737 down off Honolulu

You don't need a lot of dexterity to wrap your arms around something. And none if you are wearing a PFD. If anything, the lesson here is that wearing a PFD could take your survival time from minutes to hours or days.
I'm not in the Coast Guard, but I'll bet if the current is 1 to 3 knots, then 40 hours after the crash, they won't be searching at the spot where it went down.

Regardless, the question was about consciousness and survival times, and at 67* F, it's much more than 45 minutes. Even longer in Honolulu where the water temp is almost 80*.
Everyone has a different risk threshold when flying. In my opinion being out of glide range of land in a single engine piston requires a fair amount of vigilance.. a PFD and PLB are part of my minimum equipment list for any overwater flying
 
at least they didn't mention the 737 Max...

:-/
 
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This carrier didn't seem to have the best reputation. Also, the 737-200 isn't known for stellar single engine performance to start with. Honestly, this incident was a situation where checklist running probably contributed to the problems - they would have landed safely if they just turned a downwind pattern visual.

at least they didn't mention the 737 Max...

:-/

Pretty sure I saw at least one article that mentioned the MAX.
 
There is a reason high time pilots fly with those types of outfits!
 
So you are flying a 737 and don’t know how to confirm on an engine emergency?
 
So you are flying a 737 and don’t know how to confirm on an engine emergency?

There are many instances in which experienced pilots misidentified the failed engine resulting in crashes.
Many years ago I suggested here that this was a continuing problem which deserves more attention. I offered some instrument panel changes which would help reduce the confusion that occurs.
My suggestion that this was a problem were vigorously dismissed, with the argument that pilots needed to follow the existing procedures to ID & secure the failed engine, or get more training.
Yet the problem continues.
With pilots who have probably had such training drilled into their heads non-stop.

TransAsia 235:

IMG_1941.jpeg
 
Engine failure in a 737 is not like losing an engine in a GA twin. There’s no rush to secure the engine, and more than adequate time to identify a failed/failing engine.

This seems to be a rush at getting a checklist and rush to shut down the engine.
 
Engine failure in a 737 is not like losing an engine in a GA twin. There’s no rush to secure the engine, and more than adequate time to identify a failed/failing engine.

This seems to be a rush at getting a checklist and rush to shut down the engine.
Having no experience outside of Part 91 (and a relatively minor part of that), I have to ask: Is a rapid response to engine failures like this part of the standard? It was important in the DC-3 days, but is it STILL taught that way to 737 drivers?

In other words, if an instructor kills an engine in the 737 simulator and the captain says, "ho-hum, let's take a look at that," are they marked down? Or scored based on how FAST they respond to that any anomaly, whether it or not fast action is required?

Ron Wanttaja
 
Having no experience outside of Part 91 (and a relatively minor part of that), I have to ask: Is a rapid response to engine failures like this part of the standard? It was important in the DC-3 days, but is it STILL taught that way to 737 drivers?

In other words, if an instructor kills an engine in the 737 simulator and the captain says, "ho-hum, let's take a look at that," are they marked down? Or scored based on how FAST they respond to that any anomaly, whether it or not fast action is required?

Ron Wanttaja

There is no rush to secure a failed engine. Why should there be? If it isn’t producing thrust, fly the airplane, get to a safe altitude and work through it.

In the event of an engine fire, confirm which engine (red handled glowing) and pull, then continue flying.

A severe vibration might warrant a quicker shutdown, but again, verify the failed engine. If you have two thrust levers, pulling one back slowly will reveal if you have the correct engine or not, along with gauge verification.
 
Having no experience outside of Part 91 (and a relatively minor part of that), I have to ask: Is a rapid response to engine failures like this part of the standard? It was important in the DC-3 days, but is it STILL taught that way to 737 drivers?

In other words, if an instructor kills an engine in the 737 simulator and the captain says, "ho-hum, let's take a look at that," are they marked down? Or scored based on how FAST they respond to that any anomaly, whether it or not fast action is required?

Ron Wanttaja
Especially in a jet, rapid shutdown of the engine is not a factor. Like anything, fly the airplane.

in a piston twin at low altitude, reducing the drag of a windmilling prop can play into it, but in a jet there’s no difference between an engine windmilling before or after the procedure is complete. Fly the profile, and apply appropriate CRM to determine which engine has failed (or, more appropriately in this case, which engine isn’t operating properly) and which checklist(s) to accomplish.

Flying along for a while without realizing a problem exists can be an issue, but prioritizing and accomplishing tasks properly is way more important than rapid response.
 
I realize the loss of an engine in an airliner is not a dangerous event. What I'm asking is whether the training reflects that, or whether pilots are expected to secure the engine at double-quick speed.

Ron Wanttaja
 
I realize the loss of an engine in an airliner is not a dangerous event. What I'm asking is whether the training reflects that, or whether pilots are expected to secure the engine at double-quick speed.

Ron Wanttaja
The training reflects that.
 
I realize the loss of an engine in an airliner is not a dangerous event. What I'm asking is whether the training reflects that, or whether pilots are expected to secure the engine at double-quick speed.
The training reflects that.
I remember John King, in their multiengine course, saying that when an engine fails, the pilot must not rush, but proceed at "a workmanlike pace."
 
I realize the loss of an engine in an airliner is not a dangerous event. What I'm asking is whether the training reflects that, or whether pilots are expected to secure the engine at double-quick speed.
Slow and methodical is how they want it done.

