Separate names with a comma.
Discussion in 'Hangar Talk' started by DaveA, Jul 7, 2015.
And the C150 has no responsibility to see and avoid?
Some of us have tried to give some insight as far as ATC is concerned. In this situation , the controllers "picture" is somewhat dubious. If you choose to follow the guidance, fine.
If I was told the traffic was at 12 o'clock, opposite direction, my natural inclination would be to turn right, (if I decided to turn) since I know the other traffic will be turning right also if he spots me.
As far as your claim of the F16 not taking appropriate action, that is just your opinion with nothing to support that opinion. The pilot may have felt the appropriate action was visually acquiring the traffic rather than inadvertently turning into the traffic.
Well doing nothing at a 300 kts closure rate with 2 miles opposite direction same altitude is not appropriate.
Academic question for which you know the obvious answer. On a practical matter does it matter? Does it also matter that he had ROW? Of course not, dead men have no rights.
Don't mean to be harsh on you, the forum or the pilots involved. I believe this has the makings of a case study and possible motives for further changes to the procedures. How do I convince those ignorant to GA that mid-air collisions have been designed out of the system and are true freak occurrences?
Would have been in this situation.
In retrospect, yes. :]
Since the procedures weren't followed, why would you want to change them?
See and avoid doesn't work, especially at those speeds. The NTSB has said so repeatedly. Anyone who has ever been in and survived a mid-air knows that. Hell, anyone who has ever received a traffic alert knows that. In this case the F16 was talking to ATC and was aware of the traffic, and the C150 was not. So I'd say the F16 had more responsibility, had more opportunity to avoid the collision, etc.
Which new TCAS equipment provides lateral RAs and what is the RTCA spec defining the logic?
Could have been done for traffic possibly. Or it may have been a case of accomplishing a task now ( the descent to 1600) rather than later. It does strike me as odd also that low that far out.
Still under development but referred to as TCAS ADS-B Integrated surveillance. I think TCAS V (III and IV were skipped/abandoned)
So what is your problem with the F16 pilot? When told to turn immediately, he did. For all we know the pilot was about to turn right or climb just when he got the command from ATC to turn left.
From the command to turn to collision was about 18 seconds. Still time for the pilot to take action if he elects to do so.
He didn't turn immediately.
If he had done nothing, we wouldn't be having this discussion.
I think one other thing should be mentioned. The F16 was at 1600 ft per ATC assignment, in Class E, not C. Think the F16 pilot might be reluctant to do any sort of violent maneuver at that altitude, not knowing what else is out there in VFR puddle jumper territory?
Well by your logic a civilian aircraft has no business flying around MOAs or MTRs. I do it daily and I manage to see and avoid. The fact that we have so few midairs with civilian vs military proves that see and avoid works. It would only get better with supplemental ADS-B.
Everyone keeps harping on what the controller or the F-16 pilot was doing but we have no idea what the pilot in the Cessna was doing. He could've been inside with attention focused on a GPS for all we know. Fact is, he was transitioning thru a relatively busy chunk of airspace and not talking to anyone. While obviously legal, he still has just as much responsibility to see and avoid just as much as the F-16 pilot.
Why we have given so much attention to an occurrence such as this is beyond me. You have far more civilian vs civilian midairs at much slower closure rates but you don't see threads on those. In this case a military aircraft is involved so people automatically assume that they screwed up and no one else.This accident is nothing more than a rare chain of events where everyone involved takes some level of blame.
Sorry. ADS-B surveillance does not add lateral RAs.
No, it proves that it's a big sky, that one or both parties will usually be talking to ATC, and that ATC will usually suggest correct action that the pilot will usually obey.
Not yet. Hence why I said it's under development.
Not even vapor ware. Who is doing the development? Since the FAA provides the collision avoidance logic and they have no work underway for lateral RAs, please let all of us know who is doing the work.
I've only commented as much as I have because some people started to drag the Major through the mud, making all sorts of claims about him. The name of the F16 pilot was released to the media.
If people are going to be critical of the Major, have some facts to back it up, rather than projecting their worst assumptions upon him.
MIT, Lincoln Laboratory, NASA and Honeywell. You're welcome.
No one has been able to explain to me why ATC told the F-16 to descend to 1600 feet so far away from the airfield. Keeping him higher, longer, would have kept him out of the prime area to encounter VFR traffic into and out of small airfields. So many are criticizing the -16 pilot for looking for the traffic he was supposed to be looking for and not turning instantly. If he had done a 6 g turn into the Cessna would that have absolved him from blame?
Because the altitude for the TACAN to rwy 15 is 1,600 ft. He could intercept higher but the goal for your arrivals is to get them under your crossing and departing traffic. An aircraft traveling at 5 miles per minute, you don't want them stuck up high and bearing down on the FAC. I don't believe the controller's altitude assignment in this case will be scrutinized by the investigating team.
Having worked abut Charleston's airspace for over 4 yrs, I can tell you we had more aircraft at mid altitudes than we did at low altitude. The controller has many other aircraft to avoid. Aircraft that actually require specific separation standards unlike this particular case.
These local airports have VFR and IFR aircraft departing to higher altitudes all the time. Let's not forget, this C150 was climbing to a higher altitude. How high we'll never know. It just so happened that this particular aircraft had a climb rate that put him in a bad area. If it were me and my little Glasair, I would've been out of 3,000 ft in that area looking down on the F-16 and not a factor. In that case, if the controller had leveled the F-16 at 3,000 ft we would've collided.
