Crash of Independence 8 writeup...

Interesting story. We can all learn a lesson from it. Thanks for sharing.

Looks like you fly an Archer II. I fly the same model. Nice plane!
 
What is so frustrating about this is it is yet another case of two pilots failing to monitor airspeed and when they did catch it, they responded with power only. No attempt to reduce pitch angle and get the airplane flying until it was too late.

We as pilots are killing ourselves with a lack of basic airmanship.
 
I really have a hard time getting my head around this one. I have flown a fair number of hours in intermittent IMC while trying to maintain position on a reference point. With two experienced pilots up front I find it puzzling that one wasn't in a constant heads down full IFR mode. There may have been terrain issues involved, it isn't clear from the information in the story, but when trying to orbit on a contact in low visibility we had one set of eyes outside and one set flying on the gauges. Once in trouble they did about everything wrong.

Totally inexplicable. :dunno:
 
This is clearly a case of pilot error and they should've known/done better, tragic but totally preventable.

Here' some insight from my 6 months flying the MC-12 in Afghanistan. No offense to anyone here, but IME flying a tactical ISR platform like the MC-12 has little in common with flying KA350's. It's not uncommon to be very very busy in the MC-12. The mission commander is typically working on a computer (with the screen mounted over the top of the basic pilot displays). I used to look across at the co-pilot (who sits in the left seat) displays to make sure we weren't doing anything crazy. You can also see the backup easily even with the laptop screen up. Typically the MC is working on as many as 6 operations, coordinating with 10 or 12 different agencies and monitoring what the sensor operator is doing while listening to/talking on as many as 7 radios.

The co-pilot also serves as the "air warden" in many/most cases. In addition to the basic flying of the aircraft, he/she is also checkin people into/out of the ROZ, handing out sensor assignments and updating ROZ participants with any changes to the products or plan that they received before stepping to fly. The co-pilot is also on NVGs monitoring for traffic and anything being shot at us. (trying to keep MQ-1's/9's from hitting us is harder than keeping the small arms fire from hitting us).

Before anyone says that they shouldn't be so busy for both pilots or they have too much to do: if the MC-12 isn't there, then one of the single or two-seat tactical airplanes are left to do air warden and the updates & coordination have to be done by the JTAC who is embedded with the tactical ground party and should really be firing back or keeping quiet. Bottom line - the aircraft is perfectly suited for the mission, you just have to have aviators (not auto pilot watchers) flying it.

RIP to the lost ones and condolences to their families. I hate losing brothers in arms, and I hate losing them more when there's no good reason.
 
Threefingeredjack said:
There may have been terrain issues involved, it isn't clear from the information in the story,
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“The Mishap Aircraft lost approximately 15,000 ft before impacting the ground.” The span from initial climb to ultimate crash: 84 seconds.

Terrain issues?
 
Threefingeredjack said:
Totally inexplicable. :dunno:
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It is actually pretty simple....just really sad.

They needed to do a spiraling climb due to the weather and trying to maintain station. They were on A/P and PF selected the climb, but never adjusted power from his previous cruise setting....so airspeed decays in the climb. When they noticed there was a problem, both pilots response was to call for power alone. No attempt to lower the nose until they departed controlled flight. As I read it in another source, I believe the A/P was still engaged when they departed controlled flight.

Why didn't either pilot notice the airspeed earlier? Well, that goes back to the same issue as Colgan 3407, all of the Air France stall accidents and incidents, Asiana 214 and several other 121 stick shaker incidents in recent years. It is as if we (pilots collectively) have gotten so complacent with all of the technology that we have gotten away from basic flying skills.
 
EvilEagle said:
Bottom line - the aircraft is perfectly suited for the mission, you just have to have aviators (not auto pilot watchers) flying it.

RIP to the lost ones and condolences to their families. I hate losing brothers in arms, and I hate losing them more when there's no good reason.
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Well said.
 
EvilEagle, question for you since you said you have done an MC-12 tour. Since most of the pilots come from other platforms and as I understand it, just like the Navy C-12 guys, there is no permanent MC-12 community, do you think the relatively low time in the air frame makes guys more dependent or otherwise likely to use the A/P?

My limited experience flying around the AG as PAX in a Navy C-12 is that the autopilot goes on as soon as the gear comes up and stays on until the flare.
 
It's heartbreaking to read a report like that. I had a friend in the F-4 who wound up out of control falling through IMC after a formation mid-air.