In the (much newer) 737s that I fly, the procedure for an engine failure at takeoff is, and this is how I brief it on my legs...

"If we continue the takeoff, 'positive rate, gear up'. At 400', track the runway centerline. At 800', we'll accelerate on VNAV, if it doesn't, we'll set Clean Maneuvering. Flaps 5. Flaps 1. Flaps up. Wait for clean maneuvering, set max continuous thrust, then the applicable engine failure checklist."

That gets us to clean maneuvering (likely in the 200 to 225KIAS range, with the gear and flaps retracted, max continuous power set, and the airplane climbing, from our 800' acceleration altitude, and ready to accept turns to return to the airport. Through all of this, we haven't done a single thing to, or about, the failed engine. It's all been about maintaining control of the airplane and flying the desired ground track while cleaning up and accelerating. The engine is then secured using a read-then-do checklist in a slow, methodical manner.

In the event of an engine fire there are some memory items which can be accomplished as low as 400', at the Captain's discretion, but we'd normally wait until reaching the "applicable engine failure checklist" part above, at which point we'd do the Engine Fire, Engine Severe Damage or Separation Checklist" instead of the "Engine Failure Checklist". Those are the two choices. The former is the only one, of the two, that has any memory items. Those memory items are:

1. Autothrottle (if engaged) ... Disengage
2. Thrust lever (affected engine) ... confirm ... Close

After that, we're back to the read-then-do checklist.
 
I realize the loss of an engine in an airliner is not a dangerous event. What I'm asking is whether the training reflects that, or whether pilots are expected to secure the engine at double-quick speed.

Ron Wanttaja
We usually get an engine fire/failure at V1 during training. The earliest we are allowed to start procedures is 400 ft agl. Single engine that can’t take a bit of time. That’s the earliest, not the required max. There is just no rush in a jet.
That said, while an engine failure in a jet is a manageable event, I’m not sure I would say it isn’t a dangerous event.
 
I realize the loss of an engine in an airliner is not a dangerous event. What I'm asking is whether the training reflects that, or whether pilots are expected to secure the engine at double-quick speed.

After an engine failure, the Pilot Flying (PF) asks for the QRH, at my company this may not occur until at or above 1,500 AGL. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) opens the book, finds the correct page, and starts reading the checklist. While reading the checklist, the PM performs the shutdown procedure of the bad engine while the PF guards the good engine. Speed is not a factor in the completion standards during training or checking events.
 
After an engine failure, the Pilot Flying (PF) asks for the QRH, at my company this may not occur until at or above 1,500 AGL. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) opens the book, finds the correct page, and starts reading the checklist. While reading the checklist, the PM performs the shutdown procedure of the bad engine while the PF guards the good engine. Speed is not a factor in the completion standards during training or checking events.
At my outfit, the last set of procedures accomplished are QRH.
 
Just saying, unlike your outfit (at least how it came across), QRH is not the first set of procedures we go though.
Perhaps I misunderstood.

So what is the procedure?
 
Broken down more specifically…

memory items
OEB
Ecam actions
—— after takeoff checklist
ECAM status
QRH procedures
QRH abnormal/emergencies
 
Memory items
OEB
ECAM
QRH

That comes from Airbus. No clue about Boeing.

Can you tell us what that means?

The industry is trying to get away from memory items. We went from 21 to 9. Never had one for engine failure, and just got rid of our engine fire memory items.
 
Can you tell us what that means?

The industry is trying to get away from memory items. We went from 21 to 9. Never had one for engine failure, and just got rid of our engine fire memory items.
Sure… in the case of the above mentioned engine fire, there are no memory items or OEB’s. OEB is an operational bulletin that has not yet been downloaded to display on ECAM. Ecam is an acronym for..??? Can’t remember exactly, but it’s the printed directions on the display for the emergency.

We too only have.. less than 10 memory items.
 
OEB - operational engineering buliten. (I know that is spelled wrong, but no time to look it up).

ECAM - electronic centralized aircraft monitor
 
OEB - operational engineering buliten. (I know that is spelled wrong, but no time to look it up).

ECAM - electronic centralized aircraft monitor

Still doesn't elucidate what your actual procedures are. Which one of those steps shuts the engine down?
 
The training reflects that.

Yet, we have 10,000hr, 20,000hr pilots with all those years of training from multiple sources who can’t get it right.

A person could post how they will handle it, what the training and manuals say till they are blue in the face and you know what? It’s going to happen again. And again. In the next year or three.

We continue to miss something on OEI that goes beyond training and is ignoring the human factor.

We need a different approach.

i think there are probably some tech geniuses out there that could come up with something to help with the cockpit display that makes it glaringly obvious “which engine “. We need to have some way to take the helmet fire out of the equation.

Last time I suggested change the backward-looking, old-school crowd blasted me; they knew better, there was no problem.
I knew it was going to happen again and just shut up.

Has anything changed; is anyone interested in addressing the problem, proposing & discussing ideas?
 
We continue to miss something on OEI that goes beyond training and is ignoring the human factor.
I agree. And part of the human factor that we’re missing is that some people simply shouldn’t be flying airplanes.

And unless we stop treating the checkride as the goal of training, we’re going to generate a lot more people who shouldn’t be flying airplanes.
 
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