KWVI Watsonville MId Air, Multiple Fatalities

Again, it's the responsibility of the pilot joining the final approach to assure that he is not interfering with an aircraft already on final approach, regardless of how the aircraft got there and regardless of their respective altitudes. That's the regulation. That means that your LAST opportunity to prevent a conflict occurs when you still have time to turn away from the final approach course, and the only good way to do that at that point is to turn in a direction that keeps you on the pattern side of the runway, left turn if left hand pattern, right turn if right hand pattern. That last opportunity also coincides with your best opportunity to actually see the aircraft on final, who very likely doesn't actually see you.
It sounds like you're talking about being on base when you recognize the conflict, which would be the toughest situation to get out of without crossing the final approach course. With left traffic, you would need to complete the turn parallel to the runway and offset to the left, but not offset enough to conflict with traffic on downwind. For comms, an announcement of "Cessna xxx going around, offsetting to the left" would have provided information that could have helped the other pilot know which way to turn to avoid the collision, whereas the commentary that "you're coming at me pretty fast" probably wasted valuable time.
 
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A further complication would be that the MDA on the VOR-A is only about 140 feet above the light-aircraft TPA.

I mean, here’s the picture when the 340 called the 3 mile final. He’s in the upper right. The 152 isn’t on FlightAware, but based on the YT video with the noise abatement tracking, he was turning downwind to base where I marked it in red. The other aircraft are on the ground. You can see that an escape to the north for either aircraft would have put them perilously close to the 182, who basically turned parallel to and just offset of upwind on the missed, just above TPA.
 
I wouldn’t be chosen to be on the jury, but the 152 had a legitimate reason to turn final. The twin had no legitimate reason to barrel down short final at 180 knots.
 
What would I have done... well if I was the twin pilot I would have entered the traffic pattern on down wind like a responsible and courteous pilot.

Grim.man, did you mean to say you would have entered the traffic pattern on the UP wind?

Honest question. Low time pilot trying to learn.
 
Here’s the sight picture one minute after the picture in my last post. The 340 has traversed the 3 miles and is moments from colliding with the 152. The 182 is now climbing, at about the 1 o’clock of the 340, about to turn left to parallel the upwind leg on the missed. I’d bet money that the 182 was on the 340’s traffic display (if he had ADS-B in).

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Still, the biggest wtf here is the high speed of the 340. Hotdogging? In a rush? Forget to configure? Planning on an overhead break to enter the pattern? Distracted by all the traffic? Mental/physical incapacitation? Or just bad habits for a busy airport?
 
Grim.man, did you mean to say you would have entered the traffic pattern on the UP wind?

Honest question. Low time pilot trying to learn.

Not to answer for him, but this was a complex issue, no matter what. Two aircraft burning up the pattern (at least one was student solo) and another doing practice approaches. Barreling in at 180+ knots, the standard 10-mile initial call up gave the 340 pilot only three minutes to figure out his entry.

Slow down, afford yourself and everybody else a bit more time. Expect a maneuver to get on a 45° entry to downwind. Take the straight-in maybe only if everything else works in your favor. But 3 minutes isn’t a lot of time for any of that. Look at my transcription a bunch of posts back - see how long some of the communications take? Some are almost 20 seconds. That’s one mile at 180 knots.

Slow. Down.
 
...Still, the biggest wtf here is the high speed of the 340. Hotdogging? In a rush? Forget to configure? Planning on an overhead break to enter the pattern? Distracted by all the traffic? Mental/physical incapacitation? Or just bad habits for a busy airport?

at one point I was wondering if he maybe misidentified the airport, maybe thought it was further out but it looks like there's just water after the airport so that prob wasn't it. but then if you look at some of his prior flights into that airport, sure enough he barrels, er, barreled in pretty quickly until a mile or three out then got her slowed down every time.
 
Grim.man, did you mean to say you would have entered the traffic pattern on the UP wind?

Honest question. Low time pilot trying to learn.
You could do either, enter the upwind and do a teardrop into the down wind. What I typically do is offset past the down wind, then enter the down wind on a 45.
 
