either. Illegal charter? Maybe someone with more FAA search experience than I can look at the PIC's certs?
Mr. Fassnacht is a SEL, instrument rated, commercial pilot issued 7/27/2017 with a first class medical issued on 2/2023. He completed Cirrus Perspective+ Advanced Transition training in his brand new Cirrus SR22, N1281F at Aero Atlanta Flight Center on 10/6/2023.

None of the others show up in the FAA pilot registration database.
 
What ever happened, he probably did not understand. It surprised him pretty severely.

May have been denial, as in overloaded… just thought it could do it. May have been non responsive control inputs… because he was already too slow for them to do anything. Who knows.

But since he was startled, he didn’t know what was happening, then of course you can’t apply the correct response, even if you know it.
 
Fassnacht was a wealth manager in Atlanta. Campbell was an Army officer in NC. Neely was his wife. They flew together a month ago. Most likely just friends, or perhaps investment clients.
Brutally sad to look at people's online profiles and think of the radiating circles of devastation these accidents cause. Kids without parents. Parents having to live the rest of their lives without their children. At least two dozen lives shattered by this accident, in addition to those lost.
 
It's most likely pretty simple. Behind the power curve, power is applied without enough right rudder. The trees are pretty close to the runway.
 
I had it in my mind that there was no way there would be 5 human-sized bodies in a 4-seat aircraft
This was my first thought as well, but it appears that starting with the G5 (2013) the standard configuration was 5 seats. The accident aircraft was a G6.

Still, three males, one female and a 6 year old (~45 lbs). Not a light plane.
 
Sorry, that doesn’t make much sense. They stalled while in the turn, somehow managed to complete the turn and fly straight on final, but stayed in the stall and did not recover for 700-800 feet down and a mile forward?

I don’t know where the idea of the base to final stall crept into the conversation (maybe based on incomplete flightaware data?), but the more complete ADS-B data doesn’t support that, nor does the NTSB saying the wreckage was located in the trees to the left of the runway.

Here’s a pic that might help illustrate, the data pulled straight from ADS-B Exchange. Note there are two finals. The signal is lost for both right about 100’ and the threshold (which is typical LOS blockage for the receivers that forward the data), so it doesn’t illustrate the events over or along the runway for either approach (this we can’t see the actual path of the crash). Both approaches were fairly steep, but pretty straight.

View attachment 133986

I added a blue arrow representing the general reported wind direction and an orange circle representing the trees adjacent to the left side of the runway into which the NTSB said the airplane crashed.

Note: the AWOS is located near the segmented circle on the west-southwest side of the runway, however a wind as reported from 170 true would be along the shown azimuth to the runway 21 threshold. There is a large clearing along that azimuth during short final, but the hill and the monument, then the stand of trees that begin complementary to that azimuth and the threshold could complicate an already gusty wind situation as you’re crossing the threshold.
I grew up flying here, I'm from Manteo. What you're saying is exactly what I said early on. I've seen it happen at this airport for YEARS....people show up and are not prepared for the mechanical turbulence below the tree line. It does some wild stuff depending on wind direction. My family operates one of the tour and banner tow operations, and I can tell you all summer long you see people go behind the trees and come shooting out the other end on a go around. Happens ALL THE TIME.

The other thing on that runway is there are a lot of deer, I've seen a few planes cream them too over the years.

My guess is either the turbulence got them spooked and they went around, depending on how much power they put in/configuration, they popped up above the tree line where the wind again changed and they stalled it.

Or it is possible they went around for deer and basically did the same thing. In the evenings a lot of times I will fly a pass down the runway there to scatter them depending where they are.

My cousin is a KDH fire fighter, it was not a base to final stall/spin, based on where they ended up. It's likely bad/slow ADSB data.

There are a lot more incidents at this airport than most people realize. Generally no one is hurt seriously and it never makes much news. But it happens.

That blue line wind direction is one is the tricky directions, Ocean breeze coming over the hill, then the pine trees, dips into the runway and hits the pines on the other side. It can go from a nice normal stable approach to gnarly really quick.
 
I wonder when I see stall spin if the newer recovery methods are part of the problem. The Cirrus wing has two separate airfoils and is designed to stall at the root section first, the outer section later. The idea is that you hear and feel the root stall, then take action.

