Cirrus down in SC

In my best Crocodile Dundee voice:

"That's not a roll cage. THIS is a roll cage!":

And here it is, Cajun Style:

mooney.jpg


(Ground incident, nobody hurt)


Ron Wanttaja
 
Most of those are going to involve an impact to the roof of >3 g. About the only one I can think of that would not exceed that would be a slow (relatively speaking) noseover from putting the nose of the aircraft down an incline or into a ditch.

A very related question is how much impact does the cabin structure of competing models withstand. The Mooneys ought to fare well but I'd be surprised if the cabin of a Bonanza would offer much protection in the event of a 3+ g inverted vertical drop to a hard surface.
 
I doubt it was two-thirds. The loss records of military aircraft are pretty easily accessible (I've spent a fair amount of time digging around in them since I have an interest in aviation archaeology). Keep in mind that a significant number of B-17s survived the war to be melted into scrap and over 1/3 (4570 out of 12731 built) were lost in combat so I think a two-thirds loss in transit is a hyperbolic comment that overplays the very real dangers those crews faced on a ferry flight across the Atlantic.

I don't mean two-thirds overall, I mean two-thirds of those that were making the trip the same day as he was.

The other part of the story: They got to Goose Bay and the weather eastbound was terrible - They thought "There's no way we're going to be able to cross in the next couple of days." So they all went out partying, returned at Midnight and went to sleep.

At 3 AM, they were roused and ordered "Go. NOW." :eek:

The weather across the pond was terrible, and the arrival weather (NDB approaches) was below minimums for most of the day at several different fields. Some didn't make the ocean crossing, some crashed on their approach attempts or after running out of fuel from making multiple approaches.

So no, the loss rate wasn't 2/3ds overall, but 30 or so of the 45 or so aircraft that crossed that day.

My main concern with the Cirrus is not it's handling characteristics, but with how it reacts in a crash.

No argument there - But you continually keep harping on them for selling their planes to non-pilots. They're somewhat unique in that regard and they're certainly better at it than anyone else... And someone has to do it or there will be no more pilots. :(

Where the idea that I fault the aircraft itself comes from is that firstly, the solution to the documented spin/stall issue was not to fix the aircraft but to put a rocket-launched parachute on the plane

Incorrect. The parachute is there because Alan Klapmeier wanted it there after being involved in a mid-air collision during his instrument training in 1985. http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001214X36116&key=1

They were exempted from the full spin certification testing due to the presence of the parachute. However, during testing they DID spin the airplane and it did recover using normal spin recovery techniques. I've spoken with the test pilot who did it.

and secondly to market the aircraft as equivalent to a Cessna single engine for training and operations purposes (I've heard it come out of the mouths of Cirrus representatives in person and seem to recall that the claim was even made in one of the Cirrus ads a couple of years back...I'll see if I can find it again).

And I maintain that there's nothing wrong with that. :no:
 
I mean two-thirds of those that were making the trip the same day as he was.
Ugh.....that sucks. Sorry for the misunderstanding.

I'd be surprised if the cabin of a Bonanza would offer much protection in the event of a 3+ g inverted vertical drop to a hard surface
It doesn't appear to.

Incorrect. The parachute is there because Alan Klapmeier wanted it there after being involved in a mid-air collision during his instrument training in 1985.
That's the story they put out there and one of the reasons why I do respect Alan Klapmeier (for being proactive).

However, if you look at the design prior to the certification flight crash, there was no parachute on that aircraft otherwise that pilot would likely not be part of my research. That's a hell of a coincidence especially if Klapmeier planned on it from the word go (which I've heard from someone who knew him before the company got going that he would "not shut up about it").

However, during testing they DID spin the airplane and it did recover using normal spin recovery techniques
Then why did they not just get the plane spin certified and remove one of the things that makes people question the safety of the aircraft? That would make more sense than allowing apparently false information (if what you're telling me and what you were told is correct) to be spread freely. I know there's a cost issue with that certification, but if I were running the company I would think the ability to quash those claims would trump the cost.

But you continually keep harping on them for selling their planes to non-pilots
And note that I said that the problem is low hour, inexperienced pilots who out of the their league. Recruiting such people, often out of careers that tend to select for cocky, arrogant and almost narcissistic personality types (docs, lawyers, engineers, brokers, etc)*, is not probably the best way to alleviate concerns about low hour pilots and your aircraft.

*- No offense meant to the docs, lawyers, engineers and brokers on the forum.
 
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That looks like the result of a fire, not any significant impact.