I have posted in the past my hyper defensive approach to a busy uncontrolled small field (fields not suitable for pure turbines who really HAVE to do straight ins, and which do NOT have TPA 1500 for turbines):

Cross to midfield 1500 above TPA, and essentially hold.
Orbit at STD rate just above midfield at 1500 AGL
360 Sweep visually for all traffic.
"On radio" traffic that I cannot see ---> second 360 sweep until visually identified.
Exit 500 above TPA 4 miles on the 90 to the downwind.
Descending right 225 turn to the 45 entry at traffic pattern speed/config. 4 miles from the field. (I have to do 100 kts or I cannot survive loss of an engine, (I'm just not THAT good).

A defensive approach was warranted, esp. with the amount of traffic present (and he was broadcasting and assumedly, therefore, listening), and given the high wing A/C below/ low wing above, setup.

It is just so "wow" sad that he didn't have the sense to be defensive. In short, "What Lance F said". (I have been to WVI many times, had fuel stolen, and been to mins on the 02 loc. Seneca II)
 
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I just noticed this in the advisory circular that we've been discussing. :eek2:

11.10 Airspeed Limitations. Airplanes should not be operated in the traffic pattern at an
indicated airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph).
 
You could do either, enter the upwind and do a teardrop into the down wind. What I typically do is offset past the down wind, then enter the down wind on a 45.


Thank you.


In my inexperienced mind, I would enter the upwind and complete a full circle to sequence myself behind the aircraft already in the pattern.

I would welcome to hear all the reasons this would not be the proper/ideal approach.
 
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It sounds like you're talking about being on base when you recognize the conflict, which would be the toughest situation to get out of without crossing the final approach course.

Actually, I'm talking about scanning the final approach course as you turn from downwind to base, assuming of course that you saw no one on final when you initiated that turn, in which case you would just extend the downwind. In a low wing airplane you need to level the wings long enough on base to get a GOOD final look at the approach path, because as soon as you turn to the final it's too late. I do this every time in the Pawnee when towing gliders, looking for NORDO traffic, aircraft on the wrong frequency, etc., and if I have to go around I do it on the pattern side rather than the upwind. (That's partly because I also don't want to clunk anybody with the tow ring on the end of the tow rope.)

With all due respect for the poor guy in the C172, when he realized that the twin was "coming at me pretty quick, man" then a standard go-around wouldn't be the best choice, particularly if the twin decides to do the same thing. I'd stay on the pattern side of the runway and announce that intention.
 
Thank you.


In my inexperienced mind, I would enter the upwind and complete a full circle to sequence myself behind the aircraft already in the pattern.

I would welcome to hear all the reasons this would not be the proper/ideal approach.

An upwind entry is an option, but in this case, that would have put the 340 up in the 182’s business. The two safest options for this scenario would have been to slow down and set up to the south for a 45° entry to the downwind. Or slow down and bully into a straight-in.
 
Thank you.


In my inexperienced mind, I would enter the upwind and complete a full circle to sequence myself behind the aircraft already in the pattern.

I would welcome to hear all the reasons this would not be the proper/ideal approach.

I think that's a good approach. I do it routinely in the Cub, even if a straight in or crosswind looks more appealing. A turn to the upwind gives you time and a better view of the whole pattern, along with the option to just extend the upwind if you need more time.
 
Of course it's about right of way. Following ROW is how we make ourselves predictable to other pilots, and how we anticipate their actions to avoid collisions.

There is nothing inherently dangerous about a straight in approach, which is why it is legal. But if you want to do so at a busy airfield, you need to understand that you are behaving differently from what other pilots expect. That means you should take additional measures to inform traffic of your intentions, watch out for aircraft who miss your calls, and always be prepared for exactly this situation. To me that means execute a stabilized descent from pattern altitude at approach speed in landing configuration, with a sharp eye on the base leg.

Blame is necessary. That is how we identify proximate cause, which helps us learn and avoid future incidents. While we can learn from the actions of both pilots, clearly the main lesson here is that a Leroy Jenkins arrival at a busy training airfield is dangerous. The twin pilot might be a nice guy and a skilled pilot, but he acted stupidly and got people killed. So don't be Leroy Jenkins.
 