Do the controllers at CHS ever wait until the traffic is within the lateral confines of Class C before descending as low as 016?
If the departures out of the GA airports don't appear on radar until 010 ft or so, not a lot of time for observation for potential conflicts for acft at 016.
Thanks for the incorrect guess.
Not sure how long they wait. Controller preference based on traffic. Our SSR didn't cover that low, that far away.
During a high traffic day, 6,000 ft within the C is not the place to be for your arrivals. You'd have them stuck on top with multiple over flights below and you'd have to restrict some of your departures at 5K below them or have to vector departures around them. Descend them to the altitude for the IAP to get them below traffic that you have separation responsibility for. Worry about 1200 code traffic calls later in as they come. Most of the low level 1200 stuff is training occurring in either designated or common training areas. In those cases, they aren't generally a factor for arrivals.
The C150 was observed just off the departure end of MKS. impact occurred 4 minutes later. I'd say that's sufficient time to issue a traffic call.
Lol. You just can't educate people who know it all.
"The current program is supporting the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Key activities include development of the next-generation airborne collision avoidance system... "
" To evaluate TCAS use of the 1030/1090 spectrum, TCAS-TCAS coordination, and to explore the potential applicability of ADSB data for collision avoidance use, Lincoln is performing 1030/1090 monitoring in the Boston area. Finally, Lincoln is developing a new approach to collision avoidance logic that builds on recent advances in mathematics and computational resources. This approach may facilitate adaptation to various airspace environments, as well as variations in aircraft and surveillance performance."
It couldn't possibly be that someone knows more about this than you do.
Ok, nothing wrong with going to 016, just wondering how they operate.
I've only had one experience with CHS z , and it was a few weeks prior to the accident. Flew into JZI from the NE through Class C VFR with no issues. Leaving JZI VFR to the NE I contacted app and requested 020 NE bound. They have me a code , radar ID, and told me to remain 011 or below,( below the shelf) then gave me an easterly vector outside of the lateral limits of Class C.
I thought hmmm, why am I talking to you, and why are you giving me a vector if you aren't going to let me in Class C? I was out of the area in no time , so I didn't ask any questions.
Doesn't sound like you got very good service out of them that day.
Last time I was in JZI was in 2011. Used to take students there in the Army for IFR training / check rides. Nice little airport. Went to some pizza joint not far out the gate.
Seeking some philosophical surcease from the actions of another after tragic consequence is common. However, it's fairly often unsatisfactory, no matter the answer given.
You first question was, 'why was the plane at 1600' so far out'. Which I answered, because he was instructed there, and he was under control of ATC. The question of why the controller put him there is something that no matter the reason, I suspect you'll never be ok with what you get.
Still just issues vertical RAs. Guess you missed that at the past several industry meetings you failed to attend. You were at the RTCA meeting at Lincoln two weeks ago, correct? Guess you know more than those that participate in the design and specification development.
Go try and convince someone else you have a clue about this topic.
Lol. I have a close acquaintance who works at NASA Moffett Field on this very project.
Go try and convince someone else you have a clue about this topic.
Huh? I flew tactical jets for half my career and never was directed to fly that low, that far from an airfield I was landing at. That's why VRs and IRs exist for tactical aircraft--so they don't just fly anywhere at three to four times the speed of other traffic they might encounter. I'm not sure off I'm okay with any explanation because I have yet to hear one. ATC turned the fighter into oncoming traffic and I admit I'm not okay with that. Was this a result of a poor radar display or some limitation of the equipment or human error? I'll let the safety investigation sort it out but I certainly don't blame the Major based on what has come out so far.
Well, I haven't blamed anyone here, for anything. My only point was that seeking some kind of answers to 'why' questions doesn't often lead to satisfaction. In most cases, it leads to more questions.
I have been teaching logic and philosophy on and off for more than half my career, and one thing I've learned, the quest for non-empirical rationalizations after the fact, isn't going to be useful to you. Whatever answer the controller gives, you can pick apart further.
If he was at 3000 or 4000 feet, wouldn't he still be going three or four times faster than the traffic he would encounter? Though I don't see how the difference in speed is an issue except in an overtake situation.
The difference is reaction time. Traffic at 030 or higher are established targets and the controller would receive assistance from the computer conflict alert feature. Traffic below 010 may just pop up on the radar at closer proximity and with less warning.
First traffic call in this situation was at 2 miles and it is possible the controller was alerted to the traffic by computer generated conflict alert.
Technically , there is nothing to prevent the controller from issuing a descent to 016 that far out, just not a real saavy move , in my opinion.
I think it just kind of depends on the situation. It is certainly not uncommon for controllers to send mil jet traffic down to MVA pretty early on if possible. I can see your point for sure, but I don't think (at least based on my own experience) that this controller did anything particularly out of the norm here, at least with respect to altitude clearance. Doesn't mean it is the best practice, and of course there are a lot of reasons not to.......fuel consumption, noise over more populated areas, possible non-squawking low altitude traffic outside the confines of controlled airspace, etc.
Mil pilot failed to execute immediate avoidance as told by ATC. He hesitated.....and that cost two people thier lives.