From what I understand, most pattern turn stalls are a result of getting slow, flying uncoordinated, then yanking and banking. The problem is unlike a practice stall, the whole wing stalls quickly and you are done. The dual airfoil is useless in that scenario.

All GA aircraft are designed to stall root first,

The only way the entire wing stalls at once is if you horse it to a high enough angle of attack quickly. It is still stalling root area first, but the whole wing can stall before you notice.
 
Reminder that there is a strong left turning tendency for Cirrus and all high powered AC. I'm remembering a Cirrus crash at the old Chapel Hill Airport just before it closed where they went left into the grass and never could back into the air. They eventually ran into something left of the runway, killing all on board.

One possibility is that they hit the power late, were surprised and not enough right rudder, then went left before they could recover. I've landed there 3 or 4 times and don't remember the runway being tight until I look at pictures later. It wouldn't take much to get into the trees.
 
I grew up flying here, I'm from Manteo. What you're saying is exactly what I said early on. I've seen it happen at this airport for YEARS....people show up and are not prepared for the mechanical turbulence below the tree line. It does some wild stuff depending on wind direction. My family operates one of the tour and banner tow operations, and I can tell you all summer long you see people go behind the trees and come shooting out the other end on a go around. Happens ALL THE TIME.

The other thing on that runway is there are a lot of deer, I've seen a few planes cream them too over the years.

My guess is either the turbulence got them spooked and they went around, depending on how much power they put in/configuration, they popped up above the tree line where the wind again changed and they stalled it.

Or it is possible they went around for deer and basically did the same thing. In the evenings a lot of times I will fly a pass down the runway there to scatter them depending where they are.

My cousin is a KDH fire fighter, it was not a base to final stall/spin, based on where they ended up. It's likely bad/slow ADSB data.

There are a lot more incidents at this airport than most people realize. Generally no one is hurt seriously and it never makes much news. But it happens.

That blue line wind direction is one is the tricky directions, Ocean breeze coming over the hill, then the pine trees, dips into the runway and hits the pines on the other side. It can go from a nice normal stable approach to gnarly really quick.
Totally agree. Good point on the deer, too - that’s always a scary possibility. I’m surprised we haven’t heard any public eyewitness accounts or seen any video yet. There are usually a ton of people on the monument and around the first flight marker, especially on a weekend, and both have a pretty clear line of sight.

I’ll re-emphasize that both approaches were about the same speed and (steep) angle, and the first resulted in a (successful) go-around. My gut tells me that whatever caused the first go-around was also in play for what ever happened on the second approach.
 
ADS-B data shows an additional 40 seconds of data flying down final after completing the base-to-final turn just prior to crossing the shore line, about 4800 ft from the runway 21 threshold.

Using instantaneous ground speed and ROD data, I calculate flight path angles between 6 and 9 degrees as the aircraft flew along final.
This! It was not a base-to-final problem. They flew down final at a *very* high angle and rate of descent both times. Speeds were appropriate for a "normal heavy" (ie max gross) airplane at the end.
The Cirrus SR has mild stall characteristics, but I would say if you get slow on it and drop a wing, many have said it spins violently, which is why the only spin recovery option per the POH is to pull CAPS. In the Cirrus forums though, there's a post from 2006 of a guy that spun an SR2x out of Sedona airport but managed to recover it without CAPS (did the P.A.R.E. response).
There are two likely reasons why the POH says to pull CAPS for a spin: One, they'll always go with the safest option. Given that people rarely get spin training and are unlikely to remember a recovery procedure in the heat of battle, pulling the handle is going to be the safer option. Two, because that's how it was certified in the US.

It recovers just fine, and the EASA authorities did not give them the waiver the FAA did, so they had to demonstrate the full spin series for European certification. It's not "impossible to recover" like a lot of keyboard warriors say.

All GA aircraft are designed to stall root first,

The only way the entire wing stalls at once is if you horse it to a high enough angle of attack quickly. It is still stalling root area first, but the whole wing can stall before you notice.

All *modern* GA aircraft, yes. Anything significantly post-WWII.
 