He was able to eject, he didn't have to ride it down. What a nightmare!
 
Fearless Tower said:
When they noticed there was a problem, both pilots response was to call for power alone. No attempt to lower the nose until they departed controlled flight.
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I think part of the problem is the way the stall maneuvers were taught in the sim. Until fairly recently (2 or 3 years ago?) you were supposed to maintain altitude which required back pressure on the yoke for the beginning of the recovery. Since then, they have gone to wanting to see you lower the nose somewhat even if you lose a little altitude. I have never trained in a King Air 350 but it was that was in the King Air 200 and various business jets.
 
If only we had the recording technology we have today back in WWII, we could all listen in while hundreds of aviators crashed their way to death and we could sit here and tell them how they screwed up and say stuff like, "These pilots of WWII, all they know is the AI and they just don't have good stick and rudder skills like the good ol' days."

War is hell and pilots of the greatest generation, that knew nothing but "basic airmanship" did this kind of stuff all the time. They died on a regular basis from other than enemy action. They did it so that we could now sit here in our comfy armchair with our magnifying glass and say- "These kids today..."

There are lessons to be learned here for the military. For us civilians... we really shouldn't try to judge, or even compare. It is a different world and I know I couldn't have done better.
 
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EvilEagle said:
This is clearly a case of pilot error and they should've known/done better, tragic but totally preventable.

Here' some insight from my 6 months flying the MC-12 in Afghanistan. No offense to anyone here, but IME flying a tactical ISR platform like the MC-12 has little in common with flying KA350's. It's not uncommon to be very very busy in the MC-12. The mission commander is typically working on a computer (with the screen mounted over the top of the basic pilot displays). I used to look across at the co-pilot (who sits in the left seat) displays to make sure we weren't doing anything crazy. You can also see the backup easily even with the laptop screen up. Typically the MC is working on as many as 6 operations, coordinating with 10 or 12 different agencies and monitoring what the sensor operator is doing while listening to/talking on as many as 7 radios.

The co-pilot also serves as the "air warden" in many/most cases. In addition to the basic flying of the aircraft, he/she is also checkin people into/out of the ROZ, handing out sensor assignments and updating ROZ participants with any changes to the products or plan that they received before stepping to fly. The co-pilot is also on NVGs monitoring for traffic and anything being shot at us. (trying to keep MQ-1's/9's from hitting us is harder than keeping the small arms fire from hitting us).

Before anyone says that they shouldn't be so busy for both pilots or they have too much to do: if the MC-12 isn't there, then one of the single or two-seat tactical airplanes are left to do air warden and the updates & coordination have to be done by the JTAC who is embedded with the tactical ground party and should really be firing back or keeping quiet. Bottom line - the aircraft is perfectly suited for the mission, you just have to have aviators (not auto pilot watchers) flying it.

RIP to the lost ones and condolences to their families. I hate losing brothers in arms, and I hate losing them more when there's no good reason.
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Good write up.

I was briefed on this a few months ago so I have a bit more insight into this than what's in the report. The missing stuff only expands on what's presented. After the brief, I was appalled.

Bottom line, the IP (called MMC in the report) should have taken controls MUCH sooner. I mean, like right away. It also shows the importance of proper use of autopilot. Unfortunately in this incident, the autopilot did exactly as it was told.:mad2:

Also, even before the incident began, the IP should have instructed the pilot on the proper setting for an orbit climb (FLC instead of Pitch Mode). Perhaps, that works on their normal equipment, but in this case it led directly to their demise.

Another thing to take from this is you got two guys that are used to flying heavy equipment that are now thrown, normally kicking and screaming, into a MUCH lighter aircraft with different systems and characteristics. Add to that a much different mission as well, with the complexities that EvilEagle described. The 200 hours that the IP had really was probably just enough to get himself comfortable with the aircraft/mission, but more than likely not up to the point where he could keep track of what the newbie was doing while doing his own job.
 
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Anymouse said:
Also, even before the incident began, the IP should have instructed the pilot on the proper setting for an orbit climb (FLC instead of Pitch Mode). Perhaps, that works on their normal equipment, but in this case it led directly to their demise.
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Does the KA350 A/P have FLC as an option?

I'm pretty sure the C-12s (BE-200s) only have pitch mode
 
I never understood (and wouldn't allow anyone flying with me to use) pitch mode when you had FLC. Bad procedures!!!
 
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