Engine out at KLZU

obelix

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N18KN engine out incident at KLZU 01/30/2022

Charles Wallace Jr.

January 31st 2022

My hope by documenting this incident is to give all who read this account some insight of what happened to me during an engine out incident that happened on 01/30/22 at Gwinnett County Airport, Georgia. Prior to explaining what happened on Jan 30th, it might help to listen the tower audio at KLZU to get an idea of what happened. It is approximately 5 minutes from takeoff to emergency landing. You can listen to that audio here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/128KoGgM-coODON8JPU9IyE_0E_txl_LK/view?usp=sharing

Pilot Background

Before diving into the details, I’d like to give some background information about myself. My name is Charles Wallace. I am currently the Vice President of AeroVentures Flying Club, a flying club in Metro Atlanta of approximately 150 members, and 6 airplanes. Piper Dakota, N18KN is one of the club Aircraft. The Club aircraft fly thousands of flights a year safely. I have never met anyone personally that has had an engine out experience. I have been a certificated pilot since 2015, have about 200 hours PIC time and logged 25 hours of actual IFR PIC.

The Airplane

AeroVentures Flying Club acquired the 1979 Piper Dakota PA-28-236 airplane in early spring of 2021. After getting the airplane back to our home base at LZU, we had our regular mechanic perform a thorough inspection of the aircraft. Subsequent repairs and even some upgrades were done to the aircraft throughout the first year that we owned it.

Flight Planning

My daughter and I planned the flight for 01/30/2022 @ 1300Z. High pressure was dominant over the area. The previous night’s TAF predicted clear skies, calm winds until 1600Z and temperatures around 20deg F. We planned the flight to complete the flight prior to an increase in forecasted winds, which may have been gusting to 20 knots.

Pre Flight

Upon arriving to the airport, the airplane was prepped in all the usual ways. Including the preflight check of the aircraft, getting all the gear into the airplane (Ipad, headphones, etc), fueling it, and pulling it out of the hangar.

Startup and Taxi

It was an unusually cold morning here in metro Atlanta. The temperature was approximately 21 deg when we boarded the aircraft. I gave the plane a few primer pumps of fuel. The engine would start and then die in a second or so. It took two subsequent attempts with a few more primer pumps each to finally get the engine started. After about 10 seconds or so I pulled the power back to idle from about 1000 RPMs. The engine would not idle and died. I gave it a few more pumps of fuel and started again. I let the engine warm up to around 250 CHT which took a few minutes before pulling the throttle back to idle from 1000 RPMs. The engine was idling ok now and the CHT/EGT’s were increasing slowly. The engine sounded normal, and I’ve had a hard time in previous experiences in starting aircraft in cold temperatures. This did not seem abnormal.

I called for taxi ground clearance and was given instruction to taxi to RW 25 via Tango, Echo and Yankee for a north departure. Once at the IFR hold point for RW 25, I started going through the ground check and before takeoff checklist. All checks were a pass, including the carb heat, prop, magnetos. There were no issues with the mag check and the engine sounded and felt as it always has. Idle was also normal at the end of the checks. With the prop set to full forward and mixture set to full rich I made the call to Gwinnett Tower that we were ready for departure.

The Flight

After receiving our takeoff clearance from the tower, I lined up on RW25 and slowly applied full throttle. We rotated somewhere around 70 knots. The clime performance with the cold temps and negative density altitude was outstanding. When we were at 900 ft above the airport and past the end of the runway, I started my turn to 360. At 1000 ft AGL, is when we lost all engine RPM. My first thoughts were of disbelief. After hundreds of flights myself this has never happened, and I personally don’t know of anyone who had this happen to them either. The feeling of disbelieve turned to great anxiety in the same instant.

At this point I made a call to the tower that we lost power and needed to head back. I had to quickly think about my options. Troubleshooting, finding a place to land, altitude, airspeed, all the things that we are taught to think of during an engine out event. All these things happening in just seconds, under enormous pressure, anxiety, and worry. They gave me clearance to land on RW 07 and asked if I wanted to declare an emergency and require 911. To which I responded “roger”.