Yup, that's why I added the note about 'Ground incident, nobody hurt.' Caught fire during pre-flight. Afterwards, they picked the plane up with a forklift and deposited it in the spot where the picture was taken.

I just thought it was interesting that the steel-tube roll cage was still visible....

Ron Wanttaja
 
If I were Alan, the answer would be "look, pal, all we've done is outsell everybody else in this business, including all the established players, by a significant margin. The market seems to be telling us it likes the way we designed them. When the issue you raise becomes a problem, we'll address it. Until then, we'd rather spend the test money for stuff we think is more important. We'll understand if you disagree, and hope you're happy with whatever else you decide to buy."

If you follow aviation history, do you honestly think Cirri is guilty of any up-selling/over-selling that hasn't been part of the industry since 1947, or maybe earlier? Who would you be trying to sell them to? high-school dropouts?

When they asked Willy Sutton why he robbed banks, he said "because that's where they keep the money."

Then why did they not just get the plane spin certified and remove one of the things that makes people question the safety of the aircraft? That would make more sense than allowing apparently false information (if what you're telling me and what you were told is correct) to be spread freely. I know there's a cost issue with that certification, but if I were running the company I would think the ability to quash those claims would trump the cost.

And note that I said that the problem is low hour, inexperienced pilots who out of the their league. Recruiting such people, often out of careers that tend to select for cocky, arrogant and almost narcissistic personality types (docs, lawyers, engineers, brokers, etc)*, is not probably the best way to alleviate concerns about low hour pilots and your aircraft.

*- No offense meant to the docs, lawyers, engineers and brokers on the forum.
 
No offense meant to the docs, lawyers, engineers and brokers on the forum.
:raspberry: Now you're the pot calling the kettle black!

And how do you propose to change that? A regulation that allows me to defer your medical becuase "I don't like your personality?" :crazy:
 
If you follow aviation history, do you honestly think Cirri is guilty of any up-selling/over-selling that hasn't been part of the industry since 1947, or maybe earlier? Who would you be trying to sell them to? high-school dropouts?

No, but just because it's common/standard practice doesn't mean it's something to laud or encourage.

And how do you propose to change that? A regulation that allows me to defer your medical becuase "I don't like your personality?"

Actually I think the tendency of certain groups to have an inflated sense of confidence in their abilities and tendency to not be critical enough of themselves just something we need to make people more aware of. It's certainly had documented impacts on error rates and such in health care and other professions. I'm not sure if it will impact the fatality rate in aviation, but I am a believer that even if it doesn't we still have done our duty by speaking up and trying to make a change for the better.

Now you're the pot calling the kettle black!

Haha! Nicely played.

You're talking to the guy who refused to solo on four different occasions and racked up 125 hours prior to his first solo because partly he wanted more experience prior to getting himself into a situation without any back up.
 
That's the story they put out there and one of the reasons why I do respect Alan Klapmeier (for being proactive).

However, if you look at the design prior to the certification flight crash, there was no parachute on that aircraft otherwise that pilot would likely not be part of my research. That's a hell of a coincidence especially if Klapmeier planned on it from the word go (which I've heard from someone who knew him before the company got going that he would "not shut up about it").

Well, that's another person's account that this wasn't just "a hell of a coincidence." Besides, it is quite possible/likely that the reason the test aircraft that crashed (N115CD) didn't have a chute was simply that BRS didn't have it ready yet. In fact, this is what the accident report says:

NTSB Report on N115CD said:
Additionally, according to CDC, the manufacturer of the CAPS was scheduled to supply the first complete production parachute assembly to CDC by March 30, 1999 (one week after the accident flight).

Then why did they not just get the plane spin certified and remove one of the things that makes people question the safety of the aircraft? That would make more sense than allowing apparently false information (if what you're telling me and what you were told is correct) to be spread freely. I know there's a cost issue with that certification, but if I were running the company I would think the ability to quash those claims would trump the cost.

I doubt it. The vast majority of people aren't concerned with the spin recovery characteristics of the Cirri because they don't ever intend to spin them.

And note that I said that the problem is low hour, inexperienced pilots who out of the their league.

And I'm talking about NO-hour, NO-experience pilots. Those are the people who we must market to if GA is to survive. Kudos to Cirrus for actually doing it. :yes:
 
Additionally, according to CDC, the manufacturer of the CAPS was scheduled to supply the first complete production parachute assembly to CDC by March 30, 1999 (one week after the accident flight).

I retract my prior statement. I did not recall reading that.