There is no track data on the 152 but if there were it would be interesting to see if his turn to base was at the same point as his previous circuits or if he decided to make it early based on the 340's 3 mile call? The audio indicates he made the turn right after that call.
 
There is track data available on the C152. One of several analyses that have it:
 
The noise abatement websites that show the C152 track; how are they getting their info IF the ADS-B out wasn’t activated on the C152? ADSBexchange wasn’t able to track it on the accident flight, previous flights it could, and that site can track 978 UAT. A renter of the accident 152 mentioned somewhere that it had a switch that had to be activated to get the OUT to work. Not sure about that, but maybe it’s referring to the airplane being equipped with a SkyBeacon, where the NAV lights have to be on. I can picture a student pilot forgetting to turn on the Nav lights. So, where does WebTrax service get data feed if no ADS-B out?
 
There is track data available on the C152. One of several analyses that have it:

Juan is showing track data for the 16th, there isn't any after that. The accident occurred on the 18th. The noise abatement website data that was posted (if accurate) shows the 152 turning base abeam the numbers, which would be considered early in general.
 
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Again, it's the responsibility of the pilot joining the final approach to assure that he is not interfering with an aircraft already on final approach,
The problem is that according to the FAA, it's also the responsibility of the pilot doing a straight in approach to assure that he is not interfering with an aircraft already in the traffic pattern. (I think the AC 90-66B discussion was quoted earlier and there are NTSB cases referring to it.)

The difficulty with analyzing Watsonville for blame is the closeness of the sequence of events. Is it a 152 turning in front of an airplane that is, at that point, on final within the traffic pattern? Or is it a twin flying substantially faster than called for barreling into the existing traffic pattern?

Your conclusion and someone else's could be completely opposite and yet both reasonable.
 
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Your conclusion and someone else's could be completely opposite and yet both reasonable.

That's the reason we have ROW rules, in my opinion. The FAA has lots of advisories, most all of which are very reasonable but many of which are known to be largely disregarded in practice, and most pilots don't rely on everyone following all advisories. While reference is often made to 91.113 (g) regarding "Landing" and the description of ROW, it follows 91.113 (b), which describes how to actually apply the ROW rules:

General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.

Understandably, there are some good reasons for allowing straight in approaches at non-towered fields but unfortunately that permission gets horribly abused by aircraft that are fully capable of operating at approach speeds that work well with a normal pattern entry in VFR conditions, but those pilots choose to essentially abuse that option. The only way to safely deal with that IMHO is twofold: (1) accept the fact that the aircraft on final does have the ROW and (2) look carefully on downwind and particularly carefully on base while you still have time to obey 91.113 (b). If you're going to get killed in a mid-air, the statistics show that you didn't do one or both of those two things.
 
Of course it's about right of way. Following ROW is how we make ourselves predictable to other pilots, and how we anticipate their actions to avoid collisions.

There is nothing inherently dangerous about a straight in approach, which is why it is legal. But if you want to do so at a busy airfield, you need to understand that you are behaving differently from what other pilots expect. That means you should take additional measures to inform traffic of your intentions, watch out for aircraft who miss your calls, and always be prepared for exactly this situation. To me that means execute a stabilized descent from pattern altitude at approach speed in landing configuration, with a sharp eye on the base leg.

Blame is necessary. That is how we identify proximate cause, which helps us learn and avoid future incidents. While we can learn from the actions of both pilots, clearly the main lesson here is that a Leroy Jenkins arrival at a busy training airfield is dangerous. The twin pilot might be a nice guy and a skilled pilot, but he acted stupidly and got people killed. So don't be Leroy Jenkins.

Flying a straight in was factor #1. Flying a final at 180 knots is factor #2. Continuing to fly that final when someone else is reporting a base to final turn is factor #3. The twin pilot commited three sins. The 152 pilot committed one, which is turning final when the twin was already on long final. It is always a chain of errors that cause an accident.
 