Fassnacht was a wealth manager in Atlanta. Campbell was an Army officer in NC. Neely was his wife. They flew together a month ago. Most likely just friends, or perhaps investment clients.
Brutally sad to look at people's online profiles and think of the radiating circles of devastation these accidents cause. Kids without parents. Parents having to live the rest of their lives without their children. At least two dozen lives shattered by this accident, in addition to those lost.
Yeah, found most of this on Facebook. The three you mentioned were all friends on there. The other guy, I couldn't find there.

Fassnacht also had a son who was 6 years old - Born 1/20/2018 it appears. He also appears to have been married and had a daughter who was older than the son.
 
Fassnacht was a wealth manager in Atlanta. Campbell was an Army officer in NC. Neely was his wife. They flew together a month ago. Most likely just friends, or perhaps investment clients.
Brutally sad to look at people's online profiles and think of the radiating circles of devastation these accidents cause. Kids without parents. Parents having to live the rest of their lives without their children. At least two dozen lives shattered by this accident, in addition to those lost.
This is what I'm finding haunts me about this accident, it takes just one time for the Swiss cheese to line up and the results are catastrophic and radiate to (and impact) many many other lives. Put another way, as a pilot, we can do the right thing (and break the accident chain) for years or decades, but one lapse might undo all of that prior effort or caution.

Incidentally, I recently completed my BFR. A few things stood out to me: (1) my normal mission is just me in the plane, but I keep the fuel at about 60% (a Cessna 182) so that I have the useful load to bring family members along on short notice; (2) practicing for my BFR, this was how I was flying the plane -- just me in the plane and fuel at 60% or less -- in other words, the plane "felt" similar to how it often does when I fly; (3) on day of my BFR, my fuel was almost full, because I had planned a longer trip that instead got scrubbed, and I also had my CFI along for the flight; (4) I was surprised by how quickly (and at what IAS) the stall horn sounded as we slowed (no flaps) to prepare for a power-on stall -- the extra weight had the plane handling differently than 90% of my other flights; (5) on my flight back to my home airport, I wound up having to do a go-around for traffic entering a crossing runway; (6) my next approach was nowhere near as stabilized as it should be, and I was high and "pushed" it to make my landing -- and it was a bad landing -- but the desire to get on the ground after one go-around definitely affected me -- I was just lucky the landing was only bad and not something worse.

So, reading these news reports, I see a number of things that resonate: (A) the heavier load in my plane made it handle noticeably differently in my maneuvers; (B) that fact snuck up on me a little; and (C) the internal pressure to land after a go-around, even with an unstable approach, caused me to make a bad decision. In my case, it was just a learning experience. In this the case at FFA, the consequences were huge and sad. There but for the grace of God . . . . Live, learn, be humble and be vigilant to catch yourself when you are pushing the envelope.
 
I grew up flying here, I'm from Manteo. What you're saying is exactly what I said early on. I've seen it happen at this airport for YEARS....people show up and are not prepared for the mechanical turbulence below the tree line. It does some wild stuff depending on wind direction. My family operates one of the tour and banner tow operations, and I can tell you all summer long you see people go behind the trees and come shooting out the other end on a go around. Happens ALL THE TIME.

The other thing on that runway is there are a lot of deer, I've seen a few planes cream them too over the years.

My guess is either the turbulence got them spooked and they went around, depending on how much power they put in/configuration, they popped up above the tree line where the wind again changed and they stalled it.

Or it is possible they went around for deer and basically did the same thing. In the evenings a lot of times I will fly a pass down the runway there to scatter them depending where they are.

My cousin is a KDH fire fighter, it was not a base to final stall/spin, based on where they ended up. It's likely bad/slow ADSB data.

There are a lot more incidents at this airport than most people realize. Generally no one is hurt seriously and it never makes much news. But it happens.

That blue line wind direction is one is the tricky directions, Ocean breeze coming over the hill, then the pine trees, dips into the runway and hits the pines on the other side. It can go from a nice normal stable approach to gnarly really quick.
I've been in there a couple times, both landing to the north. First time there it was calm. Second time had a good breeze and was with a friend who was flying. During short final I had to note that we didn't want to land in the sand before the threshold and he had to put in a healthy dose of power. There was a strong downdraft there. The trees and the dune can make it exciting. Also, on a mile out downwind, you can't see the runway for the trees. You use the monument to help find the runway.
 
This is what I'm finding haunts me about this accident, it takes just one time for the Swiss cheese to line up and the results are catastrophic and radiate to (and impact) many many other lives. Put another way, as a pilot, we can do the right thing (and break the accident chain) for years or decades, but one lapse might undo all of that prior effort or caution.