The vast majority of people aren't concerned with the spin recovery characteristics of the Cirri because they don't ever intend to spin them.

Yes, but apparently enough people are concerned that it has been- at least in some circles- what the plane is best known for (that and the tendency to burn) often to the trumping of the really good performance aspects of the aircraft (cruise speed, fuel burn, etc). Just because you don't see it as a concern doesn't mean the "majority" don't. Of course the reciprocal is also true (just because my colleagues and friends and I see it as a concern doesn't mean that we're in "majority"). Selection and confirmation biases are a pain in the ass.
 
And I'm talking about NO-hour, NO-experience pilots. Those are the people who we must market to if GA is to survive. Kudos to Cirrus for actually doing it.

I agree that's a target market we have to hit, but it would be better to have someone who produces an appropriate training aircraft (Cessna, Piper, etc) than to continue the high rate of crashes associated with a particular model despite lower numbers and lower numbers of hours flown. Killing a good portion of the "new recruits" is not going to be a long term viable business plan unless your product is literally addictive.
 
Absorbing overhead by selling more units is also important insofar as staying in business is concerned, and they are doing pretty well in that area. If/when they detect a softening of demand due to lack of proven spin-recovery capabilities (which I predict will be never) I'm betting they get right on it. I think you're overstating the problem.

I retract my prior statement. I did not recall reading that.



Yes, but apparently enough people are concerned that it has been- at least in some circles- what the plane is best known for (that and the tendency to burn) often to the trumping of the really good performance aspects of the aircraft (cruise speed, fuel burn, etc). Just because you don't see it as a concern doesn't mean the "majority" don't. Of course the reciprocal is also true (just because my colleagues and friends and I see it as a concern doesn't mean that we're in "majority"). Selection and confirmation biases are a pain in the ass.
 
....and I think understating the problem (an aircraft with a >90% mortality rate in crashes which makes even the F-16, an aircraft known in Air Force safety circles as "the lawn dart" or the "disposable jet" look good) isn't exactly a great idea either. You're looking at it solely from a business and "fun" perspective and I'm trying to look at it from that old adage of "skin, tin, ticket". I could care less if they are blowing the competition out of the water (good for them actually) in terms of sales but there also comes a corporate and personal responsibility to do what is right by your customers and not addressing issues that could be resolved- and I'm not talking the spin/stall issues since you won't admit there is an issue there and it's not specifically what I care most about- is not doing that. I really think it's ludicrous that the most resistance I get about my research comes from the very people I consider my friends and are the ones other safety researchers and myself are trying to protect (pilots).
 
....and I think understating the problem (an aircraft with a >90% mortality rate in crashes which makes even the F-16, an aircraft known in Air Force safety circles as "the lawn dart" or the "disposable jet" look good) isn't exactly a great idea either. You're looking at it solely from a business and "fun" perspective and I'm trying to look at it from that old adage of "skin, tin, ticket". I could care less if they are blowing the competition out of the water (good for them actually) in terms of sales but there also comes a corporate and personal responsibility to do what is right by your customers and not addressing issues that could be resolved- and I'm not talking the spin/stall issues since you won't admit there is an issue there and it's not specifically what I care most about- is not doing that. I really think it's ludicrous that the most resistance I get about my research comes from the very people I consider my friends and are the ones other safety researchers and myself are trying to protect (pilots).

90% fatality rate? 90% of what? Does that include the cases where the chute was pulled?
 
90% fatality rate? 90% of what? Does that include the cases where the chute was pulled?

It also doesn't include cases in which the airplane did not suffer substantial damage, because those aren't reported.

Aviation crash statistics are a joke. Fatality rates even moreso, because to have a fatality, you have to hit pretty hard. To have an accident you have to hit pretty hard. The numbers are pumped up.
 
Does that include the cases where the chute was pulled?
Last number I heard put forth was 33 lives saved by the CAPS. Wikipedia lists 31 verified (by corresponding accident reports) lives saved in 19 deployments and 4 fatalities associated with deployments. BTW, for the sake of full disclosure, one of the fatalities and three of the survivors are/were friends of my family. I do agree that the CAPS has it's place (and if there was a non-solid fuel version I would have it installed on any small aricraft I own).