I decided to try “the impossible turn”. My situation was a bit different. I was close to the airport and very high. The problem was I was too high. I tried turning north for a few seconds before making a left turn as base and then join the final with nose down. I was too high, too close, and too fast to make it to the airport. I made another call to the tower to let them know that we weren’t going to make it to RW 07. The tower advised that I was clear for RW 25 and that the “trucks” were rolling. I assume they meant fire trucks. There was indeed a fire truck at the end of RW 25 upon landing.

While all this was happening, I was concurrently checking the airplane controls. I checked the mixture and prop. I pulled the throttle back and I started to get a few RPMs, variably between 1000 and 1500. I pushed the throttle back in thinking that the problem might have cleared up. When I pushed the throttle back in, I lost all RPM again. I pulled the throttle out again, and now have 1000 to 1500, variably to work with. I made another call to the tower advising I have the power back and my intention was to land. I was wrong in this statement; I should have told them I have some power back.

Trimming up the airplane to around 85, loosing speed and altitude. I’m very close to the RW, but not quite parallel to RW 25 downwind, more cutting across it and downwind. My goal was to make it past the RW 25 abeam numbers far enough to make a left base then final turn to 25. As I was making the base turn, I could see the VASI lights indicating I was high. Once I knew I had the field made during the turn, I applied full flaps and cut of the remaining power I had left. Still too high, I headed to the numbers and ended up with a nice landing.

The full track from takeoff to landing can be seen here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/129L59AssrCgt9h8gZGTxJqfyAXIcDctI/view?usp=sharing

· Altitudes are not correct. Our tracking service, 1200.aero, confirmed that although the transponder was reporting regularly, every second, but the altitudes were not changing. The position and speed reports are correct. There was a significant headwind aloft during takeoff, and a tailwind in the opposite direction.

Post Flight

Once the airplane had landed, I taxied it to the hangar. Performed all post flight activities and left the airport. I called several people afterwards to let them know what had just happened. This included, our regular mechanic, the club president, the maintenance officer, and another member who assists the mechanic. The initial thought that some were advocating against or for was carburetor icing. This one I’ve pondered as I didn’t turn on carburetor heat. I’ve always been told that the carb icing would onset as roughness in the engine or reduced power, so with all the other many problems I had to deal with it wasn’t on the top of my list of things to try with the little time I had to deal with this problem. Hindsight, it’s possible this might have made the problem worse in my situation with reducing my already diminished RPM. Once I had some RPM, I didn’t want to alter any more engine controls. I would probably have tried it soon after if the other adjustments didn’t have an effect. The other possibility suggest that was given was ice in the fuel system. The problem is that if it were carb ice or ice in the fuel, we would likely never find out the problem after the flight with the plane in the hangar.
 
Root Cause

The root cause to the issue was eventually found. I met our A&P mechanic at the airplane a few hours after the flight. We remove the top and bottom cowling of the engine. Upon initial visual inspection there didn’t seem to be any issue. As I was looking everything over, I happened to touch the carburetor and noticed a movement. I grabbed it firmly and found that it was loose. Very loose. So loose in fact that several of the nuts that held it onto the engine were near or past the threads of the studs they were bolted to. The gap between the carburetor and the engine was approximately 1/4 to 3/8th inch. The nuts were at or past the last thread.