Understandably, there are some good reasons for allowing straight in approaches at non-towered fields but unfortunately that permission gets horribly abused by aircraft that are fully capable of operating at approach speeds that work well with a normal pattern entry in VFR conditions, but those pilots choose to essentially abuse that option. The only way to safely deal with that IMHO is twofold: (1) accept the fact that the aircraft on final does have the ROW and (2) look carefully on downwind and particularly carefully on base while you still have time to obey 91.113 (b). If you're going to get killed in a mid-air, the statistics show that you didn't do one or both of those two things.
I think given the application and potential misapplication (innocent and otherwise) of the ROW rules, the concept of defensive flying is important. If I am the one on long final and hear others in the pattern, my mindset is, "I may have to break this off." If I'm the one in the pattern and hear a long straight in call, I'm thinking, "I may have to extend my downwind."

I always remember my friend's father's description of defensive driving and I apply it to the traffic pattern. "Always assume the other guy is a schmuck. You are probably right. And so is he."
 
. The twin pilot commited three sins. The 152 pilot committed one, which is turning final when the twin was already on long final.

There's no shortage of errors in retrospect. I don't like people doing straight ins but they're legal, as was his excessive speed and his continuation on final. Very much not wise but still not against the regs. The one "sin" (I don't know what constitutes an aviation sin") the C152 committed was not permitted by the regulations.

We'll never undo any of this event, and I may be old school but I still think that, in a pinch, when regulations are obeyed the chances of this kind of event drops significantly. If ever there is a place for rules, it's on a final approach at a non-towered field, where the majority of mid-air collisions actually occur.
 
I think given the application and potential misapplication (innocent and otherwise) of the ROW rules, the concept of defensive flying is important. If I am the one on long final and hear others in the pattern, my mindset is, "I may have to break this off." If I'm the one in the pattern and hear a long straight in call, I'm thinking, "I may have to extend my downwind."

I always remember my friend's father's description of defensive driving and I apply it to the traffic pattern. "Always assume the other guy is a schmuck. You are probably right. And so is he."

I couldn't agree more. And it's unfortunate that neither of the pilots in this accident seem to have been thinking that way.
 
Not sure where the 180 knots is coming from. Gear speed for the 340 used to be about 140 kts and if it hit a hangar it was probably slowed to something closer to 95 kts over the fence, unless this was to be a highspeed pass (doubtful). One thing about coming down final toward a runway with closed traffic in the area — if you aren't extremely vigilant scanning the base leg you can be surprised by the sudden appearance of an airplane closer than you expected. BTDT. Even with two pilots both looking. It is also easy for the other plane to be hidden behind, say, a window post or other structure. So, you need to physically move your head and shoulders to see around them or rock your wings if it's an engine nacelle obstructing your field of view. Depending on the lighting and haze level, you may never see what hit you. "Slow down and take it around" is my advice. As in around the field, the whole field and nothing but the whole field.
 
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Not sure where the 180 knots is coming from. Gear speed for the 340 used to be about 140 kts and if it hit a hangar it was probably slowed to something closer to 95 kts over the fence, unless this was to be a highspeed pass (doubtful). One thing about coming down final toward a runway with closed traffic in the area — if you aren't extremely vigilant scanning the base leg you can be surprised by the sudden appearance of an airplane. BTDT. Even with two pilots both looking. It is also easy for the other plane to be hidden behind, say, a window post or other structure. So, you need to physically move your head and shoulders to see around them or rock your wings if it's an engine nacelle obstructing your field of view. Depending on the lighting and haze level, you may never see what hit you. "Slow down and take it around" is my advice. As in around the field, the whole field and nothing but the whole field.

The 340 was doing 180 groundspeed on a 1/2 mile final. This is backed up by all accounts - empirically by ADS-B data and the timing on his radio calls, and anecdotally by eyewitness accounts (including the deceased pilot he hit).

The reported wind was 9 knots almost straight down the runway, so his indicated speed was likely higher. He rolled into a hangar on the far side of the airport after otherwise, according to an eyewitness, disabling his left engine/wing by hitting and destroying a 152 that had just turned short final.

edit for a typo
 
Flying a straight in was factor #1. Flying a final at 180 knots is factor #2. Continuing to fly that final when someone else is reporting a base to final turn is factor #3. The twin pilot commited three sins. The 152 pilot committed one, which is turning final when the twin was already on long final. It is always a chain of errors that cause an accident.