The point was that in serious crashes there is a distinct lack of "serious injury" as the NTSB terms it that you commonly see in other aircraft when the crash occurs under similar circumstances. You can't include the CAPS deployments in the analysis because there is a minority of scenarios that are amenable to the use of the CAPS and also very few other aircraft are equipped with ballistic recovery systems so there is a lack of data to compare accurately. It's akin to having a debate about survivability of the crash of Delta 191 at Dallas in 1985 versus the bombing of Pan Am 103. Two separate scenarios, two separate analyses. One of my friends did a crude (basic) analysis for one of his graduate courses in epidemiology and what he found seems to indicate that you either walk away with minor injuries or you're dead. I'll e-mail him tonight and see if he still has the results.

The numbers are pumped up.
Not if you look at the right things and are not trying to view the data through a filter that is based on a preconceived notion that the data you're looking at is either going to fit your stance or it is false.

A good example is that I originally suspected the CAPS contributed to mortality because of the tendency of Cirri to burn in crashes more frequently than other aircraft. My hypothesis was that the solid fuel rocket which frequently deploys due to impact forces was serving as an ignition source for the fuel thereby decreasing chances of survival. However, when you look at the data, you find that all but one person for whom we have data died in the crash prior to the fire so that hypothesis had to be discarded as not being supported by the evidence at hand. Supposing that I truly had a problem with Cirrus specifically, I would discard the evidence as "pumped up" and ignore it rather than applying it as a valid means of answering a question I had, all the while acknowledging and working within the limitations of the data (i.e., not all victims being autopsied or the result are not reported, etc)

Also, saying the data is skewed or "pumped up" is like saying that car fatality statistics are falsified because of the fact that they are not normally reported as a fraction of all accidents (which are underreported because you don't have to file a report for an accident resulting in damage below a certain value) or whatever other format you want to see. I'm not saying the way statistics are report is ideal- it isn't and never will be, but you work with the best evidence you have. Are we supposed to just throw out all the safety advances that came out of research based on or spurred on by this data because it is "pumped up" as you say.

It also doesn't include cases in which the airplane did not suffer substantial damage, because those aren't reported.
We are not talking about minor damage accidents (or "incidents" as the NTSB terms them) so why make a strawman argument and try to complicate something?

because to have a fatality, you have to hit pretty hard.
That's not true. As an example we're all familiar with, you can have a fatality in an unrestrained person in a car accident with impact speeds of as low as 10 mph so the idea that there has to be this massive impact or "hard hit" is false. It's been documented and I've also seen it myself as an EMT on a few occasions. When you start throwing in things like a vertical deceleration component, things get cloudy (due to a lack of crash testing) but it is not most likely going to reduce the likelihood of serious or fatal injury. I make that statement based off a little educated extrapolation give that falls from greater than the standing height of people are strongly correlated with serious or fatal injury to the spine and great vessels of the thorax in a pure vertical deceleration.
 
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Have you ever flown a Cirrus? I wouldn't call it unforgiving. :no: It really is a good airplane - The most "unforgiving" thing about it is that it goes fast (which can be remedied by pulling the throttle back when the plane starts to catch up to you) and it lands fairly fast. It is not difficult to fly by any stretch of the imagination. :no:.

I recently took a demo flight in an SR22 with the Garmin Perspective, turbo, FIKI, A/C, the works. Knowing I would not get an unbaised answer, I asked about the stall/spin characteristics, recovery, etc. The answers were interesting, and two things made sense. First, he asked where most stall/spin accidents happen, he pointed to the base to final area, and asked how recoverable that is in any airplane at that place. Good point in favor of a chute vs no chute. Second, we explored slow flight and stalls, and I've got to say they are impressive. I think because of the nature of the "cuffed" wing there appeared to be aileron control throughout the stall, quite unlike anything else I've flown. Granted Vso is 60 KCAS, so you're right, Kent, it lands fast. However, I hand flew an ILS and landing was pretty straight forward, though you seem to land with some power. Overall, I was very, very impressed. (Well, as impressed as you can be with such a spartan aircraft.)

I think Cirrus has done good things in the development and refinement of this aircraft, IMO.
 
First, he asked where most stall/spin accidents happen, he pointed to the base to final area, and asked how recoverable that is in any airplane at that place. Good point in favor of a chute vs no chute.

Given that the most base to final turn stall/spins involve an airplane outside the BRS activation envelope how is that a point in favor of a chute? Seems neutral to me.
 
Given that the most base to final turn stall/spins involve an airplane outside the BRS activation envelope how is that a point in favor of a chute? Seems neutral to me.

Lance, I agree totally. I think it would take an inordinate presence of mind to react in sufficient time to pull the BRS chute from pattern altitude if one had entered a spin. The mere fact that one had entered a spin and the resulting confusion makes that near impossible in my opinion.
 