Incidentally, I recently completed my BFR. A few things stood out to me: (1) my normal mission is just me in the plane, but I keep the fuel at about 60% (a Cessna 182) so that I have the useful load to bring family members along on short notice; (2) practicing for my BFR, this was how I was flying the plane -- just me in the plane and fuel at 60% or less -- in other words, the plane "felt" similar to how it often does when I fly; (3) on day of my BFR, my fuel was almost full, because I had planned a longer trip that instead got scrubbed, and I also had my CFI along for the flight; (4) I was surprised by how quickly (and at what IAS) the stall horn sounded as we slowed (no flaps) to prepare for a power-on stall -- the extra weight had the plane handling differently than 90% of my other flights; (5) on my flight back to my home airport, I wound up having to do a go-around for traffic entering a crossing runway; (6) my next approach was nowhere near as stabilized as it should be, and I was high and "pushed" it to make my landing -- and it was a bad landing -- but the desire to get on the ground after one go-around definitely affected me -- I was just lucky the landing was only bad and not something worse.

So, reading these news reports, I see a number of things that resonate: (A) the heavier load in my plane made it handle noticeably differently in my maneuvers; (B) that fact snuck up on me a little; and (C) the internal pressure to land after a go-around, even with an unstable approach, caused me to make a bad decision. In my case, it was just a learning experience. In this the case at FFA, the consequences were huge and sad. There but for the grace of God . . . . Live, learn, be humble and be vigilant to catch yourself when you are pushing the envelope.
*GREAT* post. It's very easy for all of us to read accident reports and think, "That's dumb, I would never do that." In reality, the pilots who make those mistakes probably would have thought the same thing.

It is far better to have the mindset of "how did this pilot get themselves to the point they made this mistake?" Put yourself in the situation they were in, but knowing only what they knew, and see if it makes more sense now. Sure, there are still plenty of stupid pilot tricks, but a lot of them start to make more sense if you can really imagine the moment.

What I've found in applying this mindset, even to accidents that I'd already written off as silly/idiotic mistakes, is that once the first few links of the chain are present, it's very easy to imagine how someone can make the final mistake. It's also often easy to see why the first few links of the chain were built, because in a vacuum they don't seem like they're significant. Put it all together, and you find that it's a lot easier for that accident to occur than you had thought.
 
....but one lapse might undo all of that prior effort or caution.


Jenny38057-poster.jpg
 
Fassnacht was a wealth manager in Atlanta. Campbell was an Army officer in NC. Neely was his wife. They flew together a month ago. Most likely just friends, or perhaps investment clients.
Brutally sad to look at people's online profiles and think of the radiating circles of devastation these accidents cause. Kids without parents. Parents having to live the rest of their lives without their children. At least two dozen lives shattered by this accident, in addition to those lost.
When an airplane with all seats filled goes down, the pain is immense. When viewing and commenting on the mishaps posted in this forum, my thoughts always turn to those who have become victims by association.

I suppose many of us here have felt the same shock and grief. We have also experienced some anger at the randomness of fate or the knowledge the outcome didn't have to happen...if only.
 
And (at least for me) it's even more tragic for this to have happened at a place that means so much to aviation history.
 
It's all sad, and a 6 year old as part of if makes it all the more worse. I could see a failed go-around, that almost bit me once - following the right steps, but not having the required speed before setting the climb out pitch. And I can see the wind around the trees being a factor, too. I learned at a field where a crosswind over the trees would make for a "swirly" experience, with an angled up draft or down draft depending on the direction. So if there was a decent gusty cross wind we'd come in a little steeper, little faster until past the tree line. Not too much, just a little, and we'd be mentally setup to correct as required on the way in, and go around as required.

Lots of trees here in the NE, so lots of airports like that. One of the things I worry about is going somewhere where there are weird conditions that I don't know about. The 'unknown unknown'. Because as others have pointed out, when it happens you don't have to think about it, you just have to do the right thing. (Or maybe I just don't have time to think about it, and others can logically process a lot faster than me.) Maybe a bit like a car skidding on snow. If you're used to it, usually not a big deal. If the first time you experience it you're going 60 mph, it may bite you.
 
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