But the 152 pilot wasn’t expecting the twin to be doing 180+ knots.
He realized it only after making the turn, then attempted to avoid by going around.
The twin committed 4 sins….#4 continuing without visual contact despite the 152 being on final and commenting how fast the twin was.

This accident is 100% fault of the twin. Remember the jet pilot who was criticizing everyone in the pattern as he continued on his long straight in approach despite comment about how dangerous this was?
Different pilot, same attitude.

Yes, arm chair pilots can criticize the 152 pilot, but I see nothing he did that was blatantly wrong.
 
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And they both ended up dead. Keep that in mind.
True, but I feel a lot more sorry for one of them. One was a student pilot that probably did the best he could. The other was presumably much more experienced, flying an advanced aircraft at ridiculous speeds.
 
Not sure where the 180 knots is coming from. Gear speed for the 340 used to be about 140 kts and if it hit a hangar it was probably slowed to something closer to 95 kts over the fence, unless this was to be a highspeed pass (doubtful).
Everyone is quoting 180 kts, but like you, I don't think it's true. We'll see when the NTSB report come out.

A guy based on the field said he heard the impact and saw something falling from the sky. He didn't know it was the 152 at that time. He said the 340 was flying down the field at full power when one of his engines quit and he rolled, diving into the hangar.

I think they both made the decision to go around and it just ended up with them in the same space at the same time.
 
Everyone is quoting 180 kts, but like you, I don't think it's true. We'll see when the NTSB report come out....

I think they're quoting 180kts because of things like adsb:

upload_2022-8-22_10-19-24.png

I could have gotten a screenshot of him closer to the field at the same speed but then the green text covers up WVI.
 
I always remember my friend's father's description of defensive driving and I apply it to the traffic pattern. "Always assume the other guy is a schmuck. You are probably right. And so is he."

Agreed! There are ROW (Right Of Way) rules and there are the SMB (Save My Bacon) rules. Many times I've had a green light at an intersection but enforcing my right to my ROW would have been painful if not deadly because the other guy had a plan that didn't agree with mine.
 
I think they're quoting 180kts because of things like adsb:
I could have gotten a screenshot of him closer to the field at the same speed but then the green text covers up WVI.
I understand that, but I still think it will change. We've all seen that data be proven wrong. I've seen airplanes crash and Flight Aware showed they continued on from the point of the crash for 20 miles. Where it loses data, it estimates what it thinks happened.
 
I understand that, but I still think it will change. We've all seen that data be proven wrong. I've seen airplanes crash and Flight Aware showed they continued on from the point of the crash for 20 miles. Where it loses data, it estimates what it thinks happened.

certainly possible. would you say that's the norm? I keep checking random other flights of the 340 and the approach speeds seem to be much more normal, <140kts starting a few miles out and getting slower as he gets closer.
 
You can’t compare FlightAware algorithms with actual ADS-B tracks.
 
certainly possible. would you say that's the norm? I keep checking random other flights of the 340 and the approach speeds seem to be much more normal, <140kts starting a few miles out and getting slower as he gets closer.
I'm not sure if it's the norm, but I've seen it twice in local plane crashes. About a year ago, someone reported a local pilot had crashed and others quickly chimed in that no, he was okay, he was still flying on course. Turned out he wasn't.
 
You can’t compare FlightAware algorithms with actual ADS-B tracks.

I can compare my actual flight history with what shows up on flight aware and say the majority of times it's pretty accurate. there have definitely been some WTF moments like when my altitude jumps up to like 40,000' then back down within a few miles, and I've also seen speed jump up to like 600kts but for the most part it's pretty accurate.
 
The 340 called 10 miles straight in at 22:05. Two minutes and two seconds later, he called 3 miles. A little math puts that at 206 knots. Thirty seconds later, he called one mile. That's 240 knots! Of course, those are his estimates, but it seems pretty clear he wasn't going any 140 knots or less.
 
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