Since this thread has done just about everything but discuss the topic, I thought I would add some perspective as a pilot who bases at Rock Hill, SC and regularly flies a similar Cirrus SR22T.

Some facts. Runway 2/20 is 5500 feet long and has a single parallel taxiway. The taxiway to runway 20, ends just before a deep drainage ditch. There is a flat grass overrun of at least 1000 feet off the north departure end of runway 2 which has an ILS localizer antenna array on it. There are plans to extend the runway towards the north by at least an additional 500 feet sometime into the future. The taxiway would be extended at that time and the drainage ditch would need to be filled in. In the mean time, the airport has done some construction on the southwest side and dirt has been moved to the northwest area parallel to the existing overrun, but the dirt was insufficient to fill to the level of the runway overrun. The dirt that was moved, left a small area at the end of the parallel taxiway for the drainage ditch and I would estimate that the level drops off 20 or 30 feet at that point.

The accident aircraft hit in low in the drainage ditch at a point almost in the corner of the vertical rise to the taxiway. See the attached picture.
It shows the drainage ditch and the burn mark of the SR22 as it ejected material up the rise to the taxiway. The burn mark starts at the bottom of the ditch and the taxiway is out of sight above it and to the right on the picture. Behind the burn mark, the ditch also rises to the level of the overrun at the top of the picture. To the left, the fill dirt rises almost to the same level of the runway overrun, but is several feet lower.

The aircraft took off from Runway 2 and crashed off and to the left of runway 20 in the drainage ditch well below the level of the taxiway. Observers of the accident made statements such as his climb was very steep, that he seemed to be doing stunt flying, and that he turned back to the runway, but did not make it. My understanding is that the NTSB has determined that the engine was running, but this is not confirmed.

All this points to the aircraft entered a spin and descended at a steep angle to the ground. It was steep enough to avoid hitting the other side of the drainage ditch and the pilot was not able to land on either the flat fill area or the flat overrun immediately adjacent to the collision site.

In spite of the fact that the aircraft hit towards the bottom of the drainage ditch, debris was scattered up the side of the ditch and onto the parallel taxiway and into the grassy area between the taxiway and the runway. It was a violent and unsurvivable accident.
 

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Given that the most base to final turn stall/spins involve an airplane outside the BRS activation envelope how is that a point in favor of a chute? Seems neutral to me.

I have heard, either here or elsewhere, that chute deployment can be successful at 400 ft AGL. Since you should be at 500 feet during the base/final turn, it's plausible, but ...

Lance, I agree totally. I think it would take an inordinate presence of mind to react in sufficient time to pull the BRS chute from pattern altitude if one had entered a spin. The mere fact that one had entered a spin and the resulting confusion makes that near impossible in my opinion.

No doubt it would take one heck of a quick reaction and presence of mind to pull that off at that altitude.
 
I have heard, either here or elsewhere, that chute deployment can be successful at 400 ft AGL. Since you should be at 500 feet during the base/final turn, it's plausible, but ...



No doubt it would take one heck of a quick reaction and presence of mind to pull that off at that altitude.

I subscribe to the theory that a pilot capable of making such a quick decision at this crucial point in time wouldn't have made the mistakes required to get to the point where that decision is needed.
 
The issue is not the airplane - the issue is the type of person attracted to the Cirrus...
1. Usually low time pilots - Beck got his PPL in 2008...
2. Usually successful mid forties to early fifties business men, doctors, lawyers, and maybe an indian chief or two...
3. Compulsive, Type A personalities who believe that their smarts and their money can solve any problem...

Unfortunately for them, mother nature (the laws of physics) is not impressed by either their money or their supposed smarts...

denny-o
 
The issue is not the airplane - the issue is the type of person attracted to the Cirrus...
1. Usually low time pilots - Beck got his PPL in 2008...
2. Usually successful mid forties to early fifties business men, doctors, lawyers, and maybe an indian chief or two...
3. Compulsive, Type A personalities who believe that their smarts and their money can solve any problem...

Unfortunately for them, mother nature (the laws of physics) is not impressed by either their money or their supposed smarts...

denny-o

Well, let's see, in order to be #2, you probably are going to be #3, and to become #3, you would probably have postponed your flying until #2, and once you're #2, you probably want something like a Cirrus, because you can afford it, whereas those who are not #3, can't afford one. Without #3, Cirrus probably wouldn't exist. :smile:

I am none of the above, and probably wouldn't buy a new Cirrus if I was. ;)
 
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