A full video of the actual carburetor post flight can be seen here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/11bTcbN0AeESUCKkFd09fh3Mf8h9SzpBP/view?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/11be74Vg6sOfE6IbkZYDOgO0NUPGyM2z1/view?usp=sharing

Post Flight Perspective

First thought is I’m glad my daughter any myself survived. I went through all the same training of forced landings as all other pilots to the best of my knowledge. I think that this training is valuable to get that repetitive motion needed to provide instincts to survive, but there is a sense of security because it is planned, you’re with an instructor, or your airplane is capable to saving you. It’s just an exercise. When the engine out happened to me it was very different from practice. The skills you learn during practice are present in your thoughts. However, the actual situation adds many other complex emotions and decisions to be made. It seems as if every decision presented is number one on the list to deal with. In my case the first thing that came to mind when I lost RPM was denial. It was simply disbelief this was happening. Once this was over, I felt a sensation of shock, anxiety, and confusion, with focus on “what do I do next”. This all happened in just a few seconds from the time the engine RPM went to 0. I was still left with anxiety and confusion as I moved my thoughts towards “what to do next”. I think this is where the training helps. A list of ideas was coming to mind, among them, call the tower, let them know what was happening and that it was an emergency, flying the airplane, keep airspeed above stall speed, and where am I going to take the airplane next, maybe not in that particular order. There were a lot of options in my mind:

To the right there was highway “316”, that was an option, to the left and behind me was my departure runway (now RW 07), and the RW 25 I just departed from. 316 might have been a good option. There is a squirrel club at my local EAA called “The 316 Club”. This might have been an excellent opportunity to join this exclusive group of pilots. It has a few straight stretches of double lanes that would be good for landing an aircraft if the traffic was lite.

I chose to try to land on RW 07 via the “impossible turn”. I was high, had good speed (nose down), but there were other flaws in the “impossible turn” that I wasn’t aware of at the time, mine being different than the typical version. The “impossible turn” for me was impossible for a different reason. I was too high, too fast for the descent (even with a slip), and the descent that I tried only increased my airspeed and decreased my distance from the RW. So much so it made it impossible as an option. I could have tried to go out further, getting lower, decreasing airspeed, but this too I could have miscalculated and not made RW 07 on the way back. Going out further would have put me over the middle of a populated city with bad options to land. Remember, I have 1000ft AGL to deal with here.

Those two were my two best choices I had at the moment of decision. After discovering that landing on RW 07 was not feasible I still had two options. Head towards 316 or head towards RW 25. I chose RW25, which presented some problems and I believe this may not have been the best option, but I chose it. I still had some altitude; I had some power, and I was already headed in that direction. I decided to stay close as I could to the RW 25 downwind and make a tight base and final turn, albeit at an unusual angle from RW 25.

In hindsight, if I had it to do all over again, I would have turned north and then east, along hwy 316. This would have given me a sure option. The approach end of RW 25 was very near the parallel course of 316. This would have been the preferred option.


The option of continuing south towards RW 25 after the attempt at RW 07 was bad, as there is no good place to land.

Fortunately, this turned out ok for my daughter and myself. I’ve second guessed my decisions after the flight and maybe I could have chosen a different solution as mentioned, but ultimately the one I chose did work out. I can’t complain.

Psychological Impact

Psychologically, I don’t think my training would have ever prepared me for this. Not from the mechanical aspects of what to do in the event of an emergency, that part was spot on. My decision making, I’m still seconding guessing that as I’ve already described. My primary flight instructor could not convey the intense feelings that would have crossed my mind during the duration of the event. How could he since, I presume most flight instructors have never experienced this personally, including him. I think during training, instructors should also teach how intense the situation will be, and in my case how quick the decision-making process must be to survive. My flight from takeoff to landing lasted less than 4 minutes. Everything that is happening feels like the number one priority. So many things to deal with at once. Recognize the problem, fly the airplane, watch the airspeed, come up with options, attempt to get the engine running again, contact ATC (Tower). It is overwhelming.

Aftermath (So Far)

The FAA is of course involved at this point. They are looking into the issue. No definitive cause yet. The FAA has been very helpful in the process so far. The FAA employee I’m working is genuinely concerned and wants to find the root cause of the problem. They are looking at multiple avenues to the cause of this, which include if carburetor nuts were not torqued correctly, to if the Lycoming design (pal nut vs star washer) had a factor. The pal nut vs star washer designed changed in this model around the time of my aircraft manufacture year. They are reaching out to all those parties to gather more information. This is all I know now.

The thought I’d like to leave everyone with here, is that this was a normal run of the mill pleasure flight with my daughter. Everything was OK, until it wasn’t. It was unexpected, I was caught off guard and I believe every pilot should keep this story in mind when they fly and know that they must be prepared emotionally as well as the skills they learn to deal with the situation at hand. This, or something like this can happen to any of this.

Charles Wallace
 
Thanks for your write-up.
Good reminder to mentally prepare for the worst case on every takeoff.
Try to get back up on your own or with an instructor as soon as you are able.

"Keep sending him up."
 
Thanks for posting such a detailed write up of your experience. I’m sure it will be a good learning experience for all of us in some way. Glad you and your daughter are still with us. I have five grandchildren. I think about things like this before taking them up. I do my best to keep my airplane in top airworthiness condition, but even so, mechanical devices can still fail.
 
Glad your ok. Nice job getting down safely.
 
Still don't know how I feel about it. Very surreal..
 
Good story. You landed the plane and everyone walked away. Best possible outcome. You're second guessing all of those choices, and I get that, but the one thing you did, throughout the whole thing, was to fly the damn airplane. And that led to the great outcome. Nice flying...
 
Glad that you made it down safely. Amazing that the engine ran at all.

I'm kind-of surprised that there isn't safety wire on those nuts (that I can see) in the video. They don't look like anything was locking them in place. (going to have to take a look at the nuts on my carb later to see what they have).
 
Thanks for sharing your story.

In a way it's reassuring when you find the exact problem. Nothing is worse than having random engine troubles and not being able to find the cause - it leaves you worrying when/if it'll happen again.
 
Even had there been carb ice (didn't sound like it) you'd have had to do a landing. Takes a minute or two for the carb heat to clear the ice (at least that's what it took for me). @obelix didn't have a minute or two. Sounds like you did a really good job.
 
My first calls were to the president of the club and the A&P, both first thought carb ice, and it seemed like it could be. The A&P said that he heard that carb ice happens early in a flight (not sure if this is true). I wasn't really on board because, although it was cold, it was very dry that day and we were in high pressure. Also, I thought that carb ice would come one gradually, or atleast over a minute or so. This was instant out. It would have been horrible if we went though something like this and couldn't find the cause.

The big question right now is why did ALL FOUR nuts come loose. The engine had been installed in 2006, and the log books show no evidence that the carburetor had ever been removed. I suppose it could have been and just not noted in the log book, but we'll never know one way or the other. Seems like a few possibilities, maybe during the original install the nuts were never torqued. Someone might have remove it and put it back on not torqueing. Remote possibility (in my mind) the design change from pal nuts to star washers might be a bad design. The FAA is looking into all. They are asking Lycoming why they made the change, not sure what if anything will come of that. If it was someone not torqueing the nut, we'll just never know who did it. They might also try to find out why it wasn't found at annual or 100hr inspection.
 
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Good write up and good job of handing the situation.

Perhaps to be Captain Obvious here.... You mentioned you felt "disbelief" by the engine failure on take-off. Hopefully this experience will change your perspective on this. The moment my wheels leave the ground I am expecting engine failure. I have the pre-planned options at my home drone at the forefront of my mind for various altitudes. If I'm flying be myself I'm saying it out loud. If I'm with the wifey, I'm repeating it silently in my brain.

The first 0 to 300 feet, "Straight ahead, into the trees. Try to get between them." I keep repeating this out loud until my next milestone.

Above 300 feet to 600 feet, "I'm going to that bare hill side on the right. I'm going to the bare hillside on the right,...."

Above 600 to 800 feet, "I'm going for the lake, try along the beach area. I'm going for the lake. I'm going for the lake..." I live in an area that has some rough terrain, large oak trees, and no good options.

Above 800 feet to 1000 feet, "I'm going back to the airport, I'm going back to the airport...."

The engine failure is ALL I am thinking about during take-off. Of course, having said this, the day I actually have an engine failure will be the time I get distracted and forget my mantra...

I do this at other airports as well, though my plans are less precise.

Something to think about.

Also, don't repeat the mantra out load with passengers. Did this once, and the look on the faces made me realize my mistake. %^)
 
Great story and good job that all are on the ground safely.

As to Lndwarrior's post ... we should do a departure briefing as to what we will do and where we will go on takeoff when the engine quits. I believe doing this can help prepare us for when it happens.

It may also shorten the "startle time" before we react but I believe there will always be that moment of time while we process the fact that what is happening is real. When in doubt ... push the stick forward.
 
Nice save and thanks for sharing.
 
My first calls were to the president of the club and the A&P, both first thought carb ice, and it seemed like it could be. The A&P said that he heard that carb ice happens early in a flight (not sure if this is true). I wasn't really on board because, although it was cold, it was very dry that day and we were in high pressure. Also, I thought that carb ice would come one gradually, or atleast over a minute or so. This was instant out. It would have been horrible if we went though something like this and couldn't find the cause.

The big question right now is why did ALL FOUR nuts come loose. The engine had been installed in 2006, and the log books show no evidence that the carburetor had ever been removed. I suppose it could have been and just not noted in the log book, but we'll never know one way or the other. Seems like a few possibilities, maybe during the original install the nuts were never torqued. Someone might have remove it and put it back on not torqueing. Remote possibility (in my mind) the design change from pal nuts to star washers might be a bad design. The FAA is looking into all. They are asking Lycoming why they made the change, not sure what if anything will come of that. If it was someone not torqueing the nut, we'll just never know who did it. They might also try to find out why it wasn't found at annual or 100hr inspection.

Single data point, but my one and only experience with carb ice was over a matter of seconds. Merrily flying along, MP dropped suddenly, accompanied by significant roughness. Given that I was flying over the cascades, I briefly sucked in my shorts before going over things my CFI had taught me (I only had about 100 hrs). When the “ah-ha” moment happened the carb heat did as we hear-momentary worsening followed by a return of power.

That said, in my case I was going from relatively hot and dry (Wenatchee, Eastern WA in summer) to cooler and damp (clouds had lingered over western WA following a couple days of rain that delayed my return flight). Given the two weather extremes, that may have contributed to how suddenly the ice came on.

I will say one thing that helped me was knowing that I typically flew far higher over the mountains than some, with the idea that if the windmill quit turning, I’d have enough to get to safety on either side, even if it wasn’t an airport. Knowing this relieved a lot of stress that would’ve been present if I was flying at “best case scenario” altitudes.
 
Good on you for getting down safely.

I have a standard departure briefing I do every time at the hold short line. That being said I need to for sure spend some time in the air running through emergency procedures more often. After all we won't instantly rise to whatever emergency comes up we will fall to the level of our highest training.

Very eye opening to read... Thank you very much for sharing your experience
 
I loved my old Tiger, because the pre-flight let you look at and touch EVERYTHING in the engine compartment. Dave Fletch at FletchAIR shows new owners a VERY thorough pre-flight with many tricks that apply to other models ...

Am glad everything turned out ok. After finding out the loose carb cause, am glad there was no fire during taxi or flight ...
 
Charles - Excellent airmanship to make those decisions in the midst of an emergency! I was thinking that the reduction in MP caused the vacuum of the engine to suck the carburetor back up against the engine and thus you had some power at 1500 RPM. Just a thought after looking at the pictures your posted. I have never heard of a carburator coming loose on a PA-28 but if the bolts were not torqued correctly that could definitely happen. As my old CFI used to say, glad you lived to tell the story!
 
Charles - Excellent airmanship to make those decisions in the midst of an emergency! I was thinking that the reduction in MP caused the vacuum of the engine to suck the carburetor back up against the engine and thus you had some power at 1500 RPM. Just a thought after looking at the pictures your posted. I have never heard of a carburator coming loose on a PA-28 but if the bolts were not torqued correctly that could definitely happen. As my old CFI used to say, glad you lived to tell the story!

Brian, That's what they FAA is leaning towards now. There's no evidence in the log book that it was ever remove, it may or might not have been, just never logged. Could have been a number of sources that didn't torque it back down. No one also knows when the nuts first starting coming lose either, could have just happened during my flight, or maybe slowly over a period of time. It's all just a guess. The FAA is asking Lycoming about the design change from PAL nut to star washer. Chances are the root cause will simply be improper torque that cause the carb to slip and an intake leak. They are also looking at the 100 hr and annuals the plane had as well.

You are also right about the carb getting sucked back up with the MP dropped, the FAA also said this was most likely what happened to get some of the power back. If that hadn't happened, I would have been on 316 for sure.

The power I had was between 1000 and 1500, variable. Better than nothing but not enough to keep the plane above stall (glide speed), or from descending at the same time. The plane had 72 gallons of fuel on board plus two people, but it's useful load is around 1300 lbs.

The whole thing just sucked.

I just want to share with everyone if there might be something to learn. We did have a board meeting yesterday with the A&P/A&I, we are going to put torque stripe wherever we can on critical systems so visual inspection can be done easily. That might have helped prevent the issue with 18KN.
 
Charles - I can't imagine how much it sucked. I have had rough engines, cracked injectors, and landing gear that would not extend but have never experienced a complete loss of power. I am surprised there are not required safety wires for the bolts that hold the carburetor on. They are required for oil filters so logic would seem they would be a requirement for other critical components.
 
It’s almost as if there was a spacer of some kind there that fell out, as impossible as that sounds. All 4 being the same amount of loose doesn’t add up.
 
They should make an interim emergency AD about this and make it repetitive, with an eddy current just in case. The chaaaaaaaaaildren. :stirpot:
 
All 4 being the same amount of loose doesn’t add up.

I agree. The OP said, "The gap between the carburetor and the engine was approximately 1/4 to 3/8th inch."

I'm not the world's greatest mechanic but that's a lot of gap and is quite unusual from my experience. I'm surprised the engine would start and run smoothly. But once started and at idle it would have a lot of vacuum to pull the carb against the manifold.

I'm thankful that on my plane during preflight I can see my Marvel Schebler and the mounting bolts. I use a flashlight to look at mounting, cables, lines, etc. to see if I can spot anything amiss.
 
It’s almost as if there was a spacer of some kind there that fell out, as impossible as that sounds. All 4 being the same amount of loose doesn’t add up.
As if an insulator self destructed.
 
Root Cause

The root cause to the issue was eventually found. I met our A&P mechanic at the airplane a few hours after the flight. We remove the top and bottom cowling of the engine. Upon initial visual inspection there didn’t seem to be any issue. As I was looking everything over, I happened to touch the carburetor and noticed a movement. I grabbed it firmly and found that it was loose. Very loose. So loose in fact that several of the nuts that held it onto the engine were near or past the threads of the studs they were bolted to. The gap between the carburetor and the engine was approximately 1/4 to 3/8th inch. The nuts were at or past the last thread.

One thing I like to do on a walkaround, if possible, is to reach into the engine compartment, grab hold of things and see if they are loose. Quite often, I can reach the forward spark pugs, and depending on the cowling, very little or quite a few things on top of and around the engine. It all depends on the cowling design.
 
...reach into the engine compartment...
On my private check ride, when I wasn't looking, the examiner put a folded hankie on top of the engine to see if I would find it during the pre-flight. Frankly, I wouldn't have had someone not warned me ahead of time this was one of his tricks to emphasize the importance of inspecting everything you possibly can.
 
Glad you are ok...worst time to have engine trouble! It scares me more than anything else about flying...engine issue on takeoff. I brief myself before every takeoff on the memory items and what my tentative plan is at certain altitudes. You sharing your story only motivates me and I am sure others to review or create those plans.

Hope you get back in the air soon and I hope your daughter isn't too traumatized to stop her from wanting to fly again.
 
Glad you are ok...worst time to have engine trouble! It scares me more than anything else about flying...engine issue on takeoff. I brief myself before every takeoff on the memory items and what my tentative plan is at certain altitudes. You sharing your story only motivates me and I am sure others to review or create those plans.

Hope you get back in the air soon and I hope your daughter isn't too traumatized to stop her from wanting to fly again.

She had no idea. She was texting the entire time.
 
On my private check ride, when I wasn't looking, the examiner put a folded hankie on top of the engine to see if I would find it during the pre-flight...

So there i was... Safe for solo check, T-2C Buckeyes. You can actually open a panel and look INSIDE the compressor section of the jet engines.

After preflight, my instructor and I were cinching up all our straps for the ejection seats and I noticed his flashlight was missing from his survival vest, I pointed it out...

A VERY shocked and embarrassed instructor reminded me I apparently forgot to check the compressor on the left side!

A very thankful instructor removed the flashlight, thanked me, made new personal policy and we didn’t get to practice engine loss on takeoff!

I asked a question right about the spot and screwed up both our normal patterns... this flying gig is like that.

Glad you came out alright! Quite a confidence builder though. Goes to show you both trained and learned well. Bravo!
 
My first calls were to the president of the club and the A&P, both first thought carb ice, and it seemed like it could be. The A&P said that he heard that carb ice happens early in a flight (not sure if this is true). I wasn't really on board because, although it was cold, it was very dry that day and we were in high pressure. Also, I thought that carb ice would come one gradually, or atleast over a minute or so. This was instant out. It would have been horrible if we went though something like this and couldn't find the cause.

Yes Carb Ice frequently occurs early in the flight.
Yes Carb Ice can come rather suddenly.
I recall only reading about one instance of it causing a complete power loss, but it didn't happen to me (From a book "Into the Glory", The airplane was a Grumman Duck)

I have had and am aware of several instances (my student pilots) where carb Ice occurs shortly after take off. My worst event was test flying a C-150 after a new engine was installed. At 400 feet the engine suddenly went from 2500 RPM (IIRC) to 2300RPM. I immediately pulled carb heat and initiated a turn back to the runway. Pulling the carb heat dropped the RPM to 2100RPM which would just maintain altitude. Once I had the runway made I decided to go ahead and proceed downwind as I knew I could land on the runway if it got worse, and if I got far enough down the runway I could land into the wind instead of downwind. About midfield (maybe a minute after pulling the carb heat) the RPM came back up to 2300RPM and I made normal landing if from only a 400-500ft on downwind. Further checking and runups and further flight tests showed no mechanical issues, with a bit more attention to not turning the carb heat off until rolling on the runway.

<snip> Already covered

Brian
CFIIG/ASEL
 
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Thanks for a great posting.

Well-Done during the event! Great to hear you landed so safely!
 
The engine failure is ALL I am thinking about during take-off. Of course, having said this, the day I actually have an engine failure will be the time I get distracted and forget my mantra...

But... even if you forget or am distracted at that time, you will have mentally prepared yourself for it so many times you will likely quickly be able to resume the pre-determined action plan.

Plan A. is obviously take off and Go....
Plan B. is the take off/departure is aborted and we proceed with the predetermined plan for the situation. Not really an emergency, just executing Plan B, even though Plan B may or may not include declaring an emergency.

has been posted here before, likely by me, but this video is one of my favorites demonstrating the execution of Plan B. Is the Glider version on a power Failure, AKA a rope break on Tow.
https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/article/video-low-time-glider-pilot-has-tow-rope-break-down-low/

Brian
CFIIIG/ASEL